European Union Space Initiatives: The Political Will for Increasing European Space Power

The European Union (EU) is the newest actor in the European space sector and is cultivating the political will to make Europe a world class space power comparable to the United States (US). The Galileo satellite system and the Global Monitoring for the Environment and Security space program are the most visible manifestations of this will. This article suggests that Europe can approach comparable space power if capabilities are considered rather than just budgets. The paper discusses the catalysts driving EU space initiatives, and assesses the EU's nascent European Space Policy and European Space Program, and EU organization and funding for space. Of importance are the asymmetric means for Europe to increase its space capabilities and the implications this has for the trans-Atlantic relationship with the US. The analysis is directed to the security, civil, and dual-use space sectors within the security aspects of EU space initiatives. This article also provides a baseline to track changes in EU space policy, organization, and funding dynamics.     

Viewpoint: It is Time to Create a United States Air Force Space Corps

The United States (U.S.) has deepening dependence on space systems for economic prosperity, civil government administration, priority science and exploration programs, and national security while at the same time there is dramatic growth in competitive space capabilities and demonstrated threats to space systems globally. Despite this, the U.S. has not invested sufficient resources to meet National policy direction for capabilities to insure freedom of action in space, especially space situational awareness capabilities—the cornerstone of deterrence from space attacks. A principle reason for this shortfall is the historical absence of an organization accountable for securing the space domain like those of land, sea, and air. Using the analogy of the Army Air Corps, the author recommends creation of an autonomous Space Corps realized out of existing organizations within the USAF. The AF Space Corps would manage a separate space budget and all space professionals in organizing, training, and equipping national security space capabilities including those necessary to secure the space domain for peaceful use.     

Cascading Crises: Orbital Debris and the Widening of Space Security

The term space security is often used, but seldom analyzed. This is a significant gap in the literature of space politics, as it posits considerable implications for debates on how to deal with a runaway growth in the space debris population, and how we argue for or against space weaponization. Securitizing all threats in space may lead to greater difficulties in enacting debris removal measures, as these systems are inherently dual-use. A case is made for keeping space security in its traditional connotations of national security so that environmental issues related to orbital debris can be resolved with reduced security concerns in a space development framing.     

Viewpoint: Bureaucratic Politics and the Case of Satellite Export Controls

The export control regime applied to commercial satellites in the United States (U.S.) is not rational suggesting that the desired policy outcome of this regime is not met. The regime under review is the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Commercially available technologies were placed within this regime to make sure that such technologies do not harm U.S. national security interests. It is argued in this viewpoint that not only does this regime weaken national security, but it also affects commercial space. The commercial space sector is affected through a cost of compliance with the regime. Discussed herein is the political process of export control and commercial satellites with particular attention to how that process is influenced by bureaucratic politics.     

Workshop Review: Export Controls of Space Systems

Experts from U.S. government agencies that administer export controls of space systems and representatives from non-governmental organizations and think tanks were invited in December 2014 to participate in an invitation-only workshop co-hosted by the Secure World Foundation and Astroconsulting International to discuss export controls with a delegation of industry representatives from The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies. The underlying question when working on export controls is, with the increased access to space and burgeoning role of the private sector in space, how do you regulate this and encourage industry without harming national security? It is difficult to do this while supporting the space industrial base, as export control is perceived as a necessary part of shoring U.S. national security and assuring a stable and predictable space environment. A serious challenge is determining which technologies should be controlled: where do you draw the line? This is particularly the case for space technologies, many of which are dual-use. Countries also have to be careful of unintended consequences. Export control restrictions are extremely challenging to get “just right” and, as a result, should be undertaken only after a considerable amount of discussion with all stakeholders, including input from industry, and when the government has a solid understanding of what it is trying to accomplish via export control protections. Otherwise, the domestic industry can unduly suffer with very little benefit to national security.     

Space and Diplomacy: A New Tool for Leverage

This essay investigates how United States space systems can be used to directly achieve diplomatic objectives. While space systems are widely acknowledged as vital enablers of terrestrial-based forces, they are often overlooked as a critical component of national power capable of directly pursuing national objectives. The essay presents the Space-Diplomacy model that posits seven facets to the diplomatic power of space assets and shows when they can be effective over the spectrum of conflict: prestige, technology partnerships, access to space services, legal precedent, objective information, presence, and threat of punishment. Therefore, it is in the U.S. national interest to…use the nation's potential in space to support its domestic, economic, diplomatic and national security objectives. Report of the Space Commission During the three decades after World War II ended, on the average, U.S. armed forces were used as a political instrument once every other month. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan     

The role of individual states in addressing cases of genocide

Conclusion Overall, the leading Western states responded to genocide in the 1990s with too little, too late. Their political leaders chose a shortsighted strategy of denial, obfuscation, and deception rather than live, up to their solemn obligation to stop genocide. Humanity suffered greatly as a consequence. However, if genocide scholars can join and give direction to the ongoing debate within the national security community about how to prevent future Rwandas and Srebrenicas, then there is some hope that this new century may be less barbarous than the one we just left.     

Space and Security: The Emerging Role of Europe

Space systems have grown increasingly integral to the United States' national security in the post-Cold War era. The diplomatic and military leverage that space capabilities can provide is not going unnoticed by other countries. Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has enjoyed a near-absolute dominance in space activities. Only the civilian European space program has mounted any sort of technical challenge to the United States, with little interest devoted to space military activities, but the period of US hegemony in the space military domain might come to an end. In recent years the European Union (EU) and its member states have taken numerous steps towards designing and assembling a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a coherent European Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, several important steps toward linking security needs and space capabilities have been taken by the tandem European Union–European Space Agency and other relevant institutions. Space is now seen as an essential asset for European integration and for non-dependence in the current geo-strategic context, since space-based systems and derived information can bring necessary capabilities for autonomous decision making. The development of an integrated European space capability for security is at an early stage, but it is an ongoing process presenting some opportunities to enhance European independence and security.     

The Demise of US Spacepower: Not with a Bang but a Whimper

Spacepower is a critical element supporting the US national security strategy. As more nations gain access to technology, there is growing concern that space capabilities will be increasingly vulnerable to attack. However, a more insidious problem looms. For the last decade, the development and acquisition of US national security space systems have become more and more troubled with cost overruns and schedule delays. This grave situation has caught the attention of national security leadership and the US Congress. Panels of experts have proposed a litany of remedies. In this paper we explain and illustrate the importance of enhancing space power to better support national security needs and caution that many of the proposed acquisition solutions address symptoms, not the primary cause.

As history as shown…if the US offers an inviting target, it may well pay the price of attack. With the growing commercial and national security use of space, US assets in space and on the ground offer just such targets. The US is an attractive candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’. ¹ Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Pursuant to Public Law 106–65, January 11, 2001, available at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html>. This report is often referred to as the Space Commission Report.

This is the way the world ends

This is the way the world ends

This is the way the world ends

Not with a bang but a whimper. ² T.S. Eliot, ‘The Hollow Men’, 1925.      

U.S. Initiative to Place Weapons in Space: The Catalyst for a Space-Based Arms Race with China and Russia

The United States must ensure sustainability and stability in space by protecting its satellites to safeguard national security and economic vitality. Concerns for obtaining this security are mounting, as U.S. satellites are increasingly vulnerable to developing threats from adversaries. This article proposes that the United States will eventually initiate the weaponization of space to defend its space systems and supporting infrastructure. The consequence for such an initiative will manifest a pronounced counteraction from China and Russia, the key spacefaring adversaries of the United States. Such a counteraction will consist of a space-based arms race, as each nation will jockey to position itself as the dominant power in space.     

Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles in Regional Powers

International security concerns about ballistic missile proliferation have frequently highlighted the links between ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This article examines the extent of these links through a comprehensive survey of ballistic missile and space rocket programs in regional powers. It notes that missiles were derived from existing space launchers in just a small fraction of these cases. In a slightly greater fraction, space launchers were drawn from existing missile programs. This analysis suggests that though security concerns about space launchers being used as ballistic missiles are valid, the reverse trend, that of ballistic missiles being used as space launch vehicles, cannot be ignored. At the same time, as long as regional powers are limited to short-range and medium-range systems, their missile and space projects would only raise limited missile proliferation and space security concerns.     

Protection of Commercial Satellite Communications Infrastructure

Although a nation's interest in protecting its commercial assets in space would seem obvious, the task of protecting commercial satellites is inherently complicated. Protection of commercial space infrastructure requires coordination among multiple actors in the public and private sectors. Although most public sector actors ultimately report to the same political leadership, the process of establishing coherent policies across agencies can take time. Coordination is even more complicated in the private sector, where multi-national firms compete against each other for profits by serving a wide range of customers.

Given the complexities of this process, it is not surprising that efforts to protect commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) networks have been slow in coming. At the same time, recent progress in the U.S. may pave the way for a more coherent approach to commercial SATCOM protection. If successful, these efforts can provide increased assurance of uninterrupted satellite connectivity, thus benefiting the economic and national security interests of America, its allies and its trading partners.     

Viewpoint: The Strategic Context of the Moon Echoes of the Past,Symphony of the Future

A strategic framework for the Moon must weave together the economic, social, scientific, national security, and civil aspects that have evolved largely in isolation since the inception of the space age. The United States—based on its historical dependence upon space assets, exploration heritage, and global leadership position,—has the most to gain and lose by the tenor of its leadership in this framework's development and implementation. A permanent presence on the Moon, combined with the use of lunar and space resources, offers the means to create a new space age. Lunar exploration offers many scientific and cultural benefits and has significant historic implications. In addition, this extension of human reach beyond low Earth orbit, and the ability to regularly access and use cislunar space is critical for addressing emerging national, economic, and scientific challenges. An analogy to this strategic moment is the development of United States maritime policy at the beginning of the 20th century.     

Space Mines: Dialectics of Legality

The development of micro-satellites, including nano-satellites, has opened up opportunities for their varied uses. One such utility is as space mines. The purpose of this instrumentality is protective and defensive to escort important space-mission vehicles. These act as security commandoes till impelled to action by anticipated threat or hostile intruder entering the path. Similarly, conventional land mines can be adapted for use on the surface of the moon. These, also termed “space mines,” can serve as proximity or peripheral defense to installations and national assets on the moon and other celestial bodies.

Space mines by their small mass and weight or nature of operation cannot be regarded a weapon of mass destruction or used as nuclear weapon prohibited under the Outer Space Treaty. Secondly, their deployment in passive defensive role does not foul with any substantive provision of space law. Nor are these prohibited by any definitional embargo. Illusioned by the apparent legality, space mines could be strategized in large configurations making outer space environment denser for safe space traffic. Modern satellites are high-cost vehicles and their operational economics cannot brook attrition.

Considering the comparable purpose and role of space mines, one needs to draw wisdom from experience with landmines or cluster bombs. These have been banned on the earth after suffering enormous losses and tragedy. Prudence ordains to learn from past mistakes and it would seem sagacious to nip the evil of space mines in the bud itself.     

Astropolitics and the “Exopolitics” of Unacknowledged Activities in Outer Space

The role of unacknowledged classified programs remains an enigma for fully understanding activities in space and the study of astropolitics. Classified programs by law are not publicly announced, and remain inaccessible to all except those with valid security clearances to be briefed about them. In the United States, waived Unacknowledged Special Access Programs are the most highly classified programs conducted by the military and intelligence community. The same classification protocols are also required of private contractors working with U.S. military departments and intelligence agencies on classified programs. As space continues to grow in its national security significance, the number of these unacknowledged programs pertaining to space is likely to grow significantly from its current number. This requires adopting the necessary conceptual tools and methodological flexibility for investigating unacknowledged activities in space. This also extends to evidence concerning unidentified flying objects and extraterrestrial life. This article suggests that “exopolitics” is a unique multidisciplinary approach to extraterrestrial life that offers a helpful set of conceptual tools for studying unacknowledged space activities, and complements the field of astropolitics.     

The UK and EU Foreign and Security Policy: An Optional Extra

Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU), but security may be a key issue in the EU referendum. The untangling of Britain's foreign and security policy from the EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The EU's arrangements for collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy in the case of either a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome.     

言息公开法中的国家安全例外浅议

国家安全例外是信息公开法公开例外的一种。国家安全例外可以细分为国家安全、国家防卫、国际关系和对外承担保密义务的信息。国家安全例外的保护机制有损害测试、公共利益测试、部长否决权制度、存在与否机制等。我国应在未来的信息公开法中对国家安全例外进行立法,通过严格界定国家安全,引入损害测试、公共利益测试和存在与否机制来对国家安全例外进行周到保护,并同时实现信息公开的最大化。     

The Judicial Role in Defining National Security and Access to Information in South Africa

This article argues that judicial and other institutions concerned with legal interpretation are playing an increasing role in regulating and defining the concept of national security for South Africa, particularly in the realm of national security information. Part I surveys the post-apartheid evolution of accountability of South Africa’s national security agencies with particular attention to the treatment of national security information. Starting from a low base, intelligence agencies in South Africa have become more accountable, in part through the greater degree of access to national security information. Part II portrays the placement of access to national security information within South Africa’s legislative framework, taking into account the keys laws underpinning both secrecy and disclosure regulation. Here, with no definition of national security on the secrecy side, it is on the disclosure side of South Africa’s legislative framework that the judiciary and other legal actors are crafting an operative definition of national security. Part III covers three recent developments, arguing that they demonstrate the increasingly important regulatory role played by the judiciary and other legal institutions. These include two key Constitutional Court decisions and an ongoing legislative reform effort.     

Defending In Defence of Politics Today

What are the threats to politics fifty years after the publication of Bernard Crick's classic In Defence of Politics? The chief danger lies in the forces of globalisation and the eclipse of the national state as the locus of political life. It is the hope of many in both Europe and the US that we might replace the basic structure of the sovereign state with a variety of postnational forms of organisation such as the UN or the EU. What are the forces behind these developments? Are we entering a world beyond politics increasingly administered by international law courts and tribunals no longer responsible to their national electorates? The possibility cannot be ruled out, but such a world, I suggest, would no longer be a political world.     

The Inevitability of the Weaponization of Space: Technological Constructivism Versus Determinism

The concept of national security is based on the need to maintain the safety and security of the population. In 1957, the Soviet Union was the first state to threaten this safety in space with the launch of Sputnik. Although Sputnik did not pose a credible threat, it was perceived as such by the Western world. As the space race intensified in the 1960s, efforts were made to prevent the development and use of space weapons. With the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, space weapons were effectively made unlawful, with signatories agreeing to forgo these expensive technologies. However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, factors and efforts are beginning to converge that indicate the inevitability of space weaponization. Based on a new concept of technological development, this article proposes that as technology advances, space weaponization not only is likely, but indeed is inevitable in the near future. Grounded in the competing theories of technological determinism and social constructivism, I offer a new theory that incorporates both and introduces new components to analyze a near-future technological timeline for space weapons. I argue that the development of these weapons is inevitable and should therefore be accelerated in the United States, given the country's position as the lone superpower, to command and control the space commons. If the United States leads this drive for development, then in the end, as with thermonuclear weapons, space weapons will make the world more, not less, secure, and will contribute to the spread of democratic peace and globalized capitalism.