Towards naval normalcy: 'open seas protection' and Sino-US maritime relations

On May 26th, 2015, China published its 10th Defense White Paper which integrated 'open seas protection', along with 'offshore waters defense', into its naval strategy. This shift in naval strategy, albeit largely anticipated, raises a series of important questions about China's maritime ambitions. This article seeks to analyze the causes, nature and challenges of China's latest shift in naval strategy, and its implications for Sino-US maritime relations. The article argues that China's latest shift in naval strategy is a logical corollary of the tension between China's expanding global interests and its asymmetric approach to sea power, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides the necessary stimulus and justification for such a shift. China's new naval strategy, the paper contends, denotes that it will develop a Mahanian blue-water navy and a basic network of overseas bases in the years ahead. Those two developments are expected to pose a series of significant challenges for China's foreign policy. The article argues that China's new naval strategy presents both challenges and opportunities for China and the world. To accomplish 'open seas protection', China will probably have to modify its policies on a range of issues, and moderate its competitive stance in the near seas. Although China's new naval strategy need not be interpreted in a competitive framework, it does present China with a stark choice: either it pursues more friendly attitudes towards its maritime ambitions by modifying its current policy, or it will be increasingly confronted by a coalition of hostile states.     

The Influence of Technology on Space Strategy

The influence of technology on the conduct of warfare and the development of strategy is still largely misunderstood. This confusion also holds true regarding technology's influence on space warfare and the development of space strategy. Judging from history, we can expect that advances in space-related technology will be used in ways commensurate with the current paradigm, especially with respect to military operations. Therefore, space operations will probably play supporting roles to operations on land, at sea, and in the air, at least in the near term. It will likely be some time until the strategic advantages of space-based or space-enabled operations are fully appreciated and effectively employed. Additionally, the historical theory and principles of general warfare remain valid, even when considering military operations in space. While advances in space-related technology or space-based weaponry will not change the fundamental nature of warfare, they are expected to change warfare's conduct and character. Through a better understanding of technology's influence on military operations, it is possible to develop a more complete theory and more fully developed strategic principles of space warfare.     

Space Technology Applications for Maritime Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

ABSTRACT

Outer space, as the ultimate high ground, offers potential for contributing towards maritime domain awareness, which is dependent on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). This research discusses several utilizations and limitations of space technologies in the realm of maritime ISR through use of electronic intelligence, and electro-optical and radar imagery payload sensors. Technological and financial options for nascent and smaller space powers through dual-purpose commercial and civilian space technologies towards sea surveillance are elaborated as well. Finally, from an operational perspective of ISR, the methodology of frame-by-frame mosaicking of satellite images utilizing commercial remote sensing satellites towards space-based maritime ISR is explained using hypothetical scenarios.     

Space Traffic Management at the National and International Levels

The number of objects in Earth’s orbit has continued to grow since the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The historical “few objects, large space” principle left satellite operations a relatively benign environment, but that construct has shifted significantly due to the advent of the commercial space sector, the small satellite industry boom, and the resurgence of the desire for human space flight. The regulations for space operations both at the international and national level have always been sparse, but there is a large desire for more now that commercial capital is at stake. The purpose of this article is to bring to the surface available regulations for on-orbit operations to identify the gaps to fill and highlight the change for the Department of Defense. The international community and commercial sector recognize the need for a state like the United States to set a standard to influence the international community. This national-to-international framework is a technique used in other arenas, such as maritime traffic management and air traffic management, and the lessons learned from these fields are applicable to the space domain.     

CHINA: A GROWING MILITARY SPACE POWER

ABSTRACT

During the last few decades, space has gained considerable importance in many facets of military operations. China has always believed proficiency in space technologies to be an essential ingredient of its overall national strength. Since its beginning, the Chinese space programme has had a definite military orientation. This article examines the impact of Chinese manned space missions and their investment in Europe's proposed global navigation and positioning system (Galileo) on their military space capabilities.     

Fire over water: China's strategic engagement of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden crisis

Abstract

Since China agreed to join the international counter-piracy coalition in late 2008, a watershed development in Chinese strategic policy, Beijing's engagement in Somalia is now following two separate streams. First, China is seeking to engage Somalia as part of its expanding number of African diplomatic partners via its participation in the coalition. Second, China is attempting to demonstrate, on the international level, its growing commitment to developing its naval capabilities, and protecting its maritime trade interests, by engaging in multilateral and coalition-based operations, namely to combat piracy off the Somali coast, in order to deflect criticism from the United States and its allies of China's overall military expansion and modernization.     

The impact of the U.S. war on terrorism upon U.S.-China relations

Using a framework of geopolitical analysis. Oliver Lee argues that the fundamental geopolitical relationships between the United States and China, namely the relationship between the world’s strongest naval and air power and the world’s strongest land power, would not be upset even after the American military presence in central Asia since September 11, 2001. The relationship would remain essentially unaltered because — American initiation of the use of nuclear weapons against China being ruled out for fear of Chinese retaliation — China would be able to withstand any U.S. military offensive conducted with conventional land, sea, and air forces, regardless of whether the U.S. possesses permanent air bases in Central Asia or not, and regardless of how many troops it may station on them. His teaching and research interests include domestic and foreign policies of China and power in America and U.S. foreign policy.     

From Malin Head to ‘Okean 75’: shadowing and intelligence collection operations by Royal Navy surface ships 1975–1985*

This article analyses a hitherto neglected aspect of the Cold War at Sea: the shadowing of Soviet warships by the Royal Navy surface vessels. Making use of previously untapped government sources, this article assesses the significance of these intelligence gathering operations, as well as their role in deterring the Soviet Navy through non-nuclear means. The article reviews three types of intelligence gathering operation by British warships: the regular and routine shadowing operations off Malin Head, the short-notice shadowing of Soviet warships transiting the sea areas near the United Kingdom, and finally the co-ordinated shadowing of the enormous ‘Okean 75’ Soviet naval exercise in 1975.     

Space and Deterrence∗

Regardless of whether the United States decides to extend deployment of its weaponry beyond land, sea, and air to the medium of outer space, military dependence on assets stationed between low Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit for communication, navigation, and surveillance will likely remain high. Deterrence as a strategy to protect these assets carries with it the risk that a crisis over satellites will escalate out of control. Nevertheless, when evaluated against other options on the agenda—such as space control and space avoidance—it is the only strategy for which the United States is currently equipped militarily and politically. In order to mitigate the downsides of deterrence, in particular to stave off a decision that would require disproportionate retaliation, the new United States Administration is likely to mix in tactical elements of control and avoidance. These elements, however, will not subvert deterrence as a core strategy, nor will they obviate uncomfortable and undemocratic compromises that have marked deterrence since the Cold War.     

From Combined Arms to Combined Intelligence: Philosophy,Doctrine and Operations

‘Combined arms’ operations have been a central tenet of military planning for nearly a century. They call for the integration of land, air and sea forces to achieve battlefield synergies. This philosophy has equal application to intelligence. The article advances the combined arms concept as a way to foster synergies across the intelligence disciplines – geospatial, signals, measures and signals, human, and most recently open source intelligence. It describes the strengths and weaknesses of each discipline in forming an analytical foundation for such a ‘combined intelligence’ and calls for developing theory to integrate the intelligence disciplines. The authors suggest that combined intelligence would confer several benefits, including more effective collection efforts and stronger countermeasures against adversary denial and deception. The article closes by calling for development of concepts and doctrine to put combined intelligence into practice.     

Coast guards and maritime piracy: sailing past the impediments to cooperation in Asia

Abstract

Despite the efforts of the past decade, maritime piracy remains of international concern today. Countries need to cooperate actively at both the regional and international levels to eradicate the problem effectively. In particular, the nature of the threat in the Asia-Pacific region suggests that coastal states – countries that possess sovereignty over the pirate-infested waters but lack the law-enforcement resources – have to turn to resource-rich extra-regional powers for assistance. Unfortunately, cooperation between such disparate countries has traditionally been impeded by sovereignty sensitivities, as best exemplified by Malaysia's and Indonesia's hostile responses to the United States' Regional Maritime Security Initiative in 2003. Faced with this apparent dilemma, a new phenomenon has emerged. National coast guard agencies, instead of their military naval counterparts, have become attractive alternatives for promoting international cooperation against non-traditional security threats, such as maritime piracy. Spearheaded by the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG), coast guards from various countries have imparted training expertise, conducted joint exercises, hosted low-publicity multilateral meetings, and even transferred security equipment across international borders. Together they have succeeded in promoting cooperation without arousing the sovereignty sensitivities often associated with such cooperation. This article analyzes the evolution of coast guard cooperation in Asia, highlighting in particular the Japanese Coast Guard's success in this endeavor. With the general alignment of regional and global power interests in Southeast Asia, coast guard agencies hold promise for extra-regional powers wishing to help eradicate maritime piracy in the region.     

VIEWPOINT: EXPANDING THE HIGH FRONTIER: SPACE WEAPONS IN HISTORY

A hot topic within national security policy circles involves space weaponization. Concerns about a future arms race, cost, operational capability, and other problems appear to be new. However, past space weaponization efforts have addressed these same issues. Current policy makers can look to World War II German experiments, the Soviet Union's co-orbital anti-satellite system, and the United States' X-20 Dyna-Soar proposals to explore these same challenges. A look to the past might help policy makers to consider many of these same questions that past governments have wrestled with in any attempt to gain an operational status for a proposed space weapon.     

A FAST-FOLLOWING SPACE CONTROL STRATEGY

This article analyzes South Africa's space program, which can be divided into three chronological periods. First, was the age of amateurs that took place from 1947–1962. Second, from 1963–1993, South Africa's apartheid regime started various missile projects, including a secret military space launch program aimed at orbiting reconnaissance satellites. Under U.S. Government pressure, this was canceled before the first democratically-elected government came to power in South Africa, and the facilities for manufacturing and static testing the space launch vehicle were destroyed. But, South Africa maintains a nucleus of space heritage infrastructure, including a space launch range with telemetry capabilities, satellite testing, and integration facilities, and aerospace and software industrial sectors. Third, South Africa became a democracy in 1994, and established the legal and institutional infrastructure for a civil space program. Since then, South Africa has started to shape a new space policy, this time with greater public transparency.     

Airport Security, High Reliability, and the Problem of Rationality

The events of September 11, 2001, have raised troubling questions regarding the reliability and security of American commercial air travel. This article applies the concepts and logic of high–reliability organizations to airport security operations. Contemporary decision theory is built on the logic of limited or buffered rationability and is based on the study of error–tolerant organizations. The concept of high–reliability organizations is based on the study of nearly error–free operations. For commercial air travel to be highly secure, there must be very high levels of technical competence and sustained performance; regular training; structure redundancy; collegial, decentralized authority patterns; processes that reward error discovery and correction; adequate and reliable funding; high mission valence; reliable and timely information; and protection from external interference in operations. These concepts are used to inform early–stage issues being faced by both local airports and the newly established Transportation Security Administration.     

Security Connotations of Space Tourism

This article links the prospects of growth in space tourism to the defense preparedness of the state. It is argued that any significant developments in space tourism attract the attention of strategic planners to check the feasibility of using the transportation platforms that support tourism for strategic purposes. It is likely that the way developments in rail, air, and maritime transportation revolutionized the method of warfighting, developments in the space travel sector will make their impact on warfare in the near future.     

A Critical Assessment of Alleged Evidence of Western Submarine Intrusions in Swedish Territorial Waters

The submarine intrusions in Swedish territorial waters in the 1980s have received extensive attention. According to one theory, after the incident in 1981 when a Soviet submarine ran aground close to a Swedish naval base, Western submarines conducted subsequent intrusions as a psychological operation to affect Swedish foreign policy. In support of such claims, submarine observations and interviews with high-ranking Western officials have been put forth. However, the proposed evidence presented in Ola Tunander's article ‘Subs and PSYOPs’ in Intelligence and National Security can either be refuted or is inconclusive.     

A basic tool set for a generalized directional model

In political science, there are two classes of spatial models: those which are based on a distance logic and those which are based on a directional logic. This distinction can be found in terms of diverse topics, as voting theory, coalition theory or legislative politics. While Tsebelis (Br. J. Political Sci. 25:289–325, 1995) among others discussed implications of distance models, the respective counterparts for directional models have not been explicitly derived in the existing literature. We try to close this gap by discussing discrepancies between both kinds of models and derive some of the most relevant tools for analyses based on directional models.     

Subs and PSYOPs: The 1982 Swedish Submarine Intrusions

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was believed to have targeted Sweden by sending submarines into Swedish archipelagos and naval bases, which forced Prime Minister Olof Palme to terminate his ambitious foreign policy. The ‘imminent Soviet threat’ changed Swedish public opinion drastically. Twenty years later, statements made by the responsible US and UK leaders, including then US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and then UK Navy Minister Keith Speed, show that these operations were run by US and British submarines testing Swedish coastal defences. Then US Secretary of Navy John Lehman and the Swedish Secretary of the Submarine Inquiry, Mathias Mossberg, indicate that these operations were also deception operations and psychological operations. Swedish former defence ministers have said that ‘it was wrong to point to the Soviet Union’, indicating that the more visible submarines may have been from the West. Ralf Lillbacka's article in Intelligence and National Security in 2010 does not take this information into consideration. The technical evidence we now have is proof of Western submarines operating in Swedish archipelagos. This evidence confirms the statements made by responsible leaders.     

Counterspace Operations and Nascent Space Powers

In twenty-first-century warfare, satellites have become indispensable for gaining dominance in battlespace. This highlights the need to protect space assets while countering the qualitative edge that space can provide to adversarial actions. Hence, “counterspace operations” continue to gain the attention of military planners and researchers around the globe. Although it is the major space powers that have developed requisite capability and are showing more concerns for space security, these concerns are global in nature. As such, there is a need to develop a framework that can be utilized by nascent space powers to ensure protection of their space assets. This research work is intended to draw the attention of policymakers, space-technology protagonists, and military personnel, particularly of nascent space powers, to these global concerns. It gives an overview of counterspace operations and explores the doctrinal view-point of major military space powers for safeguarding their own space programs and negating the advantage of space to the enemy. Based upon this, a step-by-step approach is proposed for nascent space powers for embodying of elements of counterspace operations to remain protected during peace, crisis, or war.     

Viewpoint: It is Time to Create a United States Air Force Space Corps

The United States (U.S.) has deepening dependence on space systems for economic prosperity, civil government administration, priority science and exploration programs, and national security while at the same time there is dramatic growth in competitive space capabilities and demonstrated threats to space systems globally. Despite this, the U.S. has not invested sufficient resources to meet National policy direction for capabilities to insure freedom of action in space, especially space situational awareness capabilities—the cornerstone of deterrence from space attacks. A principle reason for this shortfall is the historical absence of an organization accountable for securing the space domain like those of land, sea, and air. Using the analogy of the Army Air Corps, the author recommends creation of an autonomous Space Corps realized out of existing organizations within the USAF. The AF Space Corps would manage a separate space budget and all space professionals in organizing, training, and equipping national security space capabilities including those necessary to secure the space domain for peaceful use.