Viewpoint: The Next Great White Fleet: Extending the Benefits of the International System into Space

This article argues that what naval power was to the 17th century—knitting together separate trading systems and bridging new resources, wealth, mobility, and establishing an international system of trade that pulled various powers into the dominant power's orbit—space power can be for the 21st century. To this end, airmen must take a wider view of what strategic value the United States Air Force (USAF) can provide for the United States (U.S.) beyond support for warfighting.     

Counterspace Operations and Nascent Space Powers

In twenty-first-century warfare, satellites have become indispensable for gaining dominance in battlespace. This highlights the need to protect space assets while countering the qualitative edge that space can provide to adversarial actions. Hence, “counterspace operations” continue to gain the attention of military planners and researchers around the globe. Although it is the major space powers that have developed requisite capability and are showing more concerns for space security, these concerns are global in nature. As such, there is a need to develop a framework that can be utilized by nascent space powers to ensure protection of their space assets. This research work is intended to draw the attention of policymakers, space-technology protagonists, and military personnel, particularly of nascent space powers, to these global concerns. It gives an overview of counterspace operations and explores the doctrinal view-point of major military space powers for safeguarding their own space programs and negating the advantage of space to the enemy. Based upon this, a step-by-step approach is proposed for nascent space powers for embodying of elements of counterspace operations to remain protected during peace, crisis, or war.     

Military Space Cooperation: Aligning the Balance of Power and Building Common Interest

The strengthening of alliances through cooperative military activities is a long-established tradition for land, sea and air forces. With the rise of spacepower over the last 50 years, and the growing number of spacefaring and space-using nations, military space programs provide new opportunities for military-to-military cooperation. Military space programs often represent the most technical and secretive of capabilities and there may be risks in sharing the inner workings of these capabilities, even with trusted allies. Is there a way to share the benefits of these strategically and tactically important capabilities in a manner that enhances the peace, justice and security of all stakeholders? Many nations around the world are answering ‘yes’ to this question as they enter into agreements on cooperative space projects for commercial, environmental and military security. More and more they are using their space programs to realign the old balance of power and create new common interests. As the number of spacefaring nations increase and the number of space users grow around the globe, the traditional space powers, such as the United States, need to reconsider how to integrate military space cooperation in their strategies of strengthening alliances and building common interest.     

The Influence of Technology on Space Strategy

The influence of technology on the conduct of warfare and the development of strategy is still largely misunderstood. This confusion also holds true regarding technology's influence on space warfare and the development of space strategy. Judging from history, we can expect that advances in space-related technology will be used in ways commensurate with the current paradigm, especially with respect to military operations. Therefore, space operations will probably play supporting roles to operations on land, at sea, and in the air, at least in the near term. It will likely be some time until the strategic advantages of space-based or space-enabled operations are fully appreciated and effectively employed. Additionally, the historical theory and principles of general warfare remain valid, even when considering military operations in space. While advances in space-related technology or space-based weaponry will not change the fundamental nature of warfare, they are expected to change warfare's conduct and character. Through a better understanding of technology's influence on military operations, it is possible to develop a more complete theory and more fully developed strategic principles of space warfare.     

Space Technology Applications for Maritime Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

ABSTRACT

Outer space, as the ultimate high ground, offers potential for contributing towards maritime domain awareness, which is dependent on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). This research discusses several utilizations and limitations of space technologies in the realm of maritime ISR through use of electronic intelligence, and electro-optical and radar imagery payload sensors. Technological and financial options for nascent and smaller space powers through dual-purpose commercial and civilian space technologies towards sea surveillance are elaborated as well. Finally, from an operational perspective of ISR, the methodology of frame-by-frame mosaicking of satellite images utilizing commercial remote sensing satellites towards space-based maritime ISR is explained using hypothetical scenarios.     

Application of a Maritime Framework to Space: Deep Space Conflict and Warfare Scenario

This article considers how Klein’s argument for the use of a maritime framework for space warfare is buoyed by the consideration of deep space conflict both in application to terrestrial wars and in its own right. It describes the greater alignment of Corbett’s work with this deep space medium than with the orbital medium considered by Klein. Through this analysis, it suggests that possible futures need to consider the deep space medium, making Corbett/Klein’s model superior to other possible approaches.     

Viewpoint: Space System Negation in the Context of Space Policy and Law

For 21st century warfare, space is the unquestioned new high ground for military operations. The United States (U.S.) has relied on satellites for significant support to military operations and activities since Desert Storm in 1991. Indeed, the U.S. enjoys an asymmetric advantage in modern warfare utilizing our space capabilities. States with interests hostile to the U.S. believe that the significant dependence on space assets by the U.S. military could become its “Achilles heel” in future combat operations. What are the legal and policy bases for the U.S. to respond to threats to space systems that provide support to our military forces? Should the U.S. rely on space arms control initiatives to ensure security in space? This Viewpoint analyzes the international space law regime and U.S. National Space Policy framework applicable to the conduct of military space operations and activities, including the use of force in space to protect and defend our satellite networks as well as our military forces.     

North and South Korean Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict

North and South Korea both have developed rocket technology for military and civilian applications, but their space programs differ in many important aspects. As late developing space powers, neither country poses a serious direct threat to U.S. space assets, but a successful U.S. cooperative engagement strategy towards the Koreas could help achieve U.S. policy objectives. The domestic politics of the two Koreas are very different, and Korean space development will depend upon a number of variables including inter-Korean relations and whether the two Koreas unify, domestic politics and budget constraints, the overall strategic environment, as well as opportunities for Korea in the realm of international space cooperation. The United States has opportunities to implement an engagement strategy in Korea, but it could be complicated by different U.S. objectives in North and South Korea, and by linkage to other issues. Despite the complexities, Washington should be prepared for a number of possibilities.     

Changing Forms of Federalism and Party Electoral Strategies: Belgium and the European Union

The introduction of federalism to a political system changesthe locus of power and offers new incentives to political parties.However, the way in which the new system is introduced influencesthe strategies of parties under the new federal arrangements.When federalism emerges through decentralization, the processencourages a greater focus on regional interests and regionalstrategies by parties. When federalism emerges through centralizationof authority, parties are encouraged to use a federal strategy,emphasizing common interests and common bonds across regions.Using Belgium and the European Union as examples, this articletraces changing party strategies in the wake of institutionalchange.     

“Illegalizing” Families: State,Status, and Deportability NPS Christian Bay Best Paper Award Winner,APSA 2018, Boston

There is a paradox within United States immigration policy. Immigration policy separates families while also promising family unity. We address this paradox by arguing that state actors use “family” as a state-granted status. The state perceives some households as families and grants them benefits, while forcing other households to live as legal strangers. Individuals may form familial relationships, but the privileges and status of family are controlled by state actors and institutions. When state actors separate low-wage immigrant worker families, the state's family-status-granting power keeps these workers and their families in a state of “deportability”-a legally ambiguous limbo-satiating business interests and securing a captive low-wage workforce. Lacking legal legitimacy, but financially and socially tied to their families and communities in the U.S., these immigrants have few options but to accept off-the-radar work and to raise their children while living as “outlaws.”     

A New US-Sino Space Relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation 1

Since the late 1990's the United States has maintained a strict policy of no cooperation with China on space activities. The reasons for that are several, including the desire to inhibit the development of dual-use technology considered potentially threatening to the United States and political reluctance to work with a communist country. Increasingly, however, it has become clear that policy is not constraining China from dual-use technology development and that the policy overall may be detrimental to U.S. security interests. Therefore a policy change, from a realistic consideration of circumstances, must be considered.     

The Challenges of Consulting the Public on Science Policy: Examining the Development of European Risk Assessment Policy for Genetically Modified Animals

With the growing importance of public engagement in science policy making and declining levels of public trust in food production, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has attempted to embed “good governance” approaches to strengthen scientific independence and open up risk decision making, which include the use of public consultations. However, “opening up” of risk assessment policies reveals some tensions; namely, balancing the goals of scientific excellence and transparency, protecting science from interests, addressing value judgments, and limited opportunities to debate ethical and social issues. EFSA's development of risk assessment policy for genetically modified animals is used as a case study to analyze these tensions. This analysis suggests that in order to fulfill good governance commitments and maintain trust in risk governance, closer cooperation between EFSA and the European Commission is required to provide “space” for debating the broader risk management issues. This publically accessible space may be needed alongside rather than instead of EFSA's consultation.     

Space and Deterrence∗

Regardless of whether the United States decides to extend deployment of its weaponry beyond land, sea, and air to the medium of outer space, military dependence on assets stationed between low Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit for communication, navigation, and surveillance will likely remain high. Deterrence as a strategy to protect these assets carries with it the risk that a crisis over satellites will escalate out of control. Nevertheless, when evaluated against other options on the agenda—such as space control and space avoidance—it is the only strategy for which the United States is currently equipped militarily and politically. In order to mitigate the downsides of deterrence, in particular to stave off a decision that would require disproportionate retaliation, the new United States Administration is likely to mix in tactical elements of control and avoidance. These elements, however, will not subvert deterrence as a core strategy, nor will they obviate uncomfortable and undemocratic compromises that have marked deterrence since the Cold War.     

The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union

The traditional literature on interest group behaviour presumes that private interests develop lobbying strategies based on the principle of effective allocation of resources. However, nearly 400 private interest groups actively lobby the Council of Europe, a classical intergovernmental organisation with weak decision-making powers, where no significant policy pay-off is expected to occur. This analysis aims to explain the seeming puzzle of private interest groups seeking to influence an institution which is generally perceived as having no strong decision-making powers in European political space. It does so by exploring three explanations from the existing literature, namely ‘policy overlap’, ‘venue shopping’ and ‘epistemic community’, and considers another explanation not hitherto fully developed, suggesting that the ‘ideological motivation’ of interest groups helps to explain their behaviour. Taking the ideological motivation of interest groups into account when analysing lobbying strategies can in fact shed light on certain lobbying preferences that would otherwise appear to defy the logic of interest representation. This paper therefore suggests that an ‘ideological motivation’ explanation potentially plays a crucial role in the analysis of the behaviour of any interest group.     

The Indonesian 'New Order' as New Sovereign Space: Its Creation and Narrative of Self-concealment

This paper introduces and clarifies Carl Schmitt's analytical insights on emergencies and outlines their relevance in considerations of the creation of new sovereign spaces and polities. It then argues that Schmitt's analytical perspective may be used to understand recent and ongoing attempts by collective political actors to resolve circumstances of political and spatial unfamiliarity in East Asia. The tragic events of 30 September-1 October 1965 are examined in Indonesia's case. When perceived as an emergency, their resolution led to outcomes that were both anticipated by and beyond Schmitt's theoretical expectations. The most significant (and theoretically expected) outcomes of this historic moment - de facto sovereignty and a secure space - were so novel in the Indonesian context that their military creators were constrained to hide this fact. They did so by authoring a self-concealing narrative of both the moment itself and the political nature of the resulting 'New Order' polity. While the phenomenon of the self-concealing historical narrative was not anticipated in Schmitt's thinking, its appearance in the Indonesian case is, paradoxically, the clearest evidence of the occurrence of an emergency. Moreover, the creation and perpetuation of the new space by the emergency-ending actor, as well as the sovereign power to decide matters of identity and substance for this polity, matter more than the historical accuracy or longevity of the narrative designed to obscure their essence.     

Rhetoric and rationality: A study of democratization in the Soviet Union

Can political actors use rational strategies for political conflict when established institutions are unavailable to structure political choices because the institutions are themselves among the contested issues? In Soviet politics from 1985 to 1991, cross-cutting cleavages placed in question the possibility of any stable outcome. We argue that a multi-dimensional issue space was reduced to a single dimension, along which Mikhail Gorbachev could temporarily occupy a median, by the interaction between Gorbachev's own rhetoric and rhetorical tactics used by leaders of his nomenklatura opposition, by Boris Yeltsin as the leader of the democratic opposition, and by single-issue groups called neformaly. The match between these four players' rhetorics and the four strategic options identified by a simple spatial model offers empirical evidence that rational strategies were available despite institutional flux.     

Netzwerke und Koppelgeschäfte in der europäischen Elektrizitätspolitik

Within the field of political science package deals have come to be well known as a strategy to overcome decision blockades within the European Council. However, the following essay argues that besides the Member States’ Heads of State or of Government the European Commission and large firms can agree on package deals within negotiations at European level as well. By means of the example of the liberalisation of the electricity market this article shows that networks of European electricity policy constitute the institutional framework in which options for package deals between the two actors may arise. In addition, three main dimensions are examined to demonstrate the plausibility of package deals empirically. Firstly, the formal powers of the EC Commission and the exchange resources of large electricity firms respectively, secondly, the divergence of interests as well as, thirdly, the short-termed change in preferences of the Commissions’ and firms’ actors involved in an exemplary elucidated merger decision.     

Chinese Geopolitics: Space Program Cooperation among China,Brazil, and Russia

With the Obama Administration’s foreign policy pivot to Asia, the Chinese government is concerned about the possibility of new challenges in their foreign policy sphere of influence. Since the 1990s, many political and military analysts have explored the eventual rivalry between these two states. However, events in the Middle East preoccupy U.S. attention, leaving China moderately free in Southeast Asia, though it is uncertain for how long this will persist and if the United States will reallocate its attention to contain China. In this case, the Chinese government will need to develop countermeasures to sustain its geopolitical interests. There are two focuses in this analysis: (1) the Chinese geopolitical naval situation, exploring the problems in the geosphere surrounding China and the eventual competition with other regional powers and the United States in East Asia; and (2) the potential for space program cooperation with Russia and Brazil, which, in turn, dramatically changes the balance of power in outer space through positive aspects of Russian technical capabilities and strategic Brazilian geographic (Alcântara launch site).     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

Continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy: Carter and reagan on el salvador

In attempting to understand continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy, analysts have tended to place too much emphasis on the importance of process and too little on that of values, interests, and strategies. In formulating policies toward the conflict in El Salvador, both the Carter and Reagan administrations were constrained by some enduring moral and political factors in the U.S. civic culture and by some fundamental processes of decision-making, which together account for the similarities in policy between administrations. Despite such factors, each administration's remaining space for choice produced a decidedly different set of policies with different outcomes.