Russian Energy and the Korean Peninsula

The recent agreements concerning North Korea’s nuclear program raise possibilities for providing North Korea with energy (oil and gas) to compensate for the termination of its nuclear program and of integrating it more broadly into the Northeast Asian economy. Russia has long wanted to play the role of provider of oil and gas to North Korea and these agreements open up new opportunities for it to do so. However, serious obstacles in the nature of North Korea’s precarious economic situation and its consequences, international rivalries in Northeast Asia, and Russia’s own energy policies present serious obstacles to the realization of Russia’s ambitions as regards North Korea and as energy provider to Northeast Asia as a whole.     

东北亚“核威慑效应弱化”及其应对思考

东北亚地区呈现的"核威慑效应弱化",对地区安全构成消极影响。东北亚以及美国的核威慑投入在持续,美对韩日核保护,韩日谈论核武器,朝鲜发展核武器,同时萨德部署与《中导条约》失效降低了中俄的核威慑能力,核传统的遏止功能、保护能力与可信性降低,核扩散趋势增强,核威慑悖论现象显现。"核安全保护不完全"、核拥有国数量增加,是探讨"核威慑效应弱化"成因的有益路径。建立新时代的核理论,揭示并审慎研究核武器化与民用化并存风险,建立核民用合作机制并推进建立涵盖核的武器与民用的合作机制,以核问题的处理为契机在国家层面上构建东北亚命运共同体,以及在地方与个人层面推进核文化教育与核防护演练合作,都是应对"核威慑效应弱化"的有益思考。     

Trends in North Korean foreign policy

North Korea’s foreign policy track record in the post-cold war era is mixed. Most notable setbacks are the diplomatic normalization between the Soviet Union (now Russia) and South Korea; the reversal of its UN policy that paved the way for the simultaneous admission of the two Korean states to the world organization; and the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea. On the credit side of Pyongyang’s diplomatic ledger are changes in its relations with Tokyo and Washington. While tangible results have yet to materialize, particularly in North Korea-Japan relations, the groundwork has nonetheless been laid for significant improvement. North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons development program has played a major role in the unfolding of its relations with the United States. Conceptually, North Korean foreign policy can be explained in terms of its quest for three interrelated goals: security, legitimacy, and development. In the post-cold war era security appears to have emerged as the most important of the three goals. North Korea is at a crossroads. The choices it makes in foreign policy will determine not only the direction of its domestic policy but, ultimately, the survival of the regime itself. The external players in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and Vienna (the IAEA) have varying degrees of leverage over Pyongyang’s policy as well.     

US Foreign Policy and the Korean War

Abstract

Sometimes called the “Forgotten War” because Americans pay so little attention to it, the Korean War was nevertheless a pivotal event in US foreign policy. Three themes will be integrated into this article as it analyzes Korean War policy. First, the Korean War heightened the debates and divisions among US foreign policymakers. If Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor helped to silence these divisions, then President Truman’s handling of North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South Korea helped resurrect them. Second, while foreign policy goals are generally assumed to drive the objectives of war in the classic Clausewitzian sense, the opposite frequently occurred in Korea as changes on the battlefield drove policy objectives of officials in Washington. Third, although the Americans, Chinese and Soviets all worked assiduously to keep the Korean War limited to the Korean Peninsula, the war had repercussions far beyond the Korean battlefield. Its ramifications were felt in Taiwan, Vietnam, Europe and in US defense expenditures as well.     

Editors’ Introduction

Abstract

This article explains why the United States has not fought a preventive war against North Korea despite that country’s moves to arm itself with nuclear weapons. I argue that the absence of war is mainly attributable to military strategies that the US military has with regard to North Korea. With only attrition strategies available, the United States neither expects to lose a precious military opportunity nor anticipates grave future vulnerabilities vis-à-vis North Korea. The prospect of a costly attritional campaign deters both Washington and Pyongyang from resorting to military force. Straightforward attrition strategies also allow little chance for miscalculation, thereby making inadvertent escalation to war unlikely. The research finds sufficient evidence for my argument, whereas conventional explanations offered by international relations theory fall short when applied to this case.     

Should South Korea go Nuclear?

A nuclear debate has arisen in South Korea following North Korea's nuclear tests and weapons program. Despite the US extended nuclear deterrence for its security, a sizable section of the people in South Korea have started debating if their country can revisit the nuclear option as a deterrent to North Korea's continued threats. Several law makers have started articulating such a view. Several opinion polls held recently also endorse such a view. However, the US is unlikely to allow South Korea to take the nuclear path as it would have serious consequences not only for the region but also the world. China would also not rejoice with the prospect of having another nuclear power in its neighborhood. If South Korea goes nuclear, Japan and Taiwan will find it difficult to resist having their own nuclear weapons. To stem such a trend, it becomes all the more necessary for the international community to address the issue of denuclearizing North Korea. The suspended Six-Party-Talks ought to restart soon and China has a great role in reigning in Pyongyang. Fortunately, the government in South Korea has not supported the view of the country going nuclear. But if the security situation deteriorates further, it might become irresistible for the government to have a rethink, with an inevitable domino effect in Japan and Taiwan soon.

This article makes an in-depth study of the prevailing trend in South Korea, the views of some influential law makers pleading for the country to go nuclear, various public opinions polls, possible US stance and implications that such a change in policy would have on the region's security situation and the author's assessment based on the critical examination of the above-mentioned factors. Many sources have been cited to analyze this issue before arriving at an objective assessment of the point raised in this essay.     

Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula: Visit of the MV Green peace Spotlights South Korean Nukes

Abstract

The problem of plutonium proliferation in Northeast Asia has received a great deal of international attention in the past few years, in the first instance over Japan's plutonium program, and most recently about the suspected production of plutonium in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both countries' nuclear programs have touched off regional and global fears of a de facto nuclear arms race.     

International relations theory and Japanese pacifism: Why didn’t Tokyo go ballistic over North Korean nukes?

Seen from the perspectives of the various Western theories of international relations, Japan’s peculiar armed pacifism can appear very different. Prominent neorealists have predicted that Japan will inevitably develop nuclear weapons; prominent liberals have cited Japan as the model pacifist nation of the future. Over the last five years, it became clear to Japan that North Korea either possessed, or was on the brink of acquiring, nuclear weapons. How would the Japanese government respond to such a critical threat to its security? The case of North Korean nukes suggests that policymakers should be wary of the grim expectations of Western neorealists, at least in regard to Japan.     

Managing Small Allies Amidst Patron–Adversary Rapprochement: A Tale of Two Koreas

ABSTRACT

What explains variation in how a patron manages its existing alliance with a client state when improving relations with an adversary? I theorize that the patron’s alliance management strategy is influenced by the client’s degree of bargaining power over its patron. Bargaining power derives from the availability of an outside option. Using archival and interview evidence, I show variation in alliance bargaining dynamics during US–China rapprochement. While the United States was dismissive toward South Korea, China was highly placating toward North Korea, making concessions and providing compensation. However, China became more dismissive during Sino-South Korean normalization, when North Korea’s bargaining power decreased. The findings have important policy implications for understanding how a patron could simultaneously manage alliance and adversary relationships.     

Be Careful What You Wish For: Security Challenges Facing the Korean Peninsula During a Potential Unification Process

There is a lacuna in the literature analyzing the mid-term (6-24 months) period after a DPRK contingency that results in the Pyongyang regime’s relatively sudden and unmanaged fall. This article helps fill that gap, particularly with respect to security issues that would challenge Korean unification efforts during such a period. Following an Introduction, Section I first makes the case for a DPRK contingency being the most plausible end to the Pyongyang regime. Assuming the scenarios from Section I, Section II addresses the question of what critical issues a unifying Korea will face over the mid-term, and how dealing with these challenges will condition the type of end-state that a unified Korea will embody. In particular we examine three challenges: (a) mid-term security provision related to potential weapons proliferation, cyber-security, organized criminality, and human security; (b) the foundations of institution-building through measures dealing with issues of transitional justice, disputed land title claims, and generating broad domestic stakeholder buy-in in a unifying Korea; (c) the disposition of Korea’s strategic alignment in a Northeast Asia that will have undergone a major alteration of the regional system. Section III concludes with policy recommendations concerning what efforts should be made now to prepare for the situations described in Sections I and II.     

POLICIES OF LAST RESORT FOR DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME

This paper analyzes the policy remedies for dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs. After six nuclear tests and three recent successful ICBM tests, North Korea is close to miniaturizing nuclear warheads and establishing a reliable delivery system, thus achieving a much-feared nuclear weapons capability. In defiance of the extraordinarily tough U.N. Security Council resolutions, Pyongyang persists in developing nuclear weapons. North Korea's nuclear weapons program already has exceeded the strategic patience, of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Harsher policy options to deal with the DPRK nuclear weapons are imperative. Several drastic options, including severe sanctions, preventive bombing, nuclear armament of South Korea, are evaluated in the final round of engagement policy on guaranteeing nonaggression and a peace agreement with Pyongyang.     

试论韩国朴槿惠政府的外交政策趋向与朝鲜半岛局势

韩国朴槿惠政府将在李明博政府实用主义外交的基础上,进一步调整韩国的外交政策,以韩关战略同盟关系为核心、进一步加强和充实中韩战略合作伙伴关系的内涵,并在推动朝鲜半岛和平进程方面,努力构建朝鲜半岛的南北信任程序,以改善朝鲜半岛南北关系。为解决朝鲜核问题等,朴槿惠政府还将强化韩美中三国在朝鲜半岛的战略合作,以进一步发挥韩国在中关两国和东北亚外交安保领域中的战略协调作用。朴槿惠政府时代,朝鲜半岛局势的发展,将取决于三大变量的博弈,即关朝关系、朝鲜半岛南北关系和中朝关系的变化。随着中关韩朝等半岛周边国家外交安保政策的调整,朝鲜半岛最终将走上和解与和平、合作的战略轨道。     

Perceptions toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons program: Findings from a public opinion survey

Due to the potential spread of nuclear weapons, North Korea’s nuclear weapons test represents a serious security threat to East Asia as well as a global risk. Many sources, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, argue that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program poses a security threat to the United States because missiles fired from North Korea could reach Hawaii or Alaska. Against this backdrop, however, no empirical research analyzing how much the ordinary American feels threatened by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been conducted. This paper examines American public opinion toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons program based on a regional survey conducted in Hawaii during the summer of 2005. The research compares and evaluates through various quantitative research methods, to what extent the respondents’ various demographic, political, and socioeconomic backgrounds seem to have divergently influenced the perception of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In the evaluation of the majority of people in Hawaii, North Korea is pursuing the nuclear weapons program to enhance their national prestige and for self-defense purposes. Many respondents proposed multilateral negotiation as a desirable settlement method for managing North Korea’s nuclear program.     

The North Korea Problem: Perspectives on the Nuclear Debate,Economic Reforms and Beyond

ABSTRACT

Despite a plethora of research on North Korea, understanding and managing the challenges posed by the country have long been complicated with no simple solution to put an end to this decades-long security and economic predicament on the Korean Peninsula. With the potential for international conflict, attention must be given to the converging messages emerging from the scholarly works reviewed in this article: Glyn Ford, Talking to North Korea: Ending the Nuclear Standoff, Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War and William Overholt’s collection North Korea: Peace? Nuclear War? These works speak to the need to: take seriously the risk of nuclear war; consider the connectedness of the North’s decades-long security and economic reform dilemmas; and to acknowledge that the mistrust that is deeply rooted on all sides must be mitigated to bring peace. These books are published at a critical juncture of increased tensions following a highly publicised but remarkably short-lived effort at a breakthrough on the Korean nuclear issue, Pyongyang’s rapidly evolving security posture and its perennial domestic challenges. Each of these volumes provides valuable insights on these challenges for North Korea and internationally.     

Pseudo Change: China’s Strategic Calculations and Policy Toward North Korea after Pyongyang’s 4th Nuclear Test

After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China’s response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom’s approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China’s imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North’s income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem.     

特朗普时期美朝关系变化轨迹与未来走向

特朗普就任美国总统以来,美朝关系经历了对抗与危机时期、缓和与蜜月时期以及僵持时期三个阶段。在对抗与危机时期,美国对朝采取经济制裁、军事演习等极限施压举措;在缓和与蜜月时期,美国对朝采取首脑峰会、工作磋商的接触政策;在僵持时期,美国对朝"谈压并举"。新冠肺炎疫情也没有给美朝关系改善提供机会之窗。而贯穿始终的是美国对朝制裁毫不放松。特朗普本人及其幕僚对奥巴马政府的对朝政策十分不满,积极应对突飞猛进的朝鲜核导技术,掌握在东北亚地缘战略竞争中的主导权。这成为特朗普政府对朝政策的动因。特朗普政府对朝政策推动了无核化谈判的展开和朝鲜半岛局势的缓和,但美朝无核化谈判依然陷入梗阻。     

The coming decade of change on the Korean peninsula: Implications for Northeast Asia and the United States

The next decade on the Korean peninsula will be one of dramatic change. With a nearly nonexistent economy and its people facing severe famine, the DPRK has no choice but to move away from its self-reliance policies towards another course of action—most likely leading to reunification of the peninsula. However it plays out, the changes in Korea will have important regional implications and impact U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. Policy makers must formulate plans now for U.S. forces in the region during, and after, Korean reunification. Despite being in shambles internally, North Korea remains a hermit kingdom standing steadfastly against the tides of change and pressures from the outside world to become part of the international community. The Korean peninsula remains a potential, and very likely, international flashpoint as no formal peace treaty was signed after the Korean War—only an armistice agreement keeps the peninsula in a fragile military stalemate. With a badly broken economy, its people continuing to face famine, the threat to resume its nuclear program, and the recent missile firings over Japan, North Korea will likely be an international flashpoint sooner rather than later. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.     

Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission: Chinese Diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks to Denuclearise North Korea

This paper examines China’s role in the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral initiative with the aim of denuclearising North Korea. As North Korea’s behaviour has become increasingly provocative, evidenced by the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents and the newly unveiled uranium enrichment plant at Yeonbyon, China’s indecision in dealing with the deteriorating situation has dramatically undermined Beijing’s ability to continue successfully to play the leading mediator role. Yet if China fails to take decisive action now, the consequences could be dire. Further deterioration in North Korea’s behaviour could trigger a nuclear arms race, severely hamper regional economic development and even create a geopolitical split in East Asia, leading to a confrontation between the US, South Korea and Japan acting together on one side, and China, Russia and North Korea aligned on the other. The factors that have prevented China from making further progress in the diplomatic process are many and various and this paper will reveal the complexity of the North Korean issue for China. Foreign academics and policy makers have tended to attribute China’s indecision over North Korea to China putting its own security interests first. But this is far too simplistic a picture of the complex relationship that China has with North Korea. There are a host of factors at work that need to be taken into account to understand the present impasse in the diplomatic process. These factors include China’s emotional ties to North Korea and empathy with its position as the weakest party in the Talks, the conflicting attitudes within the Chinese government itself towards the North, and the competing interests and lack of trust between the different stakeholders. It seems that for the foreseeable future, the North Korean issue will continue to plague Chinese foreign policy until all the parties involved act as a collaborative body to reach a consensus on how to resolve the situation.     

Preparing for the best: involving North Korea in the new pacific community

The United States, Japan, and South Korea should be considering ways and means to involve North Korea in regional cooperation. In the economic sector, the United States and South Korea might support the Northeast Asia Economic Forum and the Tumen River Area Development Project. The United States might also encourage Japan or South Korea to lead discussions on the possibilities of an Association of Northeast Asian Provinces, a Northeast Asian Development Bank, a regional labor market, and forums on regional transportation and communication, shipping and navigation, and air traffic management. All should support North Korea’s joining the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The need to monitor or retrieve the dumped Russian nuclear submarine reactors in North Korean waters is a serendipitous opportunity for broaching multilateral environmental cooperation.     

US Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Order: An Australian Perspective

Abstract

This article addresses the question of how US extended nuclear deterrence might endure in a shifting Asia-Pacific where the traditional nuclear order underpinning the credibility of US security guarantees is deteriorating. The Australian case study demonstrates how periods of nuclear order and disorder can inform a state's attitudes toward the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence. Australia's interest in a nuclear weapons capability from 1956 to 1972 was symptomatic of a period of nuclear disorder. This interest declined from the early 1970s due to changes in both the global and regional environments where the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons was relatively contained. This emerging, recognizable nuclear order diminished the interest in an indigenous nuclear weapons capability and led Canberra to rely on US extended nuclear deterrence. This order has remained fairly robust for more than 30 years. However, beyond 2012, we may yet witness a breakdown in this order. This will generate a much greater interest by US allies in the operational aspects of US extended nuclear deterrence.