U.S.-India Space Partnership: The Jewel in the Crown

The new strategic partnership between the United States and India is creating opportunities for security cooperation. A key element in this partnership—U.S.-India space cooperation—will most likely become the defining relationship for international space cooperation around which other space-faring nations will posture. The Indian space program is rapidly developing world-class capabilities and presents itself as a worthy partner. The U.S. space program should be able to provide innovative ideas for fruitful collaboration. Despite these propitious circumstances, there are potential obstacles of cost, security, and risk. The biggest obstacle, however, might simply be bureaucratic intransigence and inertia. The opportunity is here, now, for the United States and India each to add an important new jewel to their crown of international space cooperation activities. Most importantly, this new space partnership should enhance the security and prosperity of the United States, India, and the world.     

Chinese Capabilities as a Global Space Power

Since the early 1960s, China has been enhancing national power and, in this regard, Chinese space capabilities play a pivotal role. Today, China is second among spacefaring counties, behind the United States, as a measure of human spaceflight, as well as in commercial and military satellite systems. Chinese space technology, in contrast to developed nations, is comparatively cost-effective; China is sharing it with developing nations for their space programs, consequently expanding the pool of spacefaring states. Most significantly, China’s nuclear, military, and space capabilities provide it with an opportunity to reassert itself as a global power, enhancing its strategic outreach and preventing adversaries from contemplating strategies against it.     

Counterspace Operations and Nascent Space Powers

In twenty-first-century warfare, satellites have become indispensable for gaining dominance in battlespace. This highlights the need to protect space assets while countering the qualitative edge that space can provide to adversarial actions. Hence, “counterspace operations” continue to gain the attention of military planners and researchers around the globe. Although it is the major space powers that have developed requisite capability and are showing more concerns for space security, these concerns are global in nature. As such, there is a need to develop a framework that can be utilized by nascent space powers to ensure protection of their space assets. This research work is intended to draw the attention of policymakers, space-technology protagonists, and military personnel, particularly of nascent space powers, to these global concerns. It gives an overview of counterspace operations and explores the doctrinal view-point of major military space powers for safeguarding their own space programs and negating the advantage of space to the enemy. Based upon this, a step-by-step approach is proposed for nascent space powers for embodying of elements of counterspace operations to remain protected during peace, crisis, or war.     

Burden sharing in the NATO alliance: An empirical test of alternative views

This paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances. The first view, associated with Olson and Zeckhauser, argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members, which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members. A second view argues that NATO defense activities produce a mix of outputs, some of which are not purely public, and some of which may be complementary across nations. Furthermore, the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies. The test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of NATO members and their population and relative wealth shares. A simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data. The empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships than the Olson-Zeckhauser non-cooperative model.     

North and South Korean Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict

North and South Korea both have developed rocket technology for military and civilian applications, but their space programs differ in many important aspects. As late developing space powers, neither country poses a serious direct threat to U.S. space assets, but a successful U.S. cooperative engagement strategy towards the Koreas could help achieve U.S. policy objectives. The domestic politics of the two Koreas are very different, and Korean space development will depend upon a number of variables including inter-Korean relations and whether the two Koreas unify, domestic politics and budget constraints, the overall strategic environment, as well as opportunities for Korea in the realm of international space cooperation. The United States has opportunities to implement an engagement strategy in Korea, but it could be complicated by different U.S. objectives in North and South Korea, and by linkage to other issues. Despite the complexities, Washington should be prepared for a number of possibilities.     

Astropolitics and the “Exopolitics” of Unacknowledged Activities in Outer Space

The role of unacknowledged classified programs remains an enigma for fully understanding activities in space and the study of astropolitics. Classified programs by law are not publicly announced, and remain inaccessible to all except those with valid security clearances to be briefed about them. In the United States, waived Unacknowledged Special Access Programs are the most highly classified programs conducted by the military and intelligence community. The same classification protocols are also required of private contractors working with U.S. military departments and intelligence agencies on classified programs. As space continues to grow in its national security significance, the number of these unacknowledged programs pertaining to space is likely to grow significantly from its current number. This requires adopting the necessary conceptual tools and methodological flexibility for investigating unacknowledged activities in space. This also extends to evidence concerning unidentified flying objects and extraterrestrial life. This article suggests that “exopolitics” is a unique multidisciplinary approach to extraterrestrial life that offers a helpful set of conceptual tools for studying unacknowledged space activities, and complements the field of astropolitics.     

An Assessment of Anti-Satellite Capabilities and their Strategic Implications

ABSTRACT

The success of space-based communications, navigation and reconnaissance programs – in both the commerical and military arenas – presents a significant vulnerability. Intuitively, as the economic importance and military indispensability of space systems grows, so will their attractiveness as targets. Although attacks against satellites would involve significant operational challenges, economic costs and diplomatic risks, it is well within the realm of technological possibility. For example, China's decision to research ASATs is an indication of its long-term strategic goal of weakening America's monopoly on military space capabilities. This essay describes the current capabilities of anti-satellite (ASAT) technology, assesses its military impact and considers its broader policy and security implications. In light of the broad implications of ASAT weapons on the debate about missile defense in particular and space weaponization in general, the author concludes that the best way to protect America's space-related economic and military functions is to avoid ASATs development.     

Transatlantic Military Space Cooperation: Addressing the Capabilities Gap

Attempts to address the transatlantic capabilities gap in military space is complicated by the rivalry between NATO and the European Union's ambition to undertake a greater role in European security, as well as being held hostage by the extent and nature of the EU's role in this crucial policy area. In light of this, transatlantic military space cooperation is likely to be modest and on a bilateral basis between Washington and the various European capitals, though NATO may yet play a larger role in this area.     

Competition and cooperative practices in Sino-Japanese energy and environmental relations: towards an energy security ‘risk community’?

Abstract

This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino-Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests, as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May–June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of an energy security ‘risk community’ as cooperative practices develop between China and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy security and environmental protection.     

Normalizing Sino‐Indian relations

Realism and neoliberalism, two schools of international relations theory, provide contending explanations for state behaviour in the international system. The latter believes that interstate cooperation will create institutions and regimes for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. The former argues that only ‘self help’ — the building of individual state military capabilities — can assure that state interests will be protected. A review of Southeast Asian security policies demonstrates that both paradigms coexist as the region's members enhance their individual military capabilities because of territorial disputes with neighbours, while simultaneously entering into new collaborative arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ARF has begun as a venue for discussions and reassurance among Southeast Asian states and external powers in hopes that the zero‐sum character of pure realism may ultimately be transcended.     

Military Dimensions of the Indian Space Program

The Indian space program is increasingly militarized. A clear policy shift in this direction has taken place. The transformation is happening because of international cooperation, especially in the civilian domain. In order to get foreign support, India projects the civilian image of its space program by arguing that there are bureaucratic and organizational barriers between civil and military programs that control internal diversion. At the same time, there exists evidence of civilian technology acquired through foreign sources being diverted for military use.     

Learning from the Philippine occupation: nation‐building and institutional development in Iraq and other high security risk nations

Outcomes of armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate that the U.S. has been unprepared to fully address problems related to establishing social and economic stability, security and governance in the aftermath of war. This is unfortunate, given that U.S. policy makers' nation‐building efforts to achieve stability, security and good governance in these nations do not reflect what they should already have learnt about organisational and institutional development from past experiences providing significant development assistance to highly unstable nations. Based on the analysis rendered in this article, ‘smart practice’ development administration in such nations comprises the following key points that link nation building to institutional/organisational development:

• Nation building (creating new national sovereignty) is different from, and harder than, building government capacity (creating or strengthening institutions and organisations).
• Given that building government capacity typically requires years of patient assistance and financing, it is better to build on existing indigenous institutions like the civil service and military.
• The time and expense of development assistance to high security risk nations means that it is advisable to establish a multi‐lateral development assistance plan and a multi‐national, multi‐institutional framework for financing development to pay for all that is necessary over a long period of time (i.e. 20–50 years).
• Policy makers should emphasise social stability and stable economic growth under self‐governance to prevent actual or perceived economic exploitation.
• Policy makers' diplomatic efforts should secure accommodation of various stakeholders sufficient to permit compromise leading to formation of an independent government.
• Where occupation appears necessary to achieve security and stability, policy makers should allocate enough troops and money to do the job, and accurately assess and report all costs of military occupation and nation building.
• Once occupation has occurred, policy makers should not withdraw military support in a way that would increase the likelihood of civil war.
• Premature withdrawal of security, economic and political support prior to the point where high security risk nations are capable of governing themselves will cause a power vacuum, and may result in fragmented regional leadership by warlords. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

     

Space and Security: The Emerging Role of Europe

Space systems have grown increasingly integral to the United States' national security in the post-Cold War era. The diplomatic and military leverage that space capabilities can provide is not going unnoticed by other countries. Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has enjoyed a near-absolute dominance in space activities. Only the civilian European space program has mounted any sort of technical challenge to the United States, with little interest devoted to space military activities, but the period of US hegemony in the space military domain might come to an end. In recent years the European Union (EU) and its member states have taken numerous steps towards designing and assembling a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a coherent European Security and Defence Policy. Furthermore, several important steps toward linking security needs and space capabilities have been taken by the tandem European Union–European Space Agency and other relevant institutions. Space is now seen as an essential asset for European integration and for non-dependence in the current geo-strategic context, since space-based systems and derived information can bring necessary capabilities for autonomous decision making. The development of an integrated European space capability for security is at an early stage, but it is an ongoing process presenting some opportunities to enhance European independence and security.     

Viewpoint: Space System Negation in the Context of Space Policy and Law

For 21st century warfare, space is the unquestioned new high ground for military operations. The United States (U.S.) has relied on satellites for significant support to military operations and activities since Desert Storm in 1991. Indeed, the U.S. enjoys an asymmetric advantage in modern warfare utilizing our space capabilities. States with interests hostile to the U.S. believe that the significant dependence on space assets by the U.S. military could become its “Achilles heel” in future combat operations. What are the legal and policy bases for the U.S. to respond to threats to space systems that provide support to our military forces? Should the U.S. rely on space arms control initiatives to ensure security in space? This Viewpoint analyzes the international space law regime and U.S. National Space Policy framework applicable to the conduct of military space operations and activities, including the use of force in space to protect and defend our satellite networks as well as our military forces.     

North Korean Space Program Legitimization Efforts: Review and Policy Recommendations

With much attention being concentrated on containing North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the North Korean space program also faces objections from the international community. This article claims that identifying North Korea’s space program developments with its ballistic missile program is unjustified and even undermines the space program’s potential for hastening a successful Korean unification. The goal of the article is to suggest a departure from a current hostile attitude toward the North Korean space program and to make alternative policy recommendations. The first part of the article focuses on a literature review of sources devoted to the North Korean space program, emphasizing the existence of alternative views of it other than the common view of it being a threat to international security. The second part describes efforts made by North Korea on the international and domestic scenes to confirm its space program’s legitimacy and make it more transparent, amidst continuing condemnations and sanctions by the United Nations, concluding with the positive dynamics of North Korean space efforts. The final part is dedicated to possible alternatives to current international policy towards the North Korean space program, underscoring a potentially mutually beneficial cooperation between North Korea and Southeast Asian prospective spacefaring nations. It is claimed that such cooperation might raise the technological level of the North Korean economy and narrow the gap between the two Korean states, offering more possibilities for eventual unification.     

Viewpoint: It is Time to Create a United States Air Force Space Corps

The United States (U.S.) has deepening dependence on space systems for economic prosperity, civil government administration, priority science and exploration programs, and national security while at the same time there is dramatic growth in competitive space capabilities and demonstrated threats to space systems globally. Despite this, the U.S. has not invested sufficient resources to meet National policy direction for capabilities to insure freedom of action in space, especially space situational awareness capabilities—the cornerstone of deterrence from space attacks. A principle reason for this shortfall is the historical absence of an organization accountable for securing the space domain like those of land, sea, and air. Using the analogy of the Army Air Corps, the author recommends creation of an autonomous Space Corps realized out of existing organizations within the USAF. The AF Space Corps would manage a separate space budget and all space professionals in organizing, training, and equipping national security space capabilities including those necessary to secure the space domain for peaceful use.     

Needed: A smaller and very different U.S. military

Conclusion How should the Pentagon decide those missions that it will retain in house? Those missions for which it should seek strategic alliances? Those new missions that it will actively seek to develop a competency in? Or those missions that require service competition because they are viewed as critical? Or those missions that have acquired redundancy due to service poaching, and thus can prudently be the target of reductions?The answers to these questions very much depend on the leadership's developing a view of the long-term future that is very different from the past. For example, will the United States be in the business of maintaining stability in troubled Third World regions? If so, what kind of capabilities, what kind of missions, does it see as necessary to conduct effective operations in these conflicts? What can the U.S. military count on from its strategic partnerships with other nations? What competing roles will the U.S. military be asked to play? What resources are available?These are fundamental, first-order questions. But they must all be answered - a credible vision of the business must be established - before restructuring can proceed in a productive manner. This does not imply a definitive prediction of the future; rather, it involves recognizing that the United States is in a period of relatively low danger, high uncertainty and dynamic change. For that reason the defense establishment should restructure to be more flexible, innovative and adaptive. A primary goal should be to exploit rapidly advancing technologies, while meeting (or preferably forestalling) the greatest and most likely challenges to national security. In summary, developing a credible vision of the future security environment, and acting upon it, is essential if the U.S. defense establishment is to avoid the pitfalls of the interwar French military and the IBM of the 1980s, dominant organizations that restructured to be more efficient in a competitive environment that was rapidly passing into history.     

Determinants and directions for Chinese weapons imports

This article assesses and presents the determinants and directions of Chinese acquisitions of weapons and weapons technology from abroad, focusing on major conventional weapons and their relevant technologies. Following a brief development of historical themes which continue to affect Chinese military‐related imports today, the study considers the principal contemporary domestic and international determinants which contribute to shaping Chinese arms import policies, and the type of foreign arms acquisitions likely to result from those policies. In analysing past and current security policies, weapons development policies, foreign weapons procurement policies, the study reaches four main conclusions. First, a wide range of problems — including prohibitive cost, political and bureaucratic infighting, absorptive capacities, managerial and administrative roadblocks, and supplier controls — stand in the way of a Chinese military modernization strategy based on foreign procurement. Second, with the exception of Sino‐Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, Chinese arms and arms technology acquisitions from abroad have consistently been relatively modest, sporadic, and problematic. Even in the case of current transfers from such suppliers as Israel and Russia, it is unclear the extent to which these countries are willing to part with significant amounts of top‐of‐the‐line systems and technologies. Third, the impact upon international security of the improvement of Chinese military capability through the acquisition of foreign weapons and technology is not likely to manifest itself in violent military disruptiveness, but rather in the nuanced and steady expansion of Chinese power and influence in parts of East Asia around China's periphery. Fourth, the military capabilities of China's arms clients will probably not be significantly improved through the acquisition of foreign weapons and weapons technologies by China. In sum, Chinese military modernization through arms and technology imports will continue to be a slow and painful process.     

Military transformation,political economy pressures and the future of trans-atlantic national security space cooperation

Investment demand for national security space is building on both sides of the Atlantic due to changes in technology and the threat environment. Many people hope that the close NATO alliance ties will facilitate trans-Atlantic coordination of plans. Coordination, they argue, would increase efficiency, yielding more and better space systems, and also would enhance effectiveness, increasing the operational pay-off of each unit of investment. However, several barriers stand in the way: the economic benefits would be smaller than advocates hope, political constraints bind tightly and military doctrine is evolving in different directions in Europe and the United States. Consequently, trans-Atlantic cooperation is unlikely to make a major contribution to national security space policy.     

Innovation and Alliances

Explanations for national success in science and technology typically focus on domestic institutions and policies. However, that line of research has yet to identify any particular set of institutions or policies that explain variation in national innovation rates across cases or over time. This article offers new evidence that the problem with domestic institutions approaches stems from their failure to consider international security factors. Specifically, this article finds a positive effect for U.S. security alliances on innovation. This finding is robust across different specifications and periods of analysis. While countries that ally militarily with the United States are found to realize benefits in economy‐wide, indigenous innovation, such an effect is not observed in military technologies. This suggests that alliances may substitute for being on the frontier in military technologies. Therefore, this article contributes not just to debates over S&T competitiveness, but also to alliance formation.