India and Australia: Security Dynamics in the Asia Pacific

India and Australia are rediscovering the vast potentials of maximizing mutual benefits that are inherent in their complementary economies. There is also a great deal of convergence of interests in the strategic domain. As an emerging power, India's profile has attracted attention by countries in the Asia Pacific region, which tended to neglect it in the past. The rise of China and its assertive stances have created an element of uneasiness in the region. Its military modernization and beefing up of naval capability are suspected to be behind enhancing its power projection capability.

The strategic significance of the Indian Ocean for the region is huge. The region's growth is inextricably linked to the Indian Ocean. The littoral states in the region are home to 2.6 billion people, almost 40% of the world's population. The Indian Ocean is the world's third largest body of water, and the world's leading energy and trade seaway. The volume of global trade brings with it the re-emerging problems of terrorism and piracy, a shared policing challenge for all littoral states. The security of the Indian Ocean goes to the heart of both India's and Australia's national interests.     

China Crisis? Indian Strategy,Political Realism,and the Chinese Challenge

Abstract

China's rise has provoked a substantial debate about its possible consequences for Indian security and its implications for Indian strategy. This review essay examines the parameters of this debate, concentrating especially on the rise of a new American-derived political realism in Indian thinking about China. It argues that in urging India to abandon its longstanding posture of strategic restraint, the new realists overestimate India's political military capabilities and run the risk for driving India toward a costly and dangerous confrontation with China.     

Assessing India's Emerging Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities: Prospects and Concerns

Abstract

This article attempts to locate and assess the sources of India's land warfare doctrines and capabilities. It begins by briefly examining the Indian army's significant combat experience in dealing with the external and internal security threats during the past six decades. The first section analyzes the security challenges and threats that presently drive the evolution of India's land war–fighting doctrines and capabilities. The next section explains the military imperatives that are driving this doctrinal change. In the next section, the current status of India's land war–fighting capabilities is discussed. The subsequent section examines the institutional limitations that inhibit organizational change, and the final section highlights how these doctrinal and capability gaps might be addressed in the future.     

India's “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions

This article considers how India sees the Indian Ocean, and in particular its drive to make the Indian Ocean, “India's Ocean.” Various comparisons and links are made. Firstly there is the role and application of Mahanian tenets of “sea-power,” in particular naval projection, control of sea-routes and access to bases. Second is the contrast between the earlier maritime visions of Kavalam Panikkar (1945) and Keshav Vaidya (1949) and the continental mindset evident under Nehru and his successors which saw neglect of India's maritime power. Third is the strategic vision evident since 1998 with the BJP government and maintained by the Congress administration since 2004. This has underpinned India's Naval Chief of Staff Arun Prakash's current eloquence on the possibilities opening up for India in and around the Indian Ocean. Questions of intent (strategic doctrine) and the application of “state power” (spending, bases, ships and equipment, geographical reach) are woven together.     

Burma,China and the Myth of Military Bases

Abstract

Since the advent of a new, more outward-looking military government in 1988, Burma has come to occupy a position of considerable importance in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment. Burma's burgeoning relationship with China has attracted particular attention, not least because of the stream of reports in the news media and, to a lesser extent, academic literature, claiming that China has established several naval bases and intelligence collection stations in Burma. This apparent intrusion by China into the northeast Indian Ocean has strongly influenced the strategic perceptions and policies of Burma's regional neighbors, notably India. The reported facilities have also been cited as evidence that Burma has become a client state of China, and as proof of Beijing's expansionist designs in South and Southeast Asia. A close examination of the available evidence, however, suggests that there are no Chinese military bases on Burmese soil, a fact conceded by senior Indian officials in 2005. China still has a strong strategic interest in developing its bilateral relations with Burma but, based on this analysis, it would appear that China's presence in Burma, and its current influence over Burma's military regime, have been greatly exaggerated.     

Indian Defense Policy at a Crossroads

In November 2008, the financial capital of India, Mumbai, was struck by terrorists who the Indian (as well as the American and the British) intelligence later confirmed had received extensive training from the Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, or Army of the Pure. Given the sophistication of planning and execution involved, it soon became apparent that this was a commando-style operation that possibly had the involvement of a state actor. As physical evidence mounted in terms of satellite phone calls, equipments, and boats used for the attack, Pakistan's hand was seen as smeared all over the operation. Though India conceded that probably the new civilian administration of Asif Ali Zardari was not behind the attacks, the army and the ISI were seen as the main culprit (Chengappa 2008).

The public outcry after the Mumbai attacks was strong enough for the Indian government to consider using the military option vis-à-vis Pakistan. But it soon turned out that India no longer had the capability of imposing quick and effective retribution on Pakistan and that it no longer enjoyed the kind of conventional superiority vis-à-vis its regional adversary that it had enjoyed for the past five decades (Gupta 2009). This was a surprising conclusion for a nation that the international community regarded as a major global economic and military power, pursuing a defense modernization programme geared towards making arms purchases of more than US$35 billion over the next few years. Yet in many ways, it underlined fundamental weaknesses in Indian defense policy, especially its ad hoc attempts towards arms procurement and defense modernization. This article examines the trends in defense spending and arms procurement in India since the early 1990s, a period that has seen India rising in the global inter-state hierarchy. It argues that a lack of strategic orientation in Indian defense planning will make it difficult for India to effectively use its resources and this will circumscribe India's rise as a global military power. First an overview of trends in Indian defense spending is presented followed by a discussion of the drivers of the Indian defense modernization program. Subsequently, India's ties with its major defense partners—Russia, Israel, and the West—are examined. Finally, the constraints that will continue to constrain India's ability to emerge as a major global military power are examined.     

WHO OWNS INDIA’S HISTORY? A CRITIQUE OF SHASHI THAROOR’S INGLORIOUS EMPIRE

The historiography of Britain's colonial past has always been problematic, shaped by conflicting mythologies about Britain's role as benefactor or exploiter. In the wake of Indian independence in 1947 it was in the interests of India's national identity to present what had gone before as a period of unmitigated oppression challenged by a united people. The consequence was widespread ignorance about the realities of British rule and of the Indian economy prior to and after British rule, exemplified by a current best-seller written by a well-known Indian political figure, Dr Shashi Tharoor, whose main arguments are examined; in particular, his central claim that India was a wealthy nation prior to Britain's colonial intervention reduced to poverty by Britain's ‘depredations’.     

An Enigma that is South Asia: India versus the Region

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is now 28 years old, yet its success is nominal. That more important bilateral issues are discussed on the sidelines of SAARC Summits proves the point. Intra-regional trade is still miniscule compared to the region's overall share in the world trade. The biggest defaulter is India, the most prominent member of the group. The purpose of this paper is first to raise the question whether South Asia qualifies to be called a region, and second to argue that, given the problems it faces with most of its neighbours, India is forced to conclude that SAARC matters the least for it. For economic and strategic reasons, India's interests lie in global networking and in a balanced relationship with China. Since Chinese military, diplomatic, and economic presence in South Asia poaches into India's perceived sphere of influence, India's interest in SAARC is limited to that context for otherwise it neither provides large markets for India nor does it contribute to India's strategic policy. Inversely, such a situation justifies India's neighbours playing the China card to bargain with India though that card its losing its value. To buttress our arguments we have drawn from the region's historical experiences as well as from recent developments in international and South Asian politics, including domestic politics.     

Review: India's political economy

Abstract

Though this is an extremely important study from one of the most perceptive of U.S. scholars of India, it is not, despite its title, a study of India's “political economy.” That would require a much fuller analysis of Indian relations of production and their contradictions-including those of class, caste, gender, and nationality—within the framework of the world capitalist system. Instead, it is basically a detailed analysis of Indian government economic policy since independence, with a discussion of economic dilemmas and rural class-caste contradictions as a backdrop.     

Diego Garcia and the United States' Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy

Abstract

As the world's economic and strategic “center of gravity” shifts from the Euro-Atlantic area to the Asia-Pacific, the Indian Ocean is emerging as an increasingly critical trade and energy conduit. This region has long been a strategic backwater for the United States. Moreover, unlike in other critical subregions of Asia, the United States lacks significant host-nation bases and is unlikely to acquire them. The British territory of Diego Garcia, whose location and political reliability give it significant strategic utility, is thus central to US power projection in the Indian Ocean littoral region. The US military's approach to Diego Garcia reflects an implicit Indian Ocean strategy that seeks to establish a flexible and enduring presence within a critical and contested space. However, Washington needs to move toward an explicit Indian Ocean policy that views the region holistically rather than narrowly viewing separate US Pacific Command, US Central Command, and US Africa Command theaters.     

21世纪的英国印度洋政策

随着印度洋战略地位的持续上升,曾是印度洋霸主的英国近年来也不断加强在印度洋的存在。英国在印度洋有着自己的安全、经济和殖民利益。在安全方面,英国认为需要应对伊朗带来的传统安全威胁和恐怖主义、海盗、人道主义灾难等非传统安全威胁。在经济方面,印度洋一些国家是英国的重要贸易伙伴,英国需要从海湾进口大量的液化气,海上运输线安全对英国至关重要。在殖民利益方面,英国设立了印度洋海外属地,并通过英联邦保持与前殖民地和附属国的联系。为了维护和增进这些利益,英国在印度洋采取了一系列措施。一是提升在印度洋的军事存在,如在巴林重建军事基地、帮助阿曼完善军事基地设施以及部署航母战斗群等。二是打击非传统安全威胁特别是海盗和恐怖主义。三是加强与印度洋沿岸重要国家,如沙特、印度和澳大利亚等的关系。四是强化与美国的合作,如延长迪戈加西亚军事基地的租赁期限、参加美国在印度洋的军事行动等。尽管这些举措有助于提升在印度洋的影响,但英国也面临一些挑战。一是实力与当年称霸印度洋时不可同日而语,脱欧以及新冠肺炎疫情更是对英国经济产生了重要影响。二是与毛里求斯存在领土争端,英国背负着殖民主义的压力。这些挑战会制约英国在印度洋目标的实现。总之,无论怎样调整印度洋政策,英国都不可能复制过去在印度洋的辉煌。     

INDIA'S MYANMAR POLICY AND THE ‘SINO-INDIAN GREAT GAME’

Recent literature has aimed to “deconstruct” the notion of a “Sino-Indian rivalry” in Myanmar. The argument is that China's leverage in Myanmar far outweighs India's, and that the Tatmadaw nevertheless prevents either country's manipulation of Myanmar. In contrast this article argues that the idea of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” still marks the Indian debate, thinking and policy on Myanmar. China's continued rise will remain a main driver behind India's Myanmar policy, and Myanmar will remain geostrategic relevant to India.

The article describes the historical legacy of India's relationship with Myanmar, discusses the role of China in Indian Myanmar policies, and examines the effects of Myanmar's democratization process. While the Myanmar playing field has changed, Indian perceptions of a “Sino-Indian Great Game” are lasting.     

India as a Regional Power: Identifying the Impact of Roles and Foreign Policy Orientation on the South Asian Security Order

Abstract

The Regional Powers and Security Framework provides a systematic method to assess how the relative strength and behavior of regional powers influence regional security orders. This article applies the framework to India as a South Asian regional power. The analysis indicates that although the region is unipolar; India's impact is limited because of its failure to play leadership and custodianship roles. It does serve as a protector of the region from external threats, doing so through a unilateral, status quo, and reactive orientation. Application of this framework points to a lack of a hegemonic security order in South Asia, in spite of India's self-view as the region's natural hegemon. For India to be hegemonic, it would have to play these roles in a comprehensive manner.     

The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China's Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting

Abstract

Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the conventional missile component of the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery Force (SAF) has emerged as a centerpiece of China's accelerating military modernization program. The conventional missile force has grown in size and sophistication, and China has developed a doctrine for its employment. Chinese military publications emphasize that it plays an increasingly important role in deterrence and warfighting. In particular, Chinese sources underscore its role in achieving information dominance, air superiority, and sea control as well as countering third-party intervention. China's development of advanced conventional missile capabilities highlights the growing vulnerability of fixed bases and surface ships. Moreover, organizational tendencies, could fuel dangerous escalation. In response to these challenges, the United States must adapt its traditional approach to military operations and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.     

Are Sri Lanka's Relations with China Deepening? An Analysis of Economic,Military, and Diplomatic Data

Abstract

During the past few years, Sri Lanka appears to have forged closer relations with China. Sri Lanka welcomed Chinese investment in building a port in Hambantota, arms from China for use in its civil war, and “dialogue partner” status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Such high-profile moves have unnerved analysts fearing the rise of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. A first-time, systematic analysis of the trends in Sri Lanka's economic, military, and diplomatic relations with China reveals that ties have indeed been strengthening. However, Sri Lanka is neither bandwagoning with nor balancing China, as structural realism predicts. More attention should be devoted to explaining the security thinking of small states that are not following such predictions in response to the emergence of a regional hegemon.     

INDIA’S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY UNDER THE MODI ADMINISTRATION: BUDDHISM,DIASPORA AND YOGA

This paper examines the Narendra Modi administration's use of three specific soft power assets of India – Buddhism, Diaspora, and Yoga – in diplomacy in service of the country's national interests. It attempts to address the following questions: What is the main purpose of the Modi administration's soft power strategy and the reasons behind the promotion and utilization of these three assets? What are the impediments to India's soft power projection ability? Finally, how can the Modi administration better exploit India's soft power advantages? This paper demonstrates how the Modi administration is making efforts to project India's soft power in the service of larger strategic goals. The use of soft power is designed to complement India's conventional diplomacy, boost its international image, project it as a peaceful rising power, improve relations with other countries, and help attract foreign investment, technology, and tourists in order to promote economic growth and development.     

The Resilience of Monarchised Military in Thailand

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that conventional notions of Thailand’s military must be re-examined because they misrepresent the military’s role in politics. Instead of examining its material interests, one must also scrutinise the power and legitimacy of Thailand’s armed forces in terms of its connection to monarchy over time. The relationship between monarchy and military represents a “parallel state”, whereas the ideology, rituals and processes within this relationship result in what can be termed a “monarchised military.” The purpose of this nexus is to sustain a palace-centred order from which the military obtains legitimacy. From 1991 until 2014, the monarchised military mostly operated behind a defective democracy, although it occasionally carried out coups to re-assert the palace’s authority. Its more recent political intrusions have enhanced the military’s power on Thailand’s political stage. Civilian prime ministers have unsuccessfully sought to reign in the military, but to no avail owing to the armed forces’ close association with monarchy.     

International Law and the November 2004 “Han Incident”

Abstract

The Ishigaki Strait is an international strait by the terms of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, but for national security reasons it is not recognized as such by the Japanese government, which advocates a narrower definition of what constitutes an international strait in which the right of transit passage applies. China, as a traditional land power with tradinationally weak maritime forces, has historically agreed with Japan's limitations on access through such straits. As China's maritime strength grows, it has increasingly greater interest in access to ocean spaces. However, because of tension and poor coordination between its military and foreign policy bureaucracies, China missed an opportunity during the diplomatic crisis in November 2004 to align its position on maritime law with its strategic interests.     

The Philippines: Another Vietnam?

Abstract

The historic relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines today gives an exceptional importance to the massive economic and strategic legacy of over 70 years of American domination of that nation. Apart from its prime significance to the future of American military power in Asia after the Indochina debacle, the Philippines is the most important example of a sustained U.S. effort to transform a Third World country in its own image. Now, with a martial-law regime's fate very much in doubt and the U.S.'s economic investments and military bases all hanging in the balance, the objective pressures for a potentially open-ended American commitment to preserve its interests and credibility in yet one more Asian nation are again re-emerging in a form substantially more compulsive than those in Indochina before 1965.     

India in the Asia–Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China

It is almost a conventional wisdom now that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from Europe to the Asia–Pacific in recent years with the rise of China and India, gradual assertion by Japan of its military profile, and a significant shift in the US global force posture in favour of Asia–Pacific. The debate now is whether Asia–Pacific will witness rising tensions and conflicts in the coming years with various powers jockeying for influence in the region or whether the forces of economic globalization and multilateralism will lead to peace and stability. Some have asked the question more directly: Will Asia's future resemble Europe's past?1 ¹See Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 147–159. View all notes It is, of course, difficult to answer this question as of now when major powers in Asia–Pacific such as China, India and Japan are still rising and grappling with a plethora of issues that confront any rising power in the international system. But what is clear is that all major powers are now re-evaluating their policy options vis-à-vis the Pacific.

This paper examines India's foreign policy in the Pacific as it has emerged on the last few years. First, the emerging balance of power in Asia–Pacific will be examined in light of the theoretical debate on the issue followed by a broad assessment of the role that India envisages for itself in the region. Subsequently, India's relationship with the three major powers in Asia–Pacific—China, Japan, and the US is analysed. Finally, some observations will be made about the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy in the region.