Mergers and difference-in-difference estimator: Why firms do not increase prices?

Difference-in-difference methods are being increasingly used to analyze the impact of mergers on pricing and other market equilibrium outcomes. Using evidence from an exogenous merger between two retail gasoline companies in a specific market in Spain, this paper shows how concentration did not lead to a price increase. In fact, the conjectural variation model concludes that the existence of a collusive agreement before and after the merger accounts for this result, rather than the existence of efficient gains. This result may explain empirical evidence reported in the literature according to which mergers between firms do not have significant effects on prices.     

20世纪90年代以来的合并控制理论探析

为了适应 20世纪 90年代以来并购活动的日益增长,规制者运用“革新市场”和“单方效果”来支持积极的反托拉斯执法活动。“革新市场”理论通过对一个合并对相关市场上的研究和发展的影响来评估技术领先企业之间的合并。“单方效果”理论根据合并企业独自对相关市场上价格产生影响的能力来评估一个合并。     

THE POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT INACCURACIES IN MERGER SIMULATION MODELS

This paper considers the role that merger simulation modelsshould play in European merger control. The use of these models,as off-the-shelf instruments to assess the economic effectsof mergers, has become increasingly widespread in recent years.However, contrary to some claims, merger simulation models donot allow investigators to avoid much of the competitive effectsanalysis relating to the relevant economic market, nor do theynecessarily provide more precision to merger control. Withoutunderstanding the limitations of such models and the circumstancesunder which they can and should be usefully applied, they maynot just be useless, but dangerous in the sense of providingpossibly spurious results with spurious claimed accuracy. Thispaper argues that any merger simulation models used should be"bespoke" models, rather than off-the-shelf models, but cautionsthat even bespoke models will frequently not be as useful asis often claimed. This is not to deny that there are occasionswhen well-constructed bespoke models are genuinely useful anddo offer genuine improvements in merger control.     

Transition, the Evolution of Stock Market Efficiency and Entry into EU: The Case of Romania

In this paper we demonstrate that the measurement of stock market efficiency is an important activity in establishing whether eastern European countries satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership. Specifically, we argue that developing an efficient stock market should be an important policy focus for countries with aspirations to join the EU as it helps to demonstrate the existence of a functioning market economy. We illustrate this issue by examining the evolution of stock market efficiency in the Bucharest Stock Exchange from mid-1997 to September 2002. We use a GARCH model on daily price data and model the disturbances using the Student-t distribution to allow for ‘fat-tails’. We find strong evidence of inefficiency in the Bucharest Stock Exchange in that the lagged stock price index is a significant predictor of the current price index. This result is robust to the inclusion of variables controlling for calendar effects of the sort that have been observed in more developed stock markets. The level of inefficiency appears to diminish over time and we find evidence consistent with stock market efficiency in Romania after January 2000.     

企业合并行为的竞争法分析

对企业合并进行控制是竞争法的基本内容,而其中最核心的问题,是评价企业合并行为所依据的实体标准。基本内容包括对合并行为的反竞争影响,及其产生的积极效果。由于企业合并主要是通过改变市场结构而影响竞争,因而在对其进行分析时,一般首先分析合并行为对所在市场集中度产生的影响,这主要通过赫芬达尔指数来反映,对于发生在指数较低的市场上,或发生在集中度较高的市场上,但并未导致指数大幅度提高的企业合并行为,认定其不会产生严重的反竞争效果,可以批准。其他的合并行为则要由竞争主管机关进一步分析,主要考察该行为的反竞争效果,包括单边效果与协调效果;然后再考察存在哪些抵消因素。经过比较后,如果积极效果大于消极效果,则予以批准。     

合并控制中的向上定价压力测试法

向上定价压力测试法简称UPP测试法,是近年理论界提出的一种评估差异性产品供应商之间横向合并能否导致单边效应的新方法。UPP测试法基于对合并企业产品之间转移率的判断,通过量化合并企业之间竞争约束的减少程度,分析合并交易带来的涨价激励,从而评估合并导致单边效应的可能性。虽然目前中国还缺乏UPP测试法的适用环境,但随着立法的完善与执法的发展,该方法在中国日后肯定有适用的空间。     

從匯源果汁收購案看中國的企業兼并審查

2009年3月18日中國商務部發布第22號公告决定禁止美國可口可樂公司（簡稱可口可樂公司〉與中國匯源果汁集團有限公司〈簡稱匯源公司〉收購申請。從商,公告看,禁止合并的理由主要包括： 1.收購完成後,可口可樂公司有能力將其在碳酸軟飲料市場上的支配地位傳導到果汁飲料市場,對現有果汁飲料企業産生排除、限制競争效果。     

Eu merger control and the compatibility test:a review of recent developments

The compatibility test contained in Article 2 of the Merger Control Regulation (MCR) is at the very heart of EU merger control, for it determines whether a concentration with a community dimension is deemed compatible or incompatible with the common market. Incompatibility can lead to prohibition of a concentration, although this is rare. The paper reviews the recent developments to the conditions of the test itself as well as the analytical methods employed to determine compatibility. Concerning the former, the new foreseeable dominance interpretation, put forward by the European Commission and made law by the Court of First Instance (CFI), is explored. This new variant of the dominance condition is important on its own right but it is also of major interest because of the explicit legal requirement placed on the Commission to assess the future likelihood of abusive behaviour by the merging parties in its prospective analysis. This is not the case with the original dominance compatibility condition. The unexpected but important clarification by the CFI of the notion of substantial part of the common market, as contained in the express wording of the compatibility test, is also commented upon. Concerning the determination of compatibility, the Commission's controversial employment in certain conglomerate concentrations of the range effects of competitive harm theory is examined, as is the need to take cognisance of merger specific efficiencies when determining if a merger increases societal welfare. The EU is making progress toward such an efficiencies assessment as part of the compatibility determination. EU merger control – and hence the compatibility test – do not exist in a vacuum. The EU has played a major role in shaping the new multilateral architecture and its goal of increasing international convergence in competition matters. This in turn has led the EU to rethink the nature of the compatibility test. For example, it has sought to evaluate the dominance condition of the compatibility test with the substantial lessening of competition (SLC) approach used by some other regulators, like the US. The paper concludes by looking at a fundamental issue that has arisen from recent CFI judgements and the GE/Honeywell merger: the competence of the Commission, or more accurately the Merger Task Force (MTF), to carry out the compatibility determination. Proposals are outlined so as to ensure that the Commission's prospective analysis in a concentration case meets the requisite legal standard. It is essential for this standard to be met if EU merger control is to remain credible. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Applying antitrust law to nonprofit healthcare entities: arguments for a greater attention to detail

This Article begins with an antitrust primer, then analyzes the appropriate application of antitrust principles to nonprofit healthcare providers. In light of the inherent charitable character of nonprofit healthcare providers, the author contends that the government and the courts should accord some deference to nonprofit hospitals when they are seeking approval of mergers. To date, this has not generally been the case, although a few recent court decisions have rested their approval of mergers, in part, upon the nonprofit character of the merging entities. The author, in particular, believes the paradigmatic local nonprofit hospital with a community board is less likely than a for-profit hospital to abuse any market power that it may obtain through a merger; consequently, any such merger should not be analyzed solely under the traditional presumptions of antitrust jurisprudence. Rather, the premerger analysis should involve meaningful consideration of the hospital's charitable character.     

The Evanston initial decision: is there a future for patient flow analysis?

This Article analyzes the October 2005 Initial Decision of the Federal Trade Commission Administrative Law Judge ordering Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation to divest Highland Park Hospital on the grounds that the January 2000 merger of the entities violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In particular, this Article focuses on the ALJ's discussion of the use of patient flow analysis and the Elzinga-Hogarty test in defining relevant markets in hospital merger cases. Despite the ALJ's explicit rejection of the Elzinga-Hogarty Test and patient flow analysis as irrelevant and inappropriate in defining markets in the highly differentiated Hospital market, the author concludes that the ALJ's rejection of patient flow analysis likely was a response to misplaced and over-reliance on patient flow analysis by a number of courts in past prospective government challenges to hospital mergers as evidenced by the fact that the ALJ's analysis of competition and competitive effects relied upon, and thereby implicity endorsed, the use of patient flow analysis for certain purposes. Finally, the author concludes that patient flowanalysis, when used appropriately, should continue to be used as a preliminary step in geographic market definition and competitive effects analysis.     

互联网企业市场支配地位认定的理论反思与制度重构

随着互联网市场的发展,我国司法实践中适用的判断经营者市场支配地位的方案受到了严峻挑战。在互联网市场上,市场份额的计算方法受到质疑,市场份额对衡量经营者市场竞争力的判断作用已经退化。在我国对市场份额证据严格限制的实证法背景下,我国司法实践中推行的"单一市场结构方案"既不能适用于互联网市场中的垄断行为规制,也不符合我国反垄断的立法规定,是必须摈弃的一种落后观念。因应互联网市场的形成,根据我国《反垄断法》的立法宗旨和基本精神,应当在反垄断司法实践中贯彻"综合标准方案",既不简单反对可以根据市场份额推定经营者的市场支配地位,又充分考虑市场进入壁垒、市场竞争状况等其他因素对经营者市场支配地位的影响。     

欧盟法对企业合并的规制

企业合并是当今各国优化产业结构和企业组织结构的重要手段,也是企业迅速扩张、提高规模经济效益和国际竞争力的有效手段.然而,经济力量的集中和由此导致的市场结构的改变,容易产生或加强市场支配力量,从而起到排除或限制竞争的作用.为了防止企业通过并购实现或加强市场支配地位,维护市场上的竞争秩序,对一定规模以上的企业并购交易进行反垄断审查,已成为市场经济国家设计和实施反垄断法的通行做法.目前,已有七十多个国家建立了企业并购控制机制.其中十分引人注目的是,欧盟于上世纪90年代初建立了企业合并控制机制,并于2004年进行了改革.到目前为止,欧盟竞争总司作出的并购审查决定已达两千多件,在此过程中积累了丰富的经验.拟对欧盟企业合并控制制度的建立、理论、程序及实体规则进行研究,并就中国企业合并控制制度的现状及发展提出自己的看法.     

Market definition with differentiated products: a spatial competition application

This paper applies the ‘hypothetical monopolist’ test of market definition to a retail market with products differentiated by means of location and other dimensions. The test for defining the relevant product and geographic market follows the conditions required by the European Union Competition Law and so it takes into account both demand- and supply-side substitution. The empirical model using sales data from a set of movie theatres in the North of Spain, incorporating the observed locations of consumers vis-à-vis the stores, shows that empirical tests of market definition may lead to an implausible (too restrictive) definition of the relevant market if supply-side substitution is not accounted for. It also shows that the main driver of competition in retail markets with differentiated products is not price but product characteristics.     

The GE/Honeywell merger controversy and the path to analytical convergence in international merger assessment: A critical commentary

Globalisation, with its concomitant rise in international merger activity, allied to the proliferation of merger control regimes vetting such activity, increases the likelihood of two or more competition authorities reaching divergent decisions in the same case. This article reveals that this situation arose in the proposed merger between two US-based companies, General Electric (GE) and Honeywell, with the EU prohibiting the merger, and the US Department of Justice approving it. Further, it discusses the analytical and interpretational differences which led to those divergent outcomes. The analytical debate centres on the appropriateness of the two theoretical approaches used to assess proposed mergers, with the EU using the range effects of competitive harm approach and the US giving greater weight to an economic efficiencies merger defence. The fallout from the GE/Honeywell case has given added impetus to progress analytical convergence in relation to the vetting of international mergers. This has found expression at the multilateral level, which links to EU initiatives. The article predicts that the EU is highly likely to incorporate an economic efficiencies defence into its merger control law, bringing it into line with other key players. Of course, analytical convergence cannot guarantee that interpretational differences will not arise, as was evident in aspects of the GE/Honeywell case. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Hospital mergers and antitrust: an economic analysis

The hospital industry has recently experienced substantial merger activity. This paper examines several actual and proposed hospital mergers to determine the extent of competition in the affected markets and the effect these mergers may have on competition. Our focus is on mergers between hospitals in the same market. We define the relevant product and geographic market for hospitals, then develop criteria for evaluating hospital mergers and analyze several merger cases using these criteria. We conclude that these mergers threaten the competition that exists in most of the markets discussed, and that the claimed efficiency justification for mergers is not convincing.     

Price distortion in the transition process: A CGE analysis of China's case

The correct evaluation of price distortion is a prerequisite for designing the correct price reform policy which is of tremendous importance in the transitions process from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the advantages and shortcomings of various criteria for evaluating price distortion. Based on the characteristics of a two-tiered planned-market system in Chinese economic reform, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model has been built to evaluate quantitatively the degree of price distortion in the prevailing price system and the effects of price adjustments in order to propose a reasonable price reform policy. The difference between the planned price and the equilibrium price seems to be a better indicator for evaluating the degree of price distortion than others. Furthermore, this difference provides more accurate feedback for price reform policies in order to ensure a stable and controllable price reform process.     

Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties

When a bidding corporation succeeds in obtaining voting control of a target corporation through a hostile tender offer, many commentators argue that it is unfair to allow the bidder to exercise its voting power to set the price terms of a second-step takeout merger in which the bidder purchases the shares of the remaining target shareholders. This concern is inappropriate because it treats a unitary acquisition between adversaries as if it were two separate transactions–the second of which involves abuse of power by fiduciaries–and also because it assumes that shareholders of the target corporation are incapable of protecting themselves from the power of a successful bidder. Moreover, imposition of fiduciary rules may impose either prohibitive costs or absolute barriers to some takeovers, even if such transactions would be wealth producing. While there is a risk that some takeovers may exploit the “prisoner's dilemma” facing target shareholders threatened with an unattractive takeout threat, target shareholders are capable of responding to that threat with devices to coordinate their response. So-called “shark repellent” amendments that raise the proportion of votes required to approve second-step mergers or that limit the terms of such mergers can function as coordination devices to alleviate the prisoner's dilemma. Commentators' fears that such devices may unduly burden the market for corporate control appear to depend to a large extent on unfounded assumptions that all takeovers are wealth producing and that takeovers are never motivated by potential gains flowing from exploitation of the lack of coordination among target shareholders. However, empirical studies indicate that adoption of such coordination rules can benefit target shareholders and that it is unlikely that shareholders will approve voting rules so restrictive that they would preclude wealth-creating acquisitions. The usual notions of shareholder apathy are simply inapplicable to takeout mergers.     

Competition among physicians, revisited

Ten years ago we developed a model of demand inducement in the physician services market and explored the properties of that model. We found that predictions concerning physicians' prices, workloads, and income were ambiguous and in many cases were consistent with those derived from a standard monopoly pricing model. Spurred in part by our work, numerous empirical studies of the demand inducement model have been conducted. These studies found little evidence of demand inducement for primary care physician services. Demand inducement may exist in the market for surgical services, but its extent is less than previously estimated. We disagree with those who say that physicians generate demand to avoid price controls and that national health care spending is proportional to the number of physicians; the evidence does not support these arguments. Substantial uncertainty may surround the physician's choice of diagnosis and treatment mode. However, this does not imply a breakdown of the agency relationship. In this paper we extend our earlier model of demand inducement to include variations in the quantity of services (which was previously assumed to be less than socially ideal). Using the model, we conclude that the major objection to government price setting is not that physicians will get around the controls by inducing demand; rather, price controls result in a quantity and quality of physicians' services that is not ideal and may be inferior to those provided in an unregulated monopoly.     

Horizontal mergers, efficiency gains and remedies

The combination of structural remedies and efficiency gains in a merger may lead to pro-competitive outcomes, thus maintaining pre-merger prices. Two types of efficiencies are necessary. The first corresponds to a flatter marginal cost function, the second to a decrease in the intercept of the marginal cost curve. If these efficiency gains are not sufficient to keep the post-merger price at the pre-merger level, then divestitures by the resultant merged entity are adopted. This paper allows a comparison between two kinds of divestitures and it can be shown that, depending on the efficiency gains, divested capital distributed among the remaining competitors in the market is optimal when compared to divested capital being placed on the hands of a single competitor.