Options for state and local governments to regulate non-cigarette tobacco products

Most tobacco control laws were written to address the scourge of smoking--particularly smoking cigarettes. As a result, these laws frequently exclude non-cigarette tobacco products, which are becoming more prevalent on the market. These regulatory gaps jeopardize public health by increasing the possibility that these products will be used--particularly by minors and young adults. This article examines gaps in regulation using five products as case studies: dissolvable tobacco products, electronic cigarettes, little cigars, snus, and water pipes. In addition, this article presents policy options that state and local governments can adopt to regulate these products more effectively, including regulations relating to price, flavors, youth access, use in public places, point-of-sale warnings, and marketing. Furthermore, this article contains extensive discussion of the recently adopted federal Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which both limits and expands the power of state and local governments.     

网络经济中相关市场的界定

在网络经济条件下,相关市场的界定要全面考虑产品、地域和时间三个维度。网络效应使得市场对价格的敏感度降低,导致传统SSNIP测试法失效,而应用产品性能测试法和盈利模式测试法能更有效地界定相关产品市场。双边市场特征要求把网络平台两端的市场视为一个整体进行相关市场的测度。网络的普遍存在和全球可达性使得相关地域市场极为广阔,但也因网络接入和网络内容服务的不同性质使其呈现出相异的边界。时间成为网络经济中需要普遍考虑的维度,坚持长远发展原则和可预期范围内原则,结合网络产品的生命周期和知识产权保护期限,最终对相关时间市场的范围作出合理的界定。     

互联网行业反垄断执法中相关市场界定

对互联网产品进行相关市场界定是该领域反垄断执法的起点。互联网产品可初步区分为全新信息交换类产品和在互联网上销售的传统商品,两类产品的市场界定需分别重视纵向互联网行业内与横向传统行业同类产品的竞争关系。非合并案件中相关市场界定可作为确认供应商市场垄断地位的间接认定方法,不应阻碍对直接损害竞争证据的考量。单一价格标准方法在互联网产品市场界定中具有局限性,应注重创新因素的考量以及时间市场的界定,着重进行供给替代分析,并寻求市场界定可能的替代性方法。     

Market definition with differentiated products: a spatial competition application

This paper applies the ‘hypothetical monopolist’ test of market definition to a retail market with products differentiated by means of location and other dimensions. The test for defining the relevant product and geographic market follows the conditions required by the European Union Competition Law and so it takes into account both demand- and supply-side substitution. The empirical model using sales data from a set of movie theatres in the North of Spain, incorporating the observed locations of consumers vis-à-vis the stores, shows that empirical tests of market definition may lead to an implausible (too restrictive) definition of the relevant market if supply-side substitution is not accounted for. It also shows that the main driver of competition in retail markets with differentiated products is not price but product characteristics.     

Merger simulations with observed diversion ratios

One approach to merger simulations used in antitrust cases is to calibrate demand from market shares and a few additional parameters. When the products involved in the merger case are differentiated along several dimensions, actual diversion ratios may be very different from those calculated from market shares. This again may affect the predicted post-merger price effects. This article shows how merger simulation can be performed using observed diversion ratios. To illustrate the potential effects of this approach we use diversion ratios from a local grocery market in Norway. In this case diversions from the acquired to the acquiring stores were considerably smaller than suggested by market shares, and the predicted average price increase from the acquisition was 40% lower using this model rather than a model based upon market shares. This analysis also suggests that even a subset of observed diversion ratios may significantly change the prediction from a merger simulation based upon market shares.     

The challenges of applying turnover threshold to the sharing economy for control of concentrations between undertakings in China

The existing notification threshold for Chinese control of concentrations between undertakings is a turnover threshold, complemented by a market share threshold. The business model adopted by platform enterprises in the sharing economy, where services are provided free and subsidies are given to the platform's basic users, make it very hard for platform enterprises to produce notable turnover for a long period of time; therefore, the turnover threshold is unlikely to be satisfied in the context of concentrations. On the other hand, it is also not appropriate to apply the traditional methodology of constitutionality analysis and the SSNIP (Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price) test to define the relevant market for the sharing economy, which is characterized by a two-sided market and cross-group network externalities. The size-of-transaction threshold reflects the importance of the number of basic users to the market power possessed by platform enterprise and has the same advantages of transparency and certainty. Therefore, legislation can be used to introduce the size-of-transaction threshold to Chinese control of concentrations between undertakings in addition to the traditional turnover threshold.     

网络产业中市场支配地位认定面临的新问题

网络产业中的市场支配地位受到不同于传统产业的一系列因素的影响,诸如网络效应、产品兼容、用户锁定、知识产权以及技术标准等都在网络产业市场支配地位的形成与维护中扮演重要角色。与之相适应,网络产业中的市场支配地位认定也面临一系列新问题：相关地区市场的界定在网络产业中变得更加复杂,传统的＂假定垄断者测试法＂面临质疑与挑战;市场份额对垄断力的影响在网络产业中相对减小,其计算方法与数值功能在网络产业中需要重新调整与评估;市场进入壁垒对垄断力的影响在网络产业中相对提升,传统壁垒减弱而新型壁垒增强。而将纯粹网络市场与混合市场予以区分、对＂盈利模式测试法＂、＂产品性能测试法＂、＂销售方式测试法＂等的尝试以及对由网络效应及其作用下的用户锁定、知识产权、技术标准等因素引发的新型市场进入壁垒的关注,则为解决这些新问题提供了具有建设性意义的新思路。     

CRIME BY COMMITTEE: CONSPIRATORS AND COMPANY MEN IN THE ILLEGAL ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY CARTEL, 1954–19591

We show how cartels rely on the adaptive social structure of committee meetings to ameliorate the competitive difficulties of markets. We distill the structure of the cartel committee and test hypotheses relating market structure to committee structure and ultimately to the efficacy of cartel price‐fixing. Cartel continuity and the corporate authority of the cartel are strong predictors of cartel effectiveness. Cartel continuity is responsive to market conditions that favor cartel formation. Centralization of cartel authority in decision making results in improved collusive pricing effectiveness. Centralization of cartel authority responds to expanding industry volume that bring about incentives to increase firm level market share at the expense of other cartel members.     

基于价格影响的期货市场操纵规制理论:反思与重构

在基于价格影响的期货市场操纵规制理论中,操纵被定义为故意制造人为价格的行为。人为价格的判断依赖于替代的价格标准,即执法实践中经常采用的参照系比较方法。这种判断方法不仅证明困难,且在行政处罚听证会或法庭辩论中容易受到质疑,导致期货市场操纵问题上的监管无力。要改变此种状况,首先,在判断操纵行为是否造成人为价格时,所关注的重点应当是影响市场价格的力量和因素,而非操纵行为造成的价格是否偏离了正常供求力量下应有的价格水平。其次,应当将意图作为操纵的核心要件,运用价格影响测试的分析框架,以行为人的不正当行为和其他直接或间接证据为支撑,并辅以经济或经验分析等方法进行综合判断。最后,当行为人的操纵行为未造成或未能证明造成人为价格时,引入试图操纵进行规制。     

Oil price changes and stock market returns: cointegration evidence from emerging market

The aim of this paper is to examine whether changes in nominal oil prices (Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI)) affect the stock market returns in the context of an emerging market framework. The Autoregressive Distributed Lag bounds testing approach of cointegration is used to test for the long run relation between the two variables, where the daily stock market index return is calculated using the first difference in the natural logarithms of stock market index. Further, we test for the stability of the cointegration relationship by examining the sensitivity analysis where diagnostic tests for serial correlation (namely the Breusch–Godfrey serial correlations LM test) and cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) are employed. Using daily data from January 3, 2000 to December 9, 2015, the findings suggest that there is long run integration between oil prices and stock returns series in which the daily oil price shocks have a negative impact on stock returns. The highly significant error correction coefficient indicates high rate of convergence to equilibrium. In addition, the Toda and Yamamoto (J Econom 66(2):225–250, 1995) Granger non‐causality test indicates significant bidirectional causality between stock market returns and Brent nominal oil price, meanwhile there is unidirectional causality running from WTI oil price to stock market returns. These findings are, up to some extent, meaningful for investors, portfolio managers and policy makers.     

Market Domination: Tests Applied to the Danish Cement Industry

We propose an economic interpretation of the definition of a dominant position used by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Then we apply co-integration techniques to test econometrically whether the sole Danish producer of cement holds a dominant position. Import penetration tests show that its conduct is independent of import price and quantity, so it can act to a considerable extent independently of its competitors. We also test whether it can act independently of its customers and find that its demand is inelastic with respect to its price. It thus holds a dominant position on the relevant Danish market.     

Savings and retail price reform in a queue-rationed economy

The paper addresses the effect on consumer saving behavior of queue rationing and of price reform in a Soviet-type economy in a lifecycle framework with overlapping generations. It is shown that consumers save less for retirement in a queue-rationed exchange economy with black markets than they would in a free-market system with the same endowments. The expectation of price reform is thus likely to cause an increase in consumer savings. In addition, an analysis is given of the effect of the increase in controlled prices on the black market prices and on the prices of unrationed goods.     

Procompetitive dual pricing

We analyze the procompetitive effects of dual pricing, that is, input market price discrimination. An upstream firm has an incentive to maintain competition downstream which is realized by selling at an advantageous price to an inefficient downstream firm when discrimination is possible while it would exit under uniform pricing. We augment the exit issue into existing frameworks of Katz (Am Econ Rev 77:154–167, 1987), DeGraba (Am Econ Rev 80:1246–1253, 1990), and Yoshida (Am Econ Rev 90:240–246, 2000) which allows us to show that price discrimination in intermediary goods markets tends to have positive effects on allocative, dynamic and productive efficiency, respectively. In contrast, a discrimination ban tends to facilitate exit of relatively inefficient firms, thereby strengthening downstream market concentration.     

Oil price shocks and stock market returns of the GCC countries: empirical evidence from quantile regression analysis

This paper examines the effects of oil price shocks on the stock market returns of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The empirical method used is quantile regression analysis. In addition, we allow for structural breaks and asymmetry by differentiating between positive and negative oil price changes. Unlike OLS analysis, quantile regression allows the coefficient estimates to vary throughout the distribution of the dependent variable, which provides a complete picture of the relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. Our results suggest that the coefficient estimates have not been constant throughout the distribution of stock returns; that oil price shocks have asymmetrical effects on stock returns; and that the effects of oil price shocks on stock market returns are affected by stock market conditions. Overall, the results suggest that rising oil prices increase stock returns only when stock markets are bullish (high quantiles) and normal (medium quantiles), and that falling oil prices lower stock returns only when stock markets are bearish (low quantiles) and normal (medium quantiles). This suggests that oil and stock markets are more likely to boom together or crash together.     

平台经营者超高定价的反垄断法规制

淘宝商城事件折射了平台经营者定价的现实困境:双边市场的交叉网络外部性和互补性等经济特点决定了平台经营以不对称定价为基本特征,但从法律角度看,实施免费策略的一边市场可能涉嫌掠夺性定价,而回收总经营成本的另一边市场又可能涉嫌超高定价。如何在分享平台经营降低交易成本、提高消费者福利等正面经济效应的同时,恰当界定这种新型经营者的权利、义务边界,避免其市场力量的不当利用,是平台经营者定价反垄断法规制中需要考虑的核心问题。     

Testing the Information Structure of Eastern European Markets: The Warsaw Stock Exchange

This paper investigates the content of the information set used by the agents in the Warsaw Stock Exchange - WSE. Three “candidate variables” are examined — consumers’ prices, the zloty/US$ exchange rate and the refinancing rate of the National Bank of Poland — with respect to three WSE stocks, from different sectors of the economy. The methodology employed supposes that the innovations in the price series are orthogonal to all variables within or outside the information set. Beyond the question of how to specify the agents expectations, the WSE trading rules and the high volatility period present in all monthly price series were additional problems to render it operational. Given the solutions adopted, in only three out of the nine cases tested, it was possible to reject the null that the candidate did not belong to the information set. This is a signal that macroeconomic fundamentals are still absent from the WSE.     

Regulating the Trade in Recreational Drugs

This paper examines the market for illegal recreational drugs. Under the present regime of illegality, the law acts as a barrier to entry of other firms. It also restricts the information available to consumers. Both of these effects increase the market power of traders. Other negative consequences of illegality include the use of violence to enforce contracts, poor quality control and the use of illegal activities to finance the purchase of drugs.However, legalizing the trade is likely to lead to greater drug use in the long run. This follows from the addictive nature of recreational drugs. Initial use of the drugs will drastically reduce consumers' price elasticity at any given level of consumption. Firms can increase the extent of the market by using introduction strategies, reducing consumers' price elasticities. Since newly introduced consumers have no brand loyalty, introduction strategies are public goods for firms. Free rider problems will produce oligopoly and collusion. Legalization will lead oligopolistic firms to expand the market.To avoid these problems it is suggested that the recreational drugs industry should be nationalised, not legalised.     

Regulatory Competition: A Private International Law Approach

This article analyzes the regulatory competition model (RCM) from a private international law perspective. This perspective helps us identify and resolve two gaps in the standard explanation of the RCM. According to the standard explanation, two conditions must be fulfilled for the market of legal products to function well: (1) free movement of resources (persons, capital, and goods); (2) the absences of cross-border externalities. In relation to this second condition, the standard model argues that a uniform material rule is necessary to overcome cross-border externalities. The main thesis of this article is that a private international law approach can complete this model by adding two ideas. First, a smooth functioning of the market-of-legal products requires, not only the free movement of resources, but also a uniform private international law system which guarantees the autonomy of the parties (free choice of law) and the procedural implementation of this autonomy (free choice of forum and free movement of judgments). And second, a uniform material law, which wipes out the regulatory market, is not essential to deal with the externality problem; rather a uniform conflict-of-laws rule, which leads to the internalization of cross-border externalities by states, can correct at least some of the externalities problem and also maintains the regulatory market.     

Internal dealing regulation and insiders’ trades in the Italian financial market

We analyze insiders’ trades in the Italian financial market. Insiders buy undervalued stocks, but they also act as positive feedback traders. They exploit short term market movements with abnormal returns around trades: they purchase (sell) stocks after a price decline (increase) and trades are followed by a partial reversal. They time the market mainly through purchases immediately communicated to the market and sales (and in part purchases) communicated quarterly to the market. It seems that insiders do not manipulate the market but strategically choose the size of trades, while they are interested to disclose immediately purchases of the assets of the company they prefer not to do it in case of sales. JEL Classification: G14, G15     

Discussion of "Using Stationarity Tests in Antitrust Market Definition"

Send correspondence to: Daniel Hosken, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20850; E-mail: dhosken@ftc.gov. The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below.