European democracy,parliamentary decline and the ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union

This article examines two different, yet interrelated, phenomena: parliamentary decline in western Europe and the ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union (EU). It argues that the latter has helped to consolidate, and in certain areas, facilitate, the former. This is illustrated by two sets of empirical studies, covering first the European Community (and in particular the Common Agricultural Policy and Economic and Monetary Union) and then the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and co‐operation in Justice and Home Affairs. The main conclusion to be drawn is that a simple reordering of some policies within and across different pillars will not remedy the current democratic shortfalls of the EU which stem as much from the inadequacy of existing parliamentary structures to hold EU decision makers to account, as from the absence of a European demos. The combined effects of the above are particularly crucial for the democratic viability of the emerging European polity which, as with any other political system in the modern democratic era, needs to strike a balance between efficiency and accountability.     

EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems

Citizenship is the cornerstone of a democratic polity. It has three dimensions: legal, civic and affiliative. Citizens constitute the polity's demos, which often coincides with a nation. European Union (EU) citizenship was introduced to enhance ‘European identity’ (Europeans’ sense of belonging to their political community). Yet such citizenship faces at least two problems. First: Is there a European demos? If so, what is the status of peoples (nations, demoi) in the Member States? The original European project aimed at ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’ Second: Citizens are members of a political community; to what kind of polity do EU citizens belong? Does the EU substitute Member States, assume them or coexist alongside them? After an analytical exposition of the demos and telos problems, I will argue for a normative self‐understanding of the EU polity and citizenship, neither in national nor in federal but in analogical terms.     

Smuggling of Migrants, Trafficking in Human Beings and Irregular Migration on a Comparative Perspective

Abstract:  The European Union aims to develop a European criminal justice to combat cross-border crimes of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings. This article focuses its attention on European Community/European Union (EC/EU) law and on two Member States, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK). The findings show that there are diversities and ambiguities in the definition of irregular migration. On the contrary, the EU and Member States should concentrate their efforts on the two crimes of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings rather than criminalising irregular migration.     

A variable geometry of enforcement?

This paper locates the control of fraud against the Community budget within the wider context of the tensions engendered by fiscal crises and successive enlargements of the European Union. Funds allocated to the Member States for agriculture, whether in the form of subventions or structural grants, take up more than half of total budget expenditure, so the Common Agricultural Policy has been at the heart of the discussion on budgetary control. Since the 1980s the Common Agricultural Policy has been blamed for the repeated fiscal crises affecting the Community budget, and for frauds and irregularities. In this historical context, the control of fraud has not been static, but has gone through distinct phases, beginning with benign neglect in the 1960s and 70s, followed by transitional and active phases up to and including today's media focus on the Community budget, and the fraud affecting it. The paper analyses the prospects for future enforcement.     

Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States?

Against the background of recent developments in Hungary, the article discusses the question whether the European Union ought to play a role in protecting liberal democracy in Member States. First, it is argued that the EU has the authority to do so, both in a broad normative sense and in a narrower legal sense (though the latter is more likely to be disputed). The article then asks whether the EU has the capacity to establish a supranational militant democracy; here it is argued that at the moment both appropriate legal instruments and plausible political strategies are missing. To remedy this situation, the article proposes a new democracy watchdog, analogous to, but more powerful than, the Venice Commission. Finally, it is asked whether EU interventions would provoke a nationalist backlash. There is insufficient evidence to decide this question, but the danger of such a backlash probably tend to be overestimated.     

Civil Protection Cooperation in EU Law: Is There Room for Solidarity to Wriggle Past?

This article provides insight into the under‐researched area of civil protection cooperation and disaster response capacity in EU law. It discusses how the mechanisms set up by the EU have assisted Member States in supporting one another when faced with natural or man‐made disasters, including those perpetrated by terrorists. In particular, the article provides a critique of the Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) clause, which has introduced the principle of solidarity within the EU's security strategy. The author explores the broadened notion of ‘threat’ in Europe and assesses the significance of the Solidarity Clause vis‐à‐vis the level of commitment required by Member States for its coherent implementation. The article then contrasts Article 222 TFEU with the mutual defence clause of Article 42 (7) Treaty on European Union (TEU), and finally points into certain ‘grey areas’ that may have a diminution effect upon the political message concerning the EU as a community based on solidarity.     

Energy Security and the Division of Competences between the European Community and its Member States

Abstract: Securing energy supply for Europe has been for decades at the forefront of the energy policies of individual European Community member countries. However, dealing with energy issues in general and securing energy supply in particular is a new phenomenon within the EU's regulatory framework. One important issue which has not yet been discussed by legal scholars and which has been questioned repeatedly by energy experts, is the question who is actually responsible to guarantee security of energy supply in Europe? Is it the European Community alone? Is it the Member States alone? Or is it both? This question cannot be answered without a detailed legal analysis of the EU law in general, and EU law on division of competences between the Community and the Member States in particular. This article seeks to highlight the complications of this area of law within the EU and expand it to cover the energy sector in order to determine who and under what circumstances is responsible for guaranteeing security of energy supply for the consumers within the EU borders.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

The Constitution of a European Democracy and the Role of the Nation State

Starting from the presupposition that European democracy is necessary to the survival and development of the European Union, the author deals with the process which may entail a European constitution, and discusses the elements of the present legal structure of the EU which are conducive to a European Democracy. In particular, the author focuses on the incomplete, polycentric, and dynamic character of a possible EC/EU constitution, and on the duality of its legitimating principle. This claim is that these characteristics necessitate some institutional modifications of democratic principles if compared with national democracy, and that Euro-democracy is possible if we do not simply apply the standards of democracy valid for Member States, but succeed in developing criteria which are adequate to the institutional qualities of the EC/EU. Finally, the author maintains the legal character of the regulatory power of the Community, and invokes the mutual legal bonds linking the Member States and their peoples as the source of the Community.     

Independence of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Unchecked Member States power after the Sharpston Affair

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the apex of the EU legal order, and is the supreme arbiter of EU law. For decades, it has delivered judgments, collectively shaping European integration and ‘integration through law’. It has undoubtedly been an authoritative leader in entrenching a European judicial culture, and has benefited from the cardinal principle of judicial independence enshrined in the EU Treaties, which in turn, it has insisted on being upheld as regards national courts. Questions have rarely arisen, however, about judicial independence of the CJEU. The Sharpston Affair of 2020–2021 opened the door to questioning such judicial independence. Is the CJEU at the mercy of the Member States? If so, what are the consequences for the EU legal order? This article reflects on the judicial independence of the CJEU, and offers reflections on how it can be preserved in the future.     

Sisters in Arms: European Community Law and Sex Equality in the Armed Forces

Abstract: Recently the European Court of Justice has been shedding a new light on the limits of Community competence for defence. This article analyses the rulings in Sirdar, Kreil, and Dory with regards to two interrelated issues. First it discusses the effect of Community law on the equality of men and women in the armed forces of the Member States. Second, it deals with the impact of these decisions on the constitutional order of the European Union. The article argues that Community law has a considerable impact on defence‐related national law. Therefore the analysis ultimately contributes to a narrow aspect of the constitutional debate: the demarcation of competencies between the Member States and the Community in matters related to defence.>     

The economic costs and consequences of mass communications data retention: is the data retention directive a proportionate measure?

This article seeks to determine the economic costs and consequences of implementing the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), an extraordinary counter terrorism measure that mandates the a priori retention of communications data on every European citizen, by drawing on the insights of economic analysis. It also explores the monetary costs of the Directive on subscribers and communications service providers of Member States within the EU. Furthermore, it examines the implications of the Directive on the economic sector of the European Union, by focusing on the Directive’s impact on EU competitiveness and other EU policies such as the Lisbon Strategy. This analysis is motivated by the following questions: what are the monetary costs of creating and maintaining the proposed database for data retention? What are the effects of these measures on individuals? What obstacles arise for the global competitiveness of EU telecommunications and electronic communications service providers as a result of these measures? Are other policies in the European Union affected by this measure? If so, which ones?     

欧盟商标法律制度的协调机制及其对我国的启示

在欧盟,既有各成员国国内的商标法律制度,又有欧盟的跨国商标法律制度即共同体商标条例,并设有将这两种商标法律制度协调运行的机制。该机制的核心主要有三个方面：一是优先注册权制度,即在一成员国有效的商标,或者同时又是共同体商标,权利人可以享有将同一商标在相同商品或服务上优先注册共同体商标的权利,或者优先注册其他成员国国内商标的权利;二是转换申请制度,即共同体商标的申请人或所有人在其申请失败或其商标失效时请求将该申请或商标转换成国内商标申请的情况;三是共同体商标特有的诉讼管辖和法律适用制度。欧盟所建立的这种复式商标法律制度及其协调机制,对于“一国两制”下的中国大陆、香港、澳门和台湾四法域商标法律制度的协调具有重要的借鉴作用。     

Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination

Abstract:  The open method of coordination (OMC) has increased the competence of the European Union to regulate areas where the traditional Community legislative processes are weak, or where new areas require coordination of Member State policy, either as part of the spillover of the integration project as a result of economic and monetary union, or as a result of the case law of the European Court of Justice. The OMC is viewed as an aspect of new, experimental governance, which is part of the response by the EU to regulatory shortcomings. This article explores the normative aspects of the OMC using case studies. The article examines the conditions in which the OMC emerges, the conditions upon which it thrives, and the claims that are made for its effectiveness as a new form of governance.     

The Impact of the EU Enlargement on Economic and Monetary Union: What Lessons Can Be Learnt From the Differentiated Integration Mechanisms in an Enlarged Europe?*

Abstract: Within the context of balancing the issues stemming from a widening and deepening of the European Union, differentiated integration mechanisms are taking shape as new organisational concepts for Community integration. Yet the increasing leverage granted to them from an institutional perspective could jeopardise the unity of the Community legal order . . . unless differentiated integration is regarded as a means and not as an end in itself; as such its success therefore depends on its ability to maintain the long‐term interests of all the Members States to go further in the EU integration. Faced with its own enlargement problems, EMU has demonstrated an aptitude to some extent for absorbing the non‐participating States. Four distinct legal reasons have emerged from research into its functioning and relations between the different categories of Member States to justify its attractive force. An assessment of the current and future enhanced cooperation frameworks using these four elements demonstrates the existence of essentially cooperative systems, whilst their appeal is only modest.     

Resolving Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the EU Member States with the EC Treaty: Individual and Collective Options

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by the EU Member States contain substantially similar clauses, including free movement of capital and investor‐to‐state dispute resolution. Article 307 EC provides for the primacy of pre‐accession treaties over the EC Treaty and simultaneously requires the Member States to eliminate their mutual incompatibilities. The European Court of Justice has declared that free movement of capital clauses of Austrian and Swedish pre‐accession extra‐EU BITs are incompatible with the EC Treaty as they will impede any restrictions on the movement of capital imposed as future Community legislation. A similar ‘free movement of capital’ clause is present in all extra‐EU BITs of the Member States, whether pre‐ or post‐accession. Article 307, however, does not apply to the post‐accession treaties which are equally capable of contriving the same consequences of impeding the application of the EC Treaty. In addition, the application of intra‐EU BITs provides investors from BIT party states access to the investor‐to‐state dispute resolution which is not available to investors from the Member States who do not have BITs with those Member States. This is discrimination and may distort the principle of equal treatment within the EU. Furthermore, the newly acceding EU States are facing extensive arbitral claims for carrying out the BIT‐EU conflicting obligations within their respective territories.     

Free Movement of Persons and European Solidarity1

Abstract: This article explores the tension between freedom of movement within the EC/EU and the principle of social solidarity, a tension which has increased in step with the progressive enlargement over the years of the circle of potential beneficiaries of the right to cross‐border access to the social and welfare benefits guaranteed by the social protection systems of the Member States. The article aims to re‐construct the system of Community rules regarding the free movement of persons within the EU from the point of view of the justifying criteria for the cross‐border access to national welfare systems of the different categories of ‘migrants’. The focus of the article is on the different degrees and models of solidarity which, at least at the present stage of the European integration process, justify correspondingly graduated and differentiated forms of cross‐border access to Member States' social and welfare benefits for the various categories of persons who move about within the EU.     

Variations in Member States’ Preliminary References to the Court of Justice—Are Structural Factors (Part of) the Explanation?

The preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables national courts to request the Court of Justice to provide a ruling on the interpretation or validity of an EU legal act, is widely considered to be the jewel in the crown of EU law. When considering the number of references from different Member States, it will become immediately apparent that there are considerable variations. This article examines to what extent these variations may be explained by three structural factors, namely (1) population size, (2) willingness to litigate and (3) Member State compliance with EU law. It is concluded that some—but not all—of the variations in number of references from Member State judiciaries may be attributed to structural factors rather than being merely a reflection of different Member State courts’ willingness to make use of Article 267 TFEU on such references (the so‐called behavioural factors).     

Rules for Rights: European Law,Health Care and Social Citizenship

Social citizenship is about equality. The obvious problem for European social citizenship in a very diverse Union is that Member States will not be able or willing to bear the cost of establishing equal rights to health care and similar aspects of social citizenship. Health care is a particularly good case of this tension between EU citizenship and Member State diversity. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) strengthened the right to health care in other Member States, but this cannot create an equal right to health care when Member States are so different. In its efforts to balance a European right, the Court has formulated ‘rules for rights’—not so much European social citizenship rights, as a set of legal principles by which it judges the decisions of the Member States.