The Optional Protocol: in the best interest of whom?

Chris Dolan is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Between 1998 and 2002, he spent some 24 months conducting fieldwork in northern Uganda.     

Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis

This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically considers the implications for its evolution as an international security actor. Employing role theory, the paper reviews the historical development of the Union's security actorness and sheds specific light on the balance between self-conception and external expectations in the case of the Libyan crisis. Its central argument is that, despite external expectations and European narratives of a ‘comprehensive power role’, the Libyan crisis showed that the Union still acts in line with its traditional role as a civilian power. The inability to go beyond civilian power stemmed from internal dissonance on a potential hard power role and a corresponding lack of material capabilities. The growing gap between expectations about comprehensive actorness on the one hand and performance on the other is likely to damage the Union's future credibility as an international security actor.     

Intervening in conflict: the policy issues

After 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan, the ‘Kosovo model’ for a large-scale international response to complicated emergency became less relevant. Afghanistan was more than just a complex emergency and security now stood out as being the most challenging and rapidly developing sector that imposed a more rigorous and less idealistic approach on national contributions. The risks and costs had grown and it was important for contributing nations and their concerned officials to know how we were moving from one generation of international forces into another. This paper traces the developments that brought international forces across a threshold into a new chapter of intensive operations and explains a risk-benefit approach that any future contributors have to undergo in order to decide how deeply committed the smaller nation can afford to be.     

Revolutionary conflict in federations: the Indian case

Federations promise to provide autonomous, representative governance that is flexible enough to overcome potential internal conflict resulting from the dual stresses of governing diverse populations and power overreach. India is the world's biggest federation but also hosts the most violent revolution in modern history against a federal state. Since 2004, 150,000 people have been killed or displaced in the war between the Communist Party of India-Maoist and India's government. Conflict management efforts led not to resolution but catastrophe across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand as state responses contradicted each other and the centre's efforts. The differences illustrated how institutional mechanisms of decentralisation create, sustain and otherwise alter internal revolutionary conflicts that cross subunit boundaries. Three unique characteristics come into play when federal governments tackle revolutionary conflict: picking from subunit actions like policy buffets, exacerbation of state–subunit fissures and empowerment of local elites who put political self-interest above conflict resolution.     

Conflict mitigation in Nigeria: the strategic conflict assessment

This article focuses on the methodology and objectives of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), the fieldwork for which was concluded in Nigeria in September 2002. It analyses its achievements, the lessons that it provides for the conflict-resolution community, and what might be gained by applying Edward Azar's notion of protracted social conflict (PSC) to the SCA.     

Windows of opportunity for conflict prevention: responding to regional conflict in West Africa1

This article charts the course of regional crisis in West Africa since 1999 and assesses the extent to which the United Nations (UN) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) succeeded in preventing an escalation of crisis in that sub‐region. It argues that although windows of opportunity existed for preventing the escalation of conflict and attention was sometimes paid to warning signs, the UN and ECOWAS had limited success largely because the regional dimensions of the conflicts were not recognized earlier. Additionally, while there has been increased collaboration between the UN and ECOWAS in response to regional crisis, these efforts are hampered by the absence of a systematized base of operations. This paper discusses the experience of the last five years and concludes that ECOWAS has not only become more responsive but has developed an evolving political framework for early action which could be greatly improved with coordinated and targeted support from the UN.     

The changing phases of the Niger Delta conflict: implications for conflict escalation and the return of peace

This paper discusses the nature and dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict and traces the structural origin of the conflict to a dysfunctional Nigerian ‘state-nation’ that is a product of colonisation. The paper argues that the conflict is best understood as a process viewed in terms of nests or phases. Building on previous findings on the aetiology of African conflicts and contemporary scholarship on African politics, the paper identifies how different phases of the Niger Delta conflict interact to impel the conflict toward escalation. Consequently, it is argued that both the ‘marginalisation-relative deprivation’ and the ‘political economy of war’ theses have been instrumental in furthering our understanding of the conflict along different lines. However, the tendency for both perspectives to claim superiority over the other has meant that each only offers a partial truth and is therefore unable to explain the increasing intensity and longevity of the Niger Delta conflict. Indeed, it is shown how these theses feed into the discursive struggle between militants, militant entrepreneurs and the Nigerian Government in ways that allow for the commodification of the Niger Delta people. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of the emerging issues for the return of peace in the Niger Delta.     

Insurgency theory and the conflict in Algeria: A theoretical analysis

In the early nineties it was widely feared that Algeria was on the verge of an Islamic revolution. These fears proved to be unfounded. This article seeks to explain the failure of the insurgency to topple the current government through the use of three models of successful insurgency movements: urban insurrection, peasant‐based guerrilla warfare and focoism. Analysis shows that the first two of these models cannot be applied to the situation in Algeria because of the nature of the Algerian topography, the lack of foreign sanctuaries for the insurgents and the authoritarian nature of the Algerian regime. The single success of the third model is a historical anomaly, unlikely to lead to the overthrow of the current Algerian government, but leading to a fourth and final model; urban terror. It is the clandestine nature of this fourth model which provides for the longevity of the current insurgency, yet because of its inability to meaningfully challenge the state, gain recruits, and maintain centralized control over the movement, the insurgency degenerates, perpetrating the seemingly senseless acts of violence currently occurring in Algeria today, the natural aftermath of a failed insurgency.     

Nagorno-Karabakh: obstacles to the resolution of the frozen conflict

Asia Europe Journal - The enduring deadlock in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has created a special, “frozen” phase in the conflict cycle....     

Breaking the cycle of violence: doing development in situations of conflict

During the 1980s, armed conflict devastated an increasing number of the world's poorest countries. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in relief and development were hard-pressed to determine their most effective response to situations where normal development became meaningless, and yet short-term relief programmes failed to deal with ‘permanent emergencies?s. This article describes the nature of these conflicts, their impact on the poor, and the evolution of NGO programmes in response. It explains why some NGOs have attempted to do development in the face of on-going violence, sometimes employing risky strategies and desperate measures. It argues the need for NGOs to play a part in building a civil society which can help to break the cycle of violence.     

Turning down the heat: Influences on conflict management in enduring rivalries

Enduring rivalries represent the most difficult challenges for policy makers seeking to promote international peace and security. Once in place, enduring rivalries account for a disproportionate number of crises, militarized disputes, as well as wars, and include conflicts that are more likely to escalate than those falling in other conflict contexts. Unfortunately, we know very little about conflict management in enduring rivalries from either a theoretical or policy perspective. This study seeks to account for why some rivalries are successfully managed while others persist at high and unabated levels of conflict In addressing these concerns, we explore 35 enduring rivalries over the period 1945–1992. We find that although enduring rivalries are quite resistant to influences that produce changes in their dynamics, both endogenous and contextual influences can exercise a significant impact upon the prospects for conflict management between enduring rivals.     

Empowerment and survival: Humanitarian work in civil conflict

This two-part article explores the experience of living and working for povertyfocused NGOs in a civil war whose roots lay in the chronically inequitable distribution of power and access to resources. Drawing on 12 years' work in Central America, the author reflects on the demands and constraints placed on international aid workers in the context of civil conflict; and on the ways in which relationships with local counterpart organisations and NGOs are affected. Empowerment and participation are examined from the perspective of those who refuse to play the role of war victims. Part Two explores the immediate and longer-term impacts of war and political violence both on those who survive, and on local and international workers who are concerned to address its causes and consequences.