The Weak Reading of Authority in Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law

Authority qua empowerment is theweak reading of authority in Hans Kelsen's writings.On the one hand, this reading appears to beunresponsive to the problem of authority as we know itfrom the tradition. On the other hand, it squares withlegal positivism. Is Kelsen a legal positivist?Not without qualification. For he defends anormativity thesis along with the separation thesis,and it is at any rate arguable that the normativitythesis mandates a stronger reading of authority thanthat modelled on empowerment. I offer, in the paper,a prima facie case on behalf of a stronger reading ofauthority in Kelsen. I go on to argue, however, thatthe textual evidence weighs heavily in favour of theweak reading. Both nomostatics and nomodynamics arepervasive points of view in the Pure Theory of Law,and both reflect species of empowerment as theendpoint of Kelsen's reconstructions.

     

Hans Kelsen's Concept of Normative Imputation

This article compares and contrasts Hans Kelsen's concept of normative imputation, in the Lecture Course of 1926, with the concepts of peripheral and central imputation, in The Pure Theory of Law of 1934. In this process, a wider and more significant distinction is revealed within the development of Hans Kelsen's theory of positive law. This distinction represents a shift in Kelsen's philosophical allegiance from the Neo‐Kantianism of Windelband to that of Cohen. This, in turn, reflects a broader disengagement of The Pure Theory of Law from the more direct connection with a political project of a civitas maxima envisaged by the Lecture Course.     

Stateless Law: Kelsen's Conception and its Limits

Hans Kelsen’s claim that the state and the law are identicalis surrounded by a somewhat mystical air. Yet, the ‘identitythesis’ loses much of its mystical aura when it is seenas an attempt to recast the state, qua social fact, in deontologicalterms. The state is seen as a condition necessary to accountfor the validity of legal acts. Indeed, the meaning of the stateis reduced to the function performed by a conception of orderin the reproduction of a system of norms. No further socialfact would attest to its existence. From a sociological pointof view, all law is essentially, and principally, law sans state.     

Kelsen's Theory on International Law during His Exile in Geneva

Kelsen's monistic theory of international law was shaped during his exile in Geneva (1933–1940), but its deep roots are to be found in his Pure Theory of Law, centred on the neo‐Kantian notion of “system.” According to this conception, a legal system can only descend from a single principle. Consequently, Kelsen constructed a monistic theory of law, i.e., a legal system incorporating all norms into a pyramidal structure culminating in a single principle: the fundamental norm. This Kelsenian pyramid must also include international law, considering that if international law were a legal system different from national law (as the dualistic theory assumes), the theoretical construction would need two fundamental norms. This dualism is as incompatible with Kelsen's monistic vision as Schmitt's theory of “Great Spaces,” creating a hierarchical system of international relations. In the Kelsenian pyramid, international law occupies a position superior to national law: The consequences of this assumption are discussed in some documents recently published in German and French.     

Oakeshott on the Authority of Law

Abstract. The author explains Michael Oakeshott's distinctive theory of law through an explanation of its notion of authority. He explains the view that modern states are ambiguous, consisting partly of civil associations and partly of enterprise associations . Authority is not a function of people's attitudes to those in power, but exists when a government's action is itself accepted as sufficient reason for unconditional obedience. Authority in this sense cannot exist in enterprise association, commitment to which must be contingent on the fulfillment of purposes common to all participants. But modern states are compulsory associations, different from each. Furthermore, authority could never be justified on a rational choice model, which must always be teleological in character. Because this means there can be no solution to the problem of political obligation, all philosophy can do is describe abstractly the Rule of Law state which does reconcile authority and liberty.     

论法官助理制度的功能定位与职权界分

员额制、立案登记制以及以审判为中心的诉讼制度改革等系列改革措施的推进使入额法官面临空前的办案压力。合理的法官助理制度使数量有限的法官处理大量案件成为可能,同时为法律人才的培养提供了良好的渠道。界定法官助理的职权范围,应当以能否保障裁判的正当性为标准。根据这一标准,对非讼案件、简易程序案件进行审理和裁判的职权以及处理审前事务的职权可以划归法官助理行使。我国现行法官助理制度片面重视法官助理提高诉讼效率的功能,忽视了培养和储备法律人才的功能,导致法官助理岗位丧失吸引力。同时,现行制度未赋予法官助理审理非讼案件、简易程序案件,以及主持审前程序的权力,不利于降低法官的办案压力。为综合解决上述问题,应当将法官助理岗位分为初级法官助理和高级法官助理,并设定不同的任职条件和职权范围。     

Hans Kelsen's Doctrine of Imputation

First, the author examines the traditional doctrine of imputation. A look at the traditional doctrine is useful for establishing a point of departure in comparing Kelsen's doctrines of central and peripheral imputation. Second, the author turns to central imputation. Here Kelsen's doctrine follows the traditional doctrine in attributing liability or responsibility to the subject. Kelsen's legal subject, however, has been depersonalized and thus requires radical qualification. Third, the author takes up peripheral imputation, which is the main focus of the paper. It is argued that with respect to the basic form of the law, exhibited by the linking of legal condition with legal consequence, peripheral imputation counts as an austere doctrine, shorn as it is of all references to legal personality or the legal subject. If Kelsen's reconstructed legal norms are empowerments, then the austere doctrine of peripheral imputation captures the rudiments of their form, exactly what would be expected if peripheral imputation does indeed serve as the category of legal cognition. Finally, the author develops the puzzle surrounding the legal "ought" in this context. Although Kelsen talks at one point as though the legal "ought" were the peculiarly legal category, the author submits that this is not the best reading of Kelsen's texts.     

论竞争法主管机关与产业监管机关的管辖权划分

竞争法主管机关与产业监管机关对受管制产业竞争行为的管辖权划分,需要考察三重维度:以政府管制与竞争政策的差异性为横向维度;以管制革新与过渡性产业的竞争政策实施为纵向维度;以产业管制密度及其对竞争政策的贯彻为个别考察维度。我国的制度构建应充分考虑上述三重维度,合理划分、协调反垄断法主管机关与产业监管机关的管辖权。     

浅议我国反垄断执法机构的设置

根据世界各国的通行做法,设置专门的反垄断执法机构,可以保障反垄断法的严格有效实施。我国应当借鉴这一做法,建立一个独立、专业、权威的反垄断执法机构,并依法赋予反垄断执法机构以准司法权,以保障反垄断法的有效实施。我国反垄断法(最新送审稿)对反垄断执法机构也予以了明确规定,但这些规定值得进一步研究。     

论越权刑法解释

在当代中国,越权刑法解释问题已经成为类推制度寿终正寝之后罪刑法定主义的最大敌人,极大地损害了刑法的人权保障机能.刑法解释有权力和权利两种不同层面的存在样态,刑法解释的对象是刑法条文背后的刑法规范,对刑法立法而言具有从属性特征."越权"包括越实有职权和越解释权两种类型.越权刑法解释包括越权刑法立法解释和越权刑法司法解释两大类.本文进一步探析了越权刑法解释的成因,进而提出了包括建立撤销机制等在内的一系列应对方案.     

The Application of Kelsen's Theory of the Legal System to European Community Law – The Supremacy Puzzle Resolved

Law and Philosophy -     

Kelsen's Development of the Fehlerkalkül-Theory

Abstract.  In this article the author follows the argumentative ascent of the Vienna School of Legal Positivism, and especially of Hans Kelsen, as concerns the intellectual topos of "law contrary to law." The issues dealt with feature under various headings—albeit always prominently—in the national schools of legal theory. What distinguishes the Viennese approach is the extraordinary generality and height of abstraction it has reached and that facilitates the unification of most disparate legal phenomena. The intention of the article is threefold: firstly, to bring the important, albeit mostly maltreated theory of the Fehlerkalkül ("error-calculus") into the light of theoretical attention; secondly, to demonstrate Kelsen's method of developing legal philosophy only given concrete problems of the positive law and its theory; finally, to deal with criticism.     

Hans Kelsen's Normativist Reductionism

Abstract. This paper discusses Kelsen's attempt at reducing the concept of subjektives Recht (what is subjectively right) to that of objektives Recht (what is objectively right). This attempt fails, it is argued, because in Kelsen's theory the concept of subjektives Recht survives concealed within the concept of individual norm (individuelle Norm), a norm that, pace Kelsen, is not a case of what is objectively right (objektives Recht) but is precisely what is subjectively right (subjektives Recht): We could call it “what is individually right.”     

Criminal Law,Parental Authority,and the State

In the recently published collection, Criminal Law and the Authority of the State, two contributions allude to an analogy with parental authority as a means to a better understanding of the institution of criminal punishment, but reach different conclusions. Malcolm Thorburn uses the parental authority analogy to justify the institution of state punishment as an assertion of robust authority over offenders. Antje du Bois-Pedain uses the same analogy to advocate the idea of punishment as an inclusionary practice, designed to reintegrate offenders into society. I argue that Thorburn’s theory of robust authority is inconsistent if not self-contradictory when it tries to assume a liberal posture, and that du Bois-Pedain’s reintegrative model provides a better account of the justification and objectives of state punishment.     

论中国反垄断执法机构的设置

以维护自由公平竞争秩序为己任的反垄断法是现代市场经济的基本法律之一,而其功能的有效发挥离不开一个权威、独立的执法机构。反垄断执法机构的科学设置及其职责的合理确定是中国反垄断法制建设中的重要一环,也是行政管理学和行政法学中的一个重要问题。本文首先分析国外反垄断执法机关的设置及其职能,作为我国反垄断执法机关的设计参考。在确定中国反垄断执法机构的设置时要考虑到反垄断法本身的特点、现有相关机构的设置情况以及外国经验的比较借鉴等因素,通过中西方政府职能的发展比较,对我国反垄断执行机构的地位作出合理的定位。最后,我国反垄断执法机关的设置,要遵循权威独立、依法设置、精干效能等原则。据此,不宜在现有机构中指定反垄断执法机构,而应该单独创设专门的执法机构,其可以称为"国家反垄断委员会"或"国家公平交易委员会",并只在中央和省两级设立。这是由于反垄断法更注重维护宏观经济秩序、防止市场竞争不足从而具有政策性、灵活性和行政主导性的特点决定的。这样的机构应拥有调查检查权、审核批准权、行政处罚权、行政强制措施权和行政裁决权,并应拥有对地方各级政府及其部门和国务院各部门的限制竞争行为(行政垄断行为)直接进行处理的权力。