Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors

There is case law to the effect that when companies are in financial difficulty directors owe a duty to take into account the interests of their companies' creditors. This article examines the primary reasons why contractarian theory, as applied by the law and economics school, is opposed to the existence of such a responsibility, namely it undermines efficiency and creditors can take measures in order to protect themselves adequately. The article asserts that efficiency cannot alone determine whether a duty should or should not be imposed on directors. Another critical value, fairness, must also be considered, and this value justifies the duty on the basis, inter alia, that many creditors are not able to protect themselves adequately, or at all by contracting, and are deserving of the limited protection that the duty would bring. In any event, it is submitted that a duty to creditors would enhance efficiency in some respects and warrants consideration on that basis.     

中国上市公司董事会治理与制度完善

结合新修改的<公司法>、<证券法>,从董事会治理的角度讨论我国上市公司董事会制度的立法完善问题,指出董事会的立法应该以上市公司利益最大化制度为目标,而不是股东利益最大化,更不是控股股东利益的最大化.在这个理论前提下,在对我国现行的董事会运行实践和制度环境进行评述后,指出我国上市公司董事会治理中,董事会独立性不够,董事会决策和监督功能弱化.最后对我国上市公司董事会制度的立法完善提出了一系列立法建议和对策,包括:设立上市公司国有股权信托计划,弱化政府透过股权对董事会的超强控制;由债权银行提名专项董事参与上市公司运作,以提高金融分业经营格局下银行信贷资金的安全性和使用效益;建立董事执业档案以培育职业经理人市场.     

国有独资公司董事长的权源结构与运行

国有独资公司董事长作为董事会之常设机构和代表职位 ,在国有独资公司内部居于领导者的地位。但由于目前我国公司法设计上的固有缺陷 ,且在董事长的权力源结构中 ,非规范性法外权力实际大大超过了公司法上赋予的规范性权力 ,致使董事长集董事会职权于一身成为可能 ,权力变型运作成为一种普遍现象。基于此 ,跳出现有制度框架 ,在现行《公司法》之外寻求对国有独资公司内部治理结构的制度创新 ,从规范董事会、董事长之权力源入手 ,改善监事会的结构 ,充实监事会的力量 ,提升监事会的地位 ,建立全新的由监事会→董事会→经理机构的二层制治理结构模式 ,应是解决目前国有独资公司治理结构进退维局面艰较为可行的制度方案。为此 ,把国有独资公司从现行公司法中析出 ,适时制定单行的《国有独资公司法》已十分必要     

Employee representation and board size in the Nordic countries

Several European countries have mandatory employee representation on company boards, but the consequences for corporate governance are debated. We use employee representation rules in the otherwise quite similar Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) to elicit information on shareholder preferences for employee representation and board size. We find that shareholders tend to choose board structures that minimize the proportion of employee representatives. In Denmark and Norway employee representation depends on board size, and shareholders choose board sizes that minimize the number of employee representatives. However, many companies have more employee representatives than is mandatory. In Sweden, where the law mandates a fixed number of employee representatives (two or three depending on firm size), shareholders choose to have larger boards. In Finland, where employee representation is not mandatory, <1 % of companies choose to have it. Whatever, the merits of employee representation, shareholders appear to be mildly averse to it.     

勒斯勒尔草案股份公司治理规则及发展

德国学者赫尔曼·勒斯勒尔帮助日本制订了第一部公司法（草案）,其中关于股份公司的一般规则,特别是股份公司机关的法的构造奠定了日本公司治理结构的深厚基础,了解这些可以掌握公司法中董事会、监事会、股东大会的历史流变和股份公司治理结构的发展脉络,并体会公司治理仍存在的制度性困惑。     

康复我国上市公司的四项施治方案论证——从公司治理结构视角观察

一股独大是导致我国上市公司诸种病症发生的直接根源之一 ,它妨碍着上市公司治理结构的完善。在目前的条件下采取以下救治方案 ,包括强化公司法的强制性规范 ,拆解国有大股东的股份 ,强制规定中小股东代表进入董事会 ,彻底改造监事会制度 ,有助于上市公司的康复和股东信心的恢复     

欧美等国公司内部监督机制对我国的启示

各国公司治理结构可分为英美的外部监控模式和德国的内部监控模式,法国属兼采用两种模式的国家。我国公司法应授权公司选择单层制或双层制,并对监事会权力作出重新调整,限制董事和监事的兼职数量,加强银行和债权人在公司治理中的作用。     

从三个“谁”的角度分析中国国有公司治理——鉴于日本的失败经验

在日本,公司治理的效力很早以前就成为较大的问题,很多人认为日本的许多经营者监督机制并没有发挥应有的作用,而是存在很多漏洞,这是因为日本的法律和现实情况之间存在很大的距离,比如日本的法律规定股东大会选任监事和董事,董事会和监事对董事或者代表董事进行监督,而在现实情况中,社长把握着极大的权力,可以选任自己的部下作为监事和董事,甚至在退休之后都可以垂帘听政。因此,20世纪90年代以后,日本引进了美国式的公司治理制度,但是这种公司治理制度改革不能认为是很成功的,以日本的失败经验为基础分析中国大型国有公司的公司治理问题很有参考价值,这就是日本没有从三个"谁"的视点进行改革。     

“个性化”的有限责任公司——评《中国公司法修改草案建议稿》相关问题

《中国公司法修改草案建议稿》基本实现了提高公司法的可操作性以及尊重公司章程自治两大目标,但在有限责任公司规定方面,仍存在改进空间。草案应取消股东最高人数限制、完善股权继承异议制、禁止以尚未履行的劳务作为出资、承认书面及电子表决方式,并在明确区分大小公司的基础上构造监事制、职工董事制,并赋予章程自身塑造董事会与股东会权限关系的自由。     

美国商业判断规则对我国公司法的启示——以经济分析为重点

商事经营判断规则:一方面保障董事的经营决策权;另一方面也是司法应经营决策特点回避对经营进行审查的一种策略。从完善公司治理机制而言,我国应借鉴商业判断规则的成功经验,以鼓励企业家的精神和促进社会效率,以及体现法律的公平、交易安全等法律价值。     

股东会、董事会职权的兜底条款质疑

规定股东会职权的《公司法》第38条和规定董事会职权的第47条分别有一个概括性的规定：“公司章程规定的其他职权”,这种条款一般被称为兜底条款。这是2005年公司法修改的时候新增加的条款,立法者试图通过强化章程自治解决股东会和董事会职权规定不清的问题。然而,事与愿违,兜底条款不能全部实现立法的目的,甚至还由此产生了新的问题,即在章程没有规定时,无法判断有些事项究竞是股东会的职权还是董事会的职权。同时在股东会职权规定条款和董事会职权规定条款增加兜底条款实际上是不了解股东会和董事会功能定位所致,因此需要先对兜底条款作无害化解释,在下次公司法修改时删除。     

德国上市公司中董事会与监事会的共同作用

德国上市公司采用双轨制的公司治理模式,即董事会和监事会分别担负公司的经营管理与监督职责。同时,通过一系列权利、义务的分配,使董事会与监事会能够在公司治理中紧密合作,共同发挥作用。依照《德国股份法》及《德国上市公司治理准则》的有关规定,德国上市公司中董事会与监事会的共同作用主要体现在以下三个方面:一、董事会对监事会的报告义务;二、监事会的同意保留权;三、监事会的协商职能。     

谈对董事会的控制问题--兼谈独立董事制度

董事会的权力日益膨胀,为了防止此种权力的滥用而有必要对董事会的行为进行控制.传统的控制机制以保护股东利益为宗旨,有很多缺陷;为了修正传统的控制机制,职工董事、职工股东、累积投票制、代理投票权竞争、要约收购等控制措施应运而生,但它们也有各自的缺陷.独立董事制度是一种较好的控制机制,其价值目标在于保证董事会的行为符合公司全体相关利益者的要求;但该机制价值的实现有赖于其内容设计的合理性.     

The Impact of Independent Directors on Organizational Effectiveness in Monetary and In-Kind Stakeholder Dialogue Museums

This study investigates the issue of stakeholder dialogue in the context of art museums. We propose and empirically test the existence of two different kinds of stakeholder dialogue: monetary and in-kind. By relying on a sample of 70 US art museums during the 2007–2010 period, we show that high monetary and high in-kind stakeholder dialogue museums are significantly different. In particular, we test the impact of the number of independent directors on fundraising activity and board monitoring. We find that a higher number of independent directors leads both to better monitoring and to improved fundraising activity, with the effect being stronger for monetary stakeholder dialogue museums.     

论公司对外担保若干问题--兼评我国《公司法》第60条第3款

公司为他人提供担保,本质上是公司之经营行为.早期,因为强调对股东等投资人的保护,各国多对公司对外担保予以严格限制.在现代,各国对公司对外担保的限制日益放宽,甚而不再对其加以特别限制.公司对外担保应当由公司董事会自主决定.公司对董事会权限的限制,不得对抗善意第三人.同时通过对董事责任的追究来避免公司滥设担保之风险.我国<公司法>第60条第3款对公司对外担保的规定因为用语模糊,多有歧义,且不能适应公司法之现代发展,应予废除.     

Company Liability and Competition Law: Exposure of Company to Risk of Undesirable Behaviour of Directors

In order to protect the objectives of competition policy, companies as undertakings are primarily targeted for the competition law infringements based on the mixed approach of compliance and deterrence theories relying on the view that company directors are incentivised to comply with the rules of competition law by the internal compliance programmes and corporate fines are the consequences of incompliance. This enforcement strategy gives rise to a tension between corporate governance, company law and competition law, as the former two focus on the behaviour of individuals within the corporate structure, while the latter concerns the impact of the company’s behaviour in the market. The question that arises in this tension is whether or to what extent competition law actually considers the way in which the company is run internally while it seeks to promote these primary objectives. This article analyses the deterrent effectiveness of primary enforcement strategy employed in the UK competition law regime and argues that competition law does not tend to localise the source of conduct or particular decisions and does not aim to correct the right wrongdoer. Despite that lack of effectiveness of public enforcement strategy to deter further anti-competitive behaviour has led individual sanctions to be introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in the UK, companies are still primarily targeted by corporate fines even though directors have intentionally breached the rules of competition law and this strategy is unlikely to deter directors from engaging with undesirable behaviour which exposes the company to risk of liability and loss.

     

背离公司担保决议规制的法效果——分析路径的困境与出路

根据公司法,公司为他人提供担保的,应当经股东会或董事会决议。对违背决议要求的公司担保行为的效力,通过分析公司担保规则是否为强制性规则的路径存在着解释困境。形成担保决议系公司意思的形成行为,公司对外签订担保合同系意思表示行为,应在意思形成行为与意思表示行为分离的基础上分析背离公司担保决议规制的法效果。     

宪法上的自由之极限:美国"劳伦斯案"评析

基本自由权之逻辑终点,可分为内外两面:所有自由中自主性最高的那一个,可谓自由之内在极限;而在整体法秩序中,宪法实定法所能给出的最边界自由,可谓自由之外在极限。当代国家所面临的同性恋者权利问题,正是自由这两个面向结合最为紧密的法律难题之一。面对这样一个临界权利的难题,2003年的美国联邦最高法院,在公认是持保守主义观点的大法官占多数的格局下,却通过劳伦斯案判决,对当今人类实定宪法上的最为极限的自由,做出了一个颇为激进的自由主义宣告。     

论域外公司治理改革实践经验之借鉴

近年来,英美等国开始对其公司治理模式进行了一系列改革,包括制定各种公司治理的原则、指引、章程、鼓励机构投资者参与公司治理、要求公司增强董事会的独立性、在董事会内引入一定数量的独立董事等,希望通过这些措施,增强公司的内部监控力度,以弥补由于外部监控不足所造成的问题.而德日的内部监控模式也开始学习、借鉴和效仿英美的公司治理模式.剖析、借鉴实践中各国公司治理改革经验将对我国公司治理的改进提供有益的帮助.     

The inefficacy of private enforcement of directors’ duties

Company directors play an important role in society. Their activities have significant effects on the interests of their companies, shareholders and other stakeholders. Consequently, the law regards them as fiduciaries and imposes duties which set out behavioural expectations. The private enforcement regime is the primary mechanism adopted by many common law jurisdictions for securing compliance with directors’ duties. The crucial question is whether this regime is effective in securing enforcement of directors’ duties. This article addresses this question by examining the fundamental weaknesses of the private enforcement regime. In exploring these weaknesses, it focuses on the UK and Nigerian experience. It crucially argues that the private enforcement regime, due to its weaknesses, is unable to provide deterrence and compensatory benefits. It is therefore ineffective as an enforcement mechanism for breach of directors’ duties. This article therefore concludes that there is need for a complementary enforcement regime.