Judges and CEOs: French Aspects of Corporate Governance

The debate about corporate governance has brought to the front stage the notion of social interest or interest of the company itself as distinct of its stakeholders. French Law, judges, and CEOs use this notion with different meanings and intentions. The judges refer to it mainly to guarantee the continuity of the firm, especially when the latter faces economic difficulties; the CEOs refer to it to keep a free hand in managing the company. Shareholders see the notion as ambiguous and mostly used against their own interest. Shareholders and company interest do not merge. They differ on the industrial relations policy they induce and in the management freedom bestowed on CEOs. A reform of French Company Law currently under discussion seeks conciliation while trying to comply with the principles of corporate governance best practices.     

The contribution of EU public procurement law to corporate social responsibility

This article argues that while EU public procurement law increasingly allows public authorities to take environmental and social considerations into account in public purchasing decisions, it does impose limits on the possibility for authorities to incentivise corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies through public procurement. These specific limits are the result of the EU legislator's choice to endorse the Court of Justice's ordoliberal approach to public procurement law. This approach is in tension with EU CSR policy, and more broadly, the EU's non‐economic goals such as environmental protection, the fight against climate change, human rights and social policy. It reflects a normative preference for the right of undertakings to compete for a tender over the freedom of government authorities to choose a supplier on public interest grounds even if these choices are based exclusively on a legitimate public interest and should be reconsidered.     

Corporate Social Responsibility European Style

Abstract: The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) emerged in the official discourse of the EU in 2000. This article explains how, while CSR may have been initially an idea about the scope of the responsibility of companies towards their environment, it has now become a process in which the representatives of the business community have come to occupy the main role, and whose purpose is to promote learning among business organisations, rather than to identify the components of a regulatory framework for CSR. The central question now, therefore, is whether the so‐called ‘business case’ for CSR is strong enough, so that we may hope that the forces of market will suffice to encourage companies to behave responsibly, over and above their obligation to comply with their legal obligations. The article shows, however, that this case rests on certain presuppositions about markets and the business environment, which cannot be simply assumed, but should be affirmatively created by a regulatory framework for CSR. Following the introduction, it proceeds in four stages. First, it examines the development of CSR in the EU. Second, it offers a critical examination of the so‐called ‘business case’ for CSR, taking into account the growing diversity within the enlarged EU. It then discusses, as an alternative, what a regulatory framework for CSR could resemble, highlighting a number of initiatives which have been taken in this regard by the EU. The article finally concludes that, since the failure of the European Multi‐Stakeholder Forum on CSR in 2004, the debate has made a turn in the wrong direction, both because of the mistaken view that the establishment of a regulatory framework for CSR would threaten the competitiveness of European companies, and because of the naive (and contradictory) view that reliance on market mechanisms will suffice to ensure that corporations will seek to minimise the negative social and environmental impacts of their activities, even in circumstances where they are not legally obliged to do so.     

Tax Havens and Criminology

For more then thirty years, "tax havens" have allowed major players form the political and financial spheres, as well as from the criminal one, to act in a "sovereign" way, that is to say, in a determinant way, so that their decisions become decisive in the historical course. "Offshore sovereignty" designates the opportunities that actors off all stripes have in the offshore centres, legal havens, free zones and free ports of the world, to conduct their activities unhampered by state structures, which they do by investing their money in recognized economic entities, or financing political parties.     

Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Globalization and Regulatory Hardening

Globalization and the growth of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been accompanied by an increasing call for corporations to take responsibility for their environmental and social impacts, and for greater corporate disclosure and transparency with regard to nonfinancial risks (collectively known as corporate social responsibility or CSR). At the same time, governments have increasingly turned to mandatory obligations for formerly voluntary CSR engagement, a trend we call the legalization of CSR. This article analyzes the “hardening” and legalization of CSR, and considers what this process tells us about norms and assumptions regarding the social responsibility of firms in the United States and around the world. Through our analysis of corporate trends, regulations, and case law from the United States, European Union, China, and India, we argue that the process of legalization and redefinition of CSR through a shareholder primacy lens may, troublingly, undermine the very notion of CSR. In the face of these trends, this article concludes with a redefinition of CSR that includes an express commitment to corporations’ social and ethical responsibility to society.     

Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World‐Culture or World‐Capitalism?

This article analyzes the phenomenon of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR; specifically: social private regulation) in light of two sociological paradigms of globalization: “world‐culture” and “world‐capitalism.” The study treats three analytically distinct features of CSR: the political contestation over its meaning, the role of business studies in transforming it into a managerial model, and its consolidation as a market of authorities. The study finds that (1) while CSR may be theorized as a emergent “world cultural” model, the culture paradigm does not take sufficient account of the role of corporations in shaping it, and (2) while both paradigms recognize the transition from political contestations over the character of CSR to its deployment by means of private regulation, the world‐capitalism paradigm offers stronger tools for theorizing the mechanisms of change that mediate between political agency and institutionalized regulatory outcomes.     

试论“超越法律”的企业社会责任

"超越法律"的企业社会责任,是企业负担的那些超出法律强制性义务规定且符合社会价值和期望的责任,确认这种责任的法律规范实为"软法",它主要通过责任目标内化于企业的商业行为和治理结构之中,以实现企业的"自我管制";通过保护利益相关者的实质性和程序性权利,提高利益相关者的谈判抗衡力量以实现市场的自发对抗;并以声誉机制和非政府组织的作用作为责任的实施机制的补充。     

Corporate Social Responsibility: A Step Towards Stronger Involvement of Business in MEA Implementation?

This article explores the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). It offers an overview of the linkages, a survey of relevant provisions of key MEAs, and a review of the relationship between global trade rules and MEAs. Finally, the article highlights three ongoing discussions with relevance to linkages between CSR and MEAs: (1) whether, and if so how, to identify minimum global business standards in the environmental sphere; (2) the rapidly evolving 'sub-theme' within the CSR agenda which addresses the business/development interface, and the contribution of business to poverty reduction, sustainable livelihoods and achieving the Millennium Development Goals; and (3) the development by the International Organization for Standardization of an international guidance standard on 'organizational social responsibility', which, if adopted, will become ISO 26000. The risk of seeing CSR as a new pathway to MEA implementation is that the role of MEAs in informing the development of minimum acceptable environmental norms of business behaviour will be 'watered down'. If MEAs are to learn from CSR, their competitors and often stronger counterparts in the international architecture – intergovernmental trade and investment arrangements – also need to be equipped not only to be sensitive to CSR, but actively to support it. ¹     

Urban Land-Use and Building Control in The Netherlands: Flexible Decisions in a Rigid System

In the Netherlands, the system of rules concerning land-use and building at first sight seems rigid. A closer look, however, discloses a remarkable amount of flexibility partly authorized by 'hidden' legal possibilities. In assessing applications for building permits officials generally rely primarily not on the rules of building ordinances but on professional norms of good construction practice. A case-study of land-use planning shows a decision-process characterized by coalition-building which produces plans that are constantly changed to meet shifting external political and economic constraints. Such practices tend to endanger the normative goals of legal certainty and public accountability. To characterize the decision-processes involved as 'rule-application' or 'rule-enforcement' is not adequate. Firstly, because it tends to reduce the complex working of a rule to the imposition of pre-existing legal standards. Secondly, because the structure of the actors and their relationships is far more complex than a dichotomy of the 'regulator' and 'the regulated' suggests.     

Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards

Arguments about Europe's democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature and ultimate goals of the integration process. Those who assume that economic integration must lead to political integration tend to apply to European institutions standards of legitimacy derived from the theory and practice of parliamentary democracies. We argue that such standards are largely irrelevant at present. As long as the majority of voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic integration, we cannot expect parliamentary democracy to flourish in the Union. Economic integration without political integration is possible only if politics and economics are kept as separate as possible. The depoliticisation of European policy-making is the price we pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact. These being the preferences of the voters, we conclude that Europe's 'democratic deficit' is democratically justified.
The expression 'democratic deficit,' however, is also used to refer to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, and this second meaning is much more relevant to a system of limited competences such as the EC. Now the key issues for democratic theory are about the tasks which may be legitimately delegated to institutions insulated from the political process, and how to design such institutions so as to make independence and accountability complementary and mutually supporting, rather than antithetical. If one accepts the 'regulatory model' of the EC, then, as long as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and narrowly defined, non-majoritarian standards of legitimacy should be sufficient to justify the delegation of the necessary powers.     

论公司社会责任及其规制

公司社会责任在本质上不是个严谨的法学术语,而应隶属社会学范畴,与个人社会责任相呼应,内容包括对于股东之外的、与公司密切相关的主体的社会性义务承担。公司社会责任的有无与公司本质的认定密切相关,在当前的社会环境下应维持公司的营利性本质,公司社会责任的履行须在不违营利性的框架内运转。结合对公司社会责任规制的比较法考察,我国公司社会责任规制问题的合理进路是外部引导督促与内部优化改善相结合,促使公司在接纳社会责任思想的前提下主动承担社会性的义务。     

The Molotov Milkshake: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Market

This article investigates links between the final scene—the milkshake scene—of P. T. Anderson’s film, ‘There Will Be Blood’, and a commercial advertisement for the sale of oil, which relies on a milkshake drinking analogy. The comparison probes a tension between the aspiration for capitalist economic growth and the self-regulation of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Business figures committed to the practice of CSR struggle with the possibility that deeper, systemic forms of violence inherent in market competition supersede their attempts at installing more responsible cycles of economic exchange. A risk remains, all the while, that social and environmental concern of the kind expressed in CSR is only able to acquire ‘value’ in the market, a relational or ‘dialectical’ system of exchange, where it meets contrasting cycles or events in the market: the value of alternatives (e.g. ‘going green’) is predicated on pre-existing products or earlier cycles of marketisation. The article discusses difficulties that CSR creates in terms of making interventions and raising conflict with corporate actors, and a tendency for the system to leave inert, exposed or abandoned, those that try. The capacity of CSR to eradicate the more vicious shadow of capitalist markets is challenged in the article. There is no release, the author argues, in a concept that is so essentially dependent on market mechanisms and on competitively motivated (ex)change.     

企业社会责任的制度化

面对后金融危机时代以来中国经济可持续发展的强风险导向,现代产业网络核心的企业,已经越来越难以离开与利益相关方涉及经济、环境和社会等不同要素层面的交互和嵌入。更多地承担企业社会责任,不仅成为现代企业融入产业网络的标签,而且越来越借助制度的约束力,以保证切实践行。本研究在完成专门指向"制度性要素"的国内外文献和经验整理的基础上,归纳CSR责任制度化的世界理论共识和中国难题,藉此分析中国企业社会责任制度化的现状、问题和矛盾,在此基础上,以作为中国经济发展引擎的上海地区近200家产业和信息化领域企业为调研样本,甄别和发现责任制度化的关键议题和优先顺位,进而提出当下中国企业责任制度化的多元路径实现方案。     

结社自由的基本权利属性定位

结社自由在基本权利体系中属于自由权范畴,并与其他基本自由权、政治权利、经济社会和文化权利在属性和内容上存在一定的交叉与竞合,因而结社自由具有复合属性之特点。从法律文本以及宪法理论考察,结社自由是一种独立的自由权类型,而非全然为表达自由或政治权利所吸收。厘清结社自由的权利属性定位,对于结社自由的实现、尤其是非政治性结社行为的保障,以及对于结社自由限制措施的合宪性审查和其他相关基本权利之法律救济均具有重要而积极的意义。     

试论现代企业的外部伦理关系

社会主义市场经济进一步深化,社会伦理道德必将随之产生变化。作为市场经济中的主体,经济组织或企业必须重新审视自身在整个社会秩序中的位置,遵循社会准则和经济原则。     

The Reflexive Properties of Corporate Governance Codes: The Reception of the ‘Comply‐or‐explain’ Approach in Slovenia

The Slovenian Corporate Governance Code for Public Joint‐Stock Companies was adopted in March 2004. We examine how far the implementation of the Code has resulted in the ‘reflexive’ learning processes which the ‘comply‐or‐explain’ approach to corporate governance aims to bring about. We find that compliance strategies are strikingly uniform across firms in terms of the content of deviations as well as in types of disclosure and explanations for deviations. Moreover, the quality of corporate reporting is low, with effective explanations representing only a small minority of disclosures. Thus there is little evidence that the Code has stimulated organizational learning. We consider the implications of our findings for the development of corporate governance in transition systems and for the comply‐or‐explain approach more generally.     

Co-evolution of politics and corporate governance

In the OECD countries, there exists a negative cross-country correlation between an economy's degree of employment protection and its degree of corporate ownership dispersion. One explanation is that employees’ political rights influence corporate governance: systems characterized by strong employees’ rights tend to be balanced by strong and concentrated owners. In this approach, the separation between ownership and control is only possible when unions and social democratic parties are sufficiently weak. In this paper we argue that causation runs also in the opposite direction (from strong concentrated ownership to strong employees’ protection) and leads to multiple equilibria characterized by alternative co-evolution paths of politics and corporate governance. To empirically assess our theoretical arguments we estimate a simultaneous equation model for workers rights’ protection and corporate ownership structure determination by three-stage least squares in a sample of 21 OECD countries. We conclude by arguing that the relative relevance of each flow of causation has important economic policy implications.     

DOES THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE HELP PROMOTE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY?

The business judgment rule (BJR) is a U.S. corporate law concept that has gained international recognition. It has been moulded, particularly in the definition of the Delaware courts, to protect the managerial business discretion, in other words to protect directors’ decisions from judicial review. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) questions the relationship between corporation with a business purpose and society. More and more attention is drawn to the various impacts of corporate decisions on society, asking for the necessity for directors to take these impacts into consideration when making business decisions. At the centre of CSR and the BJR are the fiduciary duties of the directors — the duty of diligence and the duty of care — and the question as to if the directors have breached their duties and if they have fulfilled them in a CSR compatible manner. This paper discusses how the BJR helps promoting CSR by discussing the advantages and disadvantages (real or apparent) of the BJR with respect to CSR.     

Economic incentives for the self-regulation of the release of price-sensitive information

Companies, as primary disseminators of information, and financial institutions, as major recipients, have economic incentives to self-regulate the transmission and usage of price-sensitive information. These include increased (lost) reputation costs and adverse share price penalties arising from poor management of information disclosure. The economic motivation for self-regulation is seen as conceptually linked to but distinct from legislative changes. Self-regulation has the strong support of economic efficiency arguments, whereas recent additional new legislative changes do not. This article examines a major corporate and institutional response to the new regulatory climate—to internalize part of the regulatory process during their regular relationship communications. Relationships between the case companies and institutions already exist for transaction purposes. They are used as a convenient and low-cost means to pursue self-regulation and to avoid errors of price-sensitive information release. This self-regulatory process is illustrated using case material. It is clear from the response pattern presented that the development of a self-regulatory framework by the parties has been an iterative one. The corporate and institutional systems that have been evolving seem to be significantly influenced by the regulatory trends. The regulatory changes appear to have played a role in increasing market costs incurred by those companies with poor stock market communication practices. The article ends by arguing that new proposals to change in the formal regulatory system should recognize that further legislation is unlikely to improve the poor prosecution record. Nevertheless, legislative changes can combine with and buttress the self-regulation process to create an effective regulatory system.     

Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach for Economic Expression

Commentators differ on whether a diminished constitutional status for profit-driven speech is consistent with free speech theory. Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission largely embraced an unfettered marketplace approach for political speech financed by corporate treasuries. Given the harm a free market approach is said to have produced in the economic realm, is this approach useful for structuring the constitutional protection economic expression receives? This article discusses the placement of economic expression within First Amendment theory and contends that restrictions on economic speech should be aimed at combating deceptive economic activities while overall regulatory goals should focus on requirements that enrich the supply of accurate and timely information.