Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act of 1982: A public choice analysis of turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives

The present paper uses various data sets and statistical techniques to examine the outcome of gerrymandering under the Voting Rights Act of 1982 on turnover rates in the U.S. House of Representatives, as well as the competitiveness in Party primaries for House seats. Evidence presented here suggests that political redistricting at the federal level (namely for U.S. House seats) has tended to favor incumbents in both the Party primaries and general elections. In fact, some results suggest that turnover rates (for 1988) are between 8.9 and 10.3 percentage points lower within states that engaged in such redistricting efforts. Our findings generally support the main tenets of the public choice view of legislator behavior.     

Reapportionment and partisan competition: When does reapportionment matter?

This research considers the effects of reapportionment on partisan competition. More precisely, this study develops a set of specifications under which we might expect varying effects of reapportionment on electoral patterns. By considering the history of political competition in the state, the geographic distribution of partisans, the history and methods of previous apportionments, and the political nature of the reapportionment, a set of specific hypotheses regarding the effects can be deduced. The theory is tested by application of it to the state of Oklahoma. Utilizing an interrupted time-series analysis of election results, we conclude that the 1964 reapportionment in Oklahoma had immediate electoral consequences. The 1971 reapportionment had virtually no effect. These findings are consistent with the expectations based on the theory developed in the paper.     

REPRESENTATION, REAPPORTIONMENT, AND THE SUPREME COURT

Abstract. The reapportionment of congressional and state legislative districts occasioned by decennial censuses has generated intense political and judicial conflict. This conflict has made clearer several obstacles to a deeper understanding of the nature of representation. It has also led to the fashioning of a new equal protection jurisprudence by the Supreme Court in an attempt to grapple with apportionment disputes. The Court has established clear standards for redistricting congressional and state legislative seats. Yet after two decades, the Court has still not produced judicially manageable standards to deal with the problems of partisan gerrymandering, affirmative gerrymandering,'political fairness', and the Court's impact on public policy. A review of the pertinent cases makes it possible to forecast the probable outcome of litigation involving these issues in the 1980 round of reapportionments.     

The Participatory Effects of Redistricting

While the effects of legal and institutional arrangements on political participation are well documented, little attention has been given to the potential participatory effects of one of the United States' most important electoral laws: constitutionally mandated reapportionment. By severing the ties between constituents and their incumbents, we argue, redistricting raises information costs, leading to increased levels of nonvoting in U.S. House contests. Survey data from the 1992 American National Election Studies show that redrawn citizens are half as likely to know their incumbent's name as citizens who remain in a familiar incumbent's district and, consequently, significantly more likely to roll off, or abstain from voting in the House election after having cast a presidential vote. We also show that participation rates in the 2002–2006 House elections in Texas—each of which followed a redistricting—match these patterns, with roll-off increasing 3% to 8% in portions of the state that were redrawn, controlling for other factors. The findings demonstrate that scholars and policy makers ought to be concerned with the extent to which the redrawing of congressional lines affects citizens' exercise of political voice.     

Court-ordered redistricting and the law of 1/<Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>

This paper examines the effect of redistricting on the law of 1/n, which posits that government spending increases with the number of legislative districts. Our analysis suggests that court-ordered redistricting in the 1960s significantly influenced the 1/n effect, because dividing districts (increasing their number) and merging districts (reducing their number) both reduce public spending. After redistricting, the positive relationship between seats and spending holds for lower chambers in bicameral legislatures. The US experience informs those interested in the design of bicameral institutions about the fiscal implications of legislative apportionment.     

Campaign styles: Persistency in campaign resource allocation

How do candidates allocate their campaign resources and when do they change their allocations? Using data of over 3.5 million expenditure items submitted by candidates who ran for House seats between 2004 through 2014, we provide a detailed picture of how candidates allocate their limited resources among different categories of activities. Although different candidates running in the same race allocated their campaign resource differently, in the aggregate, monthly expenditure patterns over the course of the campaign period across six election cycles are similar. Also, from one cycle to the next, candidates rarely changed their campaign resource allocations, even when they face varying qualities of challengers, different sets of voters due to redistricting, and increases in outside spending after Citizens United. This suggests that candidates’ expenditure decisions are sticky across election cycles. We show additional evidence of this persistency by documenting repeated contractual relationship with the same consultants and campaign vendors by campaigns.     

Forecasting the 2015 British general election: The Seats-Votes model

This paper applies the Seats-Votes Model to the task of forecasting the outcome of the 2015 election in Britain in terms of the seats won by the three major parties. The model derives originally from the ‘Law of Cubic Proportions’ the first formal statistical election forecasting model to be developed in Britain. It is an aggregate model which utilises the seats won by the major parties in the previous general election together with vote intentions six months prior to the general election to forecast seats. The model was reasonably successful in forecasting the 2005 and 2010 general elections, but has to be modified to take into account the ‘regime shift’ which occurred when the Liberal Democrats went into coalition with the Conservatives in 2010.     

Labour’s targeted constituency campaigning: nationally directed or locally produced?

Along with a number of other researchers, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley have consistently argued that constituency campaigning in Britain influences constituency election outcomes. In recent work, however, they have denied that the major efforts made by the Labour Party’s national headquarters to target resources and expertise into key seats in the 1997 general election was effective and that, as a consequence, the party had better results in these seats than elsewhere. Using various measures of campaign intensity, however, it is clear that target constituencies did have significantly stronger Labour campaigns than comparable constituencies that were not nationally targeted. Multivariate analysis also suggests that Labour’s performance in targeted seats was better than in comparable seats.     

Lessons of the 1982 English local elections

The 1982 local elections in Britain were the first elections fought on a nationwide basis by the Liberal/Social Democratic Party Alliance. Although there are methodological problems, the results in provincial England can be analysed to provide clues to the character of support for Britain's newest political formation. Although the Alliance achieved a substantially higher vote than the Liberals had in 1980, it proved difficult to achieve a breakthrough in terms of wards won—especially for the SDP who tended to contest poorer prospects than their Liberal partners. There is only weak evidence that the SDP could mobilize new sources of support. The even spread of the Alliance's vote was such as to cast doubt on their ability to win seats at the next general election unless a very high level of support is attained.     

The 2015 parliamentary elections in Egypt

The Egyptian parliamentary election, the third stage of the three-tiered plan created after the ouster of President Mursi, was held in two phases in late 2015. Egyptians cast their votes in the first phase on October 17 and 18, and in the second phase on December 1 and 2. The overall turnout rate was 28.3 percent. A total of 560 candidates secured seats–322 independent and 238 party-affiliated. The remaining 28 candidates were appointed by President Sisi. Traditionally, majority parties have ruled the parliament; however, in this election, independent candidates secured the majority of the seats. Most of the parliamentary seats were obtained by the supporters of Sisi. The only positive aspect of this election was the rise of previously sidelined groups: 87 women and 36 Christian Copts secured seats.     

We’ve got them on the list: contacting,canvassing and voting in a British general election campaign

Many voters are canvassed by British political parties in the months and weeks immediately preceding a general election – but many are not. The parties are selective in whom they make contact with, and where. They focus on those in marginal constituencies who are likely to vote for them – and having identified them early in the process they contact them again, seeking to sustain that support in the seats where the contest overall will be either won or lost. A large panel survey conducted immediately before and after the 2010 general election allows detailed insight into that pattern of canvassing, identifying who the parties contacted, and where, in the six months prior to the election being called, and then who were contacted during the month immediately preceding polling day, and in how many different ways. Each party focused on its own supporters in the marginal constituencies, and in the middle-class neighbourhoods within those constituencies, but whereas the Conservatives, expecting to win the election, campaigned most intensively in the seats they lost by relatively small margins at the previous contest, Labour and the Liberal Democrats fought defensive campaigns in the seats that they won then. Such tactics were successful; the more ways in which respondents were contacted by a party, the more likely they were to vote for it.     

Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan

Does reapportionment in a legislature affect policy outcomes? We examine this question from a comparative perspective by focusing on reapportionment associated with the electoral reform in Japan. First, we show that the reform of 1994 resulted in an unprecedented degree of equalization in legislative representation. Second, using municipal‐level data, we present evidence that municipalities in overrepresented districts received significantly more subsidies per capita, as compared to those in underrepresented districts, in both prereform and postreform years. Third, by examining the relationship between the change in the number of seats per capita and the change in the amount of subsidies per capita at the municipal level, we show that the equalization in voting strength resulted in an equalization of total transfers per person.     

Estimating the potential impact of nonvoters on outcomes of parliamentary elections in proportional systems with an application to German national elections from 1949 to 2009

“If turnout was 100%, would it affect the election result?” is a frequently asked research question. So far, the question has been primarily answered regarding the changes in the distribution of votes. This article extends the analysis to changes in the distribution of seats and government formation. It therefore proposes a method that factors in apportionment methods, election threshold, sizes of parliaments, leverage of nonvoters, closeness of election results, and individual characteristics of nonvoters. The method is then applied to German national elections from 1949 to 2009. The application shows that Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) would have gained from the counterfactual participation of nonvoters, although usually not enough to result in a government change. However, the elections of 1994 and 2005 show evidence that such a change could have happened.     

Electoral bias at the 2015 general election: reducing Labour’s electoral advantage

Electoral bias results in an asymmetrical seat distribution between parties with similar vote shares. Over recent British general elections Labour held an advantage because it efficiently converted votes into seats. Following the 2015 election result this advantage has reduced considerably, principally because Labour’s vote distribution saw it accumulate more ineffective votes, particularly where electoral support was not converted into seats. By contrast, the vote distribution of the Conservative party is now superior to that of Labour because it acquired fewer wasted votes although Labour retains a modest advantage overall because it benefits from inequalities in electorate size and differences in voter turnout. Features of the 2015 election, however, raise general methodological challenges for decomposing electoral bias. The analysis, therefore, considers the effect of substituting the Liberal Democrats as the third party with the United Kingdom Independence Party. It also examines the outcome in Scotland separately from that in England and Wales. Following this analysis it becomes clear that the method for decomposing electoral bias requires clearer guidelines for its application in specific settings.     

Public choice principles of redistricting

This paper uses fundamental principles of public choice, mainly the median voter theorem, to develop a simple theory of redistricting. The focus is on how closely policy outcomes correspond to majority rule. The main results are: (1) Potential policy bias in favor of nonmajority groups is structurally linked to the number of legislative seats and the population, and the structure of most states puts them very close to the theoretically maximum bias. (2) Random districting, which might seem like the essence of neutrality, does not eliminate policy bias on average. (3) Traditional principles of compact, contiguous districts that respect existing political boundaries, stressed in the Supreme Court’s Shaw v. Reno decision, minimize the chance of nonmajoritarian outcomes. Our analysis also offers a gerrymandering explanation for the positive relation between seats and spending that is usually taken as support for the “Law of 1/n.”     

District magnitudes and the election of women to the Irish Dáil

Previous research has suggested that electoral opportunities for women within proportional representation election systems may be directly related to district magnitudes. The fewer the seats apportioned to constituencies, it is argued, the less opportunities women will have to be nominated and elected. This article assesses whether the election of women to the Irish Dáil varies across that country's three, four, and five-seat constituencies. Data for three elections held in 1981 and 1982 reveal that the underrepresentation of women has been much greater in the three-seat constituencies while differences between the four and five-seaters have been only minimal. The severity of underrepresentation in the three-seat districts can be attributed to both nomination practices and voter reactions. Women were nominated by the major parties to contest three-seat constituencies much less often than the other constituencies, and when nominated, the voters' reactions to women candidates were more adverse in the three than in the four and five-seat contexts.     

Forecasting the 2015 general election using aggregate local election data

Local government election results are used to estimate a national equivalent vote that provides the basis for a general election forecast. By-elections provide the means for calculating weighted quarterly averages of national support. These show trends similar to those obtained by national polls. By-election results in the three month period leading to the general election contribute towards the national vote share calculation and seat distributions are determined by uniform national swing. Additionally, results from the main council elections from 2011 onwards are aggregated to the parliamentary constituency level and used to estimate each party's relative performance in key target seats. This information is used to fine-tune the final seat forecast which suggests a hung parliament is the most likely outcome.     

Swings and gerrymanders

It is usual for electoral analysts to calculate the swing necessary at the next election to unseat a government, assuming that the swing is a uniform one. However, swings are not uniform. The non-uniform swing which would, on average, unseat a government is shown to be different from the uniform swing. For example, at the next Australian election for the House of Representatives, a uniform swing of 1.5 per cent against the current government would cause it to lose five seats, leaving it in a minority of 73 out of 148 seats, but a non-uniform swing of only 0.8 per cent would, on average, have the same effect. Implications of this variability for the size of the majority, the possibilities of a Parliament with an even number of seats being equally-divided, and the use of this analysis to detect gerrymandering and to correct for it, are considered.     

Assessing the psychological and mechanical impact of electoral rules: A quasi-experiment

The paper assesses the influence of electoral rules on vote choice and election outcomes using a quasi-experiment conducted during a recent Canadian provincial election. Respondents were invited to vote under three voting systems (first past the post, alternative voting and proportional representation) and to answer a short questionnaire. We examine how the distribution of votes and seats is affected, and we ascertain how much of the total difference is due to psychological and mechanical effects. We find that a PR system would have increased legislative fractionalization by the equivalent of one effective party and that the mechanical effect is much more important than the psychological effect. As for AV, its mechanical and psychological effects act in opposite directions.     

A method for measuring and decomposing electoral bias for the three-party case, illustrated by the British case

The measurement of bias in election results, whereby one or more parties are advantaged in the translation of votes into seats at the expense of others, is attracting increasing attention. So far, almost all of the analytical work – aimed at both identifying the extent of bias in an election result and establishing its causes – has focused on either two-party systems or on the largest two parties in multi-party systems. Building on the firm foundations of one such approach, this paper introduces an original procedure for analysing bias in three-party systems using a readily-appreciated metric for both evaluating the degree of bias and decomposing it into the various causal factors. This is illustrated using the example of the 2005 British general election and a comparison of the results from two-party and three-party analyses of six recent elections there.