Nakasone Yasuhiro and Japan’s European Diplomacy

While Prime Minister Nakasone frequently showed his cordial personal friendship with US President Ronald Reagan, he was successful in creating new Japan-Europe relations based on his close ties with European leaders such as UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and French President François Mitterrand. Nakasone felt that the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” was not enough and focused more on “culture and politics.” This article reveals that this originated in his high school days when he learned French and the importance of the philosophy of liberalism.     

Understanding Japan’s Peacebuilding in Concept and Practice

In the post–Cold War era, Japan has developed its own version of peacebuilding in concept and practice and has taken a non-coercive approach to peacebuilding. It has been underpinned by domestic norms of pacifism. This article elaborates on the underexplored theme of Japan’s peacebuilding by focussing on its conceptual basis and three key dimensions of practice. It aims at providing a refined understanding of the Japanese version of peacebuilding, which encompasses highly comprehensive activities in and beyond troubled regions, while carefully excluding the role of military coercion. This article first presents a brief overview of the term ‘peacebuilding’ understood internationally. It then examines Japan’s understanding of the concept of peacebuilding. It consists of the ‘consolidation of peace’ as an immediate contribution to peace and human security, and ‘state-building’ as establishing and enhancing political, economic and social frameworks for durable peace in the long run. The third section of this article investigates three important dimensions of Japan’s peacebuilding practice: (1) the on-the-ground effort in troubled regions consisting of non-military peacekeeping and the provision of foreign aid; (2) taking leadership in developing principles of, and approaches to, peacebuilding in international forums; and (3) human resource development for fostering civilian peacebuilders at home. Finally, this article concludes that Japan is carving out its niche in the field of peacebuilding, suggesting that it is constructing an identity as a peacebuilder.     

‘Surrounding Areas’ and The Recalibration of Japan’s Threat Perception

The official narratives of Surrounding Areas in the 1997 New Guidelines are a curiosity: on the one hand, they signify Japan??s readiness to increase its international involvement, while on the other hand, the geographical designation remains vague despite Japan??s preoccupation with Asia. This suggests that Asia as Japan??s neighbourhood is considered along with international developments to facilitate the emergence of an ambiguous language for Japanese policy makers as they seek to adapt to changes in the international environment. As such, the term ??Surrounding Areas?? signifies Tokyo??s anxieties in facing up to new challenges, as well as the willingness of the government to enhance Japan??s international role while maintaining its status as a pacifist state.     

Japan’s Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise

This article analyzes the most recent phase of Japan’s security policy reform, focusing on its shifting priorities towards the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Japan–US alliance since mid-2010. From a realist perspective, it argues that these shifting military priorities first and foremost represent a traditional counterbalancing response to China’s rise. Conforming to the logic inherent in balance of threat theory, it moreover argues that this balancing behavior is explained by a confluence of two primary factors, namely Japanese perceptions of aggressive Chinese behavior in the maritime domain and concerns relating to the changing distribution of capabilities in China’s favor.     

The Trump Administration and Japan: Challenges and Visions for Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era

It is possible that Donald Trump’s success in the US presidential election of November 2016 will touch off the greatest transformation in world politics since World War Two. This is because, for the first time, the presidency of the United States—a country that since World War Two has consistently upheld the liberal world order—has been won by a man who asserts that the US national interests will take precedence over international cooperation.

If so, Japan could be one of the most profoundly affected countries. Japan has thus far accepted its status as a junior partner within the US security framework and—without any significant military power of its own—has devoted itself to economic development.

Although it is difficult to predict what Mr. Trump’s policies will be, there is a possibility, based on the statements he has made to date, that he will be calling for Japan to become more self-reliant. Although his comprehension of the Japan-US security arrangements is fraught with misconceptions, there is ample possibility that he will ultimately opt to maintain the current Japan-US security framework. However, given that the average defense expenditure of NATO countries is 2% of their GDPs, and that the average expenditure of OECD countries on official development assistance (ODA) is 0.7% of their GDPs, it is highly questionable whether Mr. Trump will approve of Japan’s level of defense spending (less than 1% of its GDP) or of its level of spending on ODA (approximately 0.2% of its GDP).

It would not be such a bad thing for Japan to become more self-reliant in terms of security. It is almost unnatural for Japan to maintain this relationship as it is, in the form that it has taken since before Japan’s postwar reconstruction. However, in the context of international relations in East Asia, it has long been taken for granted that this is Japan’s basic stance. Changing this will be no easy task—either domestically or in terms of Japan’s relations with neighboring countries.

In these respects, the authors of this paper decided to consider the question of how Japan should develop its foreign and security policy, and to offer some proposals in this regard.     

Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China

As China accumulates more power, Japan is often overlooked as being capable of affecting China’s continued trajectory because of material differences and narratives of Japan being a reactive state. Yet, Beijing’s strategic planning cannot ignore Tokyo because Japan has the ability to affect the region’s security environment. Feeling its presence and influence becoming relatively smaller, Tokyo has been increasingly proactive in its effort to expand its strategic space and shape the regional environment in ways conducive to its interests. A review of Japan’s approach to China since 1972 reveals that it has shifted away from its traditional engagement policy toward first a soft hedge, followed by a harder hedge that continues to this day. Today’s mix of partnerships and capabilities enable Japan to complicate China’s freedom of action and frustrate its continued rise.     

Nakasone Yasuhiro’s “Autonomous Defense” and the Security of Japan

Former Prime Minister of Japan Nakasone Yasuhiro advocated autonomous defense throughout the post-WWII period. Nakasone’s concept of autonomous defense (jishu boei) went beyond the idea of enhancing national defense capabilities—it was accompanied by a rich and varied internationalism that strove toward assuaging neighboring countries’ concerns toward Japan’s remilitarization. Nakasone also actively engaged major western powers in the global debate over nuclear issues during his term as prime minister, and it went beyond the confines of Japan’s bilateral security relationship with the United States. Thus, Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept reflected both the development of postwar Japan and the many turbulent changes in the postwar global security landscape. This essay follows the evolution of Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept during his political career from 1950 to the end of his premiership in 1988 and concludes with an overall assessment of his initiatives regarding Japanese security.     

Japan’s Quest for “Soft Power”: Attraction and Limitation

Japan is seeking to project its “soft power” through the allure of manga and anime in its public diplomacy. The production, diffusion and global consumption of manga and anime are driven by market forces and consumer tastes and not by the Japanese state. However, the latter is seeking to harness this popular culture to burnish Tokyo’s international image. Despite the attractiveness of Japanese pop culture and other more traditional forms of public diplomacy, Tokyo’s pursuit of “soft power” and a good international image is undermined by its failure to overcome its burden of history.

FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the US, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. This article regards the latter diplomatic strategic as the “FOIP 2.0” and that there emerges a possible harmony between Japan’s FOIP and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).     

Japan’s Pivotal Role in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order

The imperative in the Indo-Pacific region is to build a new strategic equilibrium pivoted on a stable balance of power. A constellation of likeminded states linked by interlocking strategic cooperation has become critical to help build such equilibrium. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is the author of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept that the US is now pushing. But Japan faces important strategic challenges. To secure itself against dangers that did not exist when its current national-security policies and laws were framed, Japan must bolster its security or risk coming under siege. US security interests will be better served by a more confident and secure Japan that assumes greater responsibility for its own defense and for regional security. The US must encourage Japan, which has not fired a single shot against an outside party since World War II, to undertake greater national-security reforms. Peace in Asia demands a proactive Japan.     

Abe Isoo and Kawakami Hajime in Interwar Japan — Economic Reform or Revolution?

This article explores the views of two eminent professors of economics, Abe Isoo (1865-1949) and Kawakami Hajime (1879-1946), regarding their socialist economic theories for easing poverty in Japan during the interwar years (1918-1939). Prior to this period, Abe believed the cure to capitalism’s ills lay in a combination of socialist economic reforms (sangyô demokurashii) and individual spiritual refinement. Kawakami, at that time a bourgeois economist, prioritised the spiritual revolution of the rich over any socialist-type economic reform. Thus, although convinced of the need for a different approach to eradicating poverty, they nevertheless agreed in the need for gradual change rather than radical reform (Gavin East Asia An International Quarterly 24:1, 30). The year 1928 marked a significant turning point both for Japanese social movements and in the lives of Abe and Kawakami. That year heralded Japan’s first national election under the new Universal Male Suffrage Law, and saw the police exercise their extended authority as they undertook a nationwide round-up of students and intellectuals suspected of left-wing tendencies (the March 15 Incident). Also in that year, Abe and Kawakami resigned from academic posts to dedicate themselves to alleviating the privations of the working class. Abe, by then well known as the father of Japanese socialism and as a Christian pacifist, became a symbolic figure for Japan’s working class parties, although he later came to support the government during WWII. Kawakami, who was forced to resign from his post during the round-up, “washed his hands of bourgeois economics”, became a prominent spokesman for Marxism in Japan ([28], xi, pp. 76, 169). This article will reveal that both Abe and Kawakami’s social and economic theories changed during the interwar period, so that Abe came to see imperial sovereignty as crucial to socialist economic reform, while Kawakami came to see it as a minion of the capitalists and advocated institutional and political revolution.     

The Trump-Kim Summit,Future Scenarios,and Japan’s Policy toward the Korean Peninsula

On June 12, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK or North Korea) leader Kim Jong Un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, met in Singapore for the first time. The two men signed a joint declaration and pledged to work toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and improving bilateral relations. These developments raise several questions. What impact will this summit meeting between the two leaders have on regional security? What sorts of opportunities and risks will that impact produce for Japan? How should Japan deal with this fluid regional situation?     

Militarizing Japan’s Southwest Islands: Subnational Involvement and Insecurities in the Maritime Frontier Zone

Abstract

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions.     

Hiding in Plain Sight? Japan’s Militarization of Space and Challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine

ABSTRACT

Japan’s security discourse – despite accelerating shifts in its security stance over the last two decades, and more recently, under the Abe administration – remains dominated by views of essential continuity and maintenance of the “Yoshida Doctrine.” The case of Japan’s militarization of space is used to create a framework for systematically dismantling default assumptions about the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine. The militarization of space serves as a driver of broader trends in Japan’s security policy manifested in the procurement of dual-use assets in launch systems, communications and intelligence satellites, and counterspace capabilities necessary for active internal and external balancing with the US–Japan alliance; the strengthening domestically of security policymaking institutions; and the jettisoning of anti-militaristic norms. Japan’s increasingly assertive military stance, bolstering of the US–Japan alliance and cessation of hedging, facing down of China’s rise, and departure from the Yoshida Doctrine as grand strategy are thus revealed as hiding in plain sight.