Institutional self-organization

The rampant acceleration of scientific advance and technological change that seems to be required for national viability unfortunately entails a disconcerting human consequence: an explosive increase in cultural complexity bearing ominous possibilities of massive social disruption. Attainment of an adequate rate of cultural adaptation—as an idealized response to this situation—can be predicated only on the basis of deeper comprehension and creative modification of the social-institutional decisionmaking processes that comprise the cognitivemodus operandi of civilized society. Recent methodological developments in management science are presented as promising theoretical resources for extending the conventional paradigm of objective rational analysis to incorporate valuative aspects of policy-level decision problems. Initially the emphasis is placed on an extension of structured rationality which constitutes one of the core-advances contributing toward emergence of the policy sciences as a legitimate supradiscipline. With its secondary emphasis on the concept institutional self-organization, this paper represents an attempt to (1) capitalize early on a particular feature of optimal organization and (2) bring this feature immediately to bear as a consideration in institutional systems design. The concept of a national administrative research agency is put forward as an institutional prototype embodying the innovative organizational format needed in order to connect theoretical and practical aspects of social problem solving. The significance of this prototype lies in its implication for achievement of a deliberately self-transforming society, a purposefully adaptive version of the social order.This article derives from research conducted with joint support of The Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-70-C-0328, and the RAC Institutional Research Program. The views expressed, however, are those of the author alone. They should not be interpreted as reflecting official views of Research Analysis Corporation or its research sponsors.     

Institutional Gaming

This paper proposes a model of 'institutional gaming,' in which intentional agents pursue their projects through games of a looser and deeper sort. Over many interactions, they develop formal institutions and informal norms concerning appropriate ways of maneuvering within them and expanding upon them. Agents shift among several different institutions governed by different norms addressing each of their many different concerns. No one agent is decisive, either negatively or positively, for long. Such a model of intentional goal-seeking agents, operating through and on history, and developing shared norms as an aid to doing so, makes tolerably good sense of much that modern institutionalists want to tell us.     

试论制度创新

在邓小平理论的指导下,我国改革开放的进程实际也是制度创新的进程。本文探讨了制度创新的条件、主体和进程,制度优化的标准、环节和层面。     

制度改革与制度定型:改革开放40年后中国制度发展的双重合奏

在改革开放进入"不惑之年"前后,推动中国特色社会主义制度更加成熟更加定型的历史任务悄然提到执政党的议事日程。从制度机理来说,制度定型与制度改革如影随形,只要是制度改革,自然会提出制度定型问题。就二者关系而言,制度改革是制度定型的前提条件,制度定型是制度改革的重要目标。因此,在中国改革开放的后半程,必须准确把握制度改革与制度定型的关系,既不能因为制度改革是制度发展的主旋律而忽视制度定型,也不能因为推动制度定型而搁置制度改革,而要按照制度发展的内在要求推进制度改革与制度定型的双重合奏。而且,还应明确,无论是制度定型还是制度改革,都只是制度发展的过程,而不是制度发展的最终目标,制度改革和制度定型的终极目标是要提升制度秉赋,推进中国特色社会主义制度的自我完善和发展。     

论跟进式制度变迁

跟进式制度变迁是介于供给主导性制度变迁和需求主导性制度变迁之间的一种变迁方式。本对跟进式制度变迁的概念、性质、运行规律和跟进制度的本地化等问题，进行了初步分析。     

新制度经济学制度变迁理论对中国改革的启示

一个灵活的制度变迁机制是经济发展的必要条件。只有产权清晰 ,经济主体才会关注效率 ,由此产生的对新制度的需求是制度变迁的第一推动力。为了保证政府提供的是一个有效率的制度 ,还需要发达的社会中介组织 ,以及企业家同政府之间有一个对话机制     

Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one-, two-, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.     

Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions

This article examines some basic assumptions about the nature of political institutions, the ways in which practices and rules that comprise institutions are established, sustained, and transformed, and the ways in which those practices and rules are converted into political behavior through the mediation of interpretation and capability. We discuss an institutional approach to political life that emphasizes the endogenous nature and social construction of political institutions, identities, accounts, and capabilities.     

组织视域中的事业单位改革

我国的事业单位在结构和功能上存在冲突和非和谐性,直接妨害了组织自身的运行逻辑,面临着进行系统性地组织诊断和变革的要求。从组织视角考察,边界的模糊性、体制的依附性、管理结构形式的单一化以及环境约束的软化等组织弊端,决定了事业单位的改革应以建构非营利组织为主体的现代公共事业、变革组织的产权结构、营设治理化的约束环境为主要路径。     

Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech

Participation in legislative debates is among the most visible activities of members of parliament (MPs), yet debates remain an understudied form of legislative behavior. This study introduces a comparative theory of legislative speech with two major implications. First, party rules for debates are endogenous to strategic considerations and will favor either party leadership control or backbencher MP exposure. Second, in some systems, backbenchers will receive less time on the floor as their ideological distance to the party leadership increases. This leads to speeches that do not reflect true party cohesion. Where party reputation matters less for reelection, leaders allow dissidents to express their views on the floor. We demonstrate the implications of our model for different political systems and present evidence using speech data from Germany and the United Kingdom.     

Institutional technology and economic growth

An endogenous model of constitutional changes and economic growth links the temporal decline in private market returns when technology is constant with the returns to rule changes realized in a political market. There is a steady state constitutional setting in which all rule changes have been incorporated that is analytically equivalent to the neoclassical steady state. As in the neoclassical model, private-sector technological progress postpones the steady state. To the extent the original constitutional setting promotes innovation, the evolutionary process toward the steady state is delayed. The model yields a theory of revolution based on forces leading to the adoption of inefficient changes in the constitutional setting.     

比较优势与制度安排

以“比较优势”“、有限(价值)理性”和“制度二要素”这三个基本假设为基础,以李嘉图所举的“英国和葡萄牙”为实例,对比较优势条件与制度安排的关系作了一个比较系统的探讨,结果发现:无论是从规则安排方面来说,还是从组织安排方面来说,比较优势条件都对制度安排具有决定性的影响。就规则安排而言,在比较优势太小和分工利益太少的情况下,保障分工的规则安排往往不存在;只有当比较优势足够大和分工利益足够多时,保障分工的规则安排才能出现;但当比较优势扩大到超过“自然分工条件”的时候,这种规则安排又会失去存在的必要。就组织安排而言,当规则供给的绝对成本一定时,绝对劣势方总是比绝对优势方作为规则供给者(组织)的相对效率要高。     

Institutional Impediments To Efficient Water Allocation

Current water institutions were developed for conditions of water penty rather than scarcity and are unable to allocate water resources efficiently under conditions such as those in the arid West. This paper reviews riparian, appropriation and correlative water law as well as existing admin- istrative rules governing water use in California and finds that all of these institutions violate norms of economic efficiency. The review suggests that decentralized water systems such as mutual irrigation companies with their appropriate laws are more flexible than centralized federal or state systems in promoting water movement to higher valued use. The paper concludes that institutional mechanisms which promote rather than inhibit water trades and transfers are more appropriate to arid areas and that these institutions will become increasingly popular as water becomes increasingly scarce.     

The Multiple Institutional Logics of Innovation

ABSTRACT

How do decentralized systems deal with innovation? In particular, how do they aggregate the myriad experiences of their component parts, facilitate diffusion of information, and encourage investments in innovation? This is a classic problem in the study of human institutions. It is also one of the biggest challenges that exists in the governance of decentralized systems: How do institutions shape individual behavior around solving problems and sharing information in a fashion that is reasonably compatible with collective well-being? We use a particular decentralized institution (the U.S. House of Representatives), wrestling with a novel problem (how to utilize the Internet), to explore the implications of three archetypical principles for organizing collective problem solving: market, network, and hierarchy.     

Norms, Interests and Institutional Change

This paper provides a norms-based account of institutional change. It compares two cases of attempted change, one successful and one unsuccessful. The argument advanced is that norm-based change occurs when the norms are congruent with the perceived interests of the actors who have the power to take on the decision. Norms affect the process of institutional change not only by providing legitimacy to some forms of political action, but also by shaping the actors' perception of their interests as well their strategies. It is argued that norms, in that sense, help political actors combine Max Weber's zweckrational (goal-orientated) and wertrational (value-orientated) categories of behaviour. Empirical evidence drawn from the context of the evolving European Union supports this argument.