What is the Theory Legal Argumentation For?

The paper aims to present the legal theories of legal argumentation constructed in the last century, organised into two groups: the precursors (Viehweg, Perelman and Toulmin) and the authors of the standard theory (MacCormick and Alexy). Then, some criticisms about all these conceptions are presented. And finally, an outline of a theory of legal argumentation is made, capable of overcoming some of the previous criticisms. The fundamental idea for this is to build a very abstract concept of argumentation that could then allow various interpretations or conceptions of legal argumentation. From here, one would be in a position to find an answer to the three main argumentative questions raised by legal practice: how to analyse an argument, how to evaluate it, how to argue.

     

Legal Argumentation and Justice in Luhmann’s System Theory of Law

The paper reconstructs Luhmann’s conception of legal argumentation and justice especially focussing on the aspects of contingency and self-referring operative closure. The aim of his conception is to describe/explain in a disenchanted way—from an external, of “second order” point of view—the work on adjudication, which, rather idealistically, lawyers and judges present as being a matter of reason. As a consequence of some surface similarities with Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy of justice, Teubner proposes integrating the supposed reductive image of formal justice described by Luhmann with the ideal conception of justice presented by Derrida. Here this kind of attempt is rejected as epistemologically wrong. In addition, Luhmann’s theory is argued to have other shortcomings, namely: the failure to understand the pragmatic function of principles, and the incapacity to describe the current legal questions linked with cultures and legal pluralism, which characterise our society.     

Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?

In this paper, I present a new argument against inclusive legal positivism. As I show, any theory which permits morality to be a condition on legality cannot account for a core feature of legal activity, namely, that it is an activity of social planning. If the aim of a legal institution is to guide the conduct of the community through plans, it would be self-defeating if the existence of these plans could only be determined through deliberation on the merits. I also argue that, insofar as inclusive legal positivism was developed as a response to Ronald Dworkin's critique of H. L. A. Hart's theory of law, it was founded on a mistake. For once we appreciate the role that planning plays in legal regulation, we will see that Dworkin's objection is based on a flawed conception of legal obligations and rights and hence does not present an objection that inclusive legal positivists were required to answer.     

Using Systems Theory to Study Legal Pluralism: What Could Be Gained?

This article examines the ability of modern systems theory to provide a foundation for understanding the problematic notion of legal pluralism, and to the ability of scholars to apply that understanding to engage in the study of pluralistic legal orders. In particular, it develops the observations of systems theory of the relationship between state law and violence by adopting one of its linked ideas, that of structural coupling. It also considers the role played by translation when law is identified by reference to the application of the legal code: legal/illegal. The whole analysis is underpinned by systems theory's account of the differences between studying premodern and modern societies.     

Critical Legal Theory’s Turn to Schmitt: Not Waving but Drowning?

I examine the current enthusiasm among some academics, whom I shall broadly refer to as critical legal theorists (CLT), for the work of Carl Schmitt which has at times been accompanied by disenchantment with Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical insights. I examine the reasons for this turn to Schmitt which I attribute to the sensitivity of CL theorists to the complaint that an over-reliance on Levinas leads to a disengaged and irrelevant discourse. I contrast their antithetical approaches through their conceptions of the Other (which in Schmitt’s case is developed through his friend and enemy distinction) and explain how, together with state of exception theory; it has appeared to some CL theorists to offer a platform for exposing the liberal democratic attempt to export human rights as a violent imperialising mission. I argue that Schmitt’s thinking represents an intellectual cul-de-sac and that Levinas continues to offer a more rewarding model of critique.     

The Turn to Imagination in Legal Theory: The Re-Enchantment of the World?

Various contemporary legal theorists have turned to ‘imagination’ as a keyword in their accounts of law. This turn is fruitfully considered as a potential response to the modern condition diagnosed by Max Weber as ‘disenchantment’. While disenchantment is often seen as a symptom of a post-metaphysical age, it is best understood as the consummation of metaphysics and not its overcoming. Law’s participation in disenchantment is illustrated by way of Holmes’ parable of the dragon in ‘The Path of the Law’, which illustrates the rationalization and demystification of law. Four ideal–typical turns to ‘imagination’ are identified: the theoretical (turning to imagination as synthesis), the progressive (imagination as empathy), the transformative (imagination as invention) and the nostalgic (imagination as attunement). Most of these turns to imagination remain complicit with disenchantment. ‘Imagination’ often appears only to be harnessed in the service of more conventional keywords of legal thought: theoreticians turn to imagination as synthesis to serve as a form of super-reason; progressives turn to imagination as empathy to make law a more effective instrument; transformatives turn to imagination as invention to serve as a form of super-will. By turning to imagination as attunement, nostalgics come closest to accepting a world that is not masterable, i.e. they come closest to accepting an enchantment that is a gift and not the product of our imaginations. Indeed, modern imaginations are themselves symptoms of disenchantment. If Weber’s diagnostic calls for a human response, it cannot be one of overcoming disenchantment by imaginative re-enchantment: it belongs integrally to enchantment to exceed any and all human capacities.     

When Is a Regime Not a Legal System? Alexy on Moral Correctness and Social Efficacy

Robert Alexy defines law as including a claim to moral correctness and demonstrating social efficacy. This paper argues that law's social efficacy is not merely an observable fact but is undergirded by moral commitments by rulers that it is possible for their subjects to follow the rules, that the rulers and others will also follow the rules, that subjects will be protected from violence if they act in accordance with the rules, and that subjects will be entitled to legal redress if others act violently towards them otherwise than in accordance with the rules. Alexy is correct in his conclusion that a system of norms that is not by and large socially efficacious is not a valid legal system, but wrong insofar as he follows legal positivism in distinguishing this aspect of law's validity from law's claim to moral correctness.     

Who Files Suit? Legal Mobilization and Torture Violations in Europe

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is the most active international court. After decades with few allegations of human rights abuses, the ECHR docket expanded in the 1990s. Paradoxically, long‐standing democracies can have standardized violation rates of the prohibition against torture that compare to transitional democracies that struggle to protect rights. Yet it is implausible that human rights abuses increased or that established democracies engage in more torture than new democracies. Instead variations in legal mobilization generate the surge and puzzling distribution of European judgments. I argue that discrepancies between the incidence of torture and litigation reflect variations in support structures, where declared violations can reflect the level of support that individuals receive in pursuing claims rather than the incidence of torture. This dynamic is most pronounced for foreign nationals, who typically possess fewer resources than citizens to access legal institutions and encounter popular and official hostility. As a result, much European litigation concerning torture in long‐standing democracies is transnational in character.     

Pathways of Victimization and Resistance: Toward a Feminist Theory of Battered Women’s Help‐Seeking

Although intimate partner abuse has been extensively researched over the last thirty years, battered women’s help‐seeking remains perplexingly undertheorized, particularly within criminology. This analysis aims to offer a corrective by applying the feminist pathways theoretical model—which examines women’s and girls’ offending behaviors in the context of their past victimization experiences—to battered women’s help‐seeking. Data from in‐depth life history interviews with 22 battered women in two states indicate that the women’s childhood victimization experiences informed their adult help‐seeking decisions in meaningful ways. The primary theoretical contribution of this analysis is the identification of specific mechanisms—five help‐seeking inhibitors and three help‐seeking promoters—through which childhood victimization influenced participants’ help‐seeking. Results of this analysis demonstrate the benefit of a feminist pathways theoretical model of battered women’s help‐seeking in order to better understand how pathways of victimization and resistance develop over the course of women’s lives.     

Methodological Clarity or the Substantial Purity of Law? Notes on the Discussion between Kelsen and Pitamic

Leonid Pitamic was convinced that law could not be understood and explored by a single method aiming at a pure object of enquiry. He argued that it was necessary to employ other methods besides the normative one (especially the sociological and axiological methods), which, however, should not be confounded. Methodological syncretism can be avoided by clearly distinguishing between different aspects of law and by allowing the methods to support each other. By following this guideline, and by arguing according to a clear method, we can also open up a space for dialogue and for the juxtaposition of contrasting points of view.     

The Legal Education and Training Review: regulating socio-legal and liberal legal education?

The Legal Education and Training Review (LETR) which reported in June 2013 conceded that undergraduate law degrees are generally outside the remit of the review other than when there is a direct impact on the provision of legal services. On first glance therefore the review has few implications for those of us interested in delivering a liberal legal education and developing socio-legal approaches to law and legal study. However, on closer reading, the report contains a number of suggestions which, if taken up by the regulators, have significant potential to change law degrees, even if regulation remains “light touch”. This article explores those issues with a particular focus on the implications for liberal law degrees and socio-legal approaches to law teaching. In particular the article will explore issues around possible changes to foundation subjects; the creation of a framework of learning outcomes; the possible strengthening of legal writing and research in the curriculum and the opportunities offered for the introduction of more socio-legal material; and the trickle-down effect likely to be felt by providers of undergraduate law degrees of changes in regulation of legal services and as a result of student, employer and other stakeholder expectations.     

Does Kelsen’s Notion of Legal Normativity Rest on a Mistake?

Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ??intention?? into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ??ought??. The methodological strategy is the ??inversion thesis?? which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ??will?? or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it is not the case that the will or the intention of the sovereign determines what the norm is, rather it is the legal ought that ??objectifies?? the will. However, it is argued that in spite of the fact that Kelsen advanced a sophisticated account of intentional action, he fails to understand the complexities of the notion of the ??will??, intentional action and practical reason. What does he miss in his understanding of the notion of the practical? I will advance the view that the notion of the practical or deliberative involves, both in Kant and Aristotle, the transparency condition which establishes that the agent or deliberator intentionally acts for reasons that are self-evident or transparent to him or her. It is a recalcitrant feature of the deliberative standpoint that cannot be theorised. For Aristotle, Aquinas and Anscombe the deliberative standpoint can be known through the end or goal of the intentional action as this provides the form of the action. The end is presented as a good-making characteristic. As problematic as that might be, this means that the end needs to be presented as a good-making characteristic and therefore it involves evaluation. For Kelsen, the soundness of this conception is an insurmountable obstacle to theorise the ??ought?? and therefore the ??will??. Yet, surprisingly and contrary to Kelsen??s own notions, I will show that Kelsen??s ??inversion thesis?? is parasitic on Aristotle?CAnscombe??s ??ought??.     

A European Legal Method? On European Private Law and Scientific Method

This article examines the relationship between European private law and scientific method. It argues that a European legal method is a good idea. Not primarily because it will make European private law scholarship look more scientific, but because a debate on the method of a normative science necessarily has to be a debate on its normative assumptions. In other words, a debate on a European legal method will have much in common with the much desired debate on social justice in European law. Moreover, it submits that, at least after the adoption of the Common Frame of Reference by the European institutions, European contract law can be regarded as a developing multi-level system that can be studied from the inside. Finally, it concludes that the Europeanisation of private law is gradually blurring the dividing line between the internal and external perspectives, with their respective appropriate methods, in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, in the developing multi-level system it is unclear where the external borders of the system lie, in particular the borders between Community law and national law. Second, because of the less formal legal culture the (formerly) external perspectives, such as the economic perspective, have easier access and play an increasing role as policy considerations.     

The Fundamental Contradiction Redux? Liberty,Coercion, and American Legal Development

In Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the Present, Gary Gerstle offers an ambitious account of American legal development from our nation's founding up to the present day. In many ways, Gerstle's account is in keeping with the long scholarly tradition of linking legal liberalism with changes in American law and politics. However, Liberty and Coercion also calls to mind critical legal scholarship, most notably Duncan Kennedy's “The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries” and the idea of the fundamental contradiction. After reconstructing Kennedy's central claims, I highlight how they actually undermine Liberty and Coercion and jeopardize the larger legal liberal tradition.     

Dead ringers? Legal persons and the deceased in European data protection law

Notwithstanding suggestions that the concrete treatment of legal and deceased person data during European data protection's development has been broadly comparable, this article finds that stark divergences are in fact apparent. Justification for the inclusion of both categories has rested on a claimed linkage to living natural person interests. However, despite early fusion, legal persons have been increasingly seen to have qualitatively different information entitlements compared to natural persons, thereby leaving European data protection with a very limited and indirect role here. In contrast, living natural persons and the deceased have not been conceived as normatively dichotomous and since the 1990s there has been growing interest both in establishing sui generis direct protection for deceased person data and also indirect inclusion through a link with living natural persons. Whilst the case for some indirect inclusion is overwhelming, a broad approach to the inter-relational nature of data risks further destabilizing the personal data concept even in relation to living persons alone. Given that jurisdictions representing almost half of the EEA's population now provide some direct protection and the challenges of managing digital data on death continue to grow, the time may be ripe for a ‘soft’ recommendation on direct protection in this area. Drawing on existing law and scholarship, such a recommendation could seek to specify the role of both specific control rights and diffuse confidentiality obligations, the criteria for time-limits in each case and the need for a balance with other rights and interests which recognises the significantly decreasing interest in protection over time.