Regulatory budgeting: A bad idea whose time has come?

Advocates of regulatory relief propose a budget that would annually cap regulatory costs. But emulating fiscal budgeting would be much more difficult than they envision. An arbitrary macrobudgetary constraint would have to be selected, and the potential scope of the regulatory budget would be vast. The process of regulatory budgeting would be very-time consuming, and could increase micromanagement by the Congress. Estimating regulatory costs would be challenging, and ignoring regulatory benefits would be unfair and inefficient. A preferable alternative to regulatory budgeting would be to expand the Government Performance and Results Act to include cost-effectiveness reviews for regulations.     

The dissemination and utilization of welfare‐to‐work experiments in state policymaking

Abstract This paper reports the results of a telephone survey of state‐level officials as to the influence of evaluations of three state welfare innovations: California's GAIN, New York's CAP, and Florida's Project Independence. The three experiments were known to those interviewed, yet they did not have dramatic, decisive effects on policymaking. However, GAIN and CAP appear to have influenced policymaking in less dramatic and more subtle respects. Much more important than empirical findings about the effects of tested programs was information about how these programs actually operated in the field along with evidence that the policies tested in welfare‐to‐work experiments were logically consistent (that is, there was no obvious reason to think that they would be unsuccessful), could clear federal waivers, and would not encounter major political resistance. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Social Security Privatization and Market Risk

Under Social Security privatization, workers would be allowed to divert some of the money that currently goes to Social Security into private accounts. This would expose them to market risk, that is, the risk of a substantial drop in equity prices or of a prolonged bear market. This could result in generations of workers with less money than they thought they would have for retirement. Depending on a worker's birth date, if the privatization approach proposed by President Bush's Commission to Strengthen Social Security had been enacted at the start of the Social Security program, the retirement benefits generated from putting 10% of earnings in a private account for 35 years would have ranged from 100% to less than 20% relative to pre‐retirement earnings. The extraordinarily high retirement income generated from the booming 1990s stock market was the equivalent of winning the generational lottery—unlikely to be repeated regularly. Even under these beneficial circumstances, a privatized system could have cost the government more than $1 trillion in today's dollars over the past 3 decades if the government decided to help out those who accumulated too little for retirement. The primary alternative to a government bailout of the Social Security system, older workers working longer, would likely not generate the desired results. Workers wanting to work longer would create labor market pressures typically at times when unemployment is already high.     

The impact of employee perception on the successful institutionalisation and implementation of performance management systems in developing countries: The perspective from Ghana's public service

Performance management (PM) has become a key instrument in the quest to ensure optimal operations by organisations in the public sector. Some scholars, though, believe that PM has failed because of employees' negative perception and management's exclusion of employees from its development. Studies on the relationship between employee perception of PM and its effectiveness in the public sector are limited. We argue that management must value employee perception more highly than they do at present because it is unlikely employees would be willing to take an active part in implementing a change with which they disagree or that they see as having no value. This study examines the effect of employees' perception on the institutionalisation and implementation of PM in developing countries, with specific reference to Ghana.     

Competition, Marketisation, Public Services and Public Ethics

The topic I address provides an embarrassment of scope. At the same time, it allows the development of a theme that is worthwhile discussing. When in the public sector is it worthwhile to import private sector concepts, principles and practices and when would the adoption of a private sector model be injurious to the state's constituents? The theme is worthwhile discussing, in part because some of Australia's jurisdictions appear to be adopting what they consider to be private sector practices, without an adequate framework to guide them. Because there is no proper framework, mistakes are made which could have been avoided. There is also some evidence that the public is uneasy about the loss of ‘public’ from the term public services. It would not be in the public’s own interests to resist, for no good reason, the adoption of private sector principles where that would allow more cost-effective services. The topic also allows a discussion on the influence on public sector ethics of the trend to place senior public servants on contracts that can be disposed of without a reason or prospect of appeal.     

Policy horizons in West European parliamentary systems

Abstract This paper investigates the hypothesis that coalition behaviour in West European parliamentary systems is conditioned by the existence of 'policy horizons' that delimit the extent to which parties can compromise on policy positions in order to participate in government. The first part of the paper demonstrates that policy horizons are implied by certain conceptions of party utility and that their existence would entail important constraints on the coalition game; in particular, they would produce equilibrium outcomes in some situations where voting cycles would normally be expected and they would tend to confine possible outcomes to central locations in the policy space in the absence of equilibria. The paper then develops a method of estimating policy horizons empirically in order to show that they account to a substantial extent for both the size and party composition of governing coalitions in these systems.     

Macro Research on Campaign Mobilization in the United States

ABSTRACT

This essay reviews the macro or aggregate-level academic literature on campaign mobilization and voter turnout in the United States. The conclusion that emerges from this literature is that hard-fought, high-stimulus electoral contests get out the vote. In part, the level of turnout on election day is a product of the efforts of strategic political actors (e.g., candidates, campaign contributors, and political parties) in the pursuit of elective office. The essay suggests that the academic literature on campaign mobilization would benefit from greater appreciation of how real world campaigns operate. A lesson that academics should draw from the practitioners is that strategic campaigns target and attempt to get out their voters. Careful consideration of the flows of information in campaigns would lead to a richer theory of mobilization. Looking at campaigns in a differentiated fashion, future research should recognize some fundamental points about their turnout implications: what campaigns do and whom they target may be more important than simply how much they do.     

Political short-termism: a possible explanation

We consider a two-period model in which politicians differ in their motivations, and show that a good politician may suboptimally provide a public good that gives an immediate payoff because if he provided one that gives a payoff only in the second term, the citizens would consider it sufficiently likely that he is a bad politician and, therefore, they would not reelect him. Quite surprisingly, such short-termism may be socially optimal: it increases the probability that the office will be held in the future by a good politician and induces a bad politician to act more in the public interest.     

Policy horizons in West European parliamentary systems

This paper investigates the hypothesis that coalition behaviour in West European parliamentary systems is conditioned by the existence of 'policy horizons' that delimit the extent to which parties can compromise on policy positions in order to participate in government. The first part of the paper demonstrates that policy horizons are implied by certain conceptions of party utility and that their existence would entail important constraints on the coalition game; in particular, they would produce equilibrium outcomes in some situations where voting cycles would normally be expected and they would tend to confine possible outcomes to central locations in the policy space in the absence of equilibria. The paper then develops a method of estimating policy horizons empirically in order to show that they account to a substantial extent for both the size and party composition of governing coalitions in these systems.     

The interaction problem in policy analysis

A problem little noted in the literature on policy analysis is that analysis can interact with problems to make them different and more difficult to solve than they would be without analysis. Four varieties of interaction can be distinguished. All are rooted in the methods and assumptions of economics, the discipline that now dominates federal analysis, and particularly in its limited capacity to set policy goals. To prevent interaction, analysts would have to be able to set goals with greater independence so that aims were not swayed by the analytic process. They would need either their own theory of ends or closer political guidance.     

Vote-seeking incentives and investment environments: The need for credit claiming and the provision of protectionism

Incentives to cultivate a personal reputation encourage legislators to generate policy outcomes for which they can claim credit. We show that these incentives make themselves felt in international agreements – a domain that might typically be considered within the purview of the executive branch. Through a cross-national analysis and brief case studies, we show that countries with electoral systems that encourage personal vote seeking are more likely to negotiate exceptions to treaties meant to liberalize their investment environments. Legislators benefit by being able to claim credit for having protected their constituents from the competition an unrestricted agreement would entail.     

The economics of the women's movement

In recent years, the political process has seemed to become increasingly favorable to issues involving women, as shown by the relatively large number of states which have passed the Equal Rights Amendment. The economic theory of politics would imply that this result would occur if the interests of women in removing labor force sex discrimination had increased. We argue that most sex descrimination in hiring and pay of women is in the form of statistical discrimination where sex is used as a proxy for labor force attachment. If this is so, then, on net, sex discrimination in employment practices would pay in the sense that the gainers from such behavior would gain more than the losers would lose. Married women would share in such gains since they would be compensated for their lower earnings by the higher earnings of their husbands. Single women, however, would receive no such compensation. We therefore hypothesize that the recent increase in legislation benefitting women is related to marriage rates, not to female labor force participation. Using votes in the state legislatures on the ERA as a measure of success by state of the women's movement, we find that our results do hold — number of single women is significant in explaining such voting but female labor force participation is not significant.     

The Venture State

The Blair governments deployed several public service reform strategies. Although many have been effective, they have had limited traction at the 'hard end' of disadvantage: entrenched deprivation remains a stubborn feature of the social landscape. Reforms have had limited impact on this deprivation because they expect users to behave either as eager recipients or as informed consumers. But disadvantaged groups rarely emulate the active middle class; instead, they are distrustful of public institutions—even hostile. We need a different reform strategy that does not presuppose these behaviours and which generates new ideas. This 'venture state' approach would go beyond commissioning and invest in services that demonstrate the greatest social returns with disadvantaged groups. Like the eponymous capitalist, it would identify a portfolio of high-impact providers that can be scaled or sustained; and it would provide the resources required to do so. Rather than seeking to target its own services with ever greater precision, the venture state would focus on structuring innovation in those services most important for the hard end of disadvantage.     

The Conservative Member of Parliament as Lobbyist for Constituency Economic Interests

Interviews undertaken in the House of Commons with 70 backbench Conservative MPs in 1983–84 examined the extent to which they pursue their own localized industrial policy strategies as part of their efforts to maintain constituency electoral support. This involves lobbying efforts directed toward ministers in support of local industries, either in defence of jobs, in promotion of new jobs, or in a variety of quests for government benefits or relaxation of restrictions. It was found that 36 of the 70 Conservative MPs could be classified as 'constituency lobbyists', reflecting interview evidence that they consider lobbying on behalf of local industries to be a normal and important part of their representative role as MPs. The hypothesis that vulnerable constituencies—vulnerable in both political and economic terms—would be represented by constituency lobbyists was tested through the construction of an index of constituency 'security'. It was found that the more secure the constituency, the less likely is the MP to lobby on behalf of local industrial interests.     

Comment on Martin D. Abravanel's “Public knowledge of fair housing law: Does it protect against housing discrimination?"—Organize! the limits of public awareness in ensuring fair housing

Abstract

Public awareness may contribute to enforcement of fair housing law. But available resources would be more productively used if they were invested directly in more aggressive and innovative law enforcement activities. Emerging debates over land use practices, particularly those pertaining to sprawl and affordable housing, may create new avenues for fair housing activity. The overriding challenge for the fair housing community, however, is to organize an effective constituency that can demand greater attention to education, enforcement, or other actions to achieve fair housing goals.     

Signs of change in North Korea

The spread of liberal democracy around the world has raised the risk of wishful thinking by students of democratization who hope that what they study will happen. One way of reducing this risk is to focus on regions that challenge the expectations and explanations of democratization. Four criteria can roughly measure a region's ‘recalcitrance’ in this regard: the extent to which it: (1) lacks liberal democracy, thus disappointing democ‐ratizers; (2) is diverse, thus making it hard to explain the lack of liberal democracy with across‐the‐board generalizations; (3) seems not to fit a particularly common expectation, e.g., that more well‐to‐do countries should be more liberal‐democratic; and (4) has leaders who have articulated a serious critique of liberal democracy. By meeting all of these criteria more fully than other parts of the world, Southeast Asia qualifies as the most recalcitrant region. The anomalousness of Southeast Asia is no reason for pessimism. But it does suggest that observers would do well to diversify what they mean by democracy beyond its conventionally liberal form.     

Citizen Assessment of Electoral Reforms: Do Evaluations of Fairness Blunt Self-Interest?

A large literature shows that citizens care about the procedural fairness of rules and institutions. This body of work suggests that citizen evaluations of institutional changes should be constrained by fairness considerations, even if they would personally benefit from the reforms. We test this expectation using two panel studies to examine whether citizens become more accepting of proposals rated as unfair (in wave one) after we experimentally manipulate (in wave two) whether the proposals aid their party’s electoral prospects. Using this approach, we are able to establish what citizens see to be fair or unfair separate from their evaluation of a given rule change. We find that supporters of both parties are consistently more favorable toward reforms their fellow partisans and, crucially, they themselves, claim reduce electoral fairness when framed as advancing their partisan interests. The results provide important insights into how citizens evaluate electoral processes, procedural fairness, and, hence, the acceptable limits of institutional change.

     

Tax decentralization and local government size

This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments. While many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it, they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy. The paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments (tax-separation), rather than on tax-base sharing, would restrain local public expenditures. Using an unbalanced panel of OECD countries, the key finding is that only property taxes—mostly based on a “tax-separation” scheme—seem to favor smaller local governments. Thus, while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments, it does not appear sufficient, as tax-separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required.     

Authoritarianism,Threat, and Americans’ Support for the War on Terror

In the years following 9/11, surveys have revealed high levels of public support for policies related to the war on terror that, many argue, contravene long‐standing American ideals. Extant research would suggest that such preferences result from the activation of authoritarianism. That is, the terrorist attacks caused those predisposed toward intolerance and aggression to become even more intolerant and aggressive. However, using data from two national surveys, we find that those who score high in authoritarianism do not become more hawkish or less supportive of civil liberties in response to perceived threat from terrorism; they tend to have such preferences even in the absence of threat. Instead, those who are less authoritarian adopt more restrictive and aggressive policy stands when they perceive threat from terrorism. In other words, many average Americans become susceptible to “authoritarian thinking” when they perceive a grave threat to their safety.