Electoral accountability,clarity of responsibility and labor market policy

Does the exercise of accountability in elections have palpable policy effects? Building on recent advances in the economic voting literature, we show that electoral accountability leaves an imprint on labor market policy when left-wing governments are in office. When responsibility for the economy is clear and elections offer an opportunity to claim credit for economic expansion, labor protections and benefits become more generous. However, when clarity of responsibility is low and incumbents can expect to veer electoral responsibility, left-wing governments are more likely to retrench labor market policy. These results hold for policies benefiting both labor market insiders and outsiders. Consistent with evidence that the labor market is the purview of the left, electoral accountability does not condition labor market policy under right-wing governments. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of growing party system fragmentation and weaker accountability across advanced industrial democracies.     

Word on the Street: The Persistence of Leftist-dominated Protest in Europe

Classic studies of protest politics have traditionally defended the dominant left-wing orientation of protesters. However, some recent research has highlighted the general spread of protest by the increasing participation of right-wing individuals. Has this process meant an ‘ideological normalisation’ of protesters? The present article tackles this question by examining competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between ideology and political protest. Through a hierarchical multilevel design, the article tests whether left-wing (or right-wing) supporters are more likely to stay at home when left-wing (right-wing) parties are in power and whether they intensify their protest activities when they are more distant from the government’s ideological position. The article shows that left-wing individuals protest more under right-wing governments than under left-wing governments and yet, they are the group which protest the most also under left-wing governments. Both party mobilisation and values appear to be behind these individuals' greater propensity to participate regardless of the governments' ideological orientation.     

Party strategies,world demand,and unemployment in Britain and the United States, 1947–1983

This paper replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in Britain and the United States from 1947 to 1983. Unemployment falls under left-wing governments and rises under right-wing governments. However, these partisan effects on unemployment in an open economy like Britain's can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the level of world economic activity. The United States has major effects on world economic activity but is also subject to feedback from the economies of other countries. Politicians' strategic incentives and economic regime constraints determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained, transitory, or absent. In Britain, only a model in which partisan impacts are transitory satisfactorily estimates the effects of changes of party control. In the United States, only the transitory-impact model is able to estimate partisan effects in recent administrations.     

Presidential Elections and the Stock Market: Comparing Markov-Switching and Fractionally Integrated GARCH Models of Volatility

Bumba Mukherjee Department of Political Science, Florida State University, 554 Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, FL 32306 e-mail: smukherj{at}mailer.fsu.edu Existing research on electoral politics and financial marketspredicts that when investors expect left parties—Democrats(US), Labor (UK)—to win elections, market volatility increases.In addition, current econometric research on stock market volatilitysuggests that Markov-switching models provide more accuratevolatility forecasts and fit stock price volatility data betterthan linear or nonlinear GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditionalheteroskedasticity) models. Contrary to the existing literature,we argue here that when traders anticipate that the Democraticcandidate will win the presidential election, stock market volatilitydecreases. Using two data sets from the 2000 U.S. presidentialelection, we test our claim by estimating several GARCH, exponentialGARCH (EGARCH), fractionally integrated exponential GARCH (FIEGARCH),and Markov-switching models. We also conduct extensive forecastingtests—including RMSE and MAE statistics as well as realizedvolatility regressions—to evaluate these competing statisticalmodels. Results from forecasting tests show, in contrast toprevailing claims, that GARCH and EGARCH models provide substantiallymore accurate forecasts than the Markov-switching models. Estimatesfrom all the statistical models support our key prediction thatstock market volatility decreases when traders anticipate aDemocratic victory.     

Partisan Differences in Swedish Macroeconomic Policy

The purpose of this paper is to trace partisan differencesamong Swedish governments during the period 1958-2000. According tothe Partisan Theory of macroeconomic policy left-wing governmentsare relatively more concerned with the performance of the realside of the economy (real output and unemployment) as compared toright-wing governments, that place a higher weight on the nominalvariables (inflation). Left-wing governments would therefore pursue moreexpansionary aggregate demand policy, and thereby be willingto risk a higher inflation, in order to improve real economicperformance. In this paper we apply the model developed in Hibbs (1994) onSwedish data. Our empirical results support the partisan theory,showing that, ceteris paribus, aggregate demand policy under left-winggovernments is relatively more expansionary than under right-wing governments, even if the expansionary policysometimes leads to higher inflation.     

Accountability from the perspective of the forum: citizens’ attitudes towards accountability in Europe

The aim of this article is to analyse citizens’ attitudes towards governmental accountability in 24 European countries and to examine the influence of contextual and individual factors on perceptions of accountability. Using as a dataset the 2012 European Social Survey, the results show that citizens respond positively when the media provides reliable information on which to judge the government, when individuals perceive that governments perform well, when individuals live in more extensive and generous welfare states and when they live in countries where the rule of law is firmly established. In addition, the findings also provide evidence that compared to politically left-wing citizens, right-wing supporters have, on average, a higher perception of governmental accountability. In particular, the findings show strong positive evaluations of right-wing governments by right-wing voters in comparison with left-wing governments by left-wing voters.     

Political Ideology and Social Services Contracting: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design

Theoretical perspectives on the ideological influences on government contracting predict that local governments controlled by right-wing political parties will contract out a higher proportion of services than those controlled by left-wing parties. However, empirical evidence on the impact of political ideology on contracting out remains inconclusive. To cast new light on this important issue, the authors apply a quasi-experimental research design to contracting choices in children's social services in English local government. Because local governments in England are largely divided along partisan lines, it is possible to estimate ideological effects using a regression discontinuity design that captures changes in political control at 50 percent of the seats gained in local elections. The regression discontinuity estimates reveal that left-wing controlled local governments exhibit a marked aversion to private sector involvement in service provision and a clear preference for in-house service provision. These results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.     

Partisan Differences in Economic Outcomes and Corresponding Voting Behavior: Evidence from the U.S.

The present empirical work examines the differences ineconomic outcomes delivered by partisan governments, and theway in which voters take this into account. Autoregressivemodels of output growth, unemployment and inflation, augmentedwith political variables; and probit binary choice models ofvoting decisions, incorporating expectations about inflationand unemployment, are estimated for U.S. post-war data. Theanalysis confirms that partisan differences in economic outcomes are actually observed in the data. U.S. unemployment rate exhibits adistinct partisan cycle, behavior of output growth andinflation rate partly supports the partisan differenceshypothesis. Thus suggesting that each party can be``instrumental'' in solving particular economic problems. Inline with this logic, U.S. voters seem to believe in theasymmetric abilities of parties to fight inflation andunemployment. Most interesting empirical findings includeevidence that U.S. citizens tend to vote for the left party(Democrats) when high unemployment is expected, and for theright party (Republicans) when high inflation is expected.This relation is especially robust for Presidential elections.There is also evidence pointing to the presence of electoralinertia and absence of ``midterm'' electoral cycle in the U.S.     

Economy,Type of Government,and Strategic Timing of Elections: Calling Opportunistic Early Elections in OECD Democracies

Although mainstream models of accountability assume that the election date is exogenously fixed, in almost any parliamentary democracy governments may choose it. This article proposes a theory of the strategic timing of elections that highlights the role of the economy and the type of government. First, incumbents will call early elections when the economy is growing and inflation rates are low. Nevertheless, coalition and majority governments will fall short of the ability and the incentives to do so, respectively. As a result, the effect of the state of the economy on the opportunistic dissolution of the parliament will be stronger when there is only one party in government, and it lacks a majority in the lower house. These patterns are examined by using data from 21 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development democracies between 1945 and 2010.     

Regression Discontinuity diagnostics reveal statistical anomalies in Turkish elections

Using Regression Discontinuity diagnostics we document a number of statistical anomalies in the 2004 Turkish mayoral elections. The governing party that controls the parliament is much more likely to win close races than lose. Moreover, compared to close governing party losses, there is a sharp drop in turnout and contending party votes in close governing party wins. Finally, the parties that disproportionately lose very close races are exclusively ideological competitors of the governing party. Among the potential mechanisms that may create those anomalies, electoral manipulation seems to a plausible explanation. Those anomalies show that the outcomes of very close popular elections can be non-random and that the assumption of the continuity of the expected potential outcomes at the threshold could be violated. We discuss implications of our findings for Regression Discontinuity Designs and for understanding the consolidation of the right-wing electorate in Turkey during the last decade.     

Populist parties in European Parliament elections: A new dataset on left,right and valence populism from 1979 to 2019

Despite the increasing interest in populism, there is a lack of comparative and longterm evidence on the electoral performance of populist parties. We address this gap by using a novel dataset covering 92 populist parties in the European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2019. Specifically, we provide aggregate data on the electoral performance of all populist parties as well as the three ideational varieties of populism, i.e. right-wing, left-wing and valence populist parties. We show that there is significant variation both across countries as well as between the ideational varieties of populism. Most notably, while the success of left-wing and valence populists is concentrated in specific areas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in the vast majority of EU countries.     

Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results Between 1950 and 2004

The results of twenty-five Turkish elections for parliament and local administrations between 1950 and 2004 are studied. Turkish voters are found to take government's economic performance into account but not look back beyond one year. Furthermore, they are found to hold the major incumbent party responsible for both growth and inflation but minor incumbent parties, only for inflation. Also, they appear to vote strategically, especially in local and parliamentary by elections, to diffuse power. Finally, all parties exhibit a steady depreciation in their political capital while in office. These conclusions are essentially in conformity with the literature on other countries.     

Stock prices,inflation, and output in India: An empirical analysis

This study focusses on the negative relationship between inflation and stock returns (the puzzle of fisher hypothesis). Fama hypothesis examined the relationship between macroeconomic variable and stock return and found the strong relationship between the real output and stock prices. This study revisits Fama's hypothesis from the period 1990M1 to 2016M6 for emerging country perspective. The results documented that there is a significant negative relationship between inflation and output whereas positive between stock price and output.     

Momentum in the polls raises electoral expectations

Voters rely on opinion polls to help them predict who is going to win elections. But they are regularly exposed to different polling results over time. How do changes in the polls affect their expectations? I show that when the polls indicate that a party’s support has increased, voters’ expectations for that party’s performance will be higher than they would be at the same vote share but without such evidence of growth, because the party appears to have momentum. Across six survey experiments in Britain (total N > 14,000), I find that this effect persists even when changes in vote share are well within the margin of error, when comparing a small change in vote share to consistently polling at the larger vote share, when the change makes little difference to a party’s objective probability of victory, and when voters have strong preferences that might colour their interpretation of the polls. In short, the appearance of momentum in the polls robustly raises voters’ expectations that a party will win an election. This finding has major implications for any area of research in political science where expectations feature, for theoretical understandings of how people perceive the future, and for salient policy debates about the regulation of opinion polls.     

Ideological congruence over government mandates under majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems

The existing literature on ideological congruence has typically looked at congruence immediately after elections when governments are formed. This article goes beyond that comparative static approach by examining changes in citizen-government ideological congruence between two fixed points in time, namely at the beginning and end of government mandates. Building on a veto player approach and dynamics of party competition under majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, the results indicate, first, that government positions are more stable in between elections, as the number of parties and their ideological distance increase in cabinet. Second, it appears that single-party and homogeneous coalition governments decrease ideological congruence between elections under low levels of polarisation, while they increase congruence under very high levels of polarisation. Third, it was found that governments under majoritarian systems slightly decrease congruence between elections while congruence stays stable on average under PR systems. The different levels of party system polarisation across majoritarian and PR electoral systems mostly explain this difference.     

Income inequality and party (de)polarisation

Scholars of US politics report a strong connection between income inequality and party polarisation. This study evaluates this relationship comparatively, and finds that the opposite association holds outside the United States, namely, that increasing inequality depolarises political parties’ economic positions. High levels of inequality change the composition of the core constituencies on the left and depress the participation of low-income voters, leaving left-wing parties with less support when they adopt distinct leftward positions. At the same time, inequality does not create strong incentives for right-wing parties to move further rightward. Therefore, income inequality leads to party systems that are depolarised on economic issues. The results have implications for our understanding of political representation, economic inequality, and political polarisation.     

Are Leftist Governments More Generous Toward Public Sector Employees? Evidence From Canada, 1967–1984

This article tests the hypothesis that leftist governments concede higher wage increases to their public sector employees than right-wing governments. Leftist governments are expected to be more generous toward public sector employees because of their commitment to public sector intervention, and because of the heavy representation of the public sector among leftist party elite and clientele. The study examines all major wage settlements signed between 1967 and 1984 in the Canadian provincial public sector and finds that, everything else being equal, wage increases are 10% higher under leftist governments. The standard economic variables (labor demand, expected inflation and spillover from previous contracts) that have been shown to affect wage increases in the private sector also emerge as significant. Finally, the data indicate that the greater the public debt the more constrained governments feel to negotiate minimal wage increases. These findings establish that a proper understanding of public sector labor relations requires a consideration of political as well as economic variables.     

The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties on the Positions of Mainstream Parties Regarding Multiculturalism

What are the political effects of rising radical right-wing parties (RRPs) in Western Europe? Does the rise of the parties drive mainstream parties (MPs) to become more restrictive on issues mobilised by RRPs, such as multiculturalism? Analysing manifesto data from 1981 to 2008, it is found that the rise of RRPs makes right-wing MPs adopt more restrictive positions regarding multiculturalism. However, left-wing MPs do so only when the opinion of party supporters on foreigners becomes more negative or when the parties lost more votes in the previous election than their opponent right-wing MPs did. The result implies that niche parties with extremist positions can benefit from their own electoral success by dragging MPs toward their own positions. However, the impact of rising niche parties on MPs should be understood against a broader background of party competition, and the impact can be dissimilar between MPs with different ideological commitment and strategic opportunities.     

Institutions and the stabilization of party systems in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

Most explanations of party system stability focus on the strength of mass-elite linkages. We highlight the role of institutions, focusing on how electoral rules and elected institutions, especially the presidency, impact elites' incentives to coordinate on a stable set of parties or to form new parties, thus affecting electoral volatility. Using Central and Eastern European elections data, we find that directly elected presidents increase volatility and that presidential power magnifies this effect. Absent a directly elected president, high district magnitude is associated with increased volatility, but district magnitude dampens the impact of an elected president on volatility; hence, our findings underscore the interactive impact of institutions on party systems. We also find evidence that bicameralism and concurrence of presidential and parliamentary elections decrease electoral volatility. Our model not only explains persistently high electoral volatility in Eastern Europe, but the extreme stability of Western European party systems.     

Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-Party System: An Application to the Netherlands

This paper is an empirical study to the effects of economic outcomes on party choice for the Netherlands. In the first part of the paper we employ a multinomial logit model to examine the links between voters' characteristics and party choice. The results suggest that there are long-run movements in party choice which are unlikely be the result of changing economic outcomes. In the second part, we use time series analysis to determine the effects of economic conditions on short-run and medium-run movements in votes shares. The estimations results provide support for the responsibility hypothesis and for the predictions of the partisan voter model that left-wing (right-wing) parties benefit (suffer) from favourable economic growth prospects.