Issue Voting in Portugal: The 2002 Legislative Elections

This article analyses the relative impact of position versus performance issues in Portuguese voting behaviour at the 2002 legislative elections and examines the relative importance of issues compared to other determinants of voting behaviour. The article first defines issues and then presents a model of voting choice, before examining the salience of different issues. The impact of issues, as opposed to other major voting determinants, is evaluated as vote predicting factor.     

Political Advertising in Greek Municipal and Prefecture Elections of 2002

Abstract

Since the restoration of democracy in 1974, Greek politics have undergone a serious transformation, exemplified by the increase in political participation that strongly affected political advertising at the national and local level. The major claim of the paper is that political campaigns in major cities in Greece are “modern” while in the periphery of the country political campaigning is based more upon direct forms of interpersonal relations. Our claim is based upon an examination of the role of political advertising in the major metropolitan city of Thessaloniki (around 1.000.000 inhabitants), and the semi-peripheral city of Kastoria (around 17.000 inhabitants), both situated in Northern Greece. The primary objective of this study is to establish a strong factual foundation that can be used by policy makers, opinion leaders, and citizens in order to understand the role of political advertising in national and municipal elections in Greece.     

The Tasmanian Electoral Roll Trial in the 2002 ATSIC Elections

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) elections since 1990 have used the Commonwealth Electoral Roll (CER) as a large under-specified list of potential voters. Dissatisfaction with this arrangement within the Tasmanian Aboriginal community led to a trial roll of Indigenous electors being drawn up for the 2002 ATSIC elections in that State. This paper recounts a number of contexts in which this trial was developed. It also recounts the experience of the trial itself, which did not work out as successfully as those who had promoted it had hoped. Finally it looks at lessons from the trial and options for the future.     

Social Context and Campaign Volatility in New Democracies: Networks and Neighborhoods in Brazil's 2002 Elections

In new democracies party systems are often young, so partisan cues and roots in the electorate tend to be weak. The results, in many instances, include volatile campaigns with comparatively high degrees of short-term preference change among voters. We explore the mechanisms of voter volatility and, more broadly, the ways in which citizens learn about issues and candidates in weak-party systems. We claim that citizens in such settings rely heavily upon persuasive information gathered from their immediate social contexts. Utilizing a unique panel survey implemented during Brazil's historic 2002 presidential election, we demonstrate the importance of political discussion within social networks and neighborhood context for explaining preference change during election campaigns. We also demonstrate the concrete political consequences of social context by showing how candidate momentum runs can be driven by waves of discussion.     

Political Communication and the Unexpected Outcome of the 2002 French Presidential Elections

ABSTRACT

The results of the first round of the 2002 French presidential election were a profound shock. Prime Minister Jospin did not make it to the final round run-off, beaten as he was by the far right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen who claimed second place. This article argues that use (and misuse) of modern campaigning methods proved decisive to this outcome. Paradoxically, Jospin's overtly professional approach actually hindered him. His flawed strategy failed to target crucial voters, and assorted tactical decisions compounded this error. Nor did the media coverage and distorted public opinion polls help a beleaguered Jospin candidacy. In this election the cautious would be the main beneficiaries.     

Debating globalization: cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as political ideologies

Economic, cultural and political systems formerly bounded by the borders of nation states are increasingly globalized. Politicians, civil society and other societal actors engage in publically debating issues related to globalization. Whether conflicts consolidate to form a stable cleavage depends among other factors on the extent to which they become ideologically underpinned. As the basis for such an underpinning, we identify philosophical debates about justice between globalists and statists and between universalists and contextualists as raw material that political entrepreneurs active in the public sphere can draw upon. On this basis, we identify four major bones of contention that could provide the core of such ideological underpinning: the permeability of borders; the allocation of authority between levels; the normative dignity of communities; and the patterns of justification. One ideal typical combination of those four components can be labelled cosmopolitanism—combining arguments from globalists and universalists; another communitarianism, combining statist and contextualist arguments. The more these two ideal types feature as political ideologies in public debate, the more do debates about globalization solidify into a new cleavage. We develop a conceptual framework which can subsequently be used in support of empirical research analysing the ideological foundations of globalization conflicts.     

Elections and selfishness

Elections affect the division of resources in society and are occasions for political elites to make appeals rooted in voters' self-interest. Hence, elections may erode altruistic norms and cause people to behave more selfishly. We test this intuition using Dictator Games in a lab-in-the-field experiment involving a sample of more than 1000 individuals in Kenya and Tanzania. We adopt two approaches. First, we experimentally prime participants to think about the upcoming or most recent elections and find that this priming treatment reduces how much money participants are willing to give to other players. Second, we compare results obtained across lab rounds in Kenya taking place right before the country's 2013 national elections and eight months prior, and find that selfishness is greater in the lab round more proximate to the election. Our results suggest that elections may affect social behavior in important—and previously unrecognized—ways.     

International ideologies: paradigms of ideological analysis and world politics

Abstract

Recent years have seen significant interest among scholars of International Relations (IR) in ideological analysis. By treating international theories as international ideologies, this trend entails both a radical reconceptualization of IR’s disciplinary foundations as well as the emergence of important new lines of inquiry for scholars of ideology. And yet, as a research programme, ideological analysis in IR has failed to establish a significant foothold in the discipline. This article locates the source of this weakness in the fractious nature of IR as a discipline, which has contributed to the emergence of five distinct paradigms of ideological analysis: analytical, historical, philosophical, critical and reflexive. Reviewing these five distinct bodies of scholarship, this article demonstrates that ideological analysis is ‘alive and well’ in IR, but argues that greater engagement between divergent paradigms will be required in order to fully understand the complexities of international ideologies.     

Elections presidential and parliamentary: Contrasts and connections

Different systems have been adopted for the popular election of a President. A comparison shows that the workings of parliamentary electoral systems and the behaviour of voters in legislative elections will be influenced by the fact that the head of state is chosen by the people. Certain aspects of this influence can be seen with particular clarity when a military hero steps forward as presidential candidate. The three cases of Hindenburg in Weimar Germany, Eisenhower in the United States and de Gaulle in France are compared.     

Patrimonial Economic Voting: Legislative Elections in France

Patrimonial economic voting has been neglected in favour of classical economic voting studies. This assertion holds less, however, with French election investigations, where the neglect is relative rather than absolute. Whereas classical economic voting holds the economy to be a valence issue, patrimonial economic voting regards the economy as a positional issue. Voters who own more property, in particular high-risk assets, are held to be more right-wing in their political preferences. This patrimonial effect shows itself to be statistically and substantively strong in one of the few election data-sets with sufficient measures available – surveys on the National Assembly contests of 1978, 1988, 2002. The electoral effect exceeds that from the traditional ‘heavy variables’ of class and income. Moreover, further work might show its impact comparable to that of classic sociotropic retrospective evaluations of the national economy. Certainly a case can be made for further study of patrimonial economic voting, as compared to classical economic voting.     

Elections and government spending

It is widely believed that electoral pressures cause legislators to favor government spending programs. This electoral theory of spending is shown to encompass two core hypotheses: (1) the electoral consequences hypothesis, which states that support for spending programs improves the representative's electoral showing; and (2) the legislator insecurity hypothesis, which states that greater electoral insecurity leads representatives to be more in favor of spending programs. A test of these ideas using spending scores for U.S. representatives in 1986 finds that neither hypothesis is supported by the data.     

Economy,Type of Government,and Strategic Timing of Elections: Calling Opportunistic Early Elections in OECD Democracies

Although mainstream models of accountability assume that the election date is exogenously fixed, in almost any parliamentary democracy governments may choose it. This article proposes a theory of the strategic timing of elections that highlights the role of the economy and the type of government. First, incumbents will call early elections when the economy is growing and inflation rates are low. Nevertheless, coalition and majority governments will fall short of the ability and the incentives to do so, respectively. As a result, the effect of the state of the economy on the opportunistic dissolution of the parliament will be stronger when there is only one party in government, and it lacks a majority in the lower house. These patterns are examined by using data from 21 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development democracies between 1945 and 2010.     

Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes

When do elections in authoritarian regimes lead to democracy? Building from the distinction between competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes, I argue that presence of relatively weaker incumbents renders competitive authoritarian elections more prone to democratization, but only when domestic and international actors choose to actively pressure the regime. The effects of two forms of pressure—opposition electoral coalitions and international conditionality—are theorized. Propositions are tested using a comprehensive dataset of elections in authoritarian regimes from 1990 to 2007. Results support two core claims: that the effect of electoral pressure is conditional on the type of authoritarianism and that this greater vulnerability to pressure is the reason why competitive authoritarian elections are more likely to lead to democracy. In contrast, several alternative explanations—that differences across regime type are explained by alternation in power, better electoral conduct, or ongoing processes of liberalization—are not supported by the evidence.