Divided by the Market,Divided by the State: Distribution,Redistribution and Welfare Attitudes in 47 Countries

This article examines the impact of income inequality and welfare state context on the extent to which the rich and poor share similar attitudes towards redistribution. It asks whether and how differences in attitudes, particularly those between income groups, are shaped by inequality and redistributive efforts. Based on a multi‐level analysis of individual survey data across 47 countries at three points in time, the article shows that such an interaction of individual characteristics and the macro‐context indeed matters considerably. While material self‐interest, unsurprisingly, explains part of the individual differences, the analysis also shows, for the first time, that both high inequality and strongly redistributive policies divide public opinion along the lines of socioeconomic position. Put differently, while market inequality may be associated with less cohesive attitudes, a highly redistributive welfare state does not seem to foster agreement among the public, either. These findings have important policy implications for advanced welfare states, including a renewed emphasis on ‘predistribution’ (i.e., policies that influence the primary distribution of income) in order to avoid the scenario of intensified redistributive conflicts.     

The Limits of Administration: A Response to Christopher Hood

The development of states coincides with the continuous (re)definition of administrative limits, according to Kutsal Yesilkagit, in this response to Christopher Hood. Hood’s thought‐provoking essay suggests putting the concept of administrative limits to greater use as an analytical concept and explores the idea of administrative limits from three basic ways of thinking: cybernetics, economics and cultural theory. This author critically analyzes one of Hood’s main conclusions—that different types of administrative limits may exist, and that “what kinds of limits we find where is likely to remain a central and contested issue in administrative analysis.”     

State of the Art: Divided by a Common Language: Political Theory and the Concept of Power

Power is probably the most universal and fundamental concept of political analysis. It has been, and continues to be, the subject of extended and heated debate. In this article I critically review the contributions of Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes to our understanding of the multiple faces of power. I suggest that although the former's two-dimensional approach to power is ultimately compromised by the residues of behaviouralism that it inherits from classic pluralism, the latter's three-dimensional view suggests a potential route out of this pluralist impasse. To seize the opportunity he provides, however, requires that we rethink the concept of power. In the second half of the paper I advance a definition of power as context-shaping and demonstrate how this helps us to disentangle the notions of power, responsibility and culpability that Lukes conflates. In so doing I suggest the we differentiate clearly between analytical questions concerning the identification of power within social and political contexts, and normative questions concerning the critique of the distribution and exercise of power thus identified.     

The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11

Two years after the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act aspired to replace a sprawling agency‐oriented intelligence apparatus with an integrated, networked intelligence community. The act envisioned a director of national intelligence who would accomplish sweeping structural reforms, while at the same time maintaining and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence operations. This vision has not materialized. The director of national intelligence does not have the power to implement structural reforms. Schisms between the legislature and the executive also hamper reforms.     

9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure

Public discussion about the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks has focused on the human causes of tragedy – on individual mistakes, failures of leadership, and the power plays between intelligence officers in the field and policymakers in Washington. But closer examination of the FBI suggests that organizational weaknesses are the root cause of poor agency performance. Longstanding deficiencies in the FBI's organizational structure, culture, and incentive systems proved crippling in the 1990s, when the Cold War ended and the terrorist threat emerged. These lingering weaknesses ultimately prevented the bureau from capitalizing on 12 separate opportunities that might have disrupted the 9/11 plot.     

9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence

Professor Goodman analyses the failure of US intelligence prior to 9/11 setting the context in the 1980s and 1990s. He dissects the flaws of the CIA, FBI and the Pentagon. He argues that the State Department should be strengthened because its capabilities are the most important. He also recommends that the FBI be split in two and that the CIA's budget be disclosed.     

The American Right and the Framing of 9/11

On September 11th, 2001, 2 hijacked airliners were crashed into the World Trade Center and a third into the Pentagon. The Bush administration's response, both in regard to civil liberties at home and the launching of military action abroad, has been the subject of considerable controversy. As we might expect, the Bush administration's framing of events met with acclaim among many on the American right But here, as elsewhere on the political spectrum, how to understand and react to 9/11 was also the subject of bitter dispute, a dispute that sheds new light on the ongoing arguments among American conservatives in the aftermath of the Cold War.     

A Failure to Communicate: 9/11 and the Tragedy of the Informational Commons

ABSTRACT

We investigate how networks among service organizations are integrated through a shared participant type of governance. Shared participant governance is a non-brokered type of network coordination where a network is governed by its members without a separate governance entity. We study the integrative capacity of this type of governance by measuring the effect of participation in a shared participant governance on tie formation in networks among service organizations. We analyze three networks of service organizations in three districts of Antwerp, Belgium. In each of these districts, the networks are governed by welfare meetings, defined as a shared participant type of governance. We use exponential random graph models. The results show that a shared participant type of governance has a positive effect on tie formation. We also find that the positive effect on tie formation is dependent on the active participation of centralized actors in the welfare meetings.     

The Limits of Regulation: Indirect Party Access to State Resources in Australia and the United Kingdom

The way in which political parties use state resources indirectly (e.g., parliamentary expenses) receives substantial attention in public debate, particularly when surrounded by perceptions of misuse. However, scholarly studies of resources indirectly available to parties through their functions in the state, how they are used and regulated, are rare. This article presents an analytical framework that identifies and categorizes the range of indirect resources linked to parties' institutional roles. It locates these resources within a four‐fold matrix of regulation, distinguishing regimes that vary in their detail and whether compliance is externally monitored. Undertaking comparative case studies of parliamentary resource use in the United Kingdom and Australia, we argue that the blurring of party‐political and parliamentary roles can impede the effectiveness of regulatory regimes that democracies adopt, regardless of detail and external enforcement. These findings have important implications for regulatory reforms that seek to constrain parties' behavior to depoliticize democratic governance.