State of the Art: Divided by a Common Language: Political Theory and the Concept of Power

Power is probably the most universal and fundamental concept of political analysis. It has been, and continues to be, the subject of extended and heated debate. In this article I critically review the contributions of Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes to our understanding of the multiple faces of power. I suggest that although the former's two-dimensional approach to power is ultimately compromised by the residues of behaviouralism that it inherits from classic pluralism, the latter's three-dimensional view suggests a potential route out of this pluralist impasse. To seize the opportunity he provides, however, requires that we rethink the concept of power. In the second half of the paper I advance a definition of power as context-shaping and demonstrate how this helps us to disentangle the notions of power, responsibility and culpability that Lukes conflates. In so doing I suggest the we differentiate clearly between analytical questions concerning the identification of power within social and political contexts, and normative questions concerning the critique of the distribution and exercise of power thus identified.     

9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence

Professor Goodman analyses the failure of US intelligence prior to 9/11 setting the context in the 1980s and 1990s. He dissects the flaws of the CIA, FBI and the Pentagon. He argues that the State Department should be strengthened because its capabilities are the most important. He also recommends that the FBI be split in two and that the CIA's budget be disclosed.     

9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure

Public discussion about the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks has focused on the human causes of tragedy – on individual mistakes, failures of leadership, and the power plays between intelligence officers in the field and policymakers in Washington. But closer examination of the FBI suggests that organizational weaknesses are the root cause of poor agency performance. Longstanding deficiencies in the FBI's organizational structure, culture, and incentive systems proved crippling in the 1990s, when the Cold War ended and the terrorist threat emerged. These lingering weaknesses ultimately prevented the bureau from capitalizing on 12 separate opportunities that might have disrupted the 9/11 plot.     

The American Right and the Framing of 9/11

On September 11th, 2001, 2 hijacked airliners were crashed into the World Trade Center and a third into the Pentagon. The Bush administration's response, both in regard to civil liberties at home and the launching of military action abroad, has been the subject of considerable controversy. As we might expect, the Bush administration's framing of events met with acclaim among many on the American right But here, as elsewhere on the political spectrum, how to understand and react to 9/11 was also the subject of bitter dispute, a dispute that sheds new light on the ongoing arguments among American conservatives in the aftermath of the Cold War.     

A Failure to Communicate: 9/11 and the Tragedy of the Informational Commons

ABSTRACT

We investigate how networks among service organizations are integrated through a shared participant type of governance. Shared participant governance is a non-brokered type of network coordination where a network is governed by its members without a separate governance entity. We study the integrative capacity of this type of governance by measuring the effect of participation in a shared participant governance on tie formation in networks among service organizations. We analyze three networks of service organizations in three districts of Antwerp, Belgium. In each of these districts, the networks are governed by welfare meetings, defined as a shared participant type of governance. We use exponential random graph models. The results show that a shared participant type of governance has a positive effect on tie formation. We also find that the positive effect on tie formation is dependent on the active participation of centralized actors in the welfare meetings.     

The Limits of Regulation: Indirect Party Access to State Resources in Australia and the United Kingdom

The way in which political parties use state resources indirectly (e.g., parliamentary expenses) receives substantial attention in public debate, particularly when surrounded by perceptions of misuse. However, scholarly studies of resources indirectly available to parties through their functions in the state, how they are used and regulated, are rare. This article presents an analytical framework that identifies and categorizes the range of indirect resources linked to parties' institutional roles. It locates these resources within a four‐fold matrix of regulation, distinguishing regimes that vary in their detail and whether compliance is externally monitored. Undertaking comparative case studies of parliamentary resource use in the United Kingdom and Australia, we argue that the blurring of party‐political and parliamentary roles can impede the effectiveness of regulatory regimes that democracies adopt, regardless of detail and external enforcement. These findings have important implications for regulatory reforms that seek to constrain parties' behavior to depoliticize democratic governance.     

9/11 Myths,Islam, and American Cultural Conflict

Mythological thinking about events of mass violence is common in modern societies and this thinking frequently focuses on dynamics of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Myths about the 9/11 terrorist attacks can be found on political right and left. On the right, the United Flight 93 memorial is described as an Islamist plot designed to denigrate the victims and venerate Islamist terrorism. On the left, the 9/11 attacks are viewed as orchestrations of an imperialist American government interested in vilifying and subjugating Muslims. Both myths are easily debunked with empirical data, but the power of mythological thinking about such events is such that data-based criticism has limited power to change the minds of adherents to myth.     

The Limits of Mobilization: Turnout Evidence from State House Primaries

Many analysts have lamented the decline of political mobilization efforts. They suggest that the cause of worsening voter turnout may be traceable to the failure of political candidates and political parties to target and activate nonvoters. This research explores the effects of face-to-face mobilization efforts in a sample of September 5, 2000, Florida state house primary races. Controlling for their voting history, the face-to-face mobilization effort did increase turnout by about 8% among those contacted. However, the effects were weakest among those who voted least regularly. The results suggest that implementing more face-to-face mobilization efforts would increase turnout—mostly by encouraging occasional voters to go to the polls. However, those same mobilization efforts would not substantially affect the turnout of chronic nonvoters.     

Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from 'Liddism' to 'Drainism'

Significant shifts have been underway in security intelligence agencies and processes since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Whereas the previous quarter of a century had seen a considerable democratization of intelligence, the article examines whether UK and US government responses risk the re-creation of 'security states'. Changes since 9/11 in law, doctrine, the intelligence process - targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action - and oversight are considered and it is concluded that there is a danger of the rebirth of independent security states.     

The State of American Federalism, 2001-2002: Resilience in Response to Crisis

The past year has been one of repeated shocks to governmentand the larger society. Terrorist attacks in New York City andWashington, D. C., the burst of the dot.com bubble in the stockmarket, a wave of corporate scandals, and a slowdown in theeconomy posed severe problems for officials of all governmentsin the federal system. The combined effects of the war on terrorismand the economic turmoil forced federal policymakers to createnew agencies and to enact new policies. State and local governmentsalso responded to the multiple shocks with a variety of initiatives,often independent of Washington. Instead of a move toward centralizationthat might have been predicted as a consequence of the seriousshocks, all elements of the American federal system demonstrateda capacity and energy to marshal resources in a time of urgency.