“Reformology”: The Case of Slovakia

Over the eight years beginning with the election of a reformist government in September 1998, Slovakia achieved a remarkable turnaround from reform laggard into one of the leaders among the postcommunist transitions of Central and Eastern Europe. This article examines the lessons learned from this successful transition, which demonstrates that quick and effective implementation of a cogent set of economic reforms can produce positive short-term economic results, with favorable and prompt political benefits. Foreign governments, multinational financial institutions, and nationals with technical training abroad who return home to serve in key positions can make a real difference.     

The Cold War “Special Relationship” Revisited

This article focuses on one of the most potent ideas in world politics: the idea of an Anglo-American “special relationship.” It examines the use and abuse of this relationship, as cultural referent, rhetorical construct, and political imperative, during the long Cold War. It inspects the roots of specialness—the core conditions—in terms of belief and experience as well as need and opportunity. It warns of the hubris inherent in the presumption of specialness on the Churchillian model, a frame of reference (and a set of strategic contingencies) time-expired even before the expiration of the Cold War itself.     

The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

Scholars have variously queried the existence of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” consigned it to history as “special no more,” or demanded that Britain choose between its European and American relationships. These critiques have become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War. Yet the current British government, like many before it, continues to portray a choice between America and Europe as a “false choice,” and the “special relationship” has arguably deepened in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This article contends that international diplomatic history can contribute much to understanding the “Lazarus-like” quality of the “special relationship.” Specifically it argues that a number of critical continuities in post-World War II British foreign policy survived the end of the Cold War and have since contributed heavily to the determination of the British foreign policymaking elite to maintain the “special relationship” at the same time that Britain pursues a leadership role within Europe.     

“Hut ab,” “Promenade with Kamerade for Schokolade,” and the Flying Dutchman: British Soldiers in the Rhineland, 1918-1929

This essay explores the social history of the “British Army of the Rhine,” especially their interactions with the German population, over the eleven-year period of occupation in Cologne and part of the Rhineland. It covers the initial, sometimes fraught establishment of the occupation and interactions with the civil population, especially the perennial problem of British soldiers' relations with German women. These were initially prohibited altogether, but the rule was quickly relaxed, and the British authorities even accepted and regulated the use of brothels, leading to criticisms back home. The essay also discusses the comparatively small number of serious violent crimes (including four murders) during the occupation, and concludes that the occupation was characterized on both sides by grudging acceptance and some degree of forbearance.     

Essence of Negotiation: Understanding Appeasement and “The Great Munich Stereotype”

The relative merits of rational choice and behavioral approaches to the study of negotiation continue to be hotly debated. This article tests qualitative postdictions (assertions or deductions about something in the past) from these paradigms as well as the alternative approach of new institutional theory against the extensive record of negotiation process, contractual form, and contract implementation from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I find the incomplete relational form of the peace treaty to be consistent with the behavioral and new institutional concepts and find that only behavioral theory can explain how unilateral German moves unraveled the treaty during the 1930s. But the historical record further reveals that the close fit between the behavioral paradigm and these events is more than coincidence. I also discuss the role of conference participants, particularly John Maynard Keynes and Walter Lippmann, in establishing the basis for modern behavioral science. The behavioral paradigm emerged from efforts to understand and fix serious policy mistakes such as those made in the peace negotiations. The study of human error was intended to serve as the basis for broad‐based organizational solutions. Finally, I discuss the impact of “the Munich stereotype” on such recent events as the planning for the American invasion and reconstruction of Iraq; such examples suggest continued imperfections in the system of organized intelligence that has actually evolved in the United States.     

Reading “Threats to International Peace and Security,” 1946-2005

In the United Nations Charter the notion of the “threat to international peace and security” is designed to play a key enabling role in framing its collective security functions. Taking a 60-year period from the UN's founding, this article examines how the UN Security Council has developed the notion of the “threat to international peace and security” through its resolutions, and what this evolution might mean for the notion of collective security and the Council's role in it.     

Level Two Negotiations: Helping the Other Side Meet Its “Behind‐the‐Table” Challenges

A long analytic tradition has explored the challenge of productively synchronizing “internal” with “external” negotiations, with a special focus on how each side can best manage internal opposition to agreements negotiated “at the table.” Implicit in much of this work has been the view that each side's leadership is best positioned to manage its own internal conflicts, often by pressing for deal terms that will overcome internal objections and by effectively “selling” the agreement to key constituencies. Far less frequently have analysts considered how each side can help the other side with its “behind‐the‐table” barriers to successful agreement. Following Robert Putnam's two‐level games schema, I characterize such “behind‐the‐table” or “Level Two” barriers more broadly, offer several innovative examples of how each side can help the other overcome them, and develop more general advice on doing so most effectively. As a fuller illustration of a Level Two negotiator helping the other side with its formidable behind‐the‐table challenges, I pay special attention to the end‐of‐Cold‐War negotiations over German reunification in which former American Secretary of State James Baker played a key role.     

Alan Bullock, 1914-2004: “I Only Write Enormous Books”

Alan Bullock (1914-2004) was one of Britain's most distinguished scholars and the author of several extremely important books on recent and modern European civilization, history and culture. His enormous contribution to British, European, and Anglo-Saxon culture and historiography is easily discernible in his many books and essays. Chief among them his biography of Hitler, parallel study of Hitler and Stalin, three volume biography of Ernest Bevin, and the Fontana dictionaries of modern thought. One of Bullock's greatest achievements was the establishment of St. Catherine's College in Oxford University, at which he served as the Founding Master for more than a generation (1962-1990). Prior to WW II, recent European history was not considered a respectable research field worthy of serious academic work, nor was it thought that there existed the necessary distance from recent events for historians to deal with such history in a proper fashion. However, Alan Bullock's books turned the study of modern and recent European history into the mainstream of postgraduate studies at Oxford. Lord Bullock contributed tremendously (together with Hugh Seton-Watson, Bill Deakin, Hugh Trevor-Roper and A. J. P. Taylor) to the breakthrough which turned contemporary history into a focus for academic research and teaching.     

Allies and Other Strangers: European Integration and the American “Empire by Invitation”

Current tensions between the United States and Europe have raised questions about the future of the transatlantic relationship, though historical analysis suggests that the good old days were not perfect either. This article considers the history of U.S.-European relations and concludes that they have always been complex, as neither Americans nor Europeans have been sure how an integrated Europe would fit into an Atlantic partnership. It concludes that the future of the West depends on Europeans’ developing on their own a clearer vision of the concrete shape and international role of the eu.     

“The Sore That would Never HeaL”: The Genesis of the Polish Corridor

This paper consists of an examination of the historic and ethnographic origins of the Polish Corridor question and of the various suggestions proposed for its equitable solution in the aftermath of World War One. It outlines the negotiations and memoranda devoted to the issue at the Versailles Conference and, in particular, the role played by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. It concludes that the result of these deliberations was as much the product of international tensions and a collective failure of vision as of any coherent planning or policy.