Designing policy for the long term: agency,policy feedback and policy change

Policy Sciences - Policy feedback research faces a potential pivot point owing to recent theoretical and substantive advances. Concerted attention now spans new scientific communities, such as...     

The implications of the emerging disproportionate policy perspective for the new policy design studies

This paper articulates the disproportionate policy perspective and uses it to mount four challenges for the new policy design orientation. First, in contrast to the new policy design thinking, disproportionate policy options may be systematically designed, and at times, successfully implemented. Second, in contrast to the new policy design thinking, there are certain conditions under which policymakers may tend to develop effective response, with cost considerations becoming only secondary in importance if at all (read, policy overreaction), or cost-conscious response, with effectiveness considerations becoming only secondary in importance if at all (read, policy underreaction). Third, in contrast to the new policy design thinking, disproportionate policy options may be designed for purposes other than implementation (e.g., to be used as signaling devices or as context-setters). Fourth, in contrast to new policy design thinking, there are certain conditions under which the emotional arena of policy may be equally, if not more, important than the substantive one. The paper concludes that so far the literature on new policy design has not responded to the emergence of the disproportionate policy perspective, but a robust research agenda awaits those answering this paper’s call for action.     

The effects of state policy design features on take-up and crowd-out rates for the State Children's Health Insurance Program.

We evaluate the effects of state policy design features on SCHIP take-up rates and on the degree to which SCHIP benefits crowd out private benefits. The results indicate overall program take-up rates of approximately 10 percent. However, there is considerable heterogeneity across states, suggesting a potential role of inter-state variation in policy design. We find that several design mechanisms have significant and substantial positive effects on take-up. For example, eliminating asset tests, offering continuous coverage, simplifying the application and renewal processes, and extending benefits to parents all have sizable and positive effects on take-up rates. Mandatory waiting periods, on the other hand, consistently reduce take-up rates. In all, inter-state differences in outreach and anti-crowd-out efforts explain roughly one-quarter of the cross-state variation in take-up rates. Concerning the crowding out of private health insurance benefits, we find that between one-quarter and one-third of the increase in public health insurance coverage for SCHIP-eligible children is offset by a decline in private health coverage. We find little evidence that the policy-induced variation in take-up is associated with a significant degree of crowd out, and no evidence that the negative effect on private coverage caused by state policy choices is any greater than the overall crowding-out effect. This suggests that states are not augmenting take-up rates by enrolling children that are relatively more likely to have private health insurance benefits.     

What future for the policy sciences?

The term “policy sciences” refers both to a distinctive tradition within the policy movement and to the broader policy movement itself. While the generic use of this term is sure to persist, the community of policy scientists trained in the tradition founded by Harold Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal faces challenges to its sustainability as a distinctive tradition of the policy movement. To motivate open discussion and debate, this essay follows the logic of a problem-oriented analysis, and also includes personal reflections and anecdote, with the following objectives: It suggests that the policy sciences tradition faces challenges to its sustainability because of the simple arithmetic of generational turnover in university faculty. It explores six factors internal and external to the policy sciences community militating against sustainability. The essay then critiques three different roles the policy scientist might play in contemporary academia, and concludes with a discussion of alternatives that might enhance the sustainability of the policy sciences tradition, should sustainability indeed be a desired outcome.     

Mechanisms for policy (dis)integration: explaining food policy and climate change adaptation policy in the Netherlands

Policy Sciences - Recent years have witnessed increased political interest to the challenge of organizing policy integration to govern societal problems that crosscut the boundaries of traditional...     

Prospects for communication policy

At stake in communication policymaking is control and use of technologies central to the process of governance in society. Future policies must admit a broader range of social goals than present ones. Defining such goals will require shifting conceptual approaches from regulation to investment, from information goods to communication resources, and from consumerism to politics. Persons engaged in communication policy research and planning had best avoid traps of being blinded by the technology, underestimating the political process and making easy assumptions about goals and values.David Grey, Edwin Parker and Donald Dunn of the faculty of Stanford University were especially helpful in the preparation of this article.     

A guide for the analysis of policy arguments

Based on what appears to be required for fully supporting a proposal for policy action, a series of interrelated propositional types is suggested as a tool for the design and critique of policy arguments. The kinds of criticisms to which different prepositional types are susceptible and the impacts of these on a policy argument are explored as are the uses persons in different roles might make of these criticisms. Finally, as an example, the typology is applied to a portion of the President's 1973 State of the Union Address.A draft of this paper was prepared while the author was Research Fellow in the Educational Policy Research Center at Syracuse. Suggestions on earlier drafts by Paul P. Van Riper, Warren A. Dixon, and Gerald C. Swanson at Texas A&M University are acknowledged with appreciation.     

Ten commandments for policy economists

The incorporation of economic approaches into policymaking requires special skills on the part of the economist. This article examines the use of economics in government as illustrated by the experience of the natural resources agencies. It presents ten guiding rules for the practicing policy economist: (1) be economical about the use of economics; (2) discount for political demand; (3) dare to be “quick-and-dirty”; (4) think like a manager; (5) analyze equity as well as efficiency; (6) know your market; (7) pay your organizational dues; (8) profit from action-forcing events; (9) do not oversell economic analysis; and (10) learn policy economics by doing it.     

Public policy for dangerous inventions

This study explores the relationship between dangerous invention characteristics and US local, state, and federal government safety policy-making patterns and effectiveness. When an invention prototype appears and its existence is recognized, an initial policy direction is established quickly if the invention is treated by society as being similar to a previous way of doing things. In this case the invention's dangers will be regulated within the established legal and administrative framework. If an invention is perceived as being entirely new, its introduction tends to be followed by governmental inaction for years or even decades. When government finally responds it is likely to be at the federal level.     

Transitioning policy: co-production of a new strategic framework for energy innovation policy in the Netherlands

This article describes policy–science interactions in a transition process in which we were involved as scientists. We describe the interactions that occurred in a project for the fourth National Environmental Policy Plan in the Netherlands. The project was successful in that it produced a new concept and set of principles for policy to deal with persistent problems such as global climate change, which were used in the national policy plan. The new concept was that of transition and the principles were: policy integration, long-term thinking for short-term action, keeping multiple options open and learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning. Retrospectively, we ask ourselves: what factors facilitated the acceptance of the first ideas about transition management? Reconstructing the events and drawing on interviews with key individuals involved, we have tried to find the key factors for the adoption of the ideas developed in the project. Finally, we reflect upon our role as scientists-advisors and the role of others in the development of a new story line and set of principles for policy. Our own assessment, 8 years later, is that we were engaged in boundary work.     

Compensation rules for climate policy in the electricity sector

Most previous cap and trade programs have distributed emission allowances for free to incumbent producers. However, in the electricity sector the value of CO₂ allowances may be far in excess of costs to industry and giving them away to firms diverts allowance value from other purposes. Using a detailed simulation model, this paper shows that compensation to firms losing asset value under a climate cap and trade policy can be achieved for a small fraction of total allowance value, if targeted carefully. However, the economic efficiency cost of providing incremental compensation to reach the fully compensated level is many multiples of that incremental compensation. These considerations might move policymakers away from free allocation of CO₂ emission allowances in the electricity sector. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Capital mobility and the possibilities for international policy coordination

When capital is internationally mobile, small differences in macroeconomic policies generate massive payments imbalances that cannot be managed successfully with the policy tools used during the Bretton Woods era. Monetary and fiscal policy coordination is needed to stabilize the international economy, but is difficult to achieve. This article uses insights from the theoretical literature on international cooperation to account for characteristics of policy coordination in recent years. Examination of the strategic situation helps to explain why governments have rejected proposals for a rules-based regime (e.g., strict multilateral surveillance using quantitative indicators) yet have coordinated policy adjustments on an ad hoc basis in response to crises. A solution to the strategic problem — in which there is one mutually adverse outcome (no adjustment by any government) and a number of Pareto-optimal outcomes preferred by different governments — depends on the exercise of power. Consideration of theories about hegemony and cooperation suggests that the U.S. continues to act as a hegemon in this area, albeit of the coercive rather than benevolent sort. International theories of cooperation, however, neglect the domestic policy making practices and institutions that pose the central problems for international policy coordination.