Anger and Declining Trust in Government in the American Electorate

Partisanship in the United States in the contemporary era is largely characterized by feelings of anger and negativity. While the behavioral consequences of this new style of partisanship have been explored at some length, less is known about how the anger that is at the root of this growing partisan antipathy affects Americans’ views of the national government. In this paper, I utilize data from the 2012 American National Election Studies to show that higher levels of anger are associated with a greater level of distrust in government across a variety of metrics. I then present evidence from a survey experiment on a national sample of registered voters to show that anger has a causal effect in reducing citizens’ trust in government. Importantly, I find that anger is able to affect an individual’s views of the national government even when it is aroused through apolitical means. I also find that merely prompting individuals to think about politics is sufficient to arouse angry emotions. In total, the results suggest that anger and politics are closely intertwined, and that anger plays a broad and powerful role in shaping how Americans view their governing institutions.     

Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior

Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies.An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies.     

Comparative Analysis in Political Science: Requiem or Resurrection?

Comparative method in political science is currently going through a critical time, particularly after the failure of developmentalism, and of the classical paradigm of comparative government. This crisis stems from questioning universalism, mono-determinism and the compartmentalism between political science and history. New paradigms are now conceived in order to overcome this crisis: culturalism, social action, historical sociology. Can they be used to construct a new kind of comparison? Can they deal effectively with the new objects of comparison which derive from the increasing differentiation of political situations and political practices that we currently observe?     

Reputation management as an interplay of structure and agency: A strategic-relational approach

Reputation scholars in the field of regulation tend to focus on the strategic nature—or: “agency”—of reputation management. We know fairly little about the precise nature of the dynamics and conflicts between structural and agential factors that are experienced by regulators in practice, and how these dynamics impact reputation management and its outcomes. This study addresses these questions, using conceptual language from the strategic-relational approach to study the reputation management of the Belgian financial regulator during an event of high reputational salience: the global financial crisis. The results present an image of a regulator as a strategic actor who—either consciously or more intuitively—calculated its possible moves in light of a strategically selective context (which, in turn, was constantly evolving as a result of strategic actions). This contributes to a more complex and behaviorally realistic understanding of regulatory reputation management.     

Against Humanitarian Impunity: Rethinking Responsibility for Displacement and Disaster in Northern Uganda

Abstract

Given that humanitarian organizations can often be responsible for enabling, prolonging or intensifying violence and conflict through their interventions into war zones, it is important that these organizations, despite their presumed neutrality and beneficence, be held accountable for the deleterious consequences of their actions. The case of northern Uganda will be used to demonstrate how humanitarian agencies have made possible the government's counterinsurgency, including its policy of mass forced displacement and internment, which has led to a vast humanitarian crisis. The Ugandan government policy will be assessed as a war crime, making aid agencies accessories to this crime. This case study is used as an example to highlight that processes which demand the post-conflict accountability of those responsible for violence may be dramatically incomplete, and unjust, if they do not include the humanitarian agencies. In conclusion it will be suggested that if humanitarian organizations built popular accountability mechanisms into their daily operations this might prevent them from being complicit with egregious violence in the first place.     

South Africa’s troubled outlook

Elections to Ukraine's parliament should result in a new government that reflects the political changes that have occurred in the country since late 2013. But if it is not able to implement long-overdue institutional reforms, there is a substantial risk of another political crisis in the next few years.     

When good news is scarce and bad news is good: Government responsibilities and opposition possibilities in political agenda‐setting

Recent studies have drawn attention to the political contingencies of the media's political agenda‐setting influence, finding, for instance, that issues from the media agenda are more likely to attract attention if a party enjoys ownership of the issue. Supplementing the debate on why political parties respond to news, it is argued in this article that ownership is only part of the picture and that policy responsibility, together with news tone, constitutes a stronger explanation of news politicisation. Opposition parties respond to bad news because they reflect negative developments in social problems for which the government could be held responsible. The government responds to good news that reflects positive developments in social problems because this could politicise policy success, but is also forced to react when news explicitly address government responsibility and thereby threatens its image as responsive and competent. Furthermore, it is shown that news tone and policy responsibility condition the incentive to politicise owned issues from the media agenda. Thus, opposition parties will not politicise owned issues when news is good because this could draw attention to government success, while government is unable and unwilling to prioritise owned issues when news is bad and instead is likely to make use of its ownership strengths when news is good and the pressure to respond is low. The arguments are tested on a large‐N sample of radio news stories from Denmark (2003–2004). Opposition response is measured through parliamentary questions spurred by the news stories, while government response is indicated by references to these stories in the prime minister's weekly press meeting. Results confirm the expectations, suggesting that parties care more about the tone of news stories and the type of attention they might produce, rather than what type of issues they could serve to politicise.     

Gender-Related Political Knowledge and the Descriptive Representation of Women

Past scholarship has documented that women tend to know less about politics than men. This study finds that political knowledge of one kind—knowledge about the actual level of women's representation—is related to support for having more women in office. Individuals who underestimate the percentage of women in office are more likely than individuals who know the correct percentage to support increasing women's representation. Meanwhile, individuals who overestimate the percentage of women in office are less likely to support increasing women's representation. Ironically, women are more likely than men to overestimate the presence of women in office. I also find that gender predicts support for having more women in office, with women more supportive than men. Women would be even more supportive of electing more women to office if they were as knowledgeable as men about the extent of women's underrepresentation.     

New Citizens and Old Politics in Peru

The article presents an analysis of the disjunction between civil and political society in Perú and its consequences in the collapse of the political parties and the rise of an authoritarian regime. It explains how citizenship developed as social rights in the realm of Peruvian civil society before the population gained access to full civil and political rights. This situation diminished the capacity of Peruvian citizens to have their own political representation and created a distance between Peru's civil and political societies, making it difficult for the population to hold politicians accountable for their actions in government and the opposition. This situation proved particularly serious when the country went through a period of deep economic crisis and extended political violence during the 1980s. The breach between civil and political society destroyed the prestige of politicians and democracy, paving the way for an authoritarian cuadillo who dismissed representation with promises of "direct communication with the people" and harsh solutions to the problems of economic crisis and political violence.     

Participation in hard times: how constrained government depresses turnout among the highly educated

Existing studies on electoral turnout in times of economic crisis have predominantly focused on disadvantaged voters. However, during the recent economic crisis, turnout among highly educated citizens has strongly declined as well. Existing resource-based theories of political participation cannot account for this. This article suggests that the anticipation of government inefficacy is an important driver of abstention among highly educated. Where governments are severely constrained, these citizens anticipate that the hands of future governments will be tied. Hence they are more likely to abstain out of frustration or rational calculations. The study uses the recent economic crisis as test case, as it entails particularly acute constraints on several European governments. The cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence – based on ESS survey data and different measures of government constraint in 28 European countries – provides ample support for the argument.     

Economic dissatisfaction and political alienation in Western Europe

Abstract. Using Euro-Barometers 20 and 21, this research examines the role of economic discontent in promoting disenchantment with democracy in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy. Both cognitive and affective economic evaluations have a strong effect on one's level of political alienation. Those who believe the government will have a negative effect on the economy in the future and those who are angry over their government's management of the economy are likely to be dissatisfied with the way in which democracy is working in their country. After these economic evaluations the factors most closely related to alienation are support for the parties not in the governing coalition and post-materialist values. Even with these items included, however, economic evaluations continue to dominate the model of political alienation.     

‘Yes,but all responsible Finns want to stop living on credit’: Feeling rules in the Finnish politics of austerity

In 2015, the newly elected government of Finland introduced austerity measures designed to improve the public economy, which had not recovered from the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The article examines how the government sought to secure acceptance for austerity by appealing to citizens’ emotions. We analyse how the measures were emotionally motivated and how, according to the parties in power, citizens should and should not have felt about them. The article shows how the politics of austerity produces various and contradictory feeling rules. These seek to temper citizens’ negative emotions towards austerity, such as dissatisfaction over unfair sharing of pain and distrust towards political authority. Interestingly, the rules evoke hope that a better future lies ahead if citizens follow the proposed measures, yet prompt fears of what will happen if they do not. The government also emphasised its transparency and honesty to prompt empathy and trust from the population.     

Not All Housing GSEs Are Alike: An Analysis of the Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Foreclosure Crisis

While the financial crisis of 2008 ultimately affected the range of U.S. financial institutions, it began with practices in home ownership finance. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) System was the first instrumentality created by the U.S. government, in 1932, to sustain affordable home ownership finance. In this article, the authors ask what role, if any, the FHLBanks played in the subprime lending and securitization practices that precipitated the current crisis. The authors analyze publicly available FHLBank financial data in terms of a framework focused on the System's assets: advances; mortgage loans acquired from members; and investments, particularly in mortgage-backed-securities. They conclude that the FHLBanks did not contribute significantly to problematic practices. Nonetheless, they recommend consideration of three reforms to the FHLBanks to ensure a return to effective regulation and responsible, affordable home ownership finance.     

Coalition politics and accountability

The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) can not be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy.     

Participation in the Wake of Adversity: Blame Attribution and Policy-Oriented Evaluations

In this paper we investigate to what extent perceptions of economic conditions, policy-oriented evaluations, and blame attribution affected Californians’ involvement in political activities in 2010. We use a statistical methodology that allows us to study not only the behavior of the average citizen, but also the behavior of “types” of citizens with latent predispositions that incline them toward participation or abstention. The 2010 election is an excellent case study, because it was a period when citizens were still suffering the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and many were concerned about the state’s budgetary crisis. We find that individuals who blamed one of the parties for the problems with the budget process, and who held a position on the 2010 Affordable Care Act, were often considerably more likely to participate. We also find, however, that the impact of economic evaluations, positions on the health care reform, and blame attributions was contingent on citizens’ latent participation propensities and depended on the class of political activity.     

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW SOUTH WALES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION*

There are probably more changes taking place in public administration than at any previous time. In some sectors (like health) staff are now used to change; it has become a normal part of their everyday life. In other sectors (like road transport) it is a new experience. Some changes are the latest chapter in a long and continuing story. Clear objectives, downstream autonomy and performance monitoring have been issues for as long as most public servants can remember. The fresh ingredients added by New South Wales Incorporated are the management incentives that make a direct appeal to the self-interest of senior executives, and the ideology of competitive neutrality that mimics the price signals which motivate private enterprise. The intended results are less political patronage, smaller government, more accountability, better morale and higher productivity. Stated in these terms they are unlikely to cause controversy; the current political consensus is that they would constitute worthy goals for any government. However important differences of opinion will probably emerge over the order of priority for these goals. For example, how much should higher productivity be sought if it threatens accountability or morale? There is also likely to be debate between those who want everything in place immediately, even if it means industrial strife, and those who prefer a softly-softly approach.     

Ministerial careers and the nature of parliamentary government: the cases of Austria and Belgium

Abstract. The characteristics of parliamentary government vary markedly from one Western European country to another. Although we still do not know in detail the nature and amplitude of these variations, they are sufficiently manifest to warrant close examination. One way in which these variations can be assessed is through the analysis of the career patterns of ministers. These are interesting both in themselves and because they provide information about the nature of the decision-making process: for instance, ministers who stay in office for very short periods are less likely to be involved in collective decisions than ministers who stay in office for a decade or more. Differences are particularly marked among ministerial career patterns in the Austrian and Belgian cabinets. Not only do Austrian ministers stay in office longer: they tend to come to office only once and then remain in the same post; they often do not come to the government by the parliamentary route, many coming from the civil service, industry, or interest groups. In all these respects, Belgian ministers have opposite characteristics. Thus it does seem that while both governments are ostensibly parliamentary, the Austrian government tends to be managerial, while the Belgian government is parliamentary and more truly 'political'.     

Oxytocin and the Biological Basis for Interpersonal and Political Trust

Political scientists have documented the many ways in which trust influences attitudes and behaviors that are important for the legitimacy and stability of democratic political systems. They have also explored the social, economic, and political factors that tend to increase levels of trust in others, in political figures, and in government. Neuroeconomic studies have shown that the neuroactive hormone oxytocin, a peptide that plays a key role in social attachment and affiliation in non-human mammals, is associated with trust and reciprocity in humans (e.g., Kosfeld et al., Nature 435:673–676, 2005; Zak et al., Horm Beh 48:522–527, 2005). While oxytocin has been linked to indicators of interpersonal trust, we do not know if it extends to trust in government actors and institutions. In order to explore these relationships, we conducted an experiment in which subjects were randomly assigned to receive a placebo or 40 IU of oxytocin administered intranasally. We show that manipulating oxytocin increases individuals’ interpersonal trust. It also has effects on trust in political figures and in government, though only for certain partisan groups and for those low in levels of interpersonal trust.     

Protest participation and economic crisis: The conditioning role of political opportunities

The economic crisis that started in 2008 has negatively affected European nations to different degrees. The sudden rise in demonstrations particularly in those countries most hard hit by the crisis suggests that grievance theories, dismissed in favour of resource‐based models since the 1970s, might have a role to play in explaining protest behaviour. While most previous studies have tested these theories at the individual or contextual levels, it is likely that mechanisms at both levels are interrelated. To fill this lacuna, this article examines the ways in which individual‐level grievances interact with macro‐level factors to impact on protest behaviour. In particular, it examines whether the impact of individual subjective feelings of deprivation is conditional on contextual macroeconomic and policy factors. It is found that while individual‐level relative deprivation has a direct effect on the propensity to have protested in the last year, this effect is greater under certain macroeconomic and political conditions. Both significant results for the cross‐level interactions are interpreted in terms of their role for opening up political opportunities for protest among those who feel they have been most deprived in the current crisis. These findings suggest that the interaction of the contextual and individual levels should continue to be explored in future studies in order to further clarify the mechanisms underlying protest behaviour.     

Party choice in hard times: Group-specific responses to economic downturns in Sweden

This article asks if, when, and why different groups of voters behave differently in the wake of economic downturns. We examine two Swedish elections (1994 and 2010) that were held just after two deep recessions (the financial crisis of 1991–1993 and the 2008–2009 Great Recession). We find that group differences were much larger in 2010 than they were in 1994. After the 1991–1993 recession, the government's electoral support declined across the board. In 2010, there were large differences between voters with low economic status (who were unlikely to support the government) and voters with high economic status (who were likely to do so). Our findings suggest that group differences in electoral behavior after an economic downturn depend on contextual differences across elections. We argue that future research should pay close attention to the magnitude of economic shocks, the development of asset prices (especially real estate), and changes in social policy.