One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting

The widespread use in legislative studies of the one-dimensional model and its median-stability consequence raises a question: Do stability and one-dimensionality rest on evidence drawn from observed votes? They do not and cannot. I prove that every possible legislative history is compatible with a transitive majority preference (hence stability), and except in very special circumstances with a cyclic majority preference (hence instability) as well: observed votes can never refute and almost never confirm stability. One-dimensionality fares worse: any legislative history is compatible with the one-dimensional model if it includes no two votes with overlapping pairs of alternatives, but otherwise, I show, it is almost certainly incompatible with the model, even in those rare cases that ensure transitivity. Voting evidence aside, the one-dimensional model is unduly restrictive, and arguments in its defense do not survive scrutiny.     

A spatial model of legislative voting with perceptual error

This paper presents a unidimensional spatial model of voting in which members of Congress vote based on an imprecise perception of roll-call alternatives. The model is applied to the Senate roll-call votes of 1977 to estimate the ideal points of the senators, and to examine the role of a liberal-conservative dimension in describing votes on economic issues relative to social issues. In light of the spatial model, the paper argues that “standard” models of roll-call voting are not based on a theory of choice, and hence, that it is difficult to interpret their results. Alternatives to standard models, based on the spatial model, are developed and are used to analyze the role of ideology in deciding a specific economic issue: coal strip-mining.     

A comparative modeling of tax reform before and after the legislative process

This research modeled the extent to which the normative goals of equity and efficiency are embodied in three seminal tax reform proposals (Bradley-Gephardt, Kemp-Kasten, and the Treasury Department proposals) relative to the extant regime. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) is also modeled in the same manner. The objective of this study is to compare the equity and efficiency of the initial proposals with that of the final tax reform law. This before and after analysis is designed to ascertain the degree to which the legislative process undermined the normative goals of the tax reform movement. The National Tax Model was applied to model each regime and to measure the distributional and redistributional effects on tax burdens and wage efficiency costs associated with each system across ten income classes. The reform models, including TRA86, are shown as superior to the pre-reform system with respect to the normative criteria. The legislative process did not substantially compromise the goals as reflected in the seminal reform proposals in the development of a more politically acceptable tax reform law. This exercise demonstrates that it is possible for sound legislation to survive a political process that frequently permits the sacrificing of normative goals in favor of special interests.Financial support provided by the Arthur Young Foundation Tax Research Grant Program and The Ralph E. Kent Fund. The helpful suggestions of Jim Curtis were sincerely appreciated.     

A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting

In market based societies consumers are able to express the intensity of their preference for an object by paying more for it. However, under some voting systems, consumers are unable to express the intensity of their preference for a candidate due to the constraint of the “one person, one vote” principle. Cumulative voting maintains the equality of the “one person, one vote” principle by allotting each voter the same number of votes, while also allowing for expression of intensity of candidate preference. This paper provides an experimental analysis of voter behavior under different voting systems.     

Class voting and left voting in Scandinavia

Abstract. This article examines the effects of different definitions of the working class on the measurement of class voting and left voting in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. First, the similarities and differences in how the working class has been operationalized in the three countries are summarized. To determine the effects of different operationalizations, Swedish election survey data are recoded to conform more closely to the classification procedures used in Danish and Norwegian studies. The analysis shows that if a similar operationalization is used, the level of left voting in both the Swedish working and middle classes increases and the Alford index of class voting declines. Class voting and left voting in the younger and older generations and among women and men are also discussed. Dissimilar patterns of class voting and left voting among women in the three countries are largely a product of different classification schemes. The concluding discussion points to a number of problems in using the Alford index as a summary statistic in cross-national comparisons.     

Q&A in legislative oversight: A framework for analysis

Parliamentary questions are an essential tool of legislative oversight. However, the extent to which they are effective in controlling the executive remains underspecified both theoretically and methodologically. This article advances a systematic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary questions drawing on principal–agent theory, the public administration literature on accountability and communication research. The framework is called the ‘Q&A approach to legislative oversight’ based on the premise that the study of parliamentary questions (Q) needs to be linked to their respective answers (A) and examined together (Q&A) at the micro-level as an exchange of claims between legislative and executive actors. Methodologically, the Q&A approach to legislative oversight offers a step-by-step guide for qualitative content analysis of Q&A that can be applied to different legislative oversight contexts at different levels of governance. It is argued that the effectiveness of Q&A depends on the strength of the questions asked and the responsiveness of answers provided, which are correspondingly operationalised. To illustrate the merits of the approach, the article includes a systematic case study on the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in banking supervision (2013–2018), showing the connection between specific institutional settings and the effectiveness of parliamentary questions.     

A mathematical one-man one-vote rationale for Madisonian presidential voting based on maximum individual voting power

North Carolina state election law gives county election boards broad authority to determine the form of the ballot used in federal, state, and local races. This paper examines the extent to which ballot formats appear to be strategically chosen and the impact of ballot design on 1992 North Carolina elections. Our results indicate that the form of the ballot influenced the decisions of some voters in statewide races in 1992 and that the design of the ballot may have been chosen strategically by county election boards dominated by the members of one party.     

Presidential elections in Finland: A plea for approval voting

The Finnish President is elected by an indirect method-the people elect special electors who carry out the final election. A proposal for a reform aiming at direct elections is, however, presently being considered. This paper agrees with this proposal and suggests that approval voting is a proper method for direct elections. Several properties of the approval voting system are discussed and the method is demonstrated to be superior to the plurality runoff method in presidential elections. It is argued that the approval voting system chooses a candidate who has overall support in the electorate and that the system therefore promotes the position of the President as a neutral and moderating political force.     

Executive budget proposal,executive veto,legislative override,and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.     

A recursive treatment of the hurdles to voting

In order to vote on a particular issue, voters first must leap the hurdles of registration, turnout, and roll-off. One way to think of these hurdles is along the lines of rational absention; at the time when a voter decides to register, they solve the forward looking problem of whether or not they expect to vote at all. In a sense, before they jump even one hurdle they will have decided that they will jump them all. But this formulation misses the complexity of the act itself. Voters do not even always know what issues will be on the ballot, how they will feel, and which of the ballot issues they may vote on at a later date. From this perspective, individuals start the “voting race” and drop out as dictated by their calculus en route to the final hurdle; registration, turnout, and roll-off are fraught with successive impediments consistent with a recursive empirical treatment of voting. The design and implementation of such a recursive treatment is the goal of this paper.     

Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets

In a model with a continuum of voters with symmetric single-peaked preferences on the one-dimensional unit interval (representing the political spectrum) a voting rule assigns to each profile of votes a point in the interval. We characterize all voting rules that are strategy-proof, anonymous, Pareto optimal, and which satisfy a weak form of continuity. This result paves the way for studying cabinet formation rules. A cabinet is an interval which has obtained sufficiently many votes. The main result on cabinet formation is a characterization of all cabinet formation rules that are strategy-proof with respect to the endpoints of the cabinet, anonymous, Pareto optimal, and continuous.     

A test of the predictive dimensions model in spatial voting theory

We model correlated voter-candidate issue data within the framework of the Enelow-Hinich spatial model of predictive dimensions. The empirical consequences of this model of the issue data are surprising and allow for an indirect test of the Enelow-Hinich spatial model. The central prediction of the correlated data model we construct, which depends critically on the underlying spatial model, is tested with issue data from the 1980 NES pre-election interview. The test results are highly supportive of the model's predictions. We conclude both that the spatial model of predictive dimensions is empirically supported and that candidate spatial locations estimated by the model are not an artifact of correlated voter-candidate issue data.     

Issues and voting in the European elections 1989

Abstract: After a discussion of the role of 'issues' in models of voting behaviour, this article focuses on the degree of homogeneity of issue evaluations on the one hand and the match between issue evaluations and vote choice on the other. Three major conclusions emerge from cross-national comparative analyses. First, and quite generally, a large segment of the national electorates does not perceive any particular party as best able to handle any of the problems they personally feel most important. Second, when particular parties are considered as best able to handle the problems seen as most important, then uniform - or homogeneous - evaluations outnumber more varied choices by far. And third, overall vote intention matches the competence evaluation much more often than not. These results give little support for the cognitive, rational choice approach to issue voting, but, still issue competence evaluations may be more than merely a reflection of affective ties.     

Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament

The Norwegian parliament uses a sequential voting procedure. After some general remarks on how the legislature can avoid strategic voting by choosing an appropriate voting order, and an exposition of the rules whereby the agenda is determined in this particular parliament, voting order manipulation is examined. A manipulative actor tries to bring about voting sequences in accordance with his interests, but contrary to the putative will of other actors. An example illustrates how manipulation may take place in practice, but it is stressed that the realm of manipulation easily escapes empirical analysis. To grasp the different types of manipulation in legislative voting, models are needed that are rich in institutional detail.