Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not

Though few voters appear to hold consistent ideological views, the roll call votes of congressmen and senators can be well predicted by ideological terms. An explanation for this puzzle is that ideology allows candidates to succinctly explain their views. Because it is difficult to explain detailed positions to voters, a candidate who presents his position in ideological terms may be able to defeat a candidate who supports a set of issue positions that would, in toto, be preferred by a majority of well-informed voters were the voters aware of all the views of that candidate. This effect can be a powerful one. Moreover, ideology may be a source of electoral stability, and a means of providing regularity and structure to elite political debate.Amihai Glazer acknowledges support from the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. Bernard Grofman received partial support from Grant SES #85-06376, Decision and Management Science Program, National Science Foundation, and NSF Grant BNS #80-01194 to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, at which he was a 1985–86 Fellow. We are indebted to Gordon Tullock for his comments.     

because they are forbidden but forbidden because they are

Carolyn Merchant: Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World. New York/London: Routledge, 1992.

David Pepper: Eco‐Socialism: From Deep Ecology to Social Justice. New York/London: Routledge, 1993.

Kirkpatrick Sale: The Green Revolution. New York: Hill and Wang, 1993.

Paul Hawken: The Ecology of Commerce. New York: Harper and Row, 1993

Vincente Navarro: Dangerous to Your Health. Capitalism in Health Care. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993     

Regulating Vertically Integrated Utilities When Transfers are Costly but Revenues are Beneficial

This paper considers regulating a vertically integratedutility under asymmetric information about efficiency gainsdue to integration. The benchmark case – benevolentregulation – implies a divestiture of a technically efficientintegration, unless the cost savings due to integrating aresubstantial. This highlights how private information causes adeviation from the standard perfect information framework.This result is at odds with the worldwide experience withpublic utilities that remained integrated almost throughoutthe 20th century despite that integration offered meager or nosavings as now becomes evident. Of course, this divergencebetween normative analysis and facts is no surprise for publicchoice. Indeed, a rather mild kind of a Leviathan motive –regulators dislike transfers to the utility, and by symmetry,like revenues – coupled with the `secrecy' only integrationoffers due to private information explains why a regulator hasan interest to keep even economically inefficiently integratedfirms integrated. This is in line with Crew and Rowley (1988)that public regulation serves to `milk' rather than to imposeefficiency.     

How rumors are born

Jean-No?l Kapferer is an internationally recognized expert on rumors. He is professor of communication at l’école des Hautes études Commercialesand at l’Institut Supérieur des Affairesin Paris, and president of the Foundation pour l’étude et l’Information sur les Rumeurs.He is author of numerous books on communication and persuasion. This article has been adapted from his book Rumors, Uses, Interpretation, and Images,published by Transaction.     

When right results are wrong

Among the topics he has worked on are: race and ethnic relations, methods, sociolinguistics, demography, ecology, leadership, and the military-industrial complex; and he is studying first names as a way to understand changing tastes. His many publications include A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants since 1880and Making It Count: The Improvement of Social Research and Theory.     

What are MPs for?

After the expenses scandal, it is time to ask what Members of Parliament are for. The traditional formal arguments are inadequate as they fail to engage with what MPs actually do. A typology is useful in illuminating the different ways in which MPs see their role: as Lickspittles, Loyalists, Localists, Legislators, Loners and Loose Cannons. Current trends in the performance of these roles can be identified, raising questions about the nature of politics and the vitality of Parliament.