利益、战略及美国台海政策的矛盾性

外交领域里的利益、战略与政策是相互关联、相互影响的一组变量。美国维持台海“不统、不独、不武”的政策是美国实现其台海利益最大化的战略意图。“不统”是美国实现霸权的必然选择；“不武”才能维持东亚和平的基本态势：中国制止“台独”的意志和决心使美国不得不以遏制“法理台独”来防止武力冲突。美国的台海政策本身就是自相矛盾的。     

A blessing in disguise? Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture

This article examines the implications of Scottish independence for the UK's nuclear posture. It is argued here that a vote for independence will critically undermine this posture. Since the UK nuclear force operates entirely out of Scotland, and since the Scottish government continues to assert its intention to see nuclear weapons removed from an independent Scotland, it is overwhelmingly likely that a ‘Yes’ vote will prompt a demand for the drawdown of the UK nuclear force in Scotland. If it wished to maintain its nuclear capability, the UK government would then have to make alternative basing arrangements. It is argued here that a host of legal, financial and political difficulties may preclude any such relocation and that Downing Street may ultimately be left with little option but to surrender the UK's nuclear capability. This article concludes that far from weakening the UK, a surrendering of its nuclear posture would result in a stronger and more functional UK military footprint and would bolster the UK's standing in the international arena.     

Russian Orthodox Church and Nuclear Command and Control: A Hypothesis

Abstract

The Russian Orthodox Church plays an immense role in current Russian national security policy. The intertwining of the church and the strategic community is nowhere more visible than in the nuclear-weapons complex, where the priesthood has penetrated all levels of command, been involved in operational activities, and positioned itself as a provider of meanings for, and guardian of, the state’s nuclear potential. The first work to highlight the phenomenon of the Russian church-nuclear nexus, this article focuses on the ecclesiastical impact on Russian nuclear command and control. The findings suggest that it is not inconceivable that the Russian military clergy—like the Soviet political officers and contrary to chaplains worldwide—might become future participants in decision making on matters of national security, and that de facto there might be two parallel chains of command authority emerging in Russia, with potential tensions between them. The article outlines the causes of this overlooked singularity and its implications for the theory and practice of international security.     

Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese Military Modernization

According to a recent RAND report, the United States will not be able to defend Taiwan from Chinese military aggression by 2020. However, this study, like many others, raises more questions than it answers about the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) current defense posture.¹ Is there a Chinese plan to claim Taiwan by force after 2020? In contrast to the conclusions of the RAND report, this article argues that China's strategic approach is not designed primarily for fighting a war over Taiwan, or over any other matter of critical interest to China, but to create a disposition of forces so favorable to Beijing that China will not need to fight a war. Rather than thinking of China's strategy as a blueprint for using military power to secure territory or vital resources, such as oil, it may be more appropriate to consider the possibility that Beijing's actions are directed at obviating the need to fight. Beijing may calculate that it can render its interests unassailable by constructing a network of friendly or dependent states by means of arms transfers and the like. The basis of such a strategy is the assumption that China's prospective enemies, finding themselves encircled or obstructed by powers aligned with Beijing, will be unable to envision a military campaign to deny China oil at an acceptable level of costs. They will, therefore, be deterred from threatening China, e.g. by interrupting its oil supplies. It is a mark of the efficacy of this broader deterrence strategy that American security analysts are already ruling out a successful defense of Taiwan in 2020. Similarly, the early stages of an effort to insulate China from an energy-related challenge are already visible.     

War Games redux? Cyberthreats,US–Russian strategic stability,and new challenges for nuclear security and arms control

Some 30 years since the release of the Hollywood blockbuster War Games, the possibility that hackers might break into nuclear command and control facilities, compromise early warning or firing systems, or even cause the launch of a nuclear weapon has become disturbingly real. While this challenge will impact all nuclear-armed states, it appears particularly acute for the USA and Russia given their large, diverse, and highly alerted nuclear forces. The fact that east–west relations have deteriorated to a nadir perhaps not seen since the 1980s, strategic instability has increased – particularly in the wake of the Ukraine and now Syria crises – and that the nuclear arms reductions agenda appears to have reached a standstill makes this challenge particularly pressing. In this discouraging milieu, new cyberthreats are both exacerbating the already strained US–Russia strategic balance – particularly the perceived safety and security of nuclear forces – and at the same time creating new vulnerabilities and problems that might be exploited by a third party. Taken together, these dynamics add another major complication for current arms control agreements and possible future nuclear cuts, and also seem likely to increase the possibility of accidents, miscalculation, and potential unauthorised nuclear use, especially given the large number of nuclear weapons that remain on “hair-trigger” alert.     

南亚核态势新发展初析

1998年印巴核试验改变了南亚地区安全格局,南亚核态势出现新的变化。南亚核态势发展变化的主要动因是南亚地缘政治因素,但同美国的南亚政策密切相关。奥巴马"无核世界"的构想,特别是2010年不扩散核武器审议大会,各方在核裁军、核不扩散、和平利用核能等重大问题上共识增加,使印巴这样的"体制外"有核国家面临压力。南亚安全形势错综复杂,如何在维护核不扩散体系有效性的同时,推动印巴两国不断改善关系,走出安全困境,考验着国际社会特别是印巴两国的智慧。     

Do nuclear weapons affect the guns-butter trade-off? Evidence on nuclear substitution from Pakistan and beyond

Scholars have argued that acquiring nuclear weapons should allow states the luxury of exiting conventional arms races. In turn, a decreased budgetary focus on conventional arms should make possible greater spending on social welfare. I contest this logic of nuclear substitution by examining its most likely exponent, Pakistan. As a poor, under-developed state, a nuclear Pakistan should have welcomed the opportunity to cease its arms race with India, and spend greater sums on its population's welfare. Instead, I show Pakistan has doubled down on its pre-nuclear conventional posture, mainly because of its revisionism over Kashmir. More generally, I show nuclear substitution should happen only rarely: when a state is satisfied with the territorial status-quo, and its security challenges are amenable to pure nuclear deterrence. An empirical overview of conventional postures in Britain, China, France, India, Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States shows these conditions are met rarely, and never sustained. The argument has implications concerning the marginal welfare effects of nuclear weapons, the stability-instability paradox in South Asia and the standoff between Iran and the West.     

Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?

There is not yet a Chinese international relations theory (IRT)mainly due to three factors: the unconsciousness of ‘international-ness’in the traditional Chinese worldview, the dominance of the WesternIR discourse in the Chinese academic community, and the absenceof a consistent theoretical core in the Chinese IR research.A Chinese IRT is likely and even inevitable to emerge alongwith the great economic and social transformation that Chinahas been experiencing and by exploring the essence of the Chineseintellectual tradition. The Tianxia worldview and the TributarySystem in the two millennia of China's history, the radicalthinking and revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth century,and reform and opening-up since 1978 are the three milestonesof China's ideational and practical development and thereforecould provide rich nutrition for a Chinese IRT. In addition,a Chinese IRT is likely to develop around the core problematicof China's identity vis-à-vis international society,a century-long puzzle for the Chinese and the world alike. Received for publication May 16, 2006. Accepted for publication June 27, 2007.     

Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security in Northeast Asia

This article argues that multilateral mechanisms for addressing security issues in East Asia are weak and that a key reason is the hollowness of China's ostensible and much-touted commitment to multilateralism. This is especially troubling when the region faces major security challenges and regional relations (and China's approach to them) appear to be moving from “economics in command” to “security in command.” The article concludes with a prediction that “A coordinated approach to combining alliances and quasi-alliances exclusive of China with multilateralism inclusive of it will best test China's intentions during this decade.”     

Engaging China in Nuclear Disarmament Debates： Is There a Role for Australia？

China has demonstrated some interest in the resurgence of nuclear disarmament debates over the past few years,but because its own nuclear arsenal is relatively small,because this capability is predicated on a very specific Chinese posture and security concerns,and because it believes firmly that the responsibility for moving towards a world without nuclear weapons belongs in the first instance to the United States and Russia-who between them possess 95% of the world’s existing nuclear weapons-it has displayed a somewhat limited contribution to this debate so far.     

Enforcing international environmental cooperation: Technological standards can help

Market instruments, such as emissions trading or pollution taxes, are less costly than “command and control” regulation. Yet technological standards are common in international environmental agreements and now figure prominently among proposals to mitigate global warming. I show that technological standards can be combined with market instruments to create collective enforcement power. They allow states to internationally enforce technology installation, so the payoff to free riding decreases. A notable feature of the argument is that technological standards and market instruments are complements, while previous research has treated them as substitutes. Empirically, technological standards are most valuable if international cooperation is difficult to enforce and the rate of technological change in concerned industries is slow.     

世界政治“平靖进程”的技术变迁支撑

二战后,世界政治经历了"平靖进程",具体体现为:"大国罕有战事""国家罕有消亡"。本文融合国际政治经济学与国际安全研究,展示二战后的技术变迁改变了大国的"意愿"与"能力",支撑了世界政治新变化。在马尔萨斯时代,由于技术水平低下,生存物资稀缺,生存保障匮乏,人类面临持续的安全难题。二战后,技术发展影响了当代大国的"意愿"与"能力",让世界政治呈现新变化。技术变迁给大国提供了更为丰富的选择,让大国使用武力征服的意愿降低;同时,随着技术变迁,尤其是在"核革命"后,大国确保自身安全的能力更强,使得"大国罕有战事"。得益于技术变迁,大国利益半径扩大,即便距离遥远地域的变化也与自身息息相关,大国保障遥远海外利益的意愿提升;同时,技术变迁扩大了大国的权力投射,让世界各国,尤其是大国保障体系稳定的能力更强,致使"国家罕见消亡"。随着技术变迁,世界政治已呈现出很多与传统智慧不同的方面,孕育国际交往的新理念。     

Islamist organizations on the Internet

Cyberspace provides a new arena for political extremists and terrorists to operate in. Among those who have eagerly seized upon its possibilities are Islamists, whose networked systems of organization are enhanced by the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). They use these for communication between themselves and to the outside world, and to a lesser extent for command and control. ICTs allow a degree of interConnectivity that previously was unavailable. They also allow them to communicate covertly. However, their use of the new technologies also allows researchers a growing opportunity to further monitor their activities and their strategic developments.     

US economic statecraft in East Asia

Linkage politics in the US were revived after the terroristattacks in 2001 as the US endeavored to bolster its positionin the international system. This paper examines current USeconomic statecraft in East Asia, particularly through the useof the preferential trade agreement instrument. As the US encountersincreasing threats in the region through China's economic andmilitary expansion, the emergence of Islamic militancy, andcontinuing tensions on the Korean peninsula, it is attemptingto reinforce its strategic position through the economic reinforcementof its bilateral politico-military alliances. However, as theestablishment of its recent free trade agreements has revealed,neo-mercantilist politics, as motivated by US Congressionalattention to domestic lobbying, present a risk to this strategy.It is possible that this tendency to economic nationalism, asevidenced in the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement, willdetract from the broader purpose of reinforcing the US strategicposition in the region. Received for publication April 10, 2007. Accepted for publication February 19, 2008.     

NATO's nuclear addiction – 12 steps to ‘kick the habit’

The article argues that NATO is a nuclear-addicted alliance. It focuses on how the addiction developed, the damage caused by the addiction and ways in which it may be overcome. After outlining the origins to NATO's nuclear addiction, the article turns to the recent defence and deterrence posture review (DDPR), which is seen as a classic example of ‘addict behaviour’ spoiling the best chance NATO has had for overcoming its addiction. The article offers an assessment of the DDPR, portraying the outcome of the process as not only a lost opportunity, but unfortunately also as a position that limits the possibilities for reaching a constructive agreement on the important question of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe. The article ends by suggesting 12 steps for NATO to overcome its addiction, although it is acknowledged that the DDPR has severely restricted NATO's room for maneuver leaving only a slim chance for ‘complete recovery’.     

中国视角：朝核问题现状及解决途径

本文通过对朝鲜拥核的内外部因素分析,重新评估了朝鲜的核政策,反驳了目前西方学者在朝核问题上的6种观点,对朝鲜拥核的动机、强制弃核的效果、朝核问题解决的程序悖论、中国在朝核问题上的作用、朝鲜经济变革的可能性以及六方会谈的未来等进行了论证。本文认为朝鲜弃核进程必须与安全关切紧密联在一起,弃核的实现又与朝鲜的经济改革存在相关性。必须强化六方会谈其他五方与朝鲜的立场和政策更为有效的协调,以多边模式整合碎片化的地区安全局面。     

AFRICOM's Relationship to Oil, Terrorism and China

Why a combatant command for Africa? I argue that AFRICOM was formed to implement the U.S. national security strategy that seeks to strengthen states and eliminate ungoverned space, as well as establish relationships with African states that offer a means to greater state stability and foster economic development. In so doing, it counters global jihadist by denying them haven among weak governments or in ungoverned areas. It protects U.S. interests in resources by helping governments become more stable. And it competes with the Chinese approach that could worsen the status quo of ineffective states and ungoverned space. Indeed, the U.S. approach of increasing state effectiveness makes African countries less susceptible to the problems that may arise from the Chinese approach and so serves China's interests in access to natural resources.     

中国在朝鲜核问题上的作用及其受局限的原因分析

自 2002年 10月以来,朝核问题一直成为国际社会关注的热点问题。“三方会谈”以及 3次“六方会谈”的成功召开把朝核问题纳入到一个多边框架下解决,对于这个重大成果,中国所起的重要作用是国际社会有目共睹的。尽管中国在朝核问题上发挥了其他国家所不可替代的作用,但是,从朝核问题的发展过程上可以看出,中国的作用也受到很大局限。     

Realism and the critique of technology

The ‘classical Realist’ thinkers Hans J Morgenthau and John Herz developed a puissant yet typically overlooked critique of technology. Driven by fears of nuclear warfare, they broke with Realism's inappropriately nonchalant view of technological development. Morgenthau focused on the dangers of a naïve faith in technological growth, arguing that it typically generated an apolitical and potentially irresponsible view of international politics. Even more effectively, Herz zeroed in on the problem of what he described as technological acceleration, according to which the rapid pace of recent technological change threatens humanity's future. While Morgenthau's ideas on technology are ultimately tension ridden, Herz still provides a fruitful starting point for any version of international relations theory hoping to take the phenomenon of social speed or acceleration seriously. Many of his reflections anticipated the contemporary debate among social theorists about the high-speed temporality of contemporary society.     

A Future US Defense Program in an Era of Great Power Competition

The Great Power Competition requires a new defense posture that adapts to the exigencies of the Russia-Ukraine war and the rise of China. A successful defense posture will necessarily require a reexamination of US defense strategy, and, importantly, the level of resources devoted by the US and its allies to national defense. A defense real growth commitment should be initiated now and sustained for as long as this more competitive and threatening security environment remains in place