Devolving Regulatory Authority:The Federal and State Response

One of the major legacies of the Reagan administration was its devolution of regulatory authority to the states, particularly in the area of environmental protection. The article descr&es how federal officials at EPA and the OfFce of Surface Mining (Department of the Interior) transferred regulatory responsibility to the states and how state officials initially responded to devolution. In a number of states, regulatory officials clwse to vigorously enforcefederal environmental standards despite the administration's desire for a more relaxed approach to regulation. Haoever, euidence generated by the GAO and others suggest that many of the states lacked the willingness and ability to effectively shoulder their new responsibilities. By the end of the Reagan administration, opposition to devolution had emergedfrom a number of quarters and administration officials were faced with, once again, refashioning the regulatory partnership.     

Reactive Responses: The Complementary Role of Federal and State Courts

The recent revival of state constitutional law has contributedsignificantly to the development of a dynamic judicial federalism.While interaction between federal and state courts is hardlynovel, acknowledgments of reciprocity have occurred more frequentlythan in the past. The Burger Courts receptivity to state judicialactivism inaugurated an era marked by creativity as well ascooperation. Thus far, major departures from established practiceshave been limited to a readily identifiable and recurring numberof state courts. All the same, the case studies included inthis article range across a variety of factual contexts andexplore an impressive array of links, both explicit and implied,between the federal and state courts. A disquieting new requirement,introduced as the result of a 1983 Supreme Court decision, exactsof state judges an unambiguous declaration of reliance on independentstate grounds as the price of ensuring federal nonintervention.Whether judicial federalism will continue to flourish withinso confining a framework remains problematic.     

The Fiscal Impact of Federal and State Aid to Large U.S. Cities: An Empirical Analysis of Budgetary Response

This article examines four types of aid programs to thirty-nine large U.S. cities federal revenue sharing, federal categorical aid, state general aid, and state categorical aid. The central finding is that there is significant variation in the magnitude of property tax reduction resulting from different types of state general aid. Property tax credits and exemptions are less effective approaches in reducing local property taxes than are state lump-sum aid or city use of piggybacked taxes Categorical state and federal aid mostly fund additional city spending and have small but important stimulative effects on the revenue side These results suggest that differences in the design of aid programs have important implications for their fiscal impact and their effectiveness in reducing property taxes.     

The Decline of the Legislative Veto: Federal/State Comparisons and Interactions

Legislative veto systems originated in the 1930s. Their numberincreased steadily until the early 1980s and then declined significantly.The decline of the legislative veto is attributable primarilyto decisions by a number of state supreme courts between 1980and 1984, and by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983. Almost allcourt decisions have held the legislative veto to be an unconstitutionalviolation of the separation of powers. In addition, most proposalsto authorize the legislative veto by state constitutional amendmenthave been rejected by voters. There has also been a decreasein legislators' enthusiasm for the legislative veto, even instates where it has not been declared unconstitutional. Legislatorshave found other ways to control administrative agencies. Inexamining the decline of the legislative veto, one finds thatthe federal government exercised little influence over the states,the states exercised still less influence over the federal government,but the states did significantly influence one another.     

The Legal Order and the Administration of Federal and State Courts

The Nigerian Constitution of 1989 establishes a system of federaland state courts, but within a structure of unified federal-statejurisdiction from the federal and state high courts, to thefederal Court of Appeal, and to the national Supreme Court.Thus, both sets of courts exercise jurisdiction with respectto federal and state laws. Although this system mitigates certainfederal-state jurisdictional conflicts, it does not eliminatesuch conflicts. At the same time, however, the Constitutionalso provides for Sharia courts of appeal under Moslem law andfor customary-law courts of appeal, thus establishing a tripartitesystem of justice. Although this system seeks to accommodateNigeria's ethnic and religious diversity, it does raise problemsfor national unity, judicial uniformity, and equity in the administrationof civil and criminal justice.     

The Federal Role in State Fiscal Stress

This article examines the extent to which the federal government'spolicies were responsible for the fiscal stress experiencedby most state governments in the early 1990s. Federal policieshave contributed considerably to recent state fiscal stress,particularly through the Medicaid program—the fastestgrowing part of state budgets—and the recession, whichdepressed revenue and increased welfare and Medicaid spending.Federal aid reductions have not been an important source ofrecent state fiscal stress. The real value of per capita federalaid other than for welfare programs fell considerably in the1980s, but the reductions were much greater for local governmentsthan for states. The largest reductions were in the early 1980s.Federal policies have affected state finances in several otherways—through tax policy, unfunded mandates, and the federalfailure to cope effectively with problems like health and poverty.Federal court rulings have also caused budget problems (as havestate court decisions). In some respects, state fiscal problemsare not a federal responsibility. Rising school enrollments,new corrections policies, and inelastic tax systems have createdfiscal stress for many states. Excessive state spending in the1980s has contributed to recent fiscal problems in some states,but not generally.     

State Corporate and Federal Securities Law: Dual Regulation in a Federal System

Corporate law in the United States involves dual regulation.Although state and federal corporate law typically functionwithout mutual interference, the last thirty years have revealedpotential conflicts, chiefly in two situations. One involvescivil remedies for investors under federal securities statutes;the other is state anti-takeover regulation and its relationshipto the federal Williams Act. The postwar years until 1975 sawperhaps too much reliance on the federal component of corporateregulation. Since 1975, there has been a renaissance of statelaw. Recently, however, appreciation for state regulatory authoritymay have degenerated into hostility to the will of Congress.The authors argue that the core interpretive task in federalsecurities law is preservation of both regimes to maximum effect,because the Congress has expressly declared that state authorityshould continue adjacent to federal regulation.     

The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level

It has been shown that states with higher per capita senate representation have higher federal spending per capita (Atlas, C. M., Gilligan, T. A., Hendershott, R. J. and Zupan, M. A. (1995). American Economic Review 85: 624–629). With a more recent data sample, more highly disaggregated data and a different set of political control variables, we are able to confirm the main result of Atlas et al. that per capita senate representation is positively related to federal expenditure. This effect is strongest for procurement expenditures. By contrast, we do not find support for their result that spending increases with per capita representation in the House of Representatives. Several other political variables are found to be significant in a subset of the expenditure equations.     

Differences Between State and Federal Public Forest Management: The Importance of Rules

In United States federalism, public policy responsibilitiesbelong to multiple jurisdictions. This article compares statewith federal public forest management. Data come from four cases,each comprising two forests sharing similar physical characteristicsbut under the authority of different governments. Systematiccomparisons suggest that officials in the national forest agencyface greater statutory, regulatory, and planning constraintsthan do state agency officials. These constraints require morepublic input and higher levels of environmental protection.Outcomes reflect these differences: federal officials provideless limber, at lower net profit, than do state officials, andthey transfer less revenue to local governments. Concurrently,federal officials make greater environmental protection efforts.     

The Federal, and the State and Local Roles in Government Expenditures

This article compares government expenditures by functional category of the federal government relative to state and local governments and the changes in their respective roles since 1955. The article includes a review of the federal role relative to the state and local role on a function-by-function basis for these three and a half decades. This analysis demonstrates considerable stability in the federal sector and the state and local sector, but also the capacity for change.     

The State Central Economic Bureaucracies and the Outcome of Systemic Economic Reform: An Institutional Explanation for the Soviet and Chinese Experiences

This article uses an institutional approach to explain the different economic reform outcomes in the Soviet Union and China. It studies how the different institutional positions of the Soviet and Chinese central economic bureaucracies give them different power resources to resist economic reform policies. This article shows that crucial differences between the two regimes in historical experiences, economic development strategies, and ideologies on bureaucratic rationality created different levels of institutional participation by the two central economic bureaucracies in state economic policymaking, and different economic management structures. Specifically, in the Soviet Union there was a strong participatory bureaucracy and a ministerial, vertically based economic management structure. In China however, there was a state leader dominated, politically weak bureaucracy and a provincial, horizontally based economic management structure. These crucial institutional differences, I argue, later gave the two central economic bureaucracies not only different incentives but also different resources to resist and sabotage economic reforms.     

The Determinants of State Budget Periodicity: An Empirical Analysis

States budget for a one-year or a two-year period. Little attention has been paid to the determinants of budget periodicity decisions at the state level. This article relies on existing surveys to develop hypotheses for the factors that influence the periodicity decision at the state level. The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 300 observations of the fifty states at various times in recent history. The results suggest that overall expenditures, budget complexity, political culture, revenue variability, and frequency of legislative session are statistically significant factors in the determination of budget periodicity.     

The Council: An Institutional Chameleon?

Council reform is a topic that has become a key issue in the wider discussion about reshaping the institutions of the European Union. This article explores five different images of the Council: as a partner of the Commission; as a club of governments; as a venue for competition and bargaining between governments and other political actors; as an arena for networked governance; and as a consortium for developing "transgovernmental" collaboration. It is conventional to examine the Council as both executive and legislative in character. More interesting, perhaps, is its evolving practice as a forum for experimentation.     

Intergovernmental Management: Federal Changes, State Responses, and New State Initiatives

This article surveys state responses and new state initiativesin 1983 to three sets of successive federal changes in domesticpolicy. Collectively referred to as the New Federalism, thesechanges include the block grants and accompanying regulatoryreforms of 1981, the changes in Medicaid reimbursement policyof 1982, and the job training and development programs of late1982 and early 1983. Following a brief overview of these changesin intergovernmental management perspective, state responsesin 1983 are examined in three areas—policy development,policy and program management, and service delivery management.     

State Initiatives in the Federal System: The Politics and Policy of Comparable Worth in 1984

In 1984, comparable worth came to occupy center stage amongstate and local political systems as the civil rights causeof the 1980s. Advocates of comparable worth came to see stateand local governments as being more receptive to consideringpolicy initiatives in this area than was the federal government.This article documents comparable worth events culminating in1984, describes the expansion of state and local action in thisarea, and considers the implications of these developments forthe federal system. A conceptual framework for examining theissue of comparable worth is also presented.     

The Influence of Federal Mandates on State Medicaid and AFDC Decision-Making

This article focuses on the influence of federal Medicaid mandateson state AFDC and Medicaid policy decision-making. The resultsconfirm certain concerns about federal mandates: the benefitsof federal Medicaid mandates (eligibility expansions to pregnantwomen and infants) appear to be offset by state reductions inAFDC and other Medicaid policy areas. In particular, federalMedicaid mandates had a negative effect on AFDC and MedicallyNeedy financial eligibility levels and Medicaid optional benefitcoverage—areas where states maintained discretionary power.A political-economic theory is used to test the impact of federalMedicaid mandates where a different political process is postulatedfor each policy dimension. The model is estimated using paneldata and a heteroskedastic, timewise autoregressive model.     

国家治理体系现代化的制度样本——评析《重大行政决策程序暂行条例》

《重大行政决策程序暂行条例》是新时代推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的制度样本。它统筹协调处理行政决策所涉及的多种关系,以形成良法善治的制度合力。理论上,它对行政决策范围的界定、重大行政决策的判断标准、公众参与的模式、合法性审查的模式、行政决策的终身责任追究等方面进行了回应或取舍。制度上,它对适用主体、重大决策事项划定方式、创新和拓展公众参与渠道、专家库和专家信用体系建设等问题进行了回应与设计。     

Institutional Linkages and Policy Networks in the Federal System of West Germany

West German federalism can be understood as a system of interlocking,but distinct and autonomous, "policy networks." Sectoral policynetworks are integrated into overarching networks. The traditionalpluri-centrism of state and societal institutions is contrastedwith an integrated (but not centralized) economic policy networkoriented toward national homogeneity. With the decline of Keynesianmacroeconomic policy, however, regional policy networks arebeing upgraded. At the same time, the political party systemand the politicization of administrative agencies have led tothe development of an overarching network in which bargainingand accommodation have precedence over hierarchical centralization.