The Danger of Global Austerity

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.     

As China Hits No. 2, Opportunity Is Shrinking in America

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.     

Rebalancing the Global Economy

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.     

Japan's Lessons for China

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.     

China's Economy Is in Balance

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.     

Short‐termism Is Undermining America

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.     

拜登政府的全球气候变化领导政策与中国应对

美国的气候治理政策长期呈现周期性变化特点。围绕气候问题,拜登政府强调引领清洁能源革命和重回气候治理,重视国内清洁能源发展、气候议题科学化塑造、气候治理多边主义,希望在继承奥巴马政府时期气候政策的基础上,全面提升美国的气候治理领导力。在国内,拜登政府欲依托科技创新、刺激需求、投资基础设施等措施使清洁能源融入美国经济进程;在气候外交方面,美国将推动相关问题在国家安全和外交事务中的主流化。拜登政府设计了“团结应对策略”,将盟友、峰会外交、经贸合作、对外援助和投资、技术标准、区域合作等内容融入其中,并突出气候变化与安全、人权的相关性。在对华气候政策方面,拜登政府将对中国实施限制性气候合作策略。虽然中美合作有助于实现《巴黎协定》的“2摄氏度”目标,也有助于全球低碳经济良性发展,但在气候治理领导权、全球低碳标准领域,中、美两国仍存在竞争。     

The mexican financial crisis

In the period 1990-93 Mexico's economy experienced expansion and structural change. This was associated with economic opening, market deregulation, and large inflows of foreign capital. Mexico had dealt with the external debt problem through a Brady debt restructuring. This restructuring lowered the financial requirements of the public sector, improved market expectations, and set the stage for a decline in domestic interest rates.

In the early 1990s Mexico attracted fully one-fifth of all capital flows directed into developing countries. These inflows more than financed the current account deficit, and permitted Mexico to expand its official reserve holdings. The portfolio capital inflow bolstered the stock market, which appreciated in value. Mexico's entry into NAFTA provided another reason to be optimistic concerning economic and business prospects.

However, Mexico's external payments position was falling deeper into deficit. By mid-1994 it was possible to observe that the current account in Mexico's balance of payments had shifted further into deficit, and that the high unsustainable level of capital inflow was diminishing. Political violence and assassinations in 1994 caused foreign investors to look more carefully at investment prospects, and steadily rising interest rates in the United States created incentives favoring dollar rather than peso financial instruments. As peso interest rates began to rise, the Mexican government and commercial banks turned to dollar-indexed or outright dollar borrowing. By December 1994 this increased dollar liability position together with a runoff in foreign exchange reserves left Mexico in a difficult liquidity position. The December 20, 1994 devaluation failed to renew confidence in the viability of Mexico's payments position, and two days later the peso was floated. In the early weeks of 1995 a massive Mexican financial assistance package was provided by the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and others.

An analysis of the components of Mexico's GDP and balance of payments suggests that the financial disequilibrium was clearly evident by mid- 1994. Over the period 1993-94 domestic absorption had increased beyond the ability of the economy to sustain it. Parallel to this, the current account deficit had increased beyond the ability of foreign exchange resources to support this deficit. Failure by the government and central bank to take action in the third quarter of 1994 resulted in a runoff of foreign exchange reserves, speculative trading in the financial markets, growing skepticism concerning the viability of existing arrangements. Fiscal and monetary tightening early in 1995 produced an improved financial equilibrium, suggesting that similar action at mid-1994 might have avoided the near debt crisis that manifested itself in December 1994 jand the following weeks.     

China: The Next Big Crash

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

Crouching Tiger,Weakened Eagle

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

Liu Xiaobo and China's Humiliation of Obama

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

Cyberwar: Former Intelligence Chief Says China Aims at America's Soft Underbelly

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

From Communism to Confucianism: China's Alternative to Liberal Democracy

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

中美在中东和中亚地区的反恐合作——在求索中前进

中美两国在中东和中亚地区进行反恐合作既符合本国国内发展的需要,也是促进两国在不存在竞争的领域实现合作、建立互信的重要方式。由于中美两国的政治体制和价值观念不同,两国对恐怖主义的界定存在分歧。但是,中美两国都需要贸易安全、全球经济健康发展、以市场价确保相互之间能源出口,以及与世界其他伙伴国家的能源出口安全运行。高于一切的战略利益能够促使两国在可能的领域开展合作,并且避免出现任何形式的对抗。因此,在现有合作的基础上,加强在情报、外交及海上反恐等方面的合作,将援助转化成反恐的手段。在反恐合作的过程中,两国应始终坚持求同存异的方针,寻求更好的结果。     

欧盟在中美之间的艰难选择——基于“蛋糕主义”视角的分析

在中美战略竞争的背景下,美国要求欧盟国家与其联手遏制中国,抵制中国在欧洲的基础设施建设和投资。欧盟陷入两难境地,一边是为欧洲诸国提供安全保障的传统盟友美国,另一边是给欧洲带来经济利益的合作伙伴中国。大多数欧洲国家和欧盟实际上在实施一种“蛋糕主义”的平衡策略,即在中美之间“不选边站队”,保持一种矛盾和摇摆的立场,同时它们也希望能够避免因得罪任何一方而遭受重大利益损失。欧盟国家非常清楚这种策略只是一种权宜之计,只有进一步加强战略自主,从根本上提升欧盟的防务能力和外交自主权,才能拯救欧洲,并在此基础上发展欧洲。中国需要认识到欧盟目前的骑墙状态无法长期持续,因为美国如果加大对欧盟的施压力度或者对欧盟作出更有利的安全承诺,欧盟国家大概率会回归美国的怀抱,进而联手应对中国。对中国来说,应该鼓励欧盟“不选边站队”,因为总体上让欧盟偏向中国是不现实的,欧盟能够保持中立对中国来说在理论上是一种次优选择,在现实中也可能是最优选择。今后的中美欧三边关系存在较大不确定性,欧盟的战略空间可能会缩小,需要在中、美两强之间艰难地维持平衡。     

China in the Russian mind today: Ambivalence and defeatism

This article describes the ambivalence of Russian attitudes toward China at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Russians of all strata combine a willingness to see China as a friendly neighbour with a high level of fear of the giant that could swallow much of the country whole, especially the Asian part. The article pays special attention to the split in Russian views of China among elites. While some elites, who have strong anti-American attitudes, see China as a major ally against the United States, others call on the government to treat the United States as the single force that can help Russia protect the integrity of its territory against China, whose people still do not recognise the existing borders between the two countries.     

Structural deficits and infrastructure investment in the u.s. economy: an emerging policy and management crisis in capital expenditures

This article examines the impact and magnitude of underinvestment in the public infrastructure of the economy of the United States, and points to its implications for deficit reduction and economic growth. It becomes evident that the lack of both a complete inventory of infrastructure investment needs and a coherent future investment strategy at the federal level have led to a situation where the volume of public works investment in the United States has fallen critically short of what may be considered an optimum level. Recognizing the limitations of capital budgeting, a management perspective is taken in which increased planning and policy development at the national level emerge as necessities in achieving the type of results required to enhance economic growth and responsibly reduce the national deficit.     

Disinvesting in America? the legacy of consumption policy in the 1980s

This article traces patterns of consumption, low productivity, debt accumulation and slow economic growth. Rather than calling for an increased emphasis on market and corporate incentives, the author calls for increased public investment. He favors particularly increases in scientific research and development and technology, in public works to rebuild the infrastructure, and calls for a public administration associated with increased investment in government.

The New Deal and the Great Society established the foundations of the public policy and administration of consumption—income transfer, entitlement, loan, loan guarantee, credit, subsidy, tax expenditure, and related programs designed to maintain or improve the income levels and social and economic well being of many elements of the United States population. Such programs now constitute approximately 50 percent of the federal budget. In the late 1980s, the United States entered into a new international economic, technological, and demographic order in which the public administration of investment will be increasingly important. The “public administration of investment” is defined as the administration of policies designed to produce future benefits for the nation through investment in people, knowledge and technology, the environment and public infrastructure, and public systems and public service.

Several trends in the 1980s contributed to the increasing importance of the public administration of investment. The first trend was the continuation of the low rate of productivity growth in the United States, a condition that has persisted since the early 1970s. ⁽¹⁾

Despite low productivity growth, the United States as a nation continues to spend as if productivity were increasing at pre-1973 rates and to borrow from other nations to make up the difference. The result has been large public and private debt. Increased productivity growth will require additional public as well as private investment if the United States is to maintain its standard of living and capacity to pursue social justice and other values into the next century.

The second trend has been the globalization of technology and the economy. The United States has been losing the comparative advantage it once enjoyed in many scientific and technological fields, as technological know-how has spread throughout the world. The United States fell further behind in the 1980s in the development of new production processes and in the commercialization of new processes and products in consumer electronics, semiconductors, and other fields.⁽²⁾ There is compelling evidence that both the private and public sectors underinvested in developing the scientific and technical workforce that will be essential in the global technological competition of the future.⁽³⁾ More generally, by many measures the education system of the United States has not been producing a well-educated workforce or well-educated citizens.⁽⁴⁾

The third trend of the ’80s was the maturation of the baby boom generation. This generation is now in the high consumption stage of its life cycle—homes, cars, and other consumer goods. The aging of the baby boom generation in the early decades of the twenty-first century will pose a complex challenge to public policy and administration. Early in the twenty-first century, the baby boomers will enter a stage of life usually marked by reduced consumption and higher saving.⁽⁵⁾ At the same time, increased longevity suggests growing demands on both public and private systems for income maintenance, health care, and social services. New technologies will compound health care costs. Unless saving and investment are increased now to partially support the baby boom generation in retirement, the “baby bust” generation that followed the baby boom will face a heavy burden of support.⁽⁶⁾ Currently, the Social Security Trust Fund does not have a single penny in it because the Treasury is borrowing the funds to reduce the federal deficit. Substantially increased productivity or substantially higher taxes will be necessary to replenish the fund in the early twenty-first century.

To compound the problem, by the year 2050, for the first time in American history (according to the middle series of Census projections), there will be more old than young Americans. The age cohort 60 and older will make up 28 percent of the population, while the age cohort 1-19 years will make up about 23 percent of the population.⁽⁷⁾ This is in stark contrast to the 16 percent of the population 60 and over, and the 32 percent of the population 1-19 years, in 1980. Greatly increased saving, increased productivity, substantially lower standards of living for working people, extended working years, or an influx of immigrant workers will be needed to produce the benefits that are promised in the entitlement programs of the federal government and expected by the American people.

Finally, many observers perceived an increase in private greed during the last decade in the United States and a growing indifference to common concerns—eroding public infrastructure, the highest infant mortality rate among industrialized nations, the highest rate of child poverty, and similar social conditions. They see a preoccupation with current pleasure at the expense of future benefits, and a decline in social discipline and civic virtue. To some observers, the United States has been in a temporary cycle of preoccupation with private needs.⁽⁸⁾ To others, civic virtue in the United States has been in decline.⁽⁹⁾

In any event, diminishing growth may intensify each individual's desire to protect his or her interests. In this context, redistribution in the pursuit of social equity will become increasingly difficult.     

国际金融体系改革的评估与展望

由美国次贷危机开始的全球金融危机爆发之后,国际金融体系的改革取得重要进展。国际货币基金组织、世界银行两大重要国际金融组织以及国际金融监管体系领域均实现近年来最大改革,新兴市场国家崭露头角。但是在国际金融体系的公平性、公正性和有效性方面,仍然存在很多问题。中国应以G20为主要平台,推动国际金融机构改革继续深入,加强国际监管协调,支持储备货币多元化和人民币国际化,同步推进区域和双边金融合作,以真正实现全球金融安全网。