Obama,Reagan and Zero Nukes

Is President Barack Obama's proposal for zero nuclear weapons realistic? Will it make the world more secure, or more prone to wars since they are no longer unthinkable? To evaluate this bold strategic initiative, we have invited comments from two former US secretaries of state, a former director of the CIA and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led the hunt for Saddam's non‐existent weapons of mass destruction on the eve of the Iraq war.     

Obama Plan May Spur Proliferation

Is President Barack Obama's proposal for zero nuclear weapons realistic? Will it make the world more secure, or more prone to wars since they are no longer unthinkable? To evaluate this bold strategic initiative, we have invited comments from two former US secretaries of state, a former director of the CIA and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led the hunt for Saddam's non‐existent weapons of mass destruction on the eve of the Iraq war.     

A Season for Disarmament

Is President Barack Obama's proposal for zero nuclear weapons realistic? Will it make the world more secure, or more prone to wars since they are no longer unthinkable? To evaluate this bold strategic initiative, we have invited comments from two former US secretaries of state, a former director of the CIA and the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led the hunt for Saddam's non‐existent weapons of mass destruction on the eve of the Iraq war.     

Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan

Pakistan's security environment has deteriorated through its adoption of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998. Internal fissures have widened along regional and sectarian lines as the Pakistani economy falters, unable to sustain even limited external sanctions following decades of internal mismanagement. Tensions with India have also increased as Pakistan's security managers adopt interventionist policies, based on a misplaced belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The international community, in particular, the USA's failure to reverse South Asian nuclear proliferation, has emboldened Indian advocates of nuclear deployment. If India deploys nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, Pakistan will follow suit. Operation-ready nuclear weapons will increase the prospects of an India - Pakistan conflict that could assume a nuclear dimension. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability will not prevent an Indian conventional attack nor will the presence of nuclear weapons deter an Indian accidental, unauthorised or preventive nuclear attack. Changed domestic and external priorities alone can buttress Pakistani security.     

The Perils of Weak Organization: Explaining Loyalty and Defection of Militant Organizations Toward Pakistan

Why do some militant groups defect against their sponsors, while others remain loyal? Pakistan's sponsorship of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba offers a controlled case comparison as the former turned its guns against Islamabad, while the latter remained obedient despite a similar strength, ethnic ties to the regime, and the presence of alternative supporters. What explains Jaish's defection and Lashkar's loyalty? Drawing on organizational and principal-agent theory, I argue that militant organizations that are more decentralized and factionalized are more likely to turn on their sponsors, because their weak command and control as well as dispersed decision making limit the militant leaders' ability to follow through on their commitments to the sponsors and makes it more difficult for the sponsors to discipline the militant organization. When a sponsor attempts to coerce such organizations into submission by detaining militant leaders, freezing or confiscating their material assets the rank-and-file is likely to turn guns against the sponsor.     

China: The Next Big Crash

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

Crouching Tiger,Weakened Eagle

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

Liu Xiaobo and China's Humiliation of Obama

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

Cyberwar: Former Intelligence Chief Says China Aims at America's Soft Underbelly

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

From Communism to Confucianism: China's Alternative to Liberal Democracy

Buoyed by its creditor's hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacific, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, China's leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice‐versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is China's new arrogance well‐founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond “the primary stage of socialism” is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of China's most well‐known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.     

Who Supports Nuclear Armament in Japan? Threat Perceptions and Japan's Nuclear Armament

The security environment in East Asia has been going through drastic changes. As China and North Korea pose a serious threat to Japan, the Japanese are now more concerned about the security issue in the region. Recognizing the highly volatile situation Japan is facing, the purpose of this study is to examine the issue of nuclear proliferation by focusing on people's attitudes in Japan. More specifically, it systematically analyzes the factors that can determine people's opinions of nuclear weapons by utilizing the survey data. The result of the statistical analysis suggests that threat perceptions significantly boost people's support for nuclear armament. Advancing our understanding of nuclear proliferation from a unique perspective, this study makes an important contribution to the literature, thus helping us predict Japan's security policy.     

Al Qaeda,Trends in Terrorism,and Future Potentialities: An Assessment

The Manhattan trial of four men linked to Osama bin Laden was the result of the largest overseas investigation ever mounted by the U.S. government. The trial generated thousands of pages of documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses with some knowledge of bin Laden's group. What was learned from the trial is that bin Laden's organization experienced severe cash flow problems in the mid-1990s; that the U.S. government has had some real successes in finding informants within bin Laden's organization; that bin Laden has taken steps to acquire weapons of mass destruction; that the training of bin Laden's followers in his camps in Afghanistan is quite rigorous, featuring tuition on a wide range of weapons and explosives and terrorism techniques; and that bin Laden's group operates transnationally, its membership drawn from four continents. Finally, the trial underlines the strengths and limits of the law enforcement approach to bin Laden.     

America's “Maginot Line” Defense Against Terror

Though anti‐American terrorism springs these days as much from Yemen and the “virtual ummah” as from Afghanistan, President Obama has nontheless further committed US troops to stabilizing a country well‐known as the graveyard of empires. What can the only Muslim country that belongs to NATO offer by way of advice? How best can the US keep its focus on the terrorist threat despite its diversion in Afghanistan? Turkey's former envoy to Afghanistan and two of Europe's leading experts on Islamist terrorism offer their views.     

Al Qaeda,Deterrence, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

This article takes issue with the frequently-made assertion that Al Qaeda cannot be deterred from employing weapons of mass destruction. It argues that Al Qaeda's leadership employs terroristic violence in a manner calculated to achieve a set of political goals. They are, in other words, rational actors who are sensitive to the potential costs and benefits associated with their actions, and thus are to some extent deterrable. The article examines a number of ways in which the lack of discrimination and proportionality associated with weapons of mass destruction might be expected to produce more problems than benefits for Al Qaeda and thus deter their use. It also considers some ways in which the West might seek to bolster these deterrent effects.     

How Turkey's Soft Power Can Aid NATO in Afghanistan

Though anti‐American terrorism springs these days as much from Yemen and the “virtual ummah” as from Afghanistan, President Obama has nontheless further committed US troops to stabilizing a country well‐known as the graveyard of empires. What can the only Muslim country that belongs to NATO offer by way of advice? How best can the US keep its focus on the terrorist threat despite its diversion in Afghanistan? Turkey's former envoy to Afghanistan and two of Europe's leading experts on Islamist terrorism offer their views.     

Headquarters of Terrorists Is “Virtual Ummah”

Though anti‐American terrorism springs these days as much from Yemen and the “virtual ummah” as from Afghanistan, President Obama has nontheless further committed US troops to stabilizing a country well‐known as the graveyard of empires. What can the only Muslim country that belongs to NATO offer by way of advice? How best can the US keep its focus on the terrorist threat despite its diversion in Afghanistan? Turkey's former envoy to Afghanistan and two of Europe's leading experts on Islamist terrorism offer their views.     

Continuity and change in Russia's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the so-called ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers' rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO's security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region.However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region. Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders.Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO's security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia's ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.     

Saddam Hussein: Political Psychological Profiling Results Relevant to His Possession,Use, and Possible Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Terrorist Groups

This article applies psychological profiling data from the speeches and interviews of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 Gulf Crisis to many of the recent questions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policies and intentions that were pivotal to the decision to wage war in Iraq. Content analysis of Hussein's verbal comments prior to the invasion of Kuwait and after the introduction of coalition forces into Saudi Arabia were used to assess his psychological state, political attitudes, and decision-making processes under stress. The findings were then applied to the recent issues of Iraqi WMD possession, use, and possible transfer to terrorist groups. The results of this political psychological assessment of Hussein indicated that prior to his removal by coalition forces it was extremely unlikely that he had significantly reduced what he perceived to be Iraq's WMD capabilities. Analysis of Hussein's political psychology, sensitivity to threats, propensity for violent reactions, and tendency to miscalculate indicated that he had a very low threshold for WMD use and may not have waited to be attacked before using these weapons. The results also indicated that the same characteristics that made Hussein an extremely likely candidate for WMD use made it unlikely that he would transfer WMD assets to a terrorist group not under his direct control. Although examination of Hussein's decision making under stress indicated that the invasion would increase the likelihood of Iraqi WMD use, it was not seen as increasing the odds of Iraqi transfer of WMD to terrorist groups. However, the results also indicated the potential for Hussein to suffer from a significant series of cognitive biases with direct impact on his decision making regarding WMD, as well as his ability to use these weapons. Support was also noted for his potential to experience gaps in reality testing and immobilizing anxiety should the military struggle turn desperate for Iraq and for him personally. The implications for the characterization of leaders likely to use WMD were also examined.­     

The Bulgarian connection: Drugs,weapons, and terrorism

Abstract

The Bulgarian government is involved in sub‐version of Western governments, almost certainly orchestrated in Moscow, involving drugs, weapons, and terrorism. Despite U.S. efforts to work with Bulgaria to curb the illicit traffic of drugs and weapons, cooperation has been virtually nil. This has prompted some members of Congress to probe Bulgaria's motives, and on February 26, 1985, Senator Alphonse D'Amato introduced a bill, S. 515, the Bulgarian Interrelation Review Act, directing the President to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Bulgaria. This article analyzes that legislation, the dimension of the drugs and terrorism connection in Bulgaria, and offers further recommendations in dealing with the issue.     

Political incrementalism: Political lessons from China's 20 years of reform

The recent crackdown by the Chinese Communist Party government on the efforts of Chinese dissidents to organise the China New Democratic Party has raised a serious question among scholars: why has the Chinese leadership been so reluctant to initiate democratic reforms? But an equally important question is: how has the Chinese political system been able to accommodate drastic socioeconomic changes? Although Chinese leaders from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin have strongly opposed the Western style of democracy, they have continuously adjusted the country's political system to prevent socioeconomic chaos from occuring, chaos that has troubled many former communist states and Third World countries. This paper explores China's political incrementalism and explains how incremental political reforms have worked. It argues that, although Chinese leaders have so far been successful in accommodating social changes through incrementalism, they are still uncertain about how to cope with increasing social demands for political reform and democratisation.