The politics and economics of pork barrel spending: The case of federal financing of water resources development

This paper empirically investigates the economic and political factors that have influenced annual Corps of Engineers water resource spending. Despite the common view that “pork barrel” spending is economically unjustified and purely politically motivated, economic factors have been important in determining water resource spending. From 1865–1920, economic development and industrialization increase spending, and from 1921–1988, spending appears to be counter-cyclical. There is also evidence that majority parties control spending levels in the post-Civil war period, while in recent times, legislators act under a norm of “constrained universalism” and are influenced by the costs to their constituents of increased spending.     

The Congress and fiscal policy

Although the common belief is that the Congress has paid little attention to fiscal policy, the same kinds of political-economic models which have been used to explain presidential budgetary policy may be used equally well to explain congressional budgetary behavior. The Congress' fiscal policy appears to be systematically sensitive to both economic and political factors. Changes in the unemployment rate have a major impact on congressional budgetary policy. As for political factors, the President's lead is followed most closely on revenue proposals and not at all on the expenditure side. The electoral cycle, in particular the off-year congressional election year, is also important; inducing larger deficits and smaller increases in revenues. When the influences on congressional fiscal behavior are compared with those on presidential behavior, the sources of the generally more expansionary congressional fiscal policy are identified. Congressional budget deficits increase in response to increased rates of unemployment but are insensitive to increases in inflation. In contrast, presidential budgets are heavily influenced by inflation and the growth in personal income — increases in each resulting in smaller proposed deficits — as well as by unemployment rates. In years in which both unemployment and inflation are increasing, the combination of the two (assuming a one percentage point change in each) implies an increase in the congressional deficit of $6.7 billion but a decrease in the president's proposed deficit of $2.5 billion. The implications of this study are a challenge to the literature which makes the President the central actor in macro-economic policy.     

Revisiting the Motivational Bases of Public Service: Twenty Years of Research and an Agenda for the Future

How has research regarding public service motivation evolved since James L. Perry and Lois Recascino Wise published their essay “The Motivational Bases of Public Service” 20 years ago? The authors assess subsequent studies in public administration and in social and behavioral sciences as well as evolving definitions of public service motivation. What have we learned about public service motivation during the last two decades? What gaps in our understanding and knowledge have appeared with respect to the three propositions offered by Perry and Wise? This essay charts new directions for public service motivation scholarship to help clarify current research questions, advance comparative research, and enhance our overall understanding of individuals’ public service motives.     

Five Questions: An Integrated Research Agenda for Public Choice

All societies, political or academic, must choose among alternatives; these choices can be good, or bad. The worst choice may be looking for“answers” before there is consensus, or at least a debate, on what the real questions should be. Five “real” questions are offered here, in an integrated research agenda for Public Choice. My premis is that there is a single, fundamental human problem: Construct or preserve institutions that make self-interested individual action not inconsistent with group welfare. All social science research is either a distraction, or a step toward understanding at least one of five questions: (1) What are Preferences? (2) What are feasible Alternatives? (3) How much does the form of Implementation affect the way alternatives are valued? (4) How do alternatives chosen Today affect the Menu of alternatives available in the Future? (5) What is Good? How would we know if some outcomes are better than others?

     

Recovery and Reinvestment Act spending at the state level: Keynesian stimulus or distributive politics?

We examine the US state-level pattern of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) spending. We relate spending to (1) Keynesian determinants of countercyclical policy, (2) congressional power and dominance, and (3) presidential electoral vote importance. We find that the ARRA is, in practice, poorly designed countercyclical stimulus. After controlling for political variables, coefficients on Keynesian variables are often statistically insignificant. When they are statistically significant they are often the “incorrect” sign. On the other hand, statistically significant effects are associated with majority party House of Representative appropriations subcommittee and authorization committee membership. One striking result is that the elasticity of ARRA spending with respect to the pre-ARRA ratio of federal grants and payments to federal taxes paid is estimated to be greater than unity in most specifications. States previously capturing large amounts of federal funds continue to do so under the ARRA stimulus.     

The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion

How does public opinion affect presidential policymaking? We address this issue by testing a diverse set of hypotheses with data concerning a set of individual policies across time. In particular, the data revolve around presidential budgetary proposals on a set of major policy issues for which there are recurring surveys on citizens' preferences over spending. The analysis suggests that presidents are more responsive to mass opinion on issues that are familiar to citizens in their everyday lives. Also, for reelection‐seeking presidents, responsiveness is shown to depend upon two key political factors. First, presidents are more responsive to public opinion when the next election is imminent. Second, the effect of presidential popularity is nonmonotonic; presidents with average approval ratings are most likely to adopt policy positions congruent with public opinion, whereas presidents with approval ratings that are significantly above or below average have the greatest propensity to take unpopular positions.     

Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840–1940

The modern history of divided government in America suggests that the framers succeeded in creating a government unresponsive to popular passions. Yet in the nineteenth century the party winning the presidency almost always captured control of the House of Representatives. Why and how could nineteenth century national elections be so responsive that they resemble parliamentary outcomes? We identify electoral institutions present in the states that directly linked congressional elections to presidential coattails. Specifically, we estimate the impact of state ballot laws and the strategic design of congressional districts on presidential coattail voting from 1840 to 1940. We find that presidential elections, as mediated by state electoral laws, strongly account for unified party control of the House and the presidency throughout the nineteenth century.     

Games presidents do and do not play: Presidential circumvention of the executive branch budget process

The federal executive budgetary process has been severely criticized in recent years for its apparent inability to curb budgetary growth and limit deficits. Much of this criticism ignores the essentially political, rather than administrative, causes of these trends. Budgetary growth and deficit spending may be viewed in part as the results of presidential circumvention of budgetary and fiscal policy processes. Circumvention consists of the movement of spending decisions out of the annual review and evaluation of current-year budgetary formulation, thus evading the constraints frequently imposed by budgetary and fiscal policies. The precise mechanisms of presidential circumvention have changed over time. However, the long-term impact of circumvention has been a reduction in the controllability and comprehensiveness of the annual federal budget, as well as higher rates of budgetary growth.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 1–4, 1983. We would like to thank George Downs, William Lammers, Harold Seidman, and James Sundquist for useful comments and discussion.     

Ideas, Inheritances, and the Dynamics of Budgetary Change

Long the lifeblood of public administration, budgeting in the United States acquired a new importance during the 1980s and 1990s because of the fiscalization of the policy debate. But how much has American national budgeting really changed? This article examines the evolution of federal budgeting over the past half-century, exploring such developments as the massive growth of entitlements, congressional budget reform, and the protracted battle over the budget deficit. It finds that year-to-year changes in budget results have been relatively small even while budgetary rules and procedures have experienced sweeping change. At the same time, the composition of federal spending has undergone a quiet revolution. The traditional concept of budgetary incrementalism offers an incomplete explanation for these dynamics. To make sense of them, the article focuses on two key factors: the impact of policy inheritances, and the role of actors' causal and normative beliefs. These factors shape the ideational and material context within which boundedly rational actors negotiate decisions. The tension between changes in ideas and entrenched budgetary commitments has often served to stimulate institutional reform.     

Incrementalism in Appropriations: Small Aggregation,Big Changes

U.S. federal budget dynamics, as a major attribute of the legislative and bureaucratic decision‐making processes, increasingly calls into question the scholarly focus on incrementalism. What constitutes a “small” change is largely unspecified in previous research that has also been unable to assess incrementalism across multiple levels of aggregation. Using a unique budgetary database, this article analyzes whether budgetary changes are in fact “small” at different levels of aggregation. Surprisingly, a low proportion of changes are small by any logical standard. During most years, more than one‐fifth of budgetary changes are greater than 50 percent, and nearly half are more than 10 percent. The level of aggregation is also important for assessing whether political variables influence incrementalism. A salient finding: change in party control reflects greater influence within micro‐level budget decisions, while divided government manifests more impact on aggregate‐level budget decisions.     

The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits

Whether term limits would increase or decrease federal spending depends on the reason for the causal relationship between tenure and spending. We investigate this subject by empirically studying congressional spending and tenure for all United States House and Senate members who entered Congress between the 94th and 102nd Congresses (1975–1992). As our measure of congressional spending we use the National Taxpayers Union's Congressional Spending Scores. Our study finds that a statistically significant relationship exists between congressional spending and tenure for some groups of congressmen. We then test three hypotheses relating tenure and spending. No single hypothesis is consistent with all of our empirical results. Nevertheless, the small sizes of the empirical effects estimated in this study suggest that term limits would have an inconsequential impact on the level of federal spending – at least via the “moral hazard” mechanisms described in this paper.     

The power not to tax: A search for effective controls

Although the primary purpose of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was to gain greater congressional control over federal spending, the act also represented a small but significant step toward controlling the substantial financial commitments made through the numerous exclusions, deductions, and credits in the federal income tax. In the Budget Act Congress, for the first time, recognized and defined these “tax expenditures” and adopted procedures for reviewing them. But tax expenditure budgeting has not had the beneficial effect that some had hoped, mainly because the 1974 effort failed to take adequate account of the organizational structure of Congress and of the political character of its decision-making. But these weaknesses can be overcome.     

The effect of legislature size on public spending: evidence from a regression discontinuity design

What is the effect of legislature size on public spending? An answer to this question is provided by Weingast et al. (J Polit Econ 89(4):642–664, 1981), whose “law of 1/n” posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives always leads to an increase in public spending. Because elected politicians regard the tax base as a common pool from which they can finance specific projects for their constituencies, and these specific constituencies internalize the full benefits of the projects, but only bear a fraction of the costs (projects are financed from the common tax base), fiscal inefficiency will increase with the number of representatives. In this paper, I test the validity of the “law of 1/n” using a dataset of 9325 German municipalities between 2008 and 2010. Through the application of a regression discontinuity design, many of the methodological pitfalls of previous studies can be avoided and a valid estimation of the causal effect of legislature size on public spending for German municipalities can be determined. The results do not corroborate the positive findings of previous studies, which generally supported the implications of the “law of 1/n”. For the years 2008–2010, I find a negative effect of legislature size on public spending in German municipal councils.     

The Consequences of Concurrent Campaigns for Citizen Knowledge of Congressional Candidates

Congressional campaigns do not occur in isolation, but concurrently with many other races. What are the effects of overlapping campaigns for how people learn about congressional candidates? On one hand, intensely fought races on the same ballot may encourage people to extend interest to contemporaneous races. Alternatively, competing campaigns may distract voters and limit learning about down-ticket contests. Using American National Election Studies data from 1996 to 2002, I test the consequences of state level presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial campaign intensity on citizen learning about congressional candidates. I find that while the local intensity of the presidential race has little effect on knowledge of House candidates, the intensity of the Senate race is positively associated with candidate recognition. These effects vary depending on the nature of the election, where House candidates benefit from intense Senate races on the ballot particularly in midterm election years.     

The influence of the gramm-rudman-hollings act on federal budgetary outcomes, 1986—1989

This article analyzes the impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act on federal budgetary and fiscal outcomes. Rather than portraying it as a two-on federal budgetary and fiscal outcomes. Rather than portraying it as a two-party game between Congress and the president, each with monolithic policy preferences, we view GRH as a multiparty negotiation game among advocates of different programs and agencies. In this game, agencies subject to sequestration and their congressional advocates have an incentive to reach a budget accord, while those exempt from sequestration do not. Consistent with this argument, we find that GRH has restrained outlays for nonexempt programs and that exempt programs have, if anything, experienced more rapid growth. Overall, GRH is estimated to have restrained outlays by $59 billion by fiscal 1989, and to have restrained outlays more effectively after the 1987 modifications in the Act. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act signals another phase in the decade-long struggle between the White House and Congress over public spending priorities. Our final counterfactual analysis suggests that GRH partially returned federal fiscal and budgetary relationships and priorities to those that prevailed before Reagan.     

Abu Ghraib, Administrative Evil, and Moral Inversion: The Value of "Putting Cruelty First"

The torture and abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison and at other sites in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba raise disturbing questions that have few, if any, easy answers. Were these intentionally evil acts committed by a few bad apples who took advantage of the power they wielded over the detainees? Or were they cases of administrative evil in which the obvious evil of torture and abuse was masked from the perpetrators, including those who performed subsidiary and supportive functions? The more fundamental question is, are torture and abuse always wrong? How close did the United States come to moral inversion in this case? Judith Shklar’s concept of “putting cruelty first” aids our understanding of this case and points toward a trajectory that could help prevent future moral inversions and administrative evil.     

Rethinking the partisan effects of higher turnout: So what's the question?

Controversy persists over the link between turnout and the likelihood of success of Democratic candidates (e.g., DeNardo, 1980, 1986; Zimmer, 1985; Tucker and Vedlitz, 1986; Piven and Cloward, 1988; Texeira, 1992; Radcliff, 1994, 1995; Erikson, 1995a, b). We argue that the authors in this debate have largely been talking past one another because of a failure to distinguish three quite different questions. The first question is: “Are low turnout voters more likely to vote Democratic than high turnout voters?” The second question is: “Should we expect that elections in which turnout is higher are ones in which we can expect Democrats to have done better?” The third question is the counterfactual: “If turnout were to have increased in some given election, would Democrats have done better?” We show the logical independence of the first two questions from one another and from the third, and argue that previous researchers have failed to recognize this logical independence – sometimes thinking they were answering question three when in fact they were answering either question one or question two. Reviewing previous research, we find that the answer to the first question once was YES but, for more recent elections at the presidential level, now appears to be NO, while, for congressional and legislative elections, the answer to the second question appears generally to be NO. However, the third question is essentially unanswerable absent an explicit model of why and how turnout can be expected to increase, and/or analyses of individual level panel data. Thus, the cross-sectional and pooled data analyses of previous research are of almost no value in addressing this third question.

     

Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives

The common wisdom in journalistic accounts of earmarking is that Congress distributes earmarks on a purely political basis, without any consideration for the demand for federal spending. Academic accounts similarly argue that factors internal to Congress are preeminent in determining where earmarks go, even more than for other types of pork‐barrel spending. Using earmarks appearing in the fiscal year 2008 Appropriations bills, I search for both chamber‐based and demand‐side determinants of the distribution of earmarks. I find that both types of factors are significantly related to the number of earmarks that a House member receives. This result indicates that even while earmarking, members of Congress are at least minimally responsive to voter preferences and calls into question whether earmarks should be treated as an outlier within the universe of spending allocation mechanisms.     

Whither Power in Public Administration? Attainment,Dissipation, and Loss

Norton Long's 1949 essay, “Power and Administration,” has a complicated legacy. First, analysis reveals both support for and important refinements of Long's arguments since the article's publication. Second, Long's claim has proven problematic that competition among agencies for power would bring more coordination and a cross‐agency sense of purpose to the federal government. Third, the bureaucratic pluralism that he explained and defended produced special interest biases that were off‐putting to large segments of citizens and thus helped create an unsupportive political environment for needed capacity building in the federal government. Fourth, by not considering how institutions “coevolve,” Long failed to warn that “horizontal power” building by individual agencies would provoke efforts by elected officials to enhance their control over bureaucracy in ways that, over time, diminished their collective sources of power. Finally, much remains to be done before what Long called a “realistic science of administration” incorporating the “budgeting of power” exists in public administration.