Financing Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness: Use of Interlocal Cost‐Sharing

Before this study, much of the research on interlocal collaboration has focused broadly on interlocal service agreements, of which interlocal cost‐sharing is but one dimension. This study is one of the first to examine the nature of interlocal cost‐sharing agreements for a specific (and critically important) functional area. A mail survey of Florida city and county finance officers finds that the most common interlocal cost‐sharing partnership is between local general purpose governments rather than with local special purpose governments. The strongest incentives for interlocal cost‐sharing are (1) inadequate funding for emergency management in a jurisdiction's capital budget, (2) the perceived inadequacy of federal and/or state homeland security funding, and (3) greater faith in horizontal (local‐to‐local) than vertical (federal‐state‐local) intergovernmental agreements. The research also highlights the importance of asking fiscal condition survey questions in a more functionally specific manner rather than as an “overall fiscal condition” question.     

Interlocal Service Cooperation in U.S. Cities: A Social Network Explanation

Local governments increasingly confront policy problems that span the boundaries of individual political jurisdictions. Institutional theories of local governance and intergovernmental relations emphasize the importance of networks for fostering service cooperation among local governments. Yet empirical research fails to examine systematically the effects of social networks on interlocal service cooperation. Do the individual networks of local government actors increase their jurisdiction's level of interlocal service delivery? Drawing data from the National Administrative Studies Project IV (NASP‐IV), multivariate analysis is applied to examine this question among 919 municipal managers and department heads across the United States. The findings indicate that interlocal service cooperation increases when jurisdictional actors network frequently through a regional association or council of government and when they are united by a common set of professional norms and disciplinary values. Manager participation in professional associations, however, does not increase interjurisdictional cooperation. The key conclusion for local government practitioners searching for ways to increase collaboration: networks that afford opportunities for more face‐to‐face interaction yield better results for effective service partnerships.     

Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures

There is high interest in economic development efforts involving cooperation or collaboration among metropolitan jurisdictions. To determine why some local governments engage in cooperative agreements while others do not, this paper investigates transaction obstacles, including bargaining, information, agency, enforcement, and division problems. The authors then advance an institutional collective action explanation for intergovernmental cooperation, focusing on the conditions under which these transactions costs are low. This work anticipates that the costs associated with interlocal cooperation are influenced by the demographic characteristics of communities, local political institutions, and the nature of regional government networks. Empirical analysis based on a national survey of local development officials provides support for several predictions from this model and identifies policy variables that, in turn, increase the prospects for cooperation, specifically through the development of informal policy networks.     

Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Provision of Public Safety: Monitoring Mechanisms Embedded in Interlocal Agreements

This article examines how monitoring mechanisms embedded in interlocal agreements (ILAs) are associated with vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations. The authors hypothesize that ILAs established by local governments with higher‐level governments are likely to rely on a clearly specified set of rules to establish an administrative structure, whereas ILAs established by local governments with other local governments rely on associational benefits to ensure that policy preferences are aligned across multiple political boundaries. The article examines ILAs established by small town, county, and municipal governments in Denton County, Texas, for the provision of emergency medical, police, and fire services. Findings show that more than half of the ILAs specified a financial reporting system, but an almost equal percentage did not contain features requiring financial records to be available for audit by a third party. Quadratic assignment procedure correlation analysis confirmed the presence of cross‐monitoring mechanisms and showed that the patterns of ILAs tend to cluster around a geographic space.

Practitioner Points

• Monitoring mechanisms embedded in interlocal agreements (ILAs) matter, highlighting the important managerial functions played by frontline officers drafting ILAs.
• The rules embedded in ILAs are important not only for encouraging intergovernmental cooperation but also for reducing the risks associated with contract failures.
• With the increasing number of ILAs, local government officials need to consider various types of ILAs that are suitable to meet jurisdictional interests and policy preferences.

     

Regional Governance and Institutional Collective Action for Environmental Sustainability

This research investigates why various mechanisms of cooperation among local authorities are chosen using the theoretical lens of institutional collective action (ICA). The article analyzes 564 local collaboration agreements drawn from four urban regions of China to explain the choices of environmental collaboration agreements among cities. Examples of three forms of interlocal agreements—informal, formal, and imposed agreements—are analyzed. Ordinal logistic regressions are estimated to test which factors predicted by the ICA framework influence the form of collaboration selected. The results indicate that the involvement of national or provincial government, the number of policy actors involved, heterogeneity of economic conditions, and differences in administrative level among the actors involved influence how collaboration agreements are structured. Examining the choice of agreement type contributes to the understanding of interlocal collaboration and provides practical insights for public managers to structure interlocal collaboration.     

City Managers,Career Incentives,and Municipal Service Decisions: The Effects of Managerial Progressive Ambition on Interlocal Service Delivery

City managers play an influential role in brokering intergovernmental service arrangements on behalf of their jurisdiction, yet their motivations for doing so are not well understood. One argument, drawn from theories of bureaucratic entrepreneurship and ambition theory, suggests that cities with managers who are motivated to advance their careers will parlay more interlocal service delivery as means of capturing economic efficiencies. Such strategies serve to build their personal resumes of career achievements. An alternative argument suggests more altruistic motives, including a desire for increased social equity and valuing the common good of the region, compel city managers to pursue interlocal service arrangements. These competing theories are tested on 134 large municipalities, using survey data from the city managers of these jurisdictions, coupled with interlocal revenue and expenditure data for these cities. Results yield greater support for the first theory. However, progressive ambition possesses complex consequences for interlocal service delivery choices. Jurisdictions managed by city managers with career‐enhancement ambitions are more likely to sell services to other local governments. Yet, they are significantly less inclined to buy services from other jurisdictions, thereby underscoring entrepreneurship in shaping managers’ professional trajectories.     

Governing Interlocal Cooperation: City Council Interests and the Implications for Public Management

Local government managers are described as key participants in the development of interlocal cooperation, but the interests of city councils in this process have gone largely unstudied. Here, the author addresses the theoretical importance of council-manager relations in interlocal public service cooperation. Three propositions identify areas of shared council-manager responsibility. Evidence from in-depth interviews with city council members is used to assess each proposition. While interlocal partnership has been described as a managerial activity, council members take an interest in network development and agreement assessment. Managers, on the other hand, give greater attention to public participation and education. The evidence refines assumptions about council-manager roles in the formation of cooperative agreements, with important implications for local government management.     

Jurisdictional integration: A framework for measuring and predicting the depth of international regulatory cooperation in competition policy

This article takes a new approach to international regulatory cooperation by developing a concept of the depth of cooperation, jurisdictional integration. A dataset of international competition policy agreements is compiled and ranked against an ordinal index of the depth of de jure cooperation in enforcing competition policies. There has been both a deepening and broadening of de jure cooperation over time. Statistical analysis finds that common membership of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development is a strong predictor of the depth of agreements to cooperate in enforcing competition policies; that we can be confident that the depth of agreements is low when signatories' substantive competition laws are dissimilar; and that the depth of de jure cooperation is a strong predictor of whether an agreement is “intergovernmental” or “transgovernmental.” The article puts forward a new way to map and measure international regulatory cooperation, and a new variable for use in research on its causes and consequences.     

Do Political Similarities Facilitate Interlocal Collaboration?

This research examines the extent to which political similarities—that is, homophily between political actors at the local level—affect patterns of interorganizational collaboration in an emergency response situation. While the field of emergency management has focused on implementation‐oriented arrangements among key stakeholders, few studies have systemically investigated the creation and development of interorganizational collaborations led by political actors, especially following catastrophic events. The analysis reveals that a dyadic tie with political homophily boosts local responders’ ties with other agencies during emergencies. Findings indicate that political solidarity, formulated by chief elected officials of municipalities and council members, can broaden the scope of interorganizational collaboration by mitigating institutional collective action problems at the local level. This research presents a critical recommendation for emergency managers that interlocal collaboration for timely response to a disaster is attributable to political similarities that facilitate frequent interlocal interactions through formal and/or informal agreements.     

City Managers View Intergovernmental Relations

This report presents the findings of a national survey of citymanagers concerning intergovernmental relations. Key aspectsof intergovernmental relations covered in the survey are theadministration of the grant system, effects of federal grantson local government decisionmaking, types of federal aid, imagesof federal administrators, intergovernmental service agreements,comparison of state and federal government, and city managerinvolvement in intergovernmental relations.     

Conflict and Collaboration in Wildfire Management: The Role of Mission Alignment

Responding to large wildfires requires actors from multiple jurisdictions and multiple levels of government to work collaboratively. The missions and objectives of federal agencies often differ from those of state land management agencies as well as local wildfire response agencies regarding land use and wildfire management. As wildfire size and intensity increase over time and associated annual suppression costs range between $2 billion and $3 billion, learning more about the existence and management of perceived agency differences becomes imperative within the academic and practitioner communities. This article examines the extent to which perceived mission misalignment exists among federal, state, and local actors and how well those differences are managed. Findings provide quantitative evidence that mission misalignment is greater within intergovernmental relationships than within intragovernmental relationships. Additionally, findings speak to the larger conversation around intergovernmental relationships within the federal structure and perceptions of the presence and management of potential interagency conflict.

Practitioner Points

• Potential conflict between the missions of federal and state land agencies presents a challenge for disaster management, and differing governmental levels and land‐use mandates may highlight relationships where tensions are likely greater.
• Wildfire managers may need to more proactively address relationships among federal agencies and state and local partners rather than relationships among multiple federal agencies.
• Wildfire management may benefit from increased awareness of—and discussion around—partner agencies’ stated land management philosophies and legal mandates, as structural frameworks, such as the Incident Command Structure, may not alone lead to conflict‐free collaboration.

     

Federalism Revised: The Promise and Challenge of the No Child Left Behind Act

Federalism in education has undergone significant changes since the Winter Commission. During the early 1990s, federal policy makers faced the challenge of organizational fragmentation and policy incoherence in public education. In the last 15 years, the intergovernmental system has evolved from one that is predominantly compliance‐driven to one that is performance based, as suggested by the congressional adoption of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001. While the former is often characterized by images of “picket fence” federalism and administrative silos, the latter remains very much a work in progress, with the promise of raising academic proficiency. This paper first examines the paradigm shift and then considers emerging politics in intergovernmental relations. The author explores the ways in which state and local policy makers are altering the rules governing education service provision in response to performance‐based federal expectations.     

Mandates and Management Challenges in the Trenches: An Intergovernmental Perspective on Homeland Security

Scholars and practitioners agree that homeland security policy implementation is contingent on a strong system of intergovernmental relations. The responsibilities associated with the homeland security mission, often mandated, cut across federal, state, and local boundaries. Local-level stakeholders are especially important players in the implementation process. This article presents a local perspective on the way intergovernmental relations have changed—and the reasons for those changes—since 9/11. Results of a survey of county and city officials in Florida provide evidence that intergovernmental cooperation has improved as a result of federal and state mandates. These results are refined by an analysis of the effects of specific local characteristics and the quality and quantity of vertical and horizontal networks on intergovernmental cooperation and local preparedness. Homeland security appears to be a policy area in which mandated cooperation and coordination—in a time and place of urgency—have actually strengthened the intergovernmental system.     

Competitors and Cooperators: A Micro‐Level Analysis of Regional Economic Development Collaboration Networks

Predispositions and orientation toward cooperation or competition with other jurisdictions can play a critical role in implementing regional collaboration. By examining collaboration at the micro level, this article investigates how individual factors, including perceptions of cooperation and competition, as well as institutional and environmental factors, are related to regional collaboration. In particular, the authors assert that competitive motivation may support the emergence of regional governance mechanisms. This article explores the relationships between competitive/cooperative motivations and interlocal collaboration networks based on a network survey conducted in the Orlando, Florida, metropolitan area. The authors apply a quadratic assignment procedure regression analysis to examine how dyadic conceptual ties of cooperation and competition, along with the effect of community characteristics, affect policy network structures for economic development. By comparing estimated coefficients with sampling distributions of coefficients from all of the permuted data sets, the regression results indicate the influences of perceived competition/cooperation on the network exchange.     

How does policy innovation diffuse among Chinese local governments? A qualitative comparative analysis of River Chief Innovation

It is well‐documented that interlocal learning and competition could drive policy innovation diffusion. However, their interconnection in non‐western regimes as China is less explored. Utilizing the method of qualitative comparative analysis on the case of River Chief Innovation, this article intends to explore the multiple conjunctural causation of Chinese policy diffusion and the impacts of central recognition. Our findings suggest that interlocal learning and tournament could intimately stimulate Chinese policy diffusion through different combinations. Different governments would adopt innovation for various reasons in a continuum of diffusion mechanisms, involving the technical learning, the championship‐induced learning, the mandate‐induced learning, and the innovation tournament. Hence, despite the ongoing centralization under Xi, space for local spontaneous learning remains. We also find that central recognition could activate the interlocal tournament and extend the diffusion continuum to the tournament side. Therefore, it facilitates policy diffusion toward governments that lack learning motivations and promotes the local implementation of central preferences.     

Homeland Security Preparedness: The Rebirth of Regionalism

The homeland security mission has placed many new demands onthe U.S. system of federalism. The successful implementationof homeland security policy requires cooperation among all levelsof government—federal, state, and local. Regionalism offersa powerful tool for encouraging greater intergovernmental cooperationand improved homeland security preparedness. We assess the impactof regionalism on intergovernmental cooperation and the implementationof the homeland security mission in Florida, an early proponentof the regional approach. From a regional perspective, we evaluatehow intergovernmental complexity, the quality and quantity ofintergovernmental networks, and security vulnerabilities contributeto perceived improvements in intergovernmental cooperation andhomeland security preparedness. The results of a 2004 mail surveyof city and county officials suggest that regional organizationalstructures are most effective in promoting intergovernmentalcooperation and preparedness where the intergovernmental landscapeis the most complex and where security vulnerabilities are themost intense.     

Local actors and international regionalism: The case of the Sea of Japan zone

The Sea of Japan Zone (SJZ) is an area that has been shaped essentially by transnational relations between the localities of western Japan, northeastern China and the Russian Far East. The emergence of this new type of space, based on interlocal cooperation, is a significant aspect of what could be called the ‘new’ regionalism, i.e. the polymorphous and multicen‐tred movement that is affecting international relations today as opposed to its more rigid version of the late 1950s. The shape of the new regionalism reflects the transformation of international relations in general: this particular regionalization process, that gave shape to the SJZ, is linked to the transnationalization of local actors. The idea of creating the SJZ, in the late 1960s, was first an external answer (interlocal cooperation) to an internal problem (uneven development in Japan). It became a reality some twenty years later as Russian and Chinese localism eventually converged with Japanese localism. Despite important domestic differences the need for local actors around the Sea of Japan to look outside for better development conditions made the synergy possible. It produced a new regional entity that needs to be defined and, for that purpose, that could be compared to other transnational zones in East Asia or even in Europe. Their common characteristic appears to be a functional approach to regional cooperation.     

The Tiebout Hypothesis 50 Years Later: Lessons and Lingering Challenges for Metropolitan Governance in the 21st Century

More than five decades have passed since Charles Tiebout wrote his seminal 1956 paper, often cited as the classic apologetic for locally based systems of metropolitan governance. This essay traces the impact of Tiebout's work and subsequent scholarship in public choice, identifying important lessons and lingering issues. Although public choice has demonstrated that polycentric systems are adept and flexible in producing and providing municipal services and a variety of interlocal agreements, the presence of municipal boundaries gives rise to a host of spillover problems, such as urban sprawl and segregation. These spillovers are particularly nefarious because, unlike the natural cooperation that seems to occur in service provision, municipalities tend to assert narrow self-interest in the face of these types of externalities. The essay proposes that, commensurate with the growing salience of equity among the pillars of public administration, interjurisdictional spillovers and their attendant equity impacts will be the central challenge for thinkers studying metropolitan governance in the 21st century.     

How gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups affect vertical fiscal imbalances in the US states: Focusing on fiscal centralization and decentralization

This study empirically examines the roles of gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups in vertical fiscal imbalances across US states via a two-step generalized method of moments estimation during a 22-year period (1987–2008). States' share of intergovernmental transfers and the local share of intergovernmental transfers are often affected by interaction between governors and interest groups, as are expenditure centralization and revenue/expenditure centralization. Revenue decentralization and the local share of intergovernmental transfers are frequently influenced by cooperation between governors and interest groups via mutual support. Long-term cooperation and gridlock each influence expenditure centralization, revenue/expenditure centralization, and revenue decentralization. Long-term cooperation is not statistically significant in terms of the state and local shares of intergovernmental transfers; that is, governors and interest groups cooperate in pursuit of short-term benefits rather than long-term results. Long-term political influence also has no impact, affirming a short-term-oriented political viewpoint.     

Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Structure: Empirical Evidence from a Synthetic Control Model

An unfunded expenditure mandate occurs when governments are required to provide a good or service by a higher level of government without an accompanying revenue source. There are no empirical studies providing causal evidence on the fiscal influence of intergovernmental mandates. This article examines Florida's 1990 constitutional Amendment 3, which sought to limit unfunded state mandates on municipal and county governments. The synthetic control method, an empirical technique for drawing causal inferences from case studies, estimates the effect of Amendment 3 on state expenditures and total transfers to local governments. The results indicate that state expenditures increased by an annual average of 9.5 percent, while state transfers to all local governments were unaffected. However, the municipalities protected by Amendment 3 saw intergovernmental revenue from the state decrease by 10 percent annually, which suggests that remaining mandates likely targeted special districts, encouraging the fragmentation of local public service delivery.