The economic model of voter participation: A further test

The central hypothesis of the economic model of voter participation was put to an empirical test. It was found that the coefficient of population size, which represents the subjective probability of affecting election results, is negative and significant in municipal local elections, but insignificant in national Knesset elections. Therefore, this variable is unable to represent subjective probability in the latter case.It was suggested that the economic model is more relevant to local elections than to Knesset elections. The empirical results revealed that the regression coefficients of municipal elections that took place separately from Knesset elections fit the expected outcome of the economic model whereas when municipal elections were held simultaneously with the Knesset election this did not hold true.     

Extending the economic theory of regulation to the form of policy

The mutually beneficial connection between industries and the governments that regulate them is the subject of a large literature led by Stigler (1971). What has not been studied is how firms choose their desired policies from the set including entry barriers, price floors, subsidies, and demand stimulation. We take as given that government and incumbents from the supply and demand for regulation and explore the choice of political product.     

An aggregative model for municipal economic planning

The growth and increasing complexity of municipal governments have been phenomenal in recent years. Thus, economic planning of the municipality has become one of the most difficult administrative functions of local government officials. Yet economic systems analysis of cities has been generally neglected by economists and management scientists. This paper presents a methodology for the effective long-range economic planning of a municipal government. More specifically, it applies the goal programming model to design optimum aggregative model for municipal economic planning.     

Underlying patterns in a current economic development model

Public officials may subjectively use a variety of elements, including economic characteristics and political considerations, in their selection of locations and allocation of resources for economic development. Policy capture is a method that determines the impartial weighting of a broad number of elements which influence these decision makers as they operationalize programs. Non-political criteria that may influence the selection of sites for local economic development provide the basis of the analysis conducted in this paper. Public officials at various levels of responsibility assessed the chances of creating jobs for disadvantaged residents (employment success) for a variety of hypothetical areas chosen as an enterprise zone. Their responses give insight into policy decisions. There is a comparison of both individual responses and groups of respondents to the hypothetical data as well as to actual zones that were recently selected. Concluding remarks will discuss these results and the application of this method for enterprise zones and other policy analyses.We wish to acknowledge the extensive helpful suggestions of the editor and two anonymous reviewers.     

The paradox of the region: economic regulation and the representation of interests

This article deals with the relationship between economic regulation and interes-group representation at the regional level in advanced capitalist societies. The importance of an ‘intermediate government’ of economic development at the regional level has increased in recent years within such societies as a result of the crisis of the Keynesian wlfare state and the decline of Fordism. At the same time, however, the growing need for regional regulation does not necessarily call into being an explicit demand for and supply of efficient regional government within the existing institutional framework. This ‘paradox fo the region’ is explored int he context of the Italian case, characterized by strong local but weak regional identities organizations of business and labour for an effective intermediate government of the economy, an proposes a strategy for reinforcing such organizatons at this level through the reform of regional government administration and the supervised delegation of public powers to them.     

The economic theory of regulation and trucking deregulation: Shifting to the state level

Federal deregulation of the trucking industry in 1980 created a general gain in economic welfare at the expense of the monopoly rents of powerful interests, leading some scholars to ponder the limitations of the economic theory of regulation. However, analyzing only the federal changes excludes evidence from the significant intrastate sector of the trucking industry, regulation of which remains largely unchanged from that prior to 1980. This paper argues that after a decade of clear federal policy success, truckers continue to capture most state regulators, sustaining monopoly rents in what would otherwise be an inherently competitive industry. Using data from the fifty states, we demonstrate the extent to which the economic theory is in fact consistent with trucking industry evidence.     

Private regulation and global economic change: The drivers of sustainable agriculture in Brazil

What determines the uptake of private sustainability regulation in developing countries? Existing studies point to the local context as the key explanatory factor. In particular, they identify local program characteristics, industry structures, and the regulatory environment as variables influencing program uptake at the point of production. However, examining two very similar certification programs in Brazil's soy and sugarcane industries, this article finds that local conditions fail to account for the observed patterns. A “local explanation” would have predicted similar levels of industry uptake in the two sectors. Conversely, it is found that Brazil's soy producers first backed but then opposed private sustainability regulation, whereas in the sugarcane sector the dynamic was exactly the opposite. Through an in‐depth analysis and cross‐case comparison this article reveals how changing transnational conditions were decisive in shaping these outcomes. Specifically, shifting end markets exposed the two sectors to different economic and regulatory pressures.     

An economic model of regime change: Freedom as a public good

This paper analyses regime change via a peaceful revolution. Under these circumstances, peaceful manifestations of unrest reach a point at which the prevailing political system collapses and is replaced by a system which provides more freedom. Such regime change occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria. It is shown that the successful quest for freedom may be explained as a dynamic game. The game has a unique strong equilibrium — that is, a Nash equilibrium robust against mass defections — which arises in consequence of a trigger strategy which is similar to the Tit-For-Tat strategy in a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

Radicalization as a reaction to failure: An economic model of Islamic extremism

This paper views Islamist radicals as self-interested political revolutionaries and builds on a general model of political extremism developed in a previous paper (Ferrero, 2002). Extremism is modelled as a production factor whose effect on expected revenue is initially positive and then turns negative, and whose level is optimally chosen by a revolutionary organization. The organization is bound by a free-access constraint and hence uses the degree of extremism as a means of indirectly controlling its level of membership with the aim of maximizing expected per capita income of its members, like a producer co-operative. The gist of the argument is that radicalization may be an optimal reaction to perceived failure (a widespread perception in the Muslim world) when political activists are, at the margin, relatively strongly averse to effort but not so averse to extremism. This configuration is at odds with secular, Western-style revolutionary politics but seems to capture well the essence of Islamic revolutionary politics, embedded as it is in a doctrinal framework.     

The multi-store model for economic voting: Rome wasn't built in a day

The 2012 presidential election was closely contested with the media predicting that the unemployment rate announcement just before the election would be the deciding factor. If a single economic indicator could buoy up job approval ratings, delivering positive economic statistics to the voters would be a rational re-election strategy for an incumbent. In contrast, this paper presents a model in which voters do not immediately convert each economic statistic into a performance evaluation. Only after many “rehearsals” do voters convert statistics into a positive or negative evaluation. I take the case of Japan and use a survey experiment and an inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator to assess whether short-, medium- and long-term performance evaluations form based on voter perception of economic conditions.