Contested multilateralism 2.0 and regional order transition: causes and implications

This article proposes a new concept of ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ to describe the puzzling institutional building efforts by non-ASEAN members after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) in the Asia-Pacific. It suggests that different to ‘multilateralism 1.0’ of the 1990s, which was mainly led by ASEAN, this wave of multilateralism has been initiated by other powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, Australia and South Korea, either by forming new institutions or by reinvigorating existing ones. This article advances an institutional balancing argument. It suggests that ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ is a result of institutional balancing among major states under the conditions of high strategic uncertainty and high economic interdependence after the GFC. One unintended consequence may be that it could well lead to a more peaceful transformation of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific if regional security hotspots, such as the Korean crisis and the South China Sea dispute, can be managed appropriately.     

The meanings,origins and implications of 'the Howard Doctrine'

This article examines the background to the so-called 'Howard Doctrine' of 1999 in response to the problems that Australian diplomacy and defence policy encountered during the East Timor crisis. The article begins by examining the critical reaction both in Australia and abroad to the doctrine which appeared to imply Australia's increased reliance on the 'special relationship' with the US and its role as a 'deputy' of its ANZUS partner in the East Asia region. The article then demonstrates the historical origins of the doctrine's thinking in Australia's reliance since the post-war period on a system of serial bilateralism and special relationships with first the UK, the US and then Indonesia. However, the article also points out the essential vulnerabilities inherent in this type of serial bilateralism and its relative inability to respond effectively to the East Timor crisis. Finally, the article considers the systemic risk in Australian policy as manifested in the doctrine, and the future viability of serial bilateralism in dealing with Australia's regional diplomatic and security agenda.     

Contested Asia's ‘New’ multilateralism and regional order*

Multilateralism has become an increasingly significant part of Asia's international relations. This paper critiques the premise that there are two phases of regional multilateralism, pre- and post-global financial crisis and instead argues that there has been one long 25-year expansion phase. Initially, this was prompted by the risks and opportunities of globalization but was adapted as a strategy to manage a changing regional order. More recently, regional multilateralism has taken on competitive characteristics reflecting Asia's more contested dynamics. The US and its allies are trying to use multilateralism as part of their broader strategy to sustain the prevailing regional order. China is also attempting to use multilateralism as a part of its efforts to change the region to one more in line with its interests and values. Multilateralism has become a sublimated form of contestation over the form and function of Asia's international order. A key consequence of this will be to weaken the policy impact of existing institutional efforts and to promote zero-sum approaches to international policy among many Asian states.     

Asia's competing multilateral initiatives: quality versus quantity

East Asia has many distinctive features that set it apart from other comparable regions, not least attitudes to regional development and cooperation. Despite a growing number of regional initiatives in East Asia, however, they are generally distinguished by their ineffectiveness. It is entirely possible that ‘institutional balancing’, like its more well-known power balancing counterpart, is designed not to facilitate but to prevent something from happening. The sort of ‘multilateralism 1.0’ developed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has a lot to answer for in this regard: having established its own pattern of institutional effectiveness ASEAN's ‘leadership’ has caused it to be replicated under the new wave of ‘multilateralism 2.0’. Consequently, I suggest that not only is China very comfortable with the idea of a rather feeble and ineffective institutional architecture, but the USA is also unlikely to do anything to change this picture, especially under a Trump administration that is highly skeptical about the efficacy of multilateral institutions at the best of times.     

Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s Multilateral Diplomacy

This article addresses Chinas multilateral diplomacy by identifying four distinct strategies: watching, engaging, circumventing, and shaping. The typology builds on two literatures: power transition theory, and the more recent ??assertiveness?? discourse in the West. Drawing from a range of cases in both the economic and security domains, the article argues that China??s multilateralism is diverse, and that it cannot be un-problematically characterized as either status-quo or revisionist in nature. However, the general trend appears to be towards engagement, but with an assertive tact as China??s interests become further entangled in the business of international institutions.     

Why George W. Bush Is a Unilateralist and How It Will Affect the 2004 Presidential Election

ABSTRACT

U.S. President George W. Bush has had a stormy relationship with Europe. Bush campaigned on a theme of putting America's interests first and eschewing multilateralism when necessary. Since taking office, Bush has been true to his campaign pledges. Bush's style and substance have caused many in Europe to regard him as a “buffoon” at best and a dangerous cowboy at worst. What the Europeans do not seem to understand is that, for better or worse, George W. Bush's view of the world is held by a substantial portion of the American people, and even when the U.S. had a more Euro-friendly leader in President Bill Clinton, America's policies were often at odds with those preferred by its allies in Europe. This is due to a fundamental difference that has developed between Europe and the United States over the last century. Today, no matter who occupies the White House, American foreign policy is likely to be in conflict with Europe's. Far from being a liability, this difference is likely to be a political asset to George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election.     

Canada's goal in the Asia Pacific

Canada's chief goal in the Pacific is to gain a greater share in the economic growth of East Asia while promoting regional stability through middle power multilateralism. Like other Western countries in the Pacific Canada should strongly support trans‐oceanic groups like the ASEAN PMCs and the APEC group as well as the numerous non‐governmental organizations devoted to keeping the countries on both sides of the Pacific cooperating together, both developed and developing. Both the US under Clinton and Canada under Chretien seem to believe the economic future of their countries depends to a significant extent on participating in East Asian economic development. Giving good economic relations precedence over sanctions suggests that they have committed themselves to that course. If successful, Canada's regional activism may help to counter its weakening European ties and its greater absorption into North America, and it may help to increase its foreign influence and independence.     

Funding Global Public Goods: The Dark Side of Multilateralism

The funding of global public goods, such as climate mitigation, presents a complex strategic problem. Potential recipients demand side payments for implementing projects that furnish global public goods, and donors can cooperate to provide the funding. We offer a game‐theoretic analysis of this problem. In our model, a recipient demands project funding. Donors can form a multilateral program to jointly fund the project. If no program is formed, bilateral funding remains a possibility. We find that donors rely on multilateralism if their preferences are relatively symmetric and domestic political constraints on funding are lax. In this case, the recipient secures large rents from project implementation. Thus, even donors with strong interests in global public good provision have incentives to oppose institutional arrangements that promote multilateral funding. These incentives have played an important role in multilateral negotiations on climate finance, especially in Cancun (2010) and Durban (2011).     

Cambodia's uncertain future

Japanese government interests in Southeast Asia continue to expand. Official speeches refer to the growth of a ‘community that acts together’, while institutional linkages have been strengthened with the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three process and by a proliferation of bilateral arrangements. These developing networks raise questions about Japan’s future orientation towards its wider region. This article assesses recent developments, by challenging some of the fundamental assumptions about Japan’s regional behaviour. First, it examines how a tendency to render mutually exclusive bilateral and multilateral forms of behaviour serves to obfuscate a focus on the fundamental processes of regional engagement. Second, this article delineates Japan’s changing orientation towards the region as part of a process of ‘complex regional multilateralism’, in which a range of often ad hoc engagements have resulted in a loose framework for interaction. In so doing, it suggests that Japan’s current policy-making approach towards Southeast Asia may be regarded as a continuation of policy that is, nevertheless, being buffeted by a range of – primarily regional – external influences. The resulting set of perceived strategies demonstrates not an either/or approach to regional engagement but, rather, shows how the Japanese government manages changing circumstances to carve out a new role for itself in Southeast Asia.     

Between realism and idealism in Japanese security policy: The case of the ASEAN regional forum

Abstract

While ASEAN played the leadership role for erecting the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Japan generated positive impact on the historical trajectory leading to the birth of the ARF. This paper asks the following question: On what ideational foundation was Japan's support for the ARF based? Utilizing a conceptual framework based on the theoretical literature of multilateralism, the paper analyzes three major Japanese perspectives on the ARF in the inception years (1991–95) — Idealism, Realism, and Liberalism — while paying special attention to Liberalism, the perspective underlying Japan's actual policy. Liberalism, while leaning toward Realism, still incorporated some elements of Idealism. For Liberals, centering around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ARF was a vehicle to foster a sense of trust, however fragile, on the basis of providing and sharing quality information about China, Japan, and the United States, without undermining the existing security arrangements including the US‐Japanese alliance.     

Invocations of Chinese Traditions in International Relations

Chinese writings on international relations increasingly invoke history. In the past Chinese and foreigners alike have seen China??s foreign policies through the lens of history, but recent Chinese stress on the ??harmonious world?? resulting from Confucianism has shifted the discussion. It serves as a guide to resurgent claims for leadership, a source of legitimation for why China deserves leadership, and a warning of how its leadership may be abused to the detriment of countries agreeing to regionalism or multilateralism. Claims to superiority raise tensions in Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere where hopes had existed for a shared view of history. They arouse controversy among advocates of socialist ideology who fear that Confucianism will eclipse communism. The increasingly hereditary elite of Party leaders continues to bridge the gap between these two types of memory, but they face an ideological challenge at home and a credibility challenge abroad.     

Ideas,identity, and institution‐building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia‐Pacific way'?

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which the development of multilateral institutions in the Asia‐Pacific region may be viewed as an exercise in identity‐building. It argues that institution‐building in this region is more of a ‘process‐orientated’ phenomenon, rather than simply being an outcome of structural changes in the international system (such as the decline of American hegemony). The process combines universal principles of multilateralism with some of the relatively distinct modes of socialization prevailing in the region. Crucial to the process have been the adaptation of four ideas: ‘cooperative security’, ‘open regionalism’, ‘soft regionalism’, and ‘flexible consensus’. The construction of a regional identity, which may be termed the ‘Asia‐Pacific Way’ has also been facilitated by the avoidance of institutional grand designs and the adoption of a consensual and cautious approach extrapolated from the ‘ASEAN Way’. The final section of the article examines the limitations and dangers of the Asia‐Pacific Way. It concludes with the assertion that while the Asia‐Pacific Way is an over‐generalised, instrumental, and pragmatic approach to regional cooperation, and there remain significant barriers to the development of a collective regional identity that is constitutive of the interests of the actors, it has helped introduce the concept and practice of multilateralism into a previously sceptical region and might have ‘bought’ enough time and space for regional actors to adapt to the demands of multilateralism.     

Asian multilateral institutions and their response to the Asian economic crisis: the regional and global implications

Asian multilateralism has been a relatively recent development. It differs from that elsewhere and reflects the history and characteristics of the region. It has been important in the growth of regional cooperation, in developing common regional interests and in the development and adherence to norms. These characteristics contributed in responding in a constructive, if limited, way to the Asian economic crisis. Nevertheless, the crisis has revealed the weaknesses of existing regional multilateral institutions and those weaknesses are often seen as raising doubts about whether those institutions can be effective in the future without major reform. Yet, although the response of the regional institutions was clearly inadequate, the region's response overall was far from negligible. Efforts to ensure regional coherence in the future by way of ASEAN, APEC and ASEAN+3 in particular are already being made to ensure greater stability in the financial sector. The region also wants to overcome its under representation in the global arena, but increased global participation, while positive, will remain supplementary to the global institutions, notably the IMF. Greater global involvement would provide, however, a more appropriate balance between regional and global contributions to future crises, since they will need to be better tailored to regional conditions and therefore depend on greater regional involvement from the start.     

Generational change: regional security and Australian engagement with Asia

The rhetoric of US foreign policy since the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001, would suggest that there has been a fundamental shift in US foreign relations. This is often summarised as a shift from multilateralism to unilateralism and, in the context of the war on terrorism, concomitantly a shift from geo-economic to geopolitical priorities. The rhetoric of the fight against the ‘axis of evil’, however, may simply cloud underlying continuities in US relations with Asia. Nevertheless the process of coalition-building by the Bush administration in the ‘War on Terrorism’ has impacted on the distance Asian countries have been able to maintain in relation to the United States. The case studies presented in this special issue raise a number of important issues concerning perceptions and the practice of US hegemony and the complex links between leadership and ‘followership’ at the inter-state level. They also draw out the impacts engendered by US–Asia relations on the wider phenomenon of regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific region.     

Proceeding in hardship: the trilateralism–bilateralism nexus and the institutional evolution of China–Japan–South Korea trilateralism

In recent decades, the development of trilateral institutions among China, Japan and South Korea has begun to take shape. This study analyzes its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the nexus between trilateralism and bilateralism. A well-functioning trilateral grouping needs to overcome two structural limitations – dilution effects and bilateral constraints – both of which are triggered by embedded bilateral approaches. The critical juncture approach is effective in terms of elevating the payoffs of cooperative trilateralism during times of exigency. However, once common crises have dissipated, trilateralism has revealed starkly different performances with respect to functional and political-diplomatic cooperation. This article adopts a dichotomous approach between the two. Functional trilateralism has been steadily growing, and has proven to be less subject to fluctuations in the nations’ political relationships. Its outcomes are positive and worthy of praise. However, the outcomes of trilateralism have been less convincing in fields of middle and high politics. Trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations when its embedded bilateral relations change, and cooperative outcomes within a trilateral grouping are prone to being diluted by bilateral approaches. China–Japan–Korea trilateralism at diplomatic levels remains more an extension of bilateral relations than a mature form of minilateral arrangement.     

Harmonious World and China’s Foreign Economic Policy: Features,Implications, and Challenges

Analysts oddly have neglected the foreign economic implications of China’s harmonious world and harmonious society doctrines. This article specifies the foreign economic policy effects of both, collectively termed harmonious world plus (HWP). It shows that HWP implies China’s continued integration into the global economic system, acceptance of the extant international economic order, and backing for increased cooperation and exchange, provided it is mutually beneficial. It further demonstrates that HWP implies support for global development, self-reliance, and multilateralism. Beyond this, the study reveals that HWP is likely to influence China’s interactions with international economic institutions, foreign investors, and its international resource dealings. Generally speaking, this article shows that China is making progress adhering to most of the tenets of HWP, though there are some areas for concern. It also reveals that convergences and divergences between HWP and China’s actual policies are attributable to national interests, China’s limited capabilities, and domestic politics. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard is associate director of the Center for U.S.-China Policy Studies and associate professor in the Department of International Relations at San Francisco State University (SFSU). He also is a Board Member of and Research Director for the Association of Chinese Political Studies. Dr. Blanchard’s research interests include China’s integration into the global economic system, China’s interactions with multinational corporations, Chinese multinational corporations, Sino-Japanese relations, and Chinese territorial and maritime issues. He is a co-editor of Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), a co-editor of and contributor to Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security (London: Frank Cass, 2000), and the author of 20 book chapters and refereed journal articles.     

Showing Restraint,Signaling Resolve: Coalitions,Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining

How do coalition partners affect the dynamics of crisis bargaining? I analyze a model in which a potential coalition leader faces a trade‐off between signaling resolve to a target and retaining a partner's support by limiting the costs of war. The strength of the target conditions the partner's effect. When the target is strong, the need to ensure military cooperation reduces the probability of war by discouraging bluffing, though resolute types can signal resolve by foregoing coalitional support. When the target is weaker, a resolute coalition leader moderates threats to preserve military cooperation, foregoing the chance to signal resolve and increasing the chances of war, even as the partner successfully moderates the leader's bargaining posture. Thus, coalitions may face higher probabilities of war against weaker targets than stronger ones, coalitions are more likely against weak than strong targets, and partners can increase or decrease the probability of war.     

La Grande Nation and Agriculture: The Power of French Farmers Demystified

France is considered a strong state, but French governments have always fiercely defended the interests of French farmers in European and global negotiations. Why would a ‘strong state’ be unable to resist farm lobby pressure? Is agriculture an exception to the French ‘strong state’ rule? This article offers a structural model of varying state sensitivity to interest group pressure, and argues that farm lobby pressure cannot fully explain French foreign policy on agriculture, as governments often go against farmers' preferences and as the level of pressure varies more than the continuity of governmental preferences. From an analysis of the negotiations on the CAP and the GATT in the 1960s and in the 1990s it emerges that ideational constraints played a major role in French obstinacy. The defence of French identity as La Grande Nation, necessitating a presence in world agricultural markets, and the defence of a strong Europe under French leadership as a counterweight to the United States, have guided French preferences without regard to the farmers' positions.     

Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments

Does partisan conflict damage citizens’ perceptions of Congress? If so, why has polarization increased in Congress since the 1970s? To address these questions, we unpack the “electoral connection” by exploring the mass public's attitudes toward partisan conflict via two survey experiments in which we manipulated characteristics of members and Congress. We find that party conflict reduces confidence in Congress among citizens across the partisan spectrum. However, there exists heterogeneity by strength of party identification with respect to evaluations of members. Independents and weak partisans are more supportive of members who espouse a bipartisan image, whereas strong partisans are less supportive. People with strong attachments to a political party disavow conflict in the aggregate but approve of individual members behaving in a partisan manner. This pattern helps us understand why members in safely partisan districts engage in partisan conflict even though partisanship damages the collective reputation of the institution.     

Profligacy Or Prudence? Changes in Employment and Compensation of State and Local Government Workers

As the 1990s began, state and local governments across the country found themselves in a situation of fiscal stress. That stress has been attributed to several sources. Recently, it has been suggested that governments themselves brought on the fiscal squeeze by their own profligacy —a profligacy rooted in excessive increases in employment and compensation of government workers during the 1980s. After summarizing some arguments presented for and against describing state and local practices of the 1980s as profligate, this article compares its evidence on the growth of employment and compensation and notes some different interpretations. The article concludes that a strong statement of the profligacy position has not been proved.