Japan's ‘green’ economic diplomacy: environmental and energy technology and foreign relations

The principal regional organizations in East Asia and Asia-Pacific, ASEAN and APEC, are widely seen to be crisis-stricken, ‘becalmed’ or ‘adrift’. At the same time, East Asia is witnessing the emergence of a new, as yet embryonic body, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and ambitious projects implying closer integration between Northeast and Southeast Asia are being mooted. Departing from an analysis of the determinants of the success and failure of regional integration, this article discusses the roots of the perceived decline of ASEAN and APEC and the origins of the rapid rise of APT. The Asian financial crisis in particular, it is argued, has been instrumental both in undermining ASEAN and APEC and in fostering the rise of APT. The crisis has brutally exposed the structural weaknesses of ASEAN and APEC, both of which are handicapped by the political and economic diversity of their member states and the absence of a benevolent dominant state or coalition of states. It has simultaneously fuelled the development of APT because it has greatly strengthened perceptions of mutual economic interdependence and vulnerability in East Asia and resentment against the West and the US. As APT is likely to exhibit similar structural weaknesses to ASEAN and APEC, the odds, however, are against it developing into a strong regional organization, notwithstanding the possibility that, in the near future, external forces and trends (stagnation of world trade liberalization, closer European and American integration) will, if anything, encourage plans for closer East Asian integration.     

Democratization,regional integration,and human rights: the case of the ASEAN intergovernmental commission on human rights

Abstract

In the post‐Cold War era, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attempted to maintain and enhance its institutional status in the Asia‐Pacific by increasing its membership and range of activities. ASEAN has tried to assume significant responsibilities for regional security and economic relations through initiatives like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and by demanding a major role in the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. This paper critically evaluates ASEAN's attempts at institutional expansion. It argues that ASEAN lacks the political, economic and military resources necessary to play the dominant role that it envisions for itself within the Asia‐Pacific. Its attempts to increase its diplomatic weight by increasing its membership actually have the potential to undermine ASEAN's unity as well as its standing in the world community. The East Asian economic crisis is largely exacerbating ASEAN's inherent weaknesses. If ASEAN is to remain relevant in the twenty‐first century its members need to modify their expectations of the level of international influence that ASEAN can afford them. They must also use ASEAN to directly address issues of dispute between member states. There is little evidence that ASEAN's members are prepared to reform the organization in this way. Therefore, ASEAN is likely to lose its pre‐eminent regional status to other institutions, and may even fade into irrelevance, in the next century.     

ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism

The following article joins the debate about the theoretical and empirical implications of the Asian crisis on Southeast Asian regionalism. It argues that the realist-institutionalist dichotomy does not provide a fruitful framework of analysis. ASEAN policies are characterized by a policy mix, albeit one that is influenced by a strong dose of realism - a tendency that has been exacerbated by the Asian crisis. The crisis has thrown ASEAN's collective identity into deep disarray - and thus also questions constructivist approaches. Departing from these theoretical issues the article traces ASEAN responses to the crisis in three key areas: economic cooperation, enlargement and values. The article concludes with a few lessons for regionalism which may be derived from the Asian crisis.     

State sovereignty,political legitimacy and regional institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific

Abstract

Regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific have been of limited efficacy. Asian members of organizations such as ASEAN and APEC have insisted that these institutions not infringe upon their sovereign rights. The basic norms, rules, structures and practices supporting these organizations have, to varying degrees, reflected this concern. A number of factors contribute to explaining this regional reluctance to create effective multilateral institutions. This paper argues that the single most important factor is the concern of most East Asian states with domestic political legitimacy. Drawing on the work of Muthiah Alagappa and Mohammed Ayoob, the paper demonstrates that a significant majority of the states of East Asia see themselves as actively engaged in the process of creating coherent nations out of the disparate ethnic, religious and political groups within the state. As a result, these states are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty to any outside actors. Indeed, the regional attitude towards multilateral institutions is that they should assist in the state-building process by enhancing the sovereignty of their members. As an exceptional case, Japan has encouraged regional institutionalism, but it has also been sensitive to the weaknesses of its neighbours, and has found non-institutional ways to promote its regional interests. The incentives to create effective regional structures increased after the Asian economic crisis, but Asian attempts to reform existing institutions or create new ones have been undermined by the issues connected to sovereignty. East Asian states recognize that they can best manage globalization and protect their sovereignty by creating and cooperating within effective regional institutions. However, their ability to create such structures is compromised by their collective uncertainty about their domestic political legitimacy. In the emerging international environment, being a legitimate sovereign state may be a necessary prerequisite to participating in successful regional organizations.     

Ethnic politics,complex legitimacy crisis,and intramural relations within ASEAN

This article examines ethnic conflict and its impacts on intramural relations within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It suggests that ethnic politics at home often propels leaders to get involved in ethnic conflict elsewhere. In the ASEAN context, regional institutions, especially the principle of non-interference, mitigate the effects of ethnic politics and preclude the possibility of coercive intervention. The third state is more likely to appeal to facilitation or mediation. On the side of the host state, when the regime faces complex legitimacy crisis, it is more likely to reject the third state's involvement. Ethnic conflict is likely to cause diplomatic tussles between the two states. In contrast, when the regime of the host state enjoys a higher level of legitimacy, it is more amenable to the third party's mediation. Cooperation on conflict management will foster inter-state trust. This article illustrates the above mechanism by examining Malaysia's role in Thailand and the Philippines’ ethnic insurgencies.     

Dealing with natural disasters

Over the past two decades, natural disasters have severely hit the Southeast Asian region causing dramatic environmental, economic and social consequences. Through the lens of Beck's risk society framework and the theory of reflexive modernization, this article attempts at empirically taking stock of how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is addressing disaster risk through the creation of new regional institutions and mechanisms. In particular, it argues that the accumulation of the experience of catastrophes is leading ASEAN members towards the development of new precautionary initiatives to deal with disasters, and to forge a new way forward for the promotion of disaster cooperation and joint emergency response. The article is divided into five sections, which will only consider initiatives endorsed within the ASEAN framework. The first introduces risk societies as forms of modern societies and of the insecurities of the present world. In the second section attention is drawn to natural disasters as a paradigmatic example of Beck's risk society. The third section explores how ASEAN normative governance is evolving to include the issue of disaster management within its security and social agenda. Then the main institutional and operational innovations and tools through which ASEAN is preparing to deal with disaster risk are explored. Finally, the article suggests that despite ASEAN overall institutional innovations, the practice of cooperation still is effected by several factors, above all the lack of adequate resources and the difficulty of reconciling principles of solidarity with national sovereignty, which hinder ASEAN effectiveness in this area.     

ASEAN sceptics versus ASEAN proponents: evaluating regional institutions

Since it was founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attracted both sceptics and proponents. With Southeast Asia’s economy growing rapidly and tied into all parts of the global economy and the region geopolitically important to the world’s major powers, how ASEAN manages its internal affairs and East Asian relations is crucial. The differences in how sceptics and proponents perceive ASEAN, and why they take up such contrasting positions, need to be fully appreciated as scholars and commentators review and assess ASEAN’s performance. This analysis uses three analytical criteria – effectiveness, legitimacy and efficiency – to juxtapose and evaluate the competing arguments of the two approaches so as to better understand how and why sceptics and proponents can examine the same institutions and events and reach very different conclusions.     

Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels

I argue that there is a distinct and longstanding regional structure in East Asia that is of at least equal importance to the global level in shaping the region's security dynamics. Without considering this regional level neither ‘unipolar’ nor ‘multipolar’ designations can explain East Asian international security. To make this case, I deploy regional security complex theory both to characterize and explain developments in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is well understood in thinking about how the ending of the Cold War impacted on East Asia. Less written about in Western security literature are the parallel developments at the regional level. Prominent among these are the relative empowerment of China in relation to its neighbours, and the effect of this, as well as of the growth of regional institutions, and the attachment of security significance to East Asian economic developments, in merging the security dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia. How China relates to its East Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security. With the notable exception of some crisis between China and Taiwan, this whole pattern looks mainly dependent on internal developments within China and the US. Also significant is whether the basic dynamic of interstate relations in East Asia is more defined by the Westphalian principle of balancing, or by the bandwagoning imperative more characteristic of suzerain-vassal relationships. The main probability is for more of the same, with East Asian security staying within a fairly narrow band between mild conflict formation and a rather odd and weak sort of security regime in which an outside power, the US, plays the key role.     

Economic security in an era of globalization: definition and provision

Abstract

Globalization has undermined the traditional definition of economic security that centered on economic vulnerability to other states. At the same time, globalization has produced a redefinition of economic security in light of the risks posed by cross-border networks of non-state actors and by the economic volatility of the new global environment. The relationship between economic globalization and undesirable economic and political outcomes must be specified precisely and assessed carefully, however. Judgements about economic security must weigh the effects of increased volatility introduced by globalization against the benefits of improved economic performance in the longer run. Institutions can offset economic insecurity through the provision of insurance, shoring up policy credibility, and guiding adaptation to the new environment. National institutions will remain central to the provision of economic security under conditions of globalization. Regional and global institutions can complement one another (and national institutions) in their alleviation of the new economic insecurity. Although some regional institutions drifted in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, new regional alternatives have emerged that promise to stake out new modalities of economic security.     

Globalization and the Korean electronics industry

Abstract

Northeast Asia is notable for the relative absence of regional institutions. The Six Party Talks could constitute an embryonic starting point for the development of such institutions. The path toward greater institutionalization is likely to begin in a modest fashion. Functional working groups on topics such as the environment, maritime transport, technical barriers to trade, road and rail links, and energy could provide the locus for integrating North Korea into the broader regional and global economies. Foreign ministries will inevitably take the lead in developing the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM), but meaningful economic achievements will require the involvement of other ministries. North Korea has proved problematic in this regard thus far. Moreover, given the importance of private-sector involvement in achieving sustainable economic development in North Korea, modalities will have to be developed to integrate private-sector actors when possible. The governments of the region, and particularly China and South Korea, may continue support on a bilateral basis as a hedge against North Korea's collapse or as inducements in the context of the nuclear talks. But the development of more permanent multilateral structures is unlikely until the nuclear issue is resolved.     

The non-traditional security concept and the EU-ASEAN relationship against the backdrop of China's rise

The rise of China raises questions about international order and whether traditional power structures will be transformed peacefully or confrontationally. Actively engaged in trade and investment activities with its Southeast Asian neighbourhood, China has been exerting political influence on many Southeast Asian states, cleaving regional cohesion and raising levels of tensity in the region. This article presupposes that within so-called non-traditional security (NTS) areas, there is room for China and Southeast Asian countries to circumvent the political tensions, to some extent. It presumes that NTS issues facilitate greater interaction with/on China for Southeast Asian states, including enhanced European Union (EU)-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engagement on China. Recognising the increasing and rather underexplored importance of the NTS perspective on the official and scholarly levels, this article delves into the rhetoric of NTS from a European perspective with particular view towards the South China Sea issue to demonstrate the use and utility of the NTS concept in the EU-ASEAN context against the backdrop of China's rise.     

From ambiguity to contestation: discourse(s) of non-traditional security in the ASEAN community

‘Non-traditional security’ (NTS) is prominently featured in the agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other ASEAN-led institutions in the Asia-Pacific. ‘NTS’ brings together a series transnational and non-military security threats that are considered common among regional states, urgent for them to attend to, and non-sensitive all at the same time. This a priori makes it a self-evident focus of attempts to bring regional security cooperation ‘to a higher plane’. However, this paper reveals that the uncontroversial character of NTS is overestimated, by shedding light on the co-existence of divergent – and potentially contradictory – interpretations of its meaning and implications in ASEAN and the wider region. In a context where ASEAN's relevance to the pursuit of regional security is increasingly being measured against its (in)ability to provide a coherent approach to security challenges that affect the region, the contested nature of NTS has important implications for the grouping's resilience in the twenty-first century.     

Crisis management and the diversity of capitalism: fiscal stimulus packages and the East Asian (neo-)developmental state

Abstract

This paper contributes to the understanding of East Asian capitalism by investigating the political economy of crisis management in Japan, Korea and China during the global economic crisis. Reacting to the global shock of the economic crisis that began in 2008, East Asian capitalism has remained a distinct state-led model that differs substantially from the liberal, neo-corporatist or welfare state varieties of capitalism in the West. More specifically, this paper studies the fiscal stimulus packages implemented by East Asian countries to address the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2010. We find that East Asian fiscal stimulus packages were comparatively large and supply-side-oriented. Unlike in the West, where a (short-lived) revival of demand-side-oriented Keynesian strategies stimulating consumption could be observed, East Asian countries reinforced industrial policies and supported investment and international competitiveness. We argue that the East Asian variety of crisis management can largely be explained by a path-dependent transformation of the East Asian developmental state into a neo-developmental competition state.     

From commitment to compliance: ASEAN's human rights regression?

Whether it is the persecution of the Rohingya, the disappearance of human rights activists, the general limiting of freedom of speech across the region, or the resumption of the arbitrary use of the death penalty, Southeast Asia can be said to be facing a human rights crisis. This human rights crisis is though occurring at a time when the region’s institution, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has never been so interested in human rights. After a lengthy period of time in which ASEAN either ignored, or paid lip service to human rights, the Association has created a human rights body – the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) – and adopted an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). In this article, I utilize the Spiral Model to explain how, when ASEAN member states are regressing in their commitment to human rights, an intergovernmental body continues to promote their commitment and lay the groundwork for their compliance.     

Emerging regional security co‐operation in Europe and the Asia Pacific

European and Asian‐Pacific policymakers need to shift from policies based on competition to those based on co‐operation. If European and Asian‐Pacific states are successful in implementing and strengthening new security institutions on the basis of co‐operative behaviour designed to realize absolute gains, then conflict in these two regions may decrease and regional hegemonic competition may not materialize. It is argued that three key factors will determine the viability of any regional security framework. These are reciprocity in security relations, great power support for the security arrangements and reassurance. In this study's comparative evaluation of Europe and the Asia Pacific, the pursuit of absolute gains through a security regime appears to be a better alternative to relative gains strategies which serve to intensify security dilemmas.

In Europe, rules and norms for state behaviour are being extended throughout the continent through the gradual extension of the West European security institutions to Central and East European states. The NACC and the PfP offer to combine the stability of the North Atlantic Alliance with the principles of co‐operative security at a pan‐European level. In the Asia Pacific, the ASEAN Regional Forum represents a positive initial step towards greater security co‐operation among the ASEAN states and their neighbours, and the United States and China need to give the ARF their full support. The difference between the ARF and NACC and the PfP is that the former does not have a history of successful military collaboration behind it, nor a developed security agenda or structure similar to that now supporting the latter two.     

Contested multilateralism 2.0 and regional order transition: causes and implications

This article proposes a new concept of ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ to describe the puzzling institutional building efforts by non-ASEAN members after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) in the Asia-Pacific. It suggests that different to ‘multilateralism 1.0’ of the 1990s, which was mainly led by ASEAN, this wave of multilateralism has been initiated by other powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, Australia and South Korea, either by forming new institutions or by reinvigorating existing ones. This article advances an institutional balancing argument. It suggests that ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ is a result of institutional balancing among major states under the conditions of high strategic uncertainty and high economic interdependence after the GFC. One unintended consequence may be that it could well lead to a more peaceful transformation of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific if regional security hotspots, such as the Korean crisis and the South China Sea dispute, can be managed appropriately.     

The concept of flexible engagement and the practice of enhanced interaction: Intramural challenges to the ‘ASEAN way’

Abstract

This article examines the challenges to the diplomatic and security culture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as posed by Thailand's spurned proposal for ‘flexible engagement’ and the pursuit of ‘enhanced interaction’ by some ASEAN members in intramural relations. It asks whether these challenges should be understood as turning points in the way in which regional leaderships in Southeast Asia interact. The article argues that while the ‘ASEAN way’ is indeed changing, this change, at least for the moment, focuses mainly on extending the range of issues and contexts traditionally defined as internal affairs in which other ASEAN governments may now legitimately become involved. Considerations about ASEAN cohesion, regime security and regional influence do not suggest an imminent or complete abandonment of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. The likelihood that enhanced interaction will continue to be pursued by ASEAN leaderships should therefore not be seen to imply that principles such as quiet diplomacy or restraint have already become obsolete.     

Building e‐government in East and Southeast Asia: Regional rhetoric and national (in)action

Among many regional policy initiatives taken by states in East and Southeast Asia in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, one central project launched by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and taken up by its dialogue partners in East Asia, was promotion of information and communication technology. While part of ASEAN's 1999–2004 action plan focused on services for business, another part sought to put public sectors online, and to promote electronic government, or e‐government. Taking the 16 states and quasi‐states of East and Southeast Asia, this article evaluates progress at the action plan's mid‐point in January 2002. It begins by defining e‐government and reviewing three academic literatures on the information age, developmental states, and Confucian societies. It then describes the major policy initiatives taken by ASEAN and its partner states, and surveys implementation progress through an analysis of government homepages and sites. Its main finding is that e‐government activity in East and Southeast Asia is highly diverse, reflecting national strengths and weaknesses rather than regional capacity for policy change. The article argues for increased attention to national implementation strategies. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy

This paper analyses the development of the US approach to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), from 1991 onwards. It examines theories of why a superpower would participate in a multilateral security institution, and investigates the motivations for the attitudes and extent of participation of the George H. Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations towards the ARF. It argues that, in the post-Cold War period and in the face of a rising China, US East Asia strategy has been geared towards retaining the American preponderance of power. Thus, the US has pursued a strategy of containment and deterrence centred upon the regional bilateral alliance structure. Multilateral institutions have been treated as a supplementary means of supporting the secondary strategy of engaging with China. However, the ARF is not viewed as one of the important institutions through which to fulfil this supplementary aim. Because it cannot deal with the key regional security issues, the ARF is seen as a low-stakes arena by Washington. But the paper concludes that US participation in the ARF may nevertheless be crucial in boosting the legitimacy of American security interests in the region, thus helping to safeguard US preponderance.     

ASEAN’s inheritance: the regionalization of Southeast Asia, 1941–61

This article explores the establishment of Southeast Asia as a regional space in the international system before the advent of ASEAN. It challenges the traditional view that the region emerged from Japanese and Allied strategies and operations during the Second World War, focusing instead upon the important role played by academics in the creation of ‘Southeast Asian studies’ in the United States and Britain in the 1940s and 1950s. On a broader level, the article highlights the cyclical nature of the regionalization process. It suggests that once a region has been ‘created’, the repeated use of the regional idea by a variety of state and non-state actors fixes it in a broad cultural context, and opens the way for subsequent appropriation by regionalizers.