Self-interest,public interest,and public health

Although the activities of physicians, as represented by the AMA, have long been viewed from a self-interest perspective by economists, public-health processes have not been subjected to such an examination. But just as the conduct of ostensibly charitable hospitals cannot be examined independently of the interests of the physicians who staff them, so too, we think, the conduct of public-health bureaus should not be examined in isolation from the interests of the medical community that they represent. An interest-group interpretation of public health would look to the ways in which public-health processes increase the aggregate demand for medical services, thereby generating quasirents for specialized input suppliers. We have explored in preliminary fashion some ways in which public-health agencies may advance the collective interests of physicians, though we would be the first to acknowledge that much work remains to be done on this topic.We are grateful to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for financial support.     

Federalism and regional interest intermediation in Brazilian public policies

Brazil became a highly decentralized country following democratization and the 1988 Constitution. The consequences of decentralization at the federal level are quite clear: the federal government is facing financial constraints and difficulties in building governing coalitions, allowing the Presidents to govern and to implement public policies, especially those concerning fiscal control. At the level of the states, however, the results of decentralization are quite heterogeneous given the country's high degree of regional inequality. The article identifies the cleavages and tensions surrounding federal–state relations, as well as the mutual dependency of the states and the federal government. It argues that the Brazilian experience of political and financial decentralization has contributed to the prospects of democratic consolidation and has forced the federal government to negotiate and compromise with subnational governments the implementation of national policies. On the other hand, the Brazilian experience highlights the constraints of decentralization in countries with deep‐rooted regional disparities. Furthermore, the financial weakness of the federal government which has been brought about by decentralization and by fiscal control brings new tensions to the federal arrangements and to public policies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inequity and risk aversion in sequential public good games

Behavioral hypotheses have recently been introduced into public-choice theory (Ostrom in American Political Science Review 92:1–22, 1998). Nevertheless, the individual intrinsic preferences which drive decisions in social dilemmas have not yet been empirically identified. This paper asks whether risk and inequity preferences are behind agents’ behavior in a sequential public good game. The experimental results show that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the contribution decision of first movers. Second movers who are averse to advantageous inequity free-ride less and reciprocate more than do others. Our results emphasize the importance of strategic uncertainty for the correct understanding of which preferences influence cooperation in social dilemmas.     

Private and public choices in public education: An investigation of trustee effects

The paper applies the concepts of the horizon problem, agency costs, monitoring, and special interest incentives to trustee management of public schools and higher education. We examine whether South Carolina's 1984 Education Improvement Act, a major restructuring of educational organization and spending in South Carolina, is related to the ratio of pupils in private versus public schools. We employ 30 years of county level data in South Carolina, and we uncover several things. There is no statistically credible relation between public school expenditures per pupil and the private school/public school enrollment ratio. However, we do find that the directed changes in rules, organizational structure, and incentives mandated by the 1984 Educational Improvement Act are associated with a reduction in the relative number of children attending private school. We interpret this to mean that the features of the law requiring better accountability and the like were perceived by parents to make for better education while the increased money spent was only a transfer to teachers or some other groups; we find that organization matters more than money.     

Majority rule and the public provision of a private good

This paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good: health care. The private use of health care is modeled as a supplement rather than as an exclusive alternative to public health care. A majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist. The equilibrium characterization is an example of Director's Law of Income Redistribution. A ban on private health care activities is shown to be opposed by a majority of voters. Implications for the size and distribution of private health care expenditures are drawn.     

论中国利益群体参与公共政策制定存在的问题

处于社会转型期的中国,如何处理利益群体参政问题关乎改革开放的历史进程和社会稳定。中国的渐进式改革路径在保持社会稳定方面发挥了重要的作用,但是这种渐进式改革更多地表现在经济领域,而政治领域的改革,特别是公民参政权的落实则略显迟滞和不够。由此引起的矛盾和问题使人们产生了诸多不满和怨恨,因此探讨中国利益群体在参与公共政策制定上存在的问题,对于进一步完善中国利益群体参政的路径、提高政府的执政能力和管理创新能力,其理论价值和现实意义不言而喻。     

Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision

In this paper, I examine how the incentives of regions to unite and to separate are related to the incentives to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. From a social welfare perspective, there are excessive incentives for separation and for the provision of public goods. When incentives for public good provision are not taken into account, however, these incentives can be misinterpreted as incentives for separation.     

National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting

The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.     

试论我国环境民事公益诉讼制度的完善

我国现行诉讼制度中并未规定环境民事公益诉讼制度.我国目前涉及环境问题的诉讼.据笔者查阅相关资料,大致呈现这种态势,印国家机关为保护公共环境利益以原告身份提起的环境民事公益诉讼多为胜诉,其他主体如社会组织或公民个人为保护公共环境利益以原告身份提起的环境民事公益诉讼,多以原告与本案没有直接利害关系、不属于人民法院管辖范围或法律没有明确规定等理由不予受理或驳回起诉.试从民事诉讼法的视角,提出有关我国环境民事公益诉讼制度的完善思路.