Contested Asia's ‘New’ multilateralism and regional order*

Multilateralism has become an increasingly significant part of Asia's international relations. This paper critiques the premise that there are two phases of regional multilateralism, pre- and post-global financial crisis and instead argues that there has been one long 25-year expansion phase. Initially, this was prompted by the risks and opportunities of globalization but was adapted as a strategy to manage a changing regional order. More recently, regional multilateralism has taken on competitive characteristics reflecting Asia's more contested dynamics. The US and its allies are trying to use multilateralism as part of their broader strategy to sustain the prevailing regional order. China is also attempting to use multilateralism as a part of its efforts to change the region to one more in line with its interests and values. Multilateralism has become a sublimated form of contestation over the form and function of Asia's international order. A key consequence of this will be to weaken the policy impact of existing institutional efforts and to promote zero-sum approaches to international policy among many Asian states.     

South Korea's elusive middlepowermanship: regional or global player?

South Korea aspires to a larger regional and global role, fuelled by economic success, and complemented by cultural and diplomatic achievement. However, a gap exists between the rhetoric and reality of its foreign policy. This paper examines Seoul's middle-power activism. It poses questions about the conceptual deficit of ‘middle power’, proffering an operational definition in illuminating the characteristic identity formation of middle powers. It analyses how the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak governments sought to articulate their respective middle-power foreign policy aspirations. Finally, it investigates how domestic political and institutional conditions shape Republic of Korea foreign policy, and identifies policy implications.     

China's ‘charm offensive’ in the Pacific and Australia's regional order

Abstract

In recent years, a perception has emerged among many policymakers and commentators that the deepening of the People's Republic of China engagement in the Pacific Islands Region, predominantly through its expanding foreign aid programme, threatens to undermine the existing regional order, in which Australia is dominant. In this article, it is argued that China's apparent ‘charm offensive’ in the Pacific is mainly driven by commercial, not political, imperatives and is far more fragmented and incoherent than is often assumed. Hence, its (real) political effects hinge, not on any Chinese strategic designs for regional domination, or even a more limited resource security agenda, but on the intent and capacity of Pacific governments to harness deepening aid, investment and trade relations with China towards their own foreign and domestic policy objectives, which include limiting Australian interference in the internal governance processes of Pacific states. This argument is demonstrated by the case of Fiji after the December 2006 military coup.     

Emerging regional security co‐operation in Europe and the Asia Pacific

European and Asian‐Pacific policymakers need to shift from policies based on competition to those based on co‐operation. If European and Asian‐Pacific states are successful in implementing and strengthening new security institutions on the basis of co‐operative behaviour designed to realize absolute gains, then conflict in these two regions may decrease and regional hegemonic competition may not materialize. It is argued that three key factors will determine the viability of any regional security framework. These are reciprocity in security relations, great power support for the security arrangements and reassurance. In this study's comparative evaluation of Europe and the Asia Pacific, the pursuit of absolute gains through a security regime appears to be a better alternative to relative gains strategies which serve to intensify security dilemmas.

In Europe, rules and norms for state behaviour are being extended throughout the continent through the gradual extension of the West European security institutions to Central and East European states. The NACC and the PfP offer to combine the stability of the North Atlantic Alliance with the principles of co‐operative security at a pan‐European level. In the Asia Pacific, the ASEAN Regional Forum represents a positive initial step towards greater security co‐operation among the ASEAN states and their neighbours, and the United States and China need to give the ARF their full support. The difference between the ARF and NACC and the PfP is that the former does not have a history of successful military collaboration behind it, nor a developed security agenda or structure similar to that now supporting the latter two.     

The ASEAN naval build‐up: Implications for the regional order

This paper examines the ongoing ASEAN force modernization in the light of whether it is stabilizing or destabilizing for the region. Donald K. Emmerson's framework for analysing security regimes — the concentration or dispersion of power in achieving regional order — is employed as a basis for analysis. The paper comes to the conclusion that while the ASEAN arms build‐up will not have a destabilizing effect on the wider Asia‐Pacific regional order or balance, it could have serious implications for ASEAN and Southeast Asia. This is because while the actual increase in the number of weapon systems and platforms is not large, it still constitutes a significant increase in percentage terms, and even more so with regard to capability. Moreover, the ASEAN members are building up their forces at a time when there are no obvious military threats. They are in effect engaged in contingency planning. All these factors could be destabilizing for ASEAN's internal balance. As such, there is a need for ASEAN to address the arms build‐up, and introduce confidence‐building measures. One suggested forum for transparency measures is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).     

One or two arenas? The break-up between national and regional elections

ABSTRACT

This paper shows that the role of national electoral dynamics on regional elections is highly mediated by institutional and electoral constraints at the regional level. Using data on statewide parties’ electoral competition in regional and national elections in Spain and Italy, results show that the contamination of regional elections is lower in regions where decentralization has travelled further and where strong regionalist parties dominate electoral competition. The paper also shows that these two channels -more regional authority and more regionalist competition- shape the regional manifestos of statewide parties by increasing their pro-regional positions. These findings represent a contribution to a better understanding of the extent to which regional elections are a separate electoral arena from the national one.     

ASEAN as the ‘regional conductor’: understanding ASEAN's role in Asia-Pacific order

This paper analyses ASEAN's prominence in regional order negotiation and management in Southeast Asia and the Asia-pacific through the lens of social role negotiation. It argues that ASEAN has negotiated legitimate social roles as the ‘primary manager’ in Southeast Asia and the ‘regional conductor’ of the Asia-Pacific order. It develops an English School-inspired role negotiation framework and applies it to three periods: 1954–1975 when ASEAN's ‘primary manager’ role emerged from negotiations with the USA; 1978–1991 when ASEAN's role was strengthened through negotiations with China during the Cambodian conflict; and 1991-present when ASEAN created and expanded the ‘regional conductor’ role. Negotiations during the Cold War established a division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the great power function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its ‘regional conductor’ role after the Cold War. ASEAN's ability to sustain its roles depends on maintaining role bargains acceptable to the great powers, an increasingly difficult task due to great power rivalry in the South China Sea.     

Regional lobbying and Structural funds: Do regional representation offices in Brussels deliver?

In recent years regional representation offices have proliferated in Brussels. Among the many aims of these offices are influencing the allocation and securing the transfer of European Structural and Cohesion funds. However, our knowledge about whether they have succeeded in this goal is limited. In this paper, we assess whether regional offices in Brussels have managed to affect the commitment and payment of Structural and Cohesion funds beyond the officially stated economic criteria of eligibility. The paper uses a custom-made survey of Brussels offices, complemented by economic, institutional, and political data. The results of the analyses for 123 regions over the period 2009–13 highlight that the capacity – proxied by the budget and staff of the office – of the regional offices to influence the commitment and payment of Structural and Cohesion funds has been negligible, when not outright negative. Regional lobbying in Brussels does not lead to more funds or to an easier disbursement of regional development funds.     

Decentralisation and regional cabinet size: the Spanish case (1979–2015)

This article explores under what conditions regional governments tend to have larger or smaller cabinets. The main contention is that cross-regional variation in cabinet size is partly explained by the dynamics set up by the multilevel system of government, mainly territorial decentralisation, multilevel government (in)congruence or the existence of nationally distinct regions. The hypotheses are tested with a new and original dataset built upon the Spanish case (1979–2015). Findings show that regions with more welfare state policies, especially when the region’s economic capacity is high, and nationally distinct regions tend to have bigger executives. In contrast, decentralisation in the form of basic state functions and government incongruence do not have a significant effect. Results have important implications for our understanding of sub-national territorial institutions and their interaction with decentralisation dynamics.     

Economic globalization and regional penetration: The failure of networks in Baden-Württemberg

Abstract. This paper explores the emergence of direct linkages between the international economy and the state government of Baden–Württemberg, Germany. In the early 1990s Baden–Württemberg embarked on a plan in which the laender government took the lead in organizing a large–scale, high technology project for the development of interactive television. Creating a 'network' between itself and major economic actors the laender government sought to enhance the economic development of the region. However, as the economic actors involved in the project questioned the economic viability of interactive television, they began to withdraw from the project. The project's failure demonstrates the incompatibility of political objectives with the economic goals of actors in a globalized economy. We conclude that as attractive as the network approach may be for regional and national governments, it is likely to be successful only where both sets of actors see the outcome as enhancing their respective priorities (political legitimacy and economic gains).     

Dispersion versus decentralization: British location of industry policies and regional development 1945–60

The 1945 Labour government launched two major location of industry intiatives-Development Area plicy, to maintain full employment in Britain's formerly depressed areas, and the decentralization of London's population and industry, partly via the development of eight London New Towns. Conflict between these policies was inevitable. Despite initial safeguards, the Conservative administrations of the 1950s allowed the industrial needs of the London New Towns to take precedence over those of the Development Areas. Furthermore, while the growth-orientated development objectives and strategy of the London New Towns produced a capital-intensive, mutually reinforcing industrial base of high-tech firms, Development Area policy emphasized short-term employment creation, encouraging the growth of low-wage, labour-intensive ‘overspill’ production. These differences in policy objectives and strategy had important consequences for the relative long-term success of the two initiatives.     

How governance boundaries affect regional collaboration on atmospheric governance—Evidence from China's Yangtze River Delta

Regional public affairs will become more complex when contradictions emerge between administrative boundaries and policy issues that require cross-boundary collaboration. Breaking administrative boundaries has become a prerequisite for facilitating inter-local government collaboration. This study categorizes governance boundaries into the administrative boundary and the ecology-based policy boundary and then examines how these two governance boundaries and their interactive relationship contribute to the intergovernmental collaboration network in China's regional atmospheric governance (RAG). Using data on the atmospheric governance collaboration from 30 cities in the Yangtze River Delta region from 2013 to 2018, we employ the MR-QAP model to find that cities within the same administrative boundary are more likely to collaborate and cities within the ecology-based policy boundary, compared with those beyond, are more likely to collaborate but with a lagging effect. Ecology-based policy boundary has a positive but lagging moderating effect on the contribution of the administrative boundary to the formation of intergovernmental collaboration networks.     

Decentralisation of regional development policies in the Netherlands ‐ A new type of state intervention?

During the past decade, regional development policies in the Netherlands have been dismantled. At the same time, economic development policies have been decentralised to regional and local government level. This has given rise to ‘local initiatives’ for implementing market‐oriented and market‐related development strategies. In the long run, decentralisation of economic policies results in a new type of regulation. It is not through administrative measures and public control that the state intervenes in economic development, but through indirect mechanisms to improve economic growth and innovation. The Keynesian model of regulation, based on far‐reaching intervention, is gradually being transformed into a more ‘modem’ model, characterised by flexible, fragmented, indirect and ‘invisible’ measures. The result is a fundamental change in the relationship between state and economy.     

Indonesia,the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community,and the contingent profile of regional ‘great-power management’

Why does Indonesia, whose regional leadership would seem to flow so obviously from its material and normative footprint, and whose role as primus inter pares is readily, if sometimes grudgingly, acknowledged by its peers, struggle to translate that position into an unambiguous, consistent, and effective regional presence? While there are many possible answers to this question, this article focuses on societal interpretations, arguing that such a role is exercised not in a vacuum, susceptible to measurement against a set of fixed criteria, but in the context of its respective region's unique and constantly evolving profile. Drawing on the English School's concept of institutions, and focusing on three areas within the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (migration, disaster preparedness, and the environment), the article argues that the paradox of Indonesia's powerful-but-not-powerful position reflects the kind of ‘great-power management’ that is to be expected in the restrictive context of regional international society, and is profoundly influenced by the uneven interplay of institutions embedded at different levels in the regional experience.     

Civil society organizations,Africa’s Great Lakes Region conflict,and attempts at regional peacebuilding

This article advances the conceptualization of ‘regional peacebuilding’ and suggests six essentials for effective regional peacebuilding that when put together present a structured analytical approach. The article rationalizes the need for civil society organizations’ (CSOs) regional peacebuilding in Africa’s Great Lakes Region based on the existing conflicts that are of a regional nature. CSOs’ attempts at regionalizing responses are discussed in the context of their constraints and impediments, including inadequate analysis of regional dimensions of conflict and fragmented action. A comparative analysis of two intergovernmental organizations reveals that CSOs’ responses are further handicapped by regional organizations’ narrow conceptualization of peace and security coupled with the limited space for their participation in shaping the organizations’ agenda. Efforts to address these constraints should be coupled with CSOs’ efforts to innovatively develop invented spaces to collaborate on regional peacebuilding.     

Japan’s approach toward Asian regional security: from ‘hub-and-spoke’ bilateralism to ‘multi-tiered’

This article argues that Japan’s growing activism in promoting multilateral regional security arrangements since the early 1990s stems from the country’s adoption of the ‘multi-tiered approach’; a new policy perspective that packages different types of coordination among region states, including bilateral, multilateral, and minilateral or subregional, in a layered, hierarchical manner. The significance of the approach explains why Japan has retained its enthusiasm for promoting multilateral arrangements, despite continuous criticism of their effectiveness and significance, as well as the marked decline in Japan’s economic power to support financially the country’s activism in regional institution-building. Meanwhile, the multi-tiered approach also explains Japan’s effort to maintain and strengthen its bilateral security relationship with the United States during the last decade. Four factors – a perceived change in the regional security order, growing self-recognition of major-power status, the legacy of history, and constitutional constraints – worked essentially to lead Japanese policy-makers to settle on a multi-tiered approach as a desirable policy choice in shaping the country’s security policy in post-Cold WarAsia.     

The quest for regional legitimation: Analyzing the Arab League’s legitimizing role in the Arab spring

The topic of international legitimacy has returned to centre stage during the Arab Spring, in which the Arab League has apparently assumed a prominent legitimation role. Although some scholarship has studied how international organizations are decisive in legitimizing actors and their actions during conflicts, relatively scant attention has been focused at constructing a comprehensive analytical framework for this kind of assessment that could be also applied to regional organizations (ROs). This paper proposes that when actors are involved in battles over international legitimation, analysing their access to the socially identified brokers of three legitimation functions (appropriateness, consensus, and empathy) is key to assess their success. Particularly, we argue that relevant identity-based ROs may have a crucial legitimizing role by operating as brokers of regional consensus. For this purpose, two case studies – Bahrain and Libya – illustrate how the Arab League’s brokerage influenced the legitimation of the actors involved and their outcomes. The findings suggest novel implications about the decisive legitimizing impact of regionalism on conflict resolution.     

Office effects and campaign spending in a semi-open list PR system: The Belgian/Flemish federal and regional elections 1999–2010

In majoritarian systems, campaign spending is generally found to be more effective for challengers than for incumbents. This article seeks to understand how the personal campaign spending of a candidate impacts preference votes in a semi-open List PR system. We analyse the effect of office in general, postulating that the size of the effect varies with the prominence of the office. On the basis of the pooled data on six different elections in the Flemish region of Belgium, we show that personal spending has an effect on the number and the relative share of preference votes, except for ministers and (to a lesser extent) mayors of local communalities. Irrespective of the office, personal spending has no effect on the odds of actually obtaining a seat.