Asia's competing multilateral initiatives: quality versus quantity

East Asia has many distinctive features that set it apart from other comparable regions, not least attitudes to regional development and cooperation. Despite a growing number of regional initiatives in East Asia, however, they are generally distinguished by their ineffectiveness. It is entirely possible that ‘institutional balancing’, like its more well-known power balancing counterpart, is designed not to facilitate but to prevent something from happening. The sort of ‘multilateralism 1.0’ developed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has a lot to answer for in this regard: having established its own pattern of institutional effectiveness ASEAN's ‘leadership’ has caused it to be replicated under the new wave of ‘multilateralism 2.0’. Consequently, I suggest that not only is China very comfortable with the idea of a rather feeble and ineffective institutional architecture, but the USA is also unlikely to do anything to change this picture, especially under a Trump administration that is highly skeptical about the efficacy of multilateral institutions at the best of times.     

A community of practice: explaining change and continuity in ASEAN's diplomatic environment

Despite change in the aims, institutions and informal diplomacy of ASEAN since 1997, the formal diplomatic code of conduct remains locked in a traditionalist mode first outlined in the 1970s. Existing approaches from mainstream International Relations theorising are unable to adequately explain this continuity and change. The recent ‘practice turn’ in theorising offers distinct explanatory advantage, which this article illustrates by arguing that the formation of an ‘ASEAN rationality’ between 1967 and 1997 fundamentally curtailed the ability of regional diplomats to revise ASEAN post 1997, resulting in the coexistence of new and old norms in ASEAN's organisation design.     

Conflict management strategies in ASEAN: perspectives for SAARC

ASEAN has generally been hailed as one of the most successful experiments in regional cooperation in the developing world, particularly in its ability to manage conflicts and maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia. SAARC, its counterpart in South Asia, on the other hand, is perceived as a moribund organization that has made little progress in furthering peace and cooperation in the region. Regionalism is indeed peculiar to its own region making for a different set of challenges, which each regional grouping has to address by evolving suitable modelsof conflict management and regional cooperation. ASEAN and its unique style of functioning are also distinct in that sense. While the experiences of one organization cannot be wholly applied or transplanted on to another, it is useful to understand the logic and dynamics in each region to draw the relevant lessons. Some aspects of cooperation in one region may be worthy of emulation in another if adapted in the right socio-economic and political context. This paper explores areas where SAARC, despite obvious divergences with ASEAN in its geopolitical and economic make-up, could benefit from the ASEAN experience in seeking to create a political climate conducive to improving regional cooperation in political and economic matters. The ASEAN model of conflict management may be of greater significance to South Asia in light of greater imminent regional tensions arising from the current war on South Asia’s border in Afghanistan.     

Response and responsibility: China in East Asian financial cooperation

Abstract

China's behaviour in East Asian financial cooperation has overall changed from passively responding to external pressures to taking proactive initiatives, which are highlighted by Chinese elites as evidence of a sense of responsibility. China has taken varied positions towards proposals for Asian financial regionalism, from ‘silent’ objection, to lukewarm or superficial support, to enthusiastic participation and substantial contribution, and this variance has not always taken place in a chronological order. Despite much speculation over the trajectory of China's role in East Asian regionalism, there has not been a study focused on China's policymaking towards East Asian financial cooperation. Therefore, this paper fills the gap by analysing the factors and policymaking processes that have led to those varied positions. It argues that China, recognising the momentum in the region to enhance cooperation, has replaced the blunt dismissals of proposals, particularly those from Japan, with a more subtle approach that is aimed at ensuring China's influence and promoting the image of a responsible great power; that the extent to which it can contribute to this process is mainly constrained by its economic conditions, particularly the financial institutions.     

Transgressiveness,civil society and Internet control in Southeast Asia

This paper assesses the potential of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) to catalyze a process of economic and political integration in East Asia. The analysis first illustrates APT participants’ projected views of APT’s opportunities and limitations and then assesses the motives and objectives driving APT cooperation. Following a review of the major achievements of APT, the study gives an outlook on APT’s relevance and prospects. The findings of the article are that most APT states do not advocate ideas of distinctive pan-East Asian regionalism, but rather take an Asia-Pacific perspective. Only Malaysia and China appear to be promoting more exclusive forms of East Asian regionalism. Within APT, China is aggressively pushing a strong China–ASEAN axis, whereas Japan is seeking to balance China’s efforts and step up its political and economic cooperative profile in the region. A look at the achievements of APT does not suggest a rapid spread of pan-East Asian regionalism. On the contrary, the proposed ASEAN–China FTA proposal has triggered fierce competition between Japan and China and thus divided APT even further. Moreover, it is not at all certain whether the ASEAN–China FTA plan is going to work out in the end, due to objections from various ASEAN members, including a somewhat capricious Malaysia. Whereas pan-East Asian integration efforts are unlikely, the APT process is attractive enough to keep Japan and China, who are competing for influence in Southeast Asia, committed to the APT process. Regardless of APT’s internal fragmentation, its dynamic has already begun to change the political and economic landscape of East Asia. Thus, ASEAN has been able to enhance its leverage vis-à-vis Japan and China, profiting from their strategic opposition. Japan’s reluctance to discuss trade liberalization with ASEAN members already appears to be crumbling, as it is struggling to preclude Chinese domination.     

Pipelines,crisis and capital: understanding the contested regionalism of Southeast Asia

Abstract

Via an analysis of the trans-ASEAN gas pipeline project (TAGP), in this article we argue for a reconceptualising of the regional dynamics of Southeast Asia and the forces shaping them. For this task, we propose an analytical framework based upon social conflict theory that delves within and beyond the state, and which places emphasis upon the roles of both material and ideological factors operating across time in the reordering of particular geographical spaces. The framework reveals that the tensions acting within and upon ASEAN and the TAGP influence regionalism in such a way that the gas pipeline project – much like other ‘regional’ projects – is unlikely to ever come close to fulfilling its brief of enhancing regional security and cohesion. What is more probable is that the project's form will continue to be conditioned by entrenched politico-economic realities and the influence of dominant ideologies – factors which have the capacity to exacerbate existing regional animosities and disparities.     

The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy

This paper analyses the development of the US approach to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), from 1991 onwards. It examines theories of why a superpower would participate in a multilateral security institution, and investigates the motivations for the attitudes and extent of participation of the George H. Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations towards the ARF. It argues that, in the post-Cold War period and in the face of a rising China, US East Asia strategy has been geared towards retaining the American preponderance of power. Thus, the US has pursued a strategy of containment and deterrence centred upon the regional bilateral alliance structure. Multilateral institutions have been treated as a supplementary means of supporting the secondary strategy of engaging with China. However, the ARF is not viewed as one of the important institutions through which to fulfil this supplementary aim. Because it cannot deal with the key regional security issues, the ARF is seen as a low-stakes arena by Washington. But the paper concludes that US participation in the ARF may nevertheless be crucial in boosting the legitimacy of American security interests in the region, thus helping to safeguard US preponderance.     

Explaining the failure of the ASEAN economic community: the primacy of domestic political economy

All reliable indicators suggest that ASEAN's (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Economic Community (AEC) will not be successfully established by its 2015 deadline. Why? Against technocratic, realist and constructivist accounts, this article offers an explanation rooted in the political economy of ASEAN's member-states. Economic liberalisation agreements promote the rescaling of economic governance, involving regulatory changes that may radically redistribute power and resources. Consequently, they are heavily contested between coalitions of social and political forces, without outcomes reflecting the outcome of these struggles. The argument is demonstrated by exploring the uneven sectoral liberalisation achieved under the AEC, the constrained integration of ASEAN's energy markets, and the limited deregulation of skilled labour migration.     

In defence of FTAs: from purity to pragmatism in East Asia

This paper discusses the shift in East Asia from a focus on multilateral trade liberalization through the WTO to a pragmatic approach since 1999 favouring bilateral and regional FTAs while continuing to support the WTO system. It is argued that such FTAs are a second-best option compared to WTO agreements. However, while economists may seek the ideal solution, governments will focus on the politically attainable, especially as new multilateral agreements require lengthy negotiations beyond the life span of governments. As the WTO negotiating process has become bogged down, even once sceptical governments in East Asia are turning to FTAs. It is contended that such FTAs could form a lattice network within and across regions. In this context, the paper discusses the underlying security rationale for the conclusion of FTAs, highlighting the nexus between security interests and international economic policy in East Asia.     

Ideas,identity, and institution‐building: From the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia‐Pacific way'?

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which the development of multilateral institutions in the Asia‐Pacific region may be viewed as an exercise in identity‐building. It argues that institution‐building in this region is more of a ‘process‐orientated’ phenomenon, rather than simply being an outcome of structural changes in the international system (such as the decline of American hegemony). The process combines universal principles of multilateralism with some of the relatively distinct modes of socialization prevailing in the region. Crucial to the process have been the adaptation of four ideas: ‘cooperative security’, ‘open regionalism’, ‘soft regionalism’, and ‘flexible consensus’. The construction of a regional identity, which may be termed the ‘Asia‐Pacific Way’ has also been facilitated by the avoidance of institutional grand designs and the adoption of a consensual and cautious approach extrapolated from the ‘ASEAN Way’. The final section of the article examines the limitations and dangers of the Asia‐Pacific Way. It concludes with the assertion that while the Asia‐Pacific Way is an over‐generalised, instrumental, and pragmatic approach to regional cooperation, and there remain significant barriers to the development of a collective regional identity that is constitutive of the interests of the actors, it has helped introduce the concept and practice of multilateralism into a previously sceptical region and might have ‘bought’ enough time and space for regional actors to adapt to the demands of multilateralism.     

Walking a tightrope: democracy versus sovereignty in ASEAN's illiberal peace

Abstract

Since 1967, ASEAN has established intramural relations that forsake war as a means for resolving conflict. While this is a remarkable achievement for the region, it must be balanced against a concomitant hindrance of democratic reform. I argue in this paper that ASEAN's nascent security community must be seen as an ‘illiberal peace’. Underlying ASEAN's peaceful community are the same principles that support illiberalism in the region, namely sovereignty and non-interference. While sovereignty has historically been a cherished norm for developing countries, ASEAN lags behind other regions, particularly Latin America, in attempting to reconcile tensions between democratic norms and the respect for sovereignty. This tension is most evident in ASEAN's relations with Myanmar. Recent events indicate that ASEAN's non-interference norm may no longer be sacrosanct, but the association is a long way from shunning illiberal politics for the sake of democratic values.     

Contested Asia's ‘New’ multilateralism and regional order*

Multilateralism has become an increasingly significant part of Asia's international relations. This paper critiques the premise that there are two phases of regional multilateralism, pre- and post-global financial crisis and instead argues that there has been one long 25-year expansion phase. Initially, this was prompted by the risks and opportunities of globalization but was adapted as a strategy to manage a changing regional order. More recently, regional multilateralism has taken on competitive characteristics reflecting Asia's more contested dynamics. The US and its allies are trying to use multilateralism as part of their broader strategy to sustain the prevailing regional order. China is also attempting to use multilateralism as a part of its efforts to change the region to one more in line with its interests and values. Multilateralism has become a sublimated form of contestation over the form and function of Asia's international order. A key consequence of this will be to weaken the policy impact of existing institutional efforts and to promote zero-sum approaches to international policy among many Asian states.     

Democratization,regional integration,and human rights: the case of the ASEAN intergovernmental commission on human rights

Abstract

In the post‐Cold War era, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attempted to maintain and enhance its institutional status in the Asia‐Pacific by increasing its membership and range of activities. ASEAN has tried to assume significant responsibilities for regional security and economic relations through initiatives like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and by demanding a major role in the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. This paper critically evaluates ASEAN's attempts at institutional expansion. It argues that ASEAN lacks the political, economic and military resources necessary to play the dominant role that it envisions for itself within the Asia‐Pacific. Its attempts to increase its diplomatic weight by increasing its membership actually have the potential to undermine ASEAN's unity as well as its standing in the world community. The East Asian economic crisis is largely exacerbating ASEAN's inherent weaknesses. If ASEAN is to remain relevant in the twenty‐first century its members need to modify their expectations of the level of international influence that ASEAN can afford them. They must also use ASEAN to directly address issues of dispute between member states. There is little evidence that ASEAN's members are prepared to reform the organization in this way. Therefore, ASEAN is likely to lose its pre‐eminent regional status to other institutions, and may even fade into irrelevance, in the next century.     

Dealing with natural disasters

Over the past two decades, natural disasters have severely hit the Southeast Asian region causing dramatic environmental, economic and social consequences. Through the lens of Beck's risk society framework and the theory of reflexive modernization, this article attempts at empirically taking stock of how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is addressing disaster risk through the creation of new regional institutions and mechanisms. In particular, it argues that the accumulation of the experience of catastrophes is leading ASEAN members towards the development of new precautionary initiatives to deal with disasters, and to forge a new way forward for the promotion of disaster cooperation and joint emergency response. The article is divided into five sections, which will only consider initiatives endorsed within the ASEAN framework. The first introduces risk societies as forms of modern societies and of the insecurities of the present world. In the second section attention is drawn to natural disasters as a paradigmatic example of Beck's risk society. The third section explores how ASEAN normative governance is evolving to include the issue of disaster management within its security and social agenda. Then the main institutional and operational innovations and tools through which ASEAN is preparing to deal with disaster risk are explored. Finally, the article suggests that despite ASEAN overall institutional innovations, the practice of cooperation still is effected by several factors, above all the lack of adequate resources and the difficulty of reconciling principles of solidarity with national sovereignty, which hinder ASEAN effectiveness in this area.     

Institutional transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN,TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968–1976

Abstract

Many international relations (IR) scholars discuss whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) possesses institutional utility in maintaining security in Southeast Asia or East Asia. While this has important implications for both academics and policy-makers, ASEAN's role has been too often evaluated in terms of what has persisted within the association rather than what changed. Yet, exploring the causes and processes of institutional transformation are particularly important because they have made ASEAN expand its security utility by creating security dialogues and fostering security cooperation in the region. In this context, the crucial question is: when and how has ASEAN changed?

Focusing on the causes and processes of institutional transformation which have occurred within ASEAN, this article explores ASEAN's transformation from 1968 to 1976, by using a theoretical model, developed from historical institutionalism and the punctuated equilibrium model. Applying this approach to institutional transformation of ASEAN in the political-security field, three transformation processes are constructed. First, ASEAN member states’ expected changes in the external security environment triggered internal discussions regarding ASEAN's political-security function; second, these internal political discussions fostered institutional consolidation of ASEAN during this period; and third, such direction of institutional transformation was fundamentally guided by ideas provided by institutional norm entrepreneurs (INEs), especially Malaysia's neutrality proposal.

In particular, this article examines the process of ASEAN's creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Bali Concord in 1976, and argues that this model shed light on the significance of ZOPFAN that created a foundation of TAC and the Bali Concord, for which conventional wisdom has dismissed as an insignificant institutional concept by academics and practitioners.     

ASEAN and human rights: resisting Western pressure or emulating the West?

Abstract

Observers of Southeast Asian affairs commonly assume that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are reluctant to pursue liberal agendas, and that their main concern is to resist pressure from Western powers to improve their human rights practice. This article, however, argues that such a conventional view is too simplistic. The Southeast Asian countries have voluntarily been pursuing liberal agendas, and their main concern here is to be identified as ‘Western’ countries – advanced countries with legitimate international status. They have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rights which is championed by the advanced industrialized democracies, with the intention of securing ASEAN's identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states. Ultimately, they have been pursuing liberal agendas, for the same reason as cash-strapped developing countries have luxurious national airlines and newly-independent countries institute national flags. Yet it should be noted that the progress of ASEAN's liberal reform has been modest. A conventional strategy for facilitating this reform would be to put more pressure on the members of ASEAN; however, the usefulness of such a strategy is diminishing. The development of an East Asian community, the core component of which is the ASEAN–China concord, makes it difficult for the Western powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries. Hence, as an alternative strategy, this article proposes that ASEAN's external partners should ‘globalize’ the issue of its liberal reform, by openly assessing its human rights record in global settings, with the aim of boosting the concern of its members for ASEAN's international standing.     

The territoriality of personalization: New avenues for decentralized personalization in multi-level Western Europe

In light of the increasing scholarly attention to the concept of decentralized personalization, this paper argues that the territoriality (the level of government to which an MP belongs) of an MP would also lead to variations in that MP’s incentive to personalize their campaigns. Using data from the PARTIREP Comparative MP survey, this paper tests the role of the territoriality of an MP in their incentive to personalize their campaigns across nine multi-level countries in Western Europe. Although the level of personalization of campaigns does differ according to territoriality, the underlying explanatory variables do not behave uniformly across territoriality. This paper thus draws attention to the rarely explored role of territory, and the complications it may bring to the explanation of the personalization of politics.     

Governed interdependence: Rethinking the government‐business relationship in East Asia

Analyses of East Asia's high‐performance economies have highlighted the advantages of a coordinated approach to market failures. With states dominating the process, both public and private agencies are increasingly involved. The recent literature sees public‐private cooperation as a limit to state capacity and thus a challenge to statism. Within an institutionalist framework, this paper proposes a fresh view of the government‐business relationship which avoids the statist premise of domination, but without relying on ‘weak state’ arguments. Through an examination of key organizational features of state and industry in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, the paper proposes a theory of ‘governed interdependence’ in which both state and capital are taken seriously; where both strong state and strong industry go hand‐in‐hand; and where the capacities of both are mutually enhanced. The article identifies four principal types of government‐industry cooperation in the East Asian experience — some apparently ‘state‐led’, others apparently ‘business‐led’ — all of which can be accommodated by the theory.     

Regionalism through social policy: collective action and health diplomacy in South America

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the place of social policy as a driver of region building in South America. The contention is that while much has been written about economic integration, institutions and security communities in regionalism, a discussion of the significance of other regional projects has lagged behind. Social policy, particularly in the Americas, has been neglected as a policy domain in the account of regionalism. Changes in the political economy of Latin America in the last decade suggest that we need to engage afresh with regional governance and social policy formation in the Americas. By looking at the institutions, resources and policy action in the area of health within the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) this paper reconnects regionalism and social policy and explores two interrelated, yet largely unexplored, issues: the linkages between regional integration and social development beyond the historical hub of trade and finance; and the capacity of UNASUR to enable new policies for collective action in support of social development goals in the region, and to act as a broker of rights-based demands in global health governance. In so doing, the paper contributes towards a more nuanced understanding of regionalism and regionalization as alternative forms of regional governance.     

Thinking strategically about ASEM: The subsidiarity question

Abstract

Aficionados of arcane European Union politics will know the importance of the term ‘subsidiarity’, for it relates to perhaps the most fundamental question facing any federal enterprise. Subsidiarity is supposed to be simple ‐ the notion that issues should be handled at the most effective level of authority ‐ but the devil is in the debate about what is ‘most effective’. The notion of subsidiarity, in all its complexity, is in fact most appropriate for those considering the shape of the agenda for the next Asia‐Europe Meeting (ASEM) in London in 1998. With the proliferation of meetings and organizations devoted to the next ASEM agenda, the time has come to pose and begin to answer the subsidiarity question. That question for ASEM would ask, ‘what is best done at the ASEM level’, as opposed to at a global, other regional, national, or even corporate, local or individual level? If officials and analysts feel that such a question is too tough for the ASEM process, perhaps they would be happier with a subsidiary subsidiarity question: ‘what can also be usefully done at the ASEM level'? If there are good answers to the main question, there is a good basis on which to engage in the ASEM process. If there are only good answers to the subsidiary question, the ASEM agenda will be less ambitious and perhaps even appear contrived.