A chance for a breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations: will the logic of great power relations prevail?

Under Mori Yoshiro the Japanese government energetically pursued Russia's new leader, Vladimir Putin. Progress was achieved, as Putin recognized the 1956 treaty in which Moscow pledged to return two islands. From the summer of 2000, however, a backlash could be detected. The architects of the initiative not only failed to make their case to Japanese politicians, but also became the object of two years of attacks, leading to Suzuki Muneo's ouster from the LDP and arrest and to Togo Kazuhiko being fired as ambasador to The Netherlands. Under Koizumi Junichiro Japan lost interest, while the media feasted on the image of foreign policy being hijacked. Lost in the media frenzy and setback to relations was the case for why Tokyo and Moscow need each other as great power partners in the face of rising Chinese power and overwhelming US power. Since both parties sided with the US war against terror, the logic of cooperation has become clearer. A general outline for an interim agreement is well understood on both sides, but a breakthrough is unlikely soon.     

The Sino–Japanese territorial dispute and threat perception in power transition

A territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has gained a high profile in Sino–Japanese relations. Since the 2012 escalation of the territorial dispute, there is no sign of any de-escalation despite economic interdependence, which previously helped ease the tension. Drawing on the constructivist understanding of threat perception and power transition theory, this article analyzes the way in which the deepening of threat perceptions associated with a perceived regional power transition prevents Japan and China from working beyond their subjective conceptions of justice associated with boarders and history. Since 2012, the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute has increasingly fitted into a larger picture of power-political conflict taking place in a power transition in which both Japan and China aim to return to ‘normality’ by propagating their territorial claims, strengthening their military capabilities, and strategic realignment. To that end, this article first introduces a theoretical framework on the centrality of threat perceptions in power transition. Second, it traces the ways in which Japan and China have developed a threat perception of each other since 1972. The third section deals with the escalation of the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute since 2010 and highlights the deepening of mutual suspicion and threat perception exemplified at the bilateral and multilateral levels. I conclude that the Sino–Japanese territorial debate entered a new stage of normative and power-political competition in earning international support for territorial claims in the East China Sea.     

The post‐cold war security agenda of Russia: Implications for Northeast Asia

The end of the cold war has seen the emergence of new political and geo‐strategic rivalries for Russia. The major aspect of change has been an intensification of an eastern focus in Russian security policy. The identification of changing security concerns, be they the intensification of local conflicts on Russian borders or potential territorial claims from neighbours, poses new problems for the Russian army. This paper looks at Russia's post‐cold war security agenda and military modernization questions in the light of these potential problems. In regional terms the paper focuses on the implications of these wider questions for Russia's relations with Northeast Asia, especially in its dealings with the Korean peninsula issue and remaining border questions with China and Japan.     

The Charismatic Body Politics of President Putin

Vladimir Putin's image and brand make sophisticated, culturally embedded use of his biography, martial arts expertise, and idiolect, with his physical self strongly privileged in the modes of his self-presentation. As a politically marketable product, his public persona enjoyed broad appeal among Russian voters in the period 2000–2011, when he and his United Russia party operated in an electorally uncompetitive environment. Since the urban protests of 2011–2012, Russia's political scene has become much more dynamic. Having initially configured himself as a charismatic leader whose very body symbolized a new and confident Russia, during his third presidential term, which began in 2012, Putin finds himself facing new presentational challenges that he may or may not be equipped to meet.     

Alexander Dugin's Views on the Middle East

Alexander Dugin, influential Russian geo-politician and proponent of Eurasianism, regards Russia as a heartland state that should engage in a web of alliances with various Eurasian powers to confront Russia's natural enemy, the US. While Eurasianism has been quite popular in the late Yeltsin era and Putin regime, it is important for other reasons as well. It demonstrates that, in the wake of the Cold War, the most unexpected combinations could happen.     

A new dynamism in Sino-Japanese security relations: Japan's strategic use of foreign aid

Abstract

In November 2004 a Chinese nuclear submarine cruised into Japan's territorial waters near the Okinawa Islands. In response, the Japanese government dispatched several Japanese naval ships and planes to chase the Chinese submarine until it navigated into international waters. This event, which potentially could have become the first exchange of fire between Japan and China since the Second World War, illuminated increasingly problematic security relations between the two neighbouring countries in the twenty-first century. In fact, deterioration of Sino-Japanese security relations is not a recent phenomenon but has already been evident since the mid-1990s, when Japan imposed a series of economic sanctions on China. Between 1995 and 2000 Japan had suspended its foreign aid to China in protest against: China's nuclear weapons tests; China's large scale war game including the launch of missiles across the Taiwan Strait; and Chinese naval activities in disputed areas in the East China Sea. This article looks at Sino-Japanese security relations since the mid-1990s through three case studies of the aid sanctions imposed by Japan on China. It clarifies the domestic political and bureaucratic interests that motivated aid sanctions and determined the decision-making process leading to these sanctions. The article argues, that with certain politico-security interests, Japanese governments actively used foreign aid as a strategic instrument to counter provocative military actions by China in the East Asian region since the mid-1990s. Despite the limited influence that Japanese aid sanctions have actually had on Chinese military behaviour, Japan's strategic use of foreign aid has undeniably created a new dynamism in security relations between the two neighbouring great powers in Asia.     

The Strategy of Territorial Conflict

Many empirical studies have found that disputes over territory are central to the outbreak and intensity of the majority of interstate military conflict. However, the existing literature lacks an explicit theoretical link between the role territory plays in disputes and the outbreak of violence as well as an exploration of how the control of territory is related to conventional military capabilities. This article demonstrates that the targets of territorial claims can consolidate their control over disputed territory to improve their ability to fight effectively on it. The empirical analysis suggests that when territory is strategically located, target states are more likely to consolidate their position, while challenger states are less likely to escalate militarily. Furthermore, when the presence of territorial characteristics such as strategic location makes consolidation an effective strategy, target states are increasingly likely to consolidate as they face stronger opponents.     

Russia's energy diplomacy with China: personalism and institutionalism in its policy-making process

ABSTRACT

Russia's growing energy cooperation with China is central to several of Moscow's top foreign-policy objectives. Analyzing what drives Russia's energy diplomacy with China can therefore shed important light on the dynamics of Russian foreign policy-making. We go beyond other recent studies of this topic by examining the role of domestic political influences and the countries’ bilateral interactions. We show that personalist elements influence both Russia's policy-making and its diplomacy with China. The personalism has made it hard for Russia to coordinate the relevant decision-making institutions and get the most from its energy strength. The economic gains from recent energy deals, particularly to Russia's Far East, have been less than expected, and Russia has met only limited success in achieving its foreign-policy priorities in the Asia-Pacific region. Moving forward, Russia must further institutionalize its decision-making process, limit the role of personalism, and better coordinate the activities of its energy firms with the goals of its central agencies and local governments.     

Economic cooperation in Northeast Asia: The proposed Tumen River scheme

Abstract

This paper examines a relatively unexplored aspect of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute: the involvement of subnational actors. It focuses in particular on the sustained campaign of domestic lobbying and paradiplomacy by elites from the Far East region of Sakhalin aimed at preventing the Russian central government from transferring the South Kuril Islands/Northern Territories to Japan during the 1990s. It explores the various responses to the ‘Sakhalin factor’ from federal authorities in Russia, as well as private and public bodies in Japan, highlighting the subsequent localization and pluralization of diplomatic channels. The paper also considers why the ‘Sakhalin factor’ became so prominent, pointing to a synergy of factors that include the high-profile anti-concessionary campaigns of the Sakhalin political elite, the fallout from Russia's troubled attempts at state building and a possible convergence of interests between Boris Yeltsin and regional authorities. The paper concludes with an analysis of how Vladimir Putin's federal reforms, launched in 2000, have diminished Sakhalin's authority over the South Kuril Islands.     

From national identity to national security: China's changing responses toward India in 1962 and 1998

This article examines Russian Government policy towards Northeast Asia as an interplay between aspirations, which have been expressed by government leaders, parliamentary figures and prominent academics and journalists and actual results. The article uses three levels, global, regional and bilateral, as a basis for the analysis. In terms of global interests the Russian leadership has sought diplomatic balance against the US, in terms of regional interests the leadership has pursued the aim of economic and security integration while at the bilateral level Russian leadership has sought specific benefits from particular relations with China, Japan and South Korea. The article notes that Russia has obtained certain diplomatic benefits from the relationship with China which serve its interests at the global level. At the regional level policy aspirations have been frustrated by Russia's dire economic condition and the tendency to be treated as an ‘outsider’. Russia has benefited from an improvement of bilateral relations with China, Japan and South Korea but these gains do not translate into an improved position at the regional level yet. while the Russian leadership has been nurturing the development of bilateral relationships problems particular to those relationships hinder its wider regional acceptance.     

China's passport move stokes South China Sea dispute

A new row over the South China Sea has erupted following Beijing's issue of biometric passports containing a map showing the so-called ‘nine-dashed line’ that China has used to assert its sovereignty over disputed islands. By printing the passports, and inviting other states to stamp their visas in them, Beijing is attempting to gain recognition for its claims to sovereignty.     

In search of the ‘Other’ in Asia: Russia–China relations revisited

This paper argues that Russia and China are partners of consequence and that the neglect of the normative dimension of the Sino-Russian relationship has led its impact on global governance to be undervalued and misunderstood. Following a constructivist approach, the paper examines the shared norms underlying an ever closer Sino-Russian partnership, despite divergent interests in a number of areas. A first section examines how shared norms lead Russia and China to define their identity similarly, facilitate joint actions, and constrain their individual policy choices. For Russia, elaborating its own unique identity is crucial to its claim to global status, though complicated by interactions with multiple ‘Others.’ Russia's effort to engage Asian partners is often viewed as hedging against China, but as second section argues that Russian engagement in Asia is better understood in terms of Russia's effort to define an Asian identity. A third section highlights the securitization/desecuritization dynamic in Sino-Russian economic relations. Xi Jinping's efforts to redefine China's global role reinforces its tendency to desecuritize the vulnerabilities that lead China to seek economic cooperation with Russia. Russia, fearing becoming a ‘resource appendage’ of China, then securitizes economic relations with China.     

Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have brought China and Japan into a bitter dispute for many decades. With regard to the real question of who owns sovereignty over the islands, the two claimants can not come to terms on several critical issues, such as whether the islands were terra nullius when Japan claimed sovereignty in 1895, whether Japan returned the islands to China after the Japanese defeat in WWII, and how their maritime boundary in the East China Sea should be demarcated according to international law. There is no ready solution to the longstanding stalemate, but the pending dispute could be shelved and managed from escalating into a military conflict. Dr. Zhongqi PAN is an Associate Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs in Fudan University. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Fudan University in 1999. He was a visiting scholar to Lund University (2006), the John K. Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University (2004), the Henry L. Stimson Center (2001), and University of Tokyo (1999–2000).     

Resolving China’s Island Disputes: A Two-Level Game Analysis

Although territorial disputes have been much studied, the application of “two-level game” analysis in peace research and conflict resolution is still relatively unexplored. In this essay, I seek to use the analytical propositions derived from this “two-level game” bargaining framework to explain the success, failure, or partial resolution of sovereignty negotiations over China’s island claims to the disputed islands of the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Amur/Ussuri rivers, and South China Sea. This essay will focus on the interaction between governments and domestic nationalist groups, the role of institutions, and the strategies of negotiators to explain the development of the territorial disputes. I will evaluate how different political and social preferences, historical memories, economic priorities, side payments, and institutional constraints affect inter-state bargaining behavior and relations between the government and different segments of society. Basically, I am interested in finding out what significant roles national, sub-national and transnational actors can and do play in aggravating, minimizing, terminating or preventing conflicts over island claims involving China. Dr. Chien-peng Chung is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Sociology of Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He is the author of Domestic Politics, International Bargaining, and China’s Territorial Disputes (London & New York: Routledge, 2004).     

Growing tensions in the East China Sea

Continuing tensions between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have fuelled international speculation that the two countries could be drawn into a military confrontation. Incidents such as an alleged ‘lock-on’ of a Chinese radar on a Japanese ship have underlined increasing maritime friction between the two countries.     

Bringing Law to the Table: Legal Claims,Focal Points,and the Settlement of Territorial Disputes Since 1945

In this article, we argue that international law can help state leaders reach a settlement in territorial disputes by suggesting a focal point for negotiations. International law is more likely to serve as a focal point when the legal principles relevant to the dispute are clear and well established and when one of the states in the dispute has a stronger legal claim to disputed territory. When these two conditions are present, we expect the state with a legal advantage to push for and receive favorable terms of settlement. In our analysis of all negotiated settlements in territorial disputes from 1945 to 2000, we find strong support for the importance of international law in influencing the terms of settlements. States with a strong legal advantage are more likely to secure favorable terms, whereas states lacking a strong legal claim are more likely to receive unfavorable terms.     

The Sino-Japanese-Russian triangle

This paper attempts to understand the relations between three important actors in Northeast Asia — China, Russia, and Japan — since the end of the Cold War. Whereas the political changes attending the collapse of the communist bloc have opened new foreign policy opportunities to all three actors, only China and Russia have been quick to move on them. Japan’s relative inflexibility, attributable to its alliance with the US on the one hand and its territorial dispute with Russia on the other, has had the effect of impeding the application of triangular diplomacy. Editor ofAsian Survey, has written or editedSino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications (1992),China’s Quest for National Identity (with Samuel Kim, 1993), and many other analyses of Chinese domestic and foreign policy. His most recent book (with Haruhiro Fukui and Peter N.S. Lee) isInformal Politics in East Asia (Cambridge, 2000).     

East asia and cross-Taiwan strait relations

The evolution of the Taiwan issue has been closely linked to the interaction of China and other countries including Japan, Russia, and especially the United States. It is important to examine the great power interaction in East Asia and its effect on the cross-strait relations. Japanese policy toward the Taiwan issue will be a critical indicator of the nature of Sino-Japanese relations. One issue is Japan’s expanding role in the U.S.-Japanese security relations and the implication of such relations for East Asian security. Russia has consistently supported Beijing’s policy on Taiwan. Since the return of Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997, the policy of “one country, two systems” has been put into practice. If Hong Kong can continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy and prosperity, valuable lessons might be gained for resolving issues in cross-Taiwan Strait relations.     

Challenges to the East Asian environment

Abstract

Can economic interdependence reduce conflicts among states in East Asia? The so-called ‘cold politics and hot economics’ has become a defining feature of Sino-Japanese political-economic relations. This puzzling pattern of interaction is clearly illustrated in the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The island dispute has unfolded in five rounds of distinct clashes thus far. From one perspective, the competitive elements in the island dispute make it difficult for both Japan and China to give way to the other side on the territorial and maritime issues. At the same time, the two countries have successfully managed to contain their respective territorial and maritime claims thus far. Drawing on the liberal peace theory, this article systematically demonstrates that economic interdependence has repeatedly fostered the de-escalation of Sino-Japanese conflict over territorial and maritime rights.     

Identity and recognition: remembering and forgetting the post-war in Sino-Japanese relations

Abstract

In the 1990s, Japanese views of China were relatively positive. In the 2000s, however, views of China have deteriorated markedly and China has increasingly come to be seen as ‘anti-Japanese’. How can these developments, which took place despite increased economic interdependence, be understood? One seemingly obvious explanation is the occurrence of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents in China since the mid-2000s. I suggest that these incidents per se do not fully explain the puzzle. Protests against other countries occasionally occur and may influence public opinion. Nonetheless, the interpretation of such events arguably determines their significance. Demonstrations may be seen as legitimate or spontaneous. If understood as denying recognition of an actor's self-identity, the causes of such incidents are likely to have considerably deeper and more severe consequences than what would otherwise be the case. Through an analysis of Japanese parliamentary debates and newspaper editorials, the paper demonstrates that the Chinese government has come to be seen as denying Japan's self-identity as a peaceful state that has provided China with substantial amounts of official development aid (ODA) during the post-war era. This is mainly because China teaches patriotic education, which is viewed as the root cause of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents. China, then, is not regarded as ‘anti-Japanese’ merely because of protests against Japan and attacks on Japanese material interests but for denying a key component of Japan's self-image. Moreover, the analysis shows that explicit Chinese statements recognising Japan's self-identity have been highly praised in Japan. The article concludes that if China recognises Japan's self-understanding of its identity as peaceful, Japan is more likely to stick to this identity and act accordingly whereas Chinese denials of it might empower Japanese actors who seek to move away from this identity and ‘normalise’ Japan, for example, by revising the pacifist Article Nine of the Japanese constitution.