Competition in political and economic markets

Prepared as a response to Frey and Eichenberger's Anomalies in Political Economy. We thank Gordon Tullock for helpful discussions. This work was partially supported by the Taylor Experimental Laboratory at Washington University.     

Institutional change and the delivery of urban public services

Problems associated with providing efficient and equitable distribution of public services are attributable in part to the inabilities of government or other public institutions to be responsive to requirements of their clientele. To permit a better understanding of the nature of such institutional failures, and to suggest avenues of effective reform, this paper views institutional systems of service provision in a control systems framework. In this perspective, the elements of feedback are seen as essential to successful system performance over time and changing conditions. The paper identifies the kinds of error signals a system needs to generate, and the types of corrective mechanisms that it may employ, and then discusses three basic modes of institutional reform—performance evaluation, decentralization, and market competition—for improving the dynamic capability of systems of providing urban public services. Two service areas—sanitation and criminal corrections—are used for illustrating possible applications of the reform strategies.The author wishes to thank his colleagues at the Urban Institute, especially Richard P. Burton, for suggestions and comments on the substance and style of the paper. This paper is based on ideas first presented by the author at the First Annual Convention of the World Future Society, May, 1971. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of The Urban Institute or its sponsors.     

Political deadlocks and distributional information: The value of the veil

Contractarian normative theory relies on the veil of ignorance construct to generate the political consensus required for its theories of justice. By eliminating distributional information, the veil is presumed to facilite consensus building by reducing conflict over the distributional effects of proposed constitutional rules or institutions. This paper explores the extent to which excessive distributional information might also impede the ordinary day-to-day decision making of democratic institutions. Our analysis suggests that distributive information makes political deadlocks under majority rule more likely. Statistical evidence suggests that the efficacy of the U.S. Congress has been reduced by the dramatic increase in distributional information made available to it over the past twenty five years.The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee and the participants of the Center for Study of Public Choice Luncheon Work Shop for helpful comments and suggestions. Helpful comments were also provided by Bruce Benson and Z.A. Spindler at the 1988 meeting of the Public Choice Society. We also wish to thank Jack Triplett for providing us with a pre-publication copy of the page proofs of his piece on computer price indices.     

University admission requirements as rent-seeking

The paper argues that admission requirements into public universities are best viewed as rent-seeking by several groups, in contrast to the conventional rationing rationale. The rents are principally nonfinancial for some of the groups. The paper concludes by showing why admission requirements are not set too high.Discussions with Joe Jadlow, Scott Turner and Larkin Warner, and comments by colleagues on an earlier version in our departmental Workshop helped clarify the issues. I thank them, emphasizing that the normal caveat is not pro forma.     

Tollison costs and technological innovation: The case of environmental regulation

This paper departs from the Tullock cost paradigm that views competition for monopoly privilege as a welfare-inimical process that wastefully dissipates preexisting producers' surplus and, occasionally, leads to inefficient increases in costs and counterproductive uses of scarce resources. The potential availability of rent-seeking may bring about the elimination of inefficient regulatory regimes that retard or prevent the introduction of cost-reducing innovations. Air quality management is but one area in which innovation rent-seeking holds promise for concrete welfare gains. Researchers may wish to focus on institutional mechanisms designed to overcome the transactions costs and free rider disincentives to the formation of a coalition to seek innovation rents. An example of such a mechanism might be a joint venture that requires all venture members to engage in lobbying and to contribute to collective research efforts. These unaddressed questions await future research.The authors are grateful for the insightful comments of Gordon Tullock, Robert D. Tollison, Michael T. Marlow and J.R. Clark. The usual caveats apply. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be taken to represent the views of their employers.     

The possibility of a desirable minimal state

There is a near consensus that organized special interests use influence to expand government into activities that are detrimental to the public at large. Consequently, as Lee (1989) suggests, it would be desirable if the general public had more control over political decisions — if government were more responsive to the public interest. However, the public interest like rent-seeking, is a subjective concept (Pasour, 1987).The possible existence of a desirable minimal state is not disproved by an approach that assumes utilities are interpersonally comparable. Individual utilities are subjective and ordinal and hence, cannot be added or weighted to determine the level of government that is socially optimal. If one accepts the subjectivist approach, it follows that no one can decide upon any policy whatever in the absence of an ultimate ethical or value judgment (Rothbard, 1982: 212). In this respect, determining the desirable minimal state is no different from determining whether an individual government program is desirable (or whether it represents rent-seeking waste).     

The median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension

Two alternative models of legislative outcomes are the minimum winning coalition and the competitive equilibrium (Koford, 1982). In a unidimensional setting, the outcome under the former is the median, while the outcome under the latter is the highest net demand location.This paper describes the competitive equilibrium in a unidimensional model, and shows that under some common conditions it coincides with the median, in particular for pure redistributive issues. However, for distributive issues, the two equilibria will differ. Finally, the comparative statics of the two models are examined; while the winning coalition is sensitive only to changes in the location of the median, for distributive issues the competitive equilibrium has the standard economic comparative statics that the outcome adjusts in the direction of the change in preferences.     

A constitutional view of legislative pay

The distinction between constitutional rules and post-constitutional laws is often a fine line. However, this analysis suggests that, in the case of state legislative pay, constitutional rules are much more binding than post-constitutional restrictions. Further research in the area of constitutions from an economic point of view may yield fruitful results. As Tullock (1988: 140) has stated, The real importance of such an evaluation could be as a first step toward developing improved constitutional rules. Evaluating other areas of policy from a constitutional point of view might shed light on the path towards the development of optimal rules in a democratic process.Thanks go to Randy Holcombe for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Incentives and political contributions

Two implications from this research are noted. First, from a researcher's viewpoint, our research suggests the importance of age, wealth, tax rates, and marital status as determinants of political contributions by top U.S. wealth-holders. Therefore, these factors should be included in aggregated models that attempt to analyze the relations between such variables as voting, campaign expenditures and the outcomes of elections. Second, from politicians' viewpoints, this research suggests that individual economic variables such as marginal tax rates and wealth are major determinants of individual decisions to contribute to politicians. Assuming that such contributions reflect votes, this research suggests the relative importance of focusing campaign promises on economic variables — a strategy that low tax politicians like Ronald Reagan and George Bush may keenly be aware of.The views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Treasury Department.     

International trade policy in Israel: Another model — Reply

The aim of this study was to examine the tariff structure in Israel in terms of the four main theoretical models of endogenous commercial policy. The empirical results for levels of protection in Israel support several of the models. In particular the pressure group model performs well and especially the variable that represents the lobbying power of the Histadrut/public sector in Israel. This is consistent with the longstanding political power of the Histadrut in Israel. The Histadrut's role in the Israeli economy rises above the western concept of a labor union and takes on a quasi-governmental function. The clearest example of this elevated status is seen when the government included the Histadrut as part of the commission charged with the responsibility of carrying out the nominal liberalization process of the 1960s. Evidently it is this kind of political-economic power that allowed the Histadrut to affect the level of protection Histadrut-dominated industries received.The displacement costs model is also supported suggesting that officials, when deciding on tariff rates, are sensitive to the displacement costs (e.g., amount and average duration of unemployment), associated with different levels of protection for various industries. This result stands in contrast to the goals set out in the New Economics Policy of 1962 discussed earlier. Apparently tariff setting authorities desired to increase efficiency by reducing protection but were also willing, perhaps for political reasons, to trade off lower displacement costs with higher tariff rates.     

Characteristics of migrants within the framework of current migration direction in the United States: Some evidence from micro-data analysis

In recent years, there has been growing interest in the phenomenon of an apparent population distribution reversal in the United States. This paper examines the characteristics of migrants participating in such moves between 1969 and 1977, based on data from a longitudinal nationwide household sample survey conducted by the University of Michigan. The data show that the amount of ruralward migration outweighs that of urbanward migration. While the ruralward migration was particularly prevalent in the Northeast, the direction of migration in the South was predominantly urbanward. Ruralward migrants appeared to be young single people and young married people without children, as well as stable families. The most ruralward migrants tended to be from the most highly urban environments. This new pattern of migration is independent of both white suburban flight and the sun-belt phenomenon. The findings suggest an important societal reorganization towards a newer post-industrial and less urban population distribution.     

A positive model of tax reform

This paper is devoted to the explanation of tax policy from a behavioural-theoretic point of view. It, for the first time, brings together within a unified framework behavioural determinants of government expenditure, taxation, and tax reform. Administrative and compliance costs associated with taxation (factors generally neglected in models of taxation), as well as tax avoidance/evasion, deadweight losses, and the costs that are involved in the tax reform process itself, play a crucial role in the model. The paper investigates how these factors influence the development of taxation and expenditure, and the occurrence of tax reform.This paper has been presented at the Congress of the European Public Choice Society, Linz (Austria), 1989. The authors would like to thank Jos de Beus, Kees Goudswaard, Hans de Groot and Jean-Dominique Lafay for their useful comments. This paper is based on our Dutch publication Belastinghervorming en politieke economie, in Belastingheffing en belastinghervorming, pp. 179–211. Preadviezen Koninklijke Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde 1988. Leiden/Antwerpen: Stenfert Kroese.     

Evolution,consciousness, and political thinking

Evolutionary theory is utilized to sketch the outline of a performance-based perspective of political thinking. It is argued that human consciousness evolved as an emergent and interactive mechanism for enabling the individual to cope strategically with environmental exigencies. Within the context of this evolutionary perspective, consciousness at the individual level is shown to develop in patterned yet flexible and individually variable ways as a result of the interaction of biological and environmental variables including, among the latter, those elements of the social environment like ideas, values, and intentions, as well as institutional patterns of conflict, affiliation, and authority, which are themselves products of coping strategies. Political thinking, it is suggested, is a strategic coping enterprise involving equilibration between the individual's own strivings and social demands for conformity in collective affairs.     

The possibility of cooperation in an n-person prisoners' dilemma with institutional arrangements

We investigate how cooperation is possible among self-interested individuals in an n-person prisoners' dilemma from the viewpoint of institutional arrangements. Assuming that individuals create by their free consent an institutional order to enforce an agreement of cooperation, we present a noncooperative game model in which individuals have negotiations for creating an enforcement agency and also for cooperation in advance of taking actual actions. The noncooperative solution of our institutional arrangement game shows that the probability of each individual participating in negotiations monotonically decreases and converges to zero as the number of individuals becomes larger and larger. Our noncooperative game model for institutional arrangements is applied to an environmental pollution problem and some numerical results are given.The research for this paper was started when I stayed at ZiF, University of Bielefeld, in 1987–88 to participate in the Research Project Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences. Financial support and warm hospitality from ZiF is gratefully acknowledged. I am grateful to Hartmut Kliemt, Elinor Ostrom, James Rhodes and Koichi Suga for their very helpful suggestions and discussions. Of course, any remaining errors are of mine. Financial support by the Murata Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Public opinion and presidential responsibility for the economy: Understanding personalization

The general mechanisms which underlie the psychological phenomenon ofpersonalizing (cognitive simplification and defensive attribution) would seem to have great utility in explaining attributions of presidential control over the economy. Yet previous research has generated inconsistent and inconclusive empirical results. This study identifies several sources of inconsistency and then attempts to clarify the approach by focusing separately on the object and the subject of personalizing. Our findings suggest that the determinants of personalizing to the president are different from the factors that explain personalizing to the incumbent. In addition, we find that the impact of the two psychological mechanisms differs substantially within economic subject areas.Paper prepared for delivery at the 1984 Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association, Fort Worth, Texas.     

The meaning of party labels

To determine the meaning(s) of the concepts Republican, Democrat, and Independent, the most frequently cited attributes of each party label were scaled in terms of their semantic centrality. An analysis of the magnitude scale values demonstrates that the labels Republican and Democrat have unique cognitive properties which easily discriminate one label from another. The most characteristic and discriminating properties refer to (1) voting, (2) electioneering, and (3) other forms of electoral behavior. Although these two labels have many strong properties over which there is considerable agreement, such consensus is lacking for the fewer and weaker properties which characterize and discriminate the label Independent. Whereas Republican and Democrat are sharply delineated, semantic inversions of one another, the concept Independent is ambiguously defined and only weakly distinguishable from other concepts.     

Ideology and the construction of nationality: The Canadian elections of 1993

Canada is one nation, but it is in many ways two communities, one Francophone and the other Anglophone. We employ a formal model of ideology and analyze how nationality is constructed in people's minds. The magnitude of the changes in expressed preferences in terms of ideology depends on the salience of the new issue, the extent to which it confirms with the existing ideological cleavage, and the difference between the perceived status quo on the new dimension and the voter's most preferred alternative. Using data from the 1993 Canadian National Election Study, we consider the relative importance of different policy dimensions in explaining voting decisions among educated Canadians. The issue of Quebec sovereignty, alone, is shown to have significant power for predicting vote choice. A plausible explanation, confirmed here by regression analysis, is that Quebec sovereignty stands for other issues in voters' conception of Canadian politics.     

Beyond acceptable risk: On the social acceptability of technologies

The social acceptability of large-scale technologies depends upon a wide range of things, some related to safety and economics, but also some factors of cultural, social and psychological significance. However, many risk analysts assume that public opposition to technologies is mostly due to unfounded fears of their risks and, that there can exist quantitative criteria of acceptable risk that could allow the acceptability of technologies to be judged. This paper traces the emergence of the acceptable risk problem formulation and reviews critically some of the approaches that have been put forward to solve it. It concludes by discussing the problem of acceptable technology returned to its wider political and cultural context.Paper written in the framework of a collaboration with the FAST Programme (Forecasting and Assessment in the Field of Science and Technology) of the Commission of the European Communities. We wish to thank Donald Bain, Ward Edwards, Howard Kunreuther, John Lathrop, Riccardo Petrella and Jerry Ravetz for their comments. Any opinions expressed or values revealed are solely those of the authors.     

Governance dilemmas in an age of ambiguous authority

A convergence of functions, financing and governance arrangements between public and private sectors of society cloud the study and understanding of policy making, implementation and evaluation. Forces creating and shaping the interpenetrated society are trends toward professionalism and corporatism. The health industry provides an example. Increasingly, but with little formal guidance from political theory, the American system has authorized privately constituted citizen governing boards to spend tax dollars, make and implement policy choices, and evaluate outcomes. This essay argues for closer examination of the nature of representation and accountability in these little studied creatures of governance and introduces the subsequent articles addressed to the subject.     

Information,intelligence, enlightened public policy: Functions and organization of societal feedback

Normative properties which make social statistics useful as social indicators are illuminated by considering the functions systematic social knowledge has at various levels of social organization and the involvements of actors at these various levels in roles which result in such knowledge. Modes and degrees of generalization which make knowledge useful for action at the lowest levels of social organization (information) or for administration at intermediate bureaucratic levels (intelligence) are not necessarily applicable to the formation of broad social policy (policy knowledge) or for affecting the general conceptions of the social world held by broad public (enlightenment). The latter two functions are not always well served by data which have been collected and ordered by systems primarily responsive to the former two functions.Portions of this paper were presented at the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, 6 September 1969 and at a Colloquium on Urban Intelligence Systems at the Center for Urban Studies, Wayne State University, 17 April, 1969.