Why do anti‐corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target compliance perspective

The Central Eastern European member states of the European Union have introduced a host of anti‐corruption measures in the past two decades, yet corruption is still prevalent. Rather than asking what is wrong with the letter of the law, which has traditionally been the focus of analysis, this article identifies some of the reasons why those whose behavior the law seeks to change fail to act as expected. Drawing on theoretical insights from implementation studies and using Hungary as an illustrative example, the article finds that both incentives and normative judgments are skewed towards non‐compliance with anti‐bribery laws. The main policy implications are that anti‐corruption interventions should pay more attention to raising awareness among target groups, take existing social norms into account, and rely on positive incentives as well as, or rather than, increasing penalties.     

An alternative route of European integration: The community's railways policy

The process of European integration and policy‐making is sometimes rather puzzling. On the one hand, it is well documented that with respect to the implementation of European legislation member states tend to do less than they are supposed to do. On the other hand, it is striking that with respect to the implementation of the Council Directive 91/440 on the development of the Community's railways many member states went far beyond the minimum required by the European legislation. We argue that these differing evaluations of implementation success can be traced to different implementation approaches, which may be termed the ‘compliance approach’ and the ‘support‐building approach’. While the first is directed at prescribing domestic reforms from above’, the latter aims at triggering European integration within the existing political context at the national level. Here, successful implementation refers to the extent to which European legislation triggers domestic changes by stimulating and strengthening support for European reform ideas at the national level. In this respect, European legislation can influence the domestic arenas in basically three ways: by providing legitimisation for political leadership, concepts for the solution of national problems, and strategic constraints for domestic actors opposing domestic reforms.     

On Trojan Horses and revolving doors: Assessing the autonomy of national officials in the European Commission

National officials working in international bureaucracies regularly invoke the fear that member states strategically use such officials for influencing decision making and agenda‐setting to their advantage. This article theoretically analyses conditions under which the autonomy of national civil servants in international bureaucracies might become compromised. The ensuing predictions are then tested using a unique survey among seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission (N ≈ 400). Finally, evaluating the characteristics linked to reduced autonomy among SNEs in the Commission, the article illustrates that these officials are, in practice, likely to be relatively independent from member state influence.     

Institutional reform and public attitudes toward EU decision making

In the face of the discourse about the democratic deficit and declining public support for the European Union (EU), institutionalist scholars have examined the roles of institutions in EU decision making and in particular the implications of the empowered European Parliament. Almost in isolation from this literature, prior research on public attitudes toward the EU has largely adopted utilitarian, identity and informational accounts that focus on individual-level attributes. By combining the insights from the institutional and behavioural literature, this article reports on a novel cross-national conjoint experiment designed to investigate multidimensionality of public attitudes by taking into account the specific roles of institutions and distinct stages in EU decision making. Analysing data from a large-scale experimental survey in 13 EU member states, the findings demonstrate how and to what extent the institutional design of EU decision making shapes public support. In particular, the study finds a general pattern of public consensus about preferred institutional reform regarding powers of proposal, adoption and voting among European citizens in different countries, but notable dissent about sanctioning powers. The results show that utilitarian and partisan considerations matter primarily for the sanctioning dimension in which many respondents in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden prefer national courts to the Court of Justice of the EU.     

Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?

To what extent are European rules complied with, and what are the reasons for non-compliance with EU law? According to an intergovernmentalist perspective, implementation problems should occur when member states failed to assert their interests in the European decision-making process. Focusing on 26 infringement procedures from the area of labour law, we show that such ‘opposition through the backdoor’ does occur occasionally. However, we demonstrate that opposition at the end of the EU policy process may also arise without prior opposition at the beginning. Additionally, our findings indicate that non-compliance is often unrelated to opposition, and due to administrative shortcomings, interpretation problems, and issue linkage. This study is based on unique in-depth data stemming from a ground-level analysis of the implementation of six EU Directives in all 15 member states.     

Why Denmark and Belgium Have Different Implementation Records: On Transposition Laggards and Leaders in the EU

Statistics of the European Commission show different performances among member states regarding the implementation of European policies. In particular, this article explains why Denmark and Belgium have different records with respect to the legal or administrative transposition of European Union environmental directives. The article starts with a short overview of the implementation problematique and a presentation of the latest available statistics. Then European-level factors are ruled out as possible explanations for the differences in performance. The author argues, on the contrary, that the differences between Belgium and Denmark must be explained by national institutional contexts. To this end, an institutional approach is presented, which draws attention to 'hard' and 'soft' institutions as explanatory variables. In total seven categories of variables are discussed: four 'hard' categories – the constitutional and administrative context (division of competencies and coordination mechanisms), institutional capacity, administrative and legal adaptation pressure, communication and continuity – and three 'soft' categories – institutional jealousy, Europeanisation and political adaptation pressure. It was found that both member states under study have different scores on almost all variables, pointing to rather unfavourable implementation conditions for Belgium and much more favourable conditions for Denmark.     

The politics of external approval: Explaining the IMF's evaluation of austerity programmes

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme.     

Religion and Fundamental Rights in European Politics: Convergences and Divisions at the European Parliament

European legislators must increasingly deal with issues related to fundamental rights. Religion is a frequent topic obliging them to do so. It is not directly part of the EU’s competences but is a source of values underlying policy choices and a tricky political object. Relying on the findings of a survey about what Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) believe and what they do with these beliefs, the article analyzes potential tensions created by religion in the implementation of human rights by the EU. A first part shows how and to what extent European law meets religion, and how it leaves ample room for flexibility but also for divergent interpretations. A second part states that MEPs agree largely on the principle of separation between politics and religion, but may be divided when it comes to drawing boundaries between the two domains. The conclusion points out the limits of the rule of law to prevent conflicts and suggests that human rights may inspire support as well as cause resistance to Europeanization.     

Implementing PBB: Conflicting Views of Success

A modern budget reform, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) emphasizes the measurement of government performance by agencies and public servants. In this article we define PBB as requiring strategic planning regarding agency mission, goals and objectives, and a process that requests quantifiable data that provide meaningful information about program outcomes. Performance‐based budgeting requirements are now pervasive in the states. Of forty‐seven states with PBB requirements, thirty‐one have legislated the process to be conducted, while sixteen have initiated the reform through budget guidelines or instructions.¹What remains unknown, yet of vital interest to state administrators, their staff, legislators, and citizens, regards implementation status of PBB systems. How many states are utilizing a PBB process as prescribed by law or administrative directive? And if PBB has been implemented, has it been successful regarding improvement of agency effectiveness and decision making about spending? Perhaps most importantly, has PBB influenced appropriation decisions?. This research is based on responses to a mail survey of executive and legislative budgeters regarding the PBB system established in their state. Results discussed in this article consider budgeters’ response about PBB implementation status and effectiveness as conducted. We find that there are differing perceptions across the branches of government regarding both the extent of PBB implementation as well as its success. Results show that states with better‐known PBB systems have not necessarily realized greater success in terms of effectiveness from this budget reform than states with less popularly known systems, at least as perceived by the budgeters included in this article.     

The Europeanisation of conflict: Reflections from a social movement perspective

If Europe is becoming a polity, then regular patterns of social and political conflict ‐ both institutional and non‐institutional ‐ will emerge between citizen groups and decision‐making authorities. Although we are beginning to have a substantial body of research on institutionalised interest group interaction at the European level, we know much less about non‐institutionalised forms of contentious collective action that have European policies as their targets. Using social movement theory, several varieties of such collective action can be identified. Based on the theory of political opportunity structure, it is shown why one of these forms ‐ actions intended to bring national states’ power to bear against European policies — appears to have a rich and turbulent future.     

Do Group Decision Rules Affect Trust? A Laboratory Experiment on Group Decision Rules and Trust

Enhanced participation has been prescribed as the way forward for improving democratic decision making while generating positive attributes like trust. Yet we do not know the extent to which rules affect the outcome of decision making. This article investigates how different group decision rules affect group trust by testing three ideal types of decision rules (i.e., a Unilateral rule, a Representative rule and a ‘Non‐rule’) in a laboratory experiment. The article shows significant differences between the three decision rules on trust after deliberation. Interestingly, however, it finds that the Representative rule yields more trust than the Non‐rule and also significantly more trust than the Unilateral rule, when analysing the results at group level. These findings challenge the theoretical understanding by, for example, deliberative normative theorists that more inclusive, consensual and non‐hierarchical decision‐making procedures enhance trust vis‐à‐vis other more hierarchical decision‐making procedures.     

Passing the buck? Analyzing the delegation of discretion after transposition of European Union law

This article seeks to map and explain the extent to which national legislators constrain discretion contained in European Union directives during transposition. To this end, we use standard hypotheses from the domestic delegation literature regarding the necessity of policy conflict and transaction costs. Our empirical approach is based on a focused comparison of the transposition of several provisions of the Asylum Reception Conditions Directive in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In order to capture content‐specific aspects of discretion we employ an innovative measurement tool, the so‐called Institutional Grammar Tool. The study shows that while all three states formally comply with the directive, the level of European Union discretion delegated to practical implementers varies considerably across the cases. Standard delegation theory cannot fully explain the patterns. Instead, existing delegation theories have to be adjusted to the transposition context, by accounting for domestic preferences regarding the status quo.     

Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission

Credible commitment problems arise whenever decisions made according to short‐term incentives undermine long‐term policy goals. While political actors can credibly commit themselves to their long‐term policy goals by delegating decisions to independent regulatory agencies, the member states of international institutions rarely sacrifice control over regulatory decisions. Against the backdrop of the United Nations Compensation Commission established by the Security Council to settle claims on damage from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, we present an institutional arrangement that promises to credibly commit member states to their previously defined interests without excluding them from the decision process. It separates the stages of rulemaking and rule application, and is reinforced by conditional agenda‐setting of an advisory body. We probe the theoretical claim with evidence from a unique data set that shows that the Commission settled compensation claims in a remarkably consistent way. The arrangement provides a blueprint for comparable regulatory tasks in many areas of international, European, or domestic politics, in which independent regulation is not feasible.     

Decoupling practical and legal compliance: Analysis of member states’ implementation of EU policy

Despite the vast literature on policy implementation, systematic cross‐national research focusing on implementers’ performance regarding different policy issues is still in its infancy. The European Union policies are conducive to examining this relationship in a comparative setting, as the EU member states need to implement various EU directives both legally and in practice. In this study, a first attempt is made to analyse the relationship between legal conformity and practical implementation and the conditions for practical deviations in 27 member states across issues from four policy areas (Internal Market, Environment, Justice and Home Affairs and Social Policy). In line with existing approaches to EU compliance, it is expected that the policy preferences of domestic political elites (‘enforcement’) affect their incentives to ‘decouple’ practical from legal compliance. Instead, administrative and institutional capacities (‘management’) and societal constraints (‘legitimacy’) are likely to limit the ability of policy makers to exert control over the implementation process. The findings suggest that practical deviations arise from policy makers’ inability to steer the implementation process, regardless of their predispositions towards internationally agreed policies. The results have strong implications for the effective application of international rules in domestic settings, as they illustrate that political support for the implementation of ‘external’ policy does not ensure effective implementation in practice.     

Coalitions in European Union Negotiations

Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition‐building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure. This article raises important research questions: What characterizes coalition building in the EU? How important are coalitions? What coalition patterns are discernible?Using data from a questionnaire to Swedish participants on EU committees, it is shown that coalitions are more frequent when majority voting occurs than when unanimity rules. Coalition behaviour is, however, important also under unanimity. The existence of consensus norms diminishes the propensity to form coalitions. As regards coalition patterns, there is a prevalence of coalitions based on policy interests and/or on cultural affinity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, consistent and durable coalition patterns seem to exist. The north–south divide is one such persistent pattern. The Swedish respondents thus reveal a close cooperation between the Nordic member states and Great Britain, whereas France and Spain are seldom approached for coalition‐building purposes. As to future research, evidence from other member states and from case studies is needed in order to learn more about the bases for coalition building in EU negotiations.     

Mobilization in the European Public Sphere: The Struggle Over Genetically Modified Organisms

The objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which supporters and opponents at the European Union (EU) level strive to mobilize the public with regard the issue of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). To this end, it addresses two research questions: First, to which concepts do GMO opponents and supporters refer when seeking to mobilize the public? Second, do GMO opponents and supporters differ in the coherence of the concepts they use to attain public mobilization? The empirical findings show that the pro‐GMO coalition is composed of biotechnology companies as well as representatives of Argentina, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World Trade Organization. The anti‐GMO coalition consists of environmental nongovernmental organizations and representatives from most of the EU member states. Altogether, the anti‐GMO coalition has been more coherent in the concepts they invoke in the last few years.     

Consideration and Choice: Analyzing Party Choice in the Swedish European Election 2014

For a long time the question of to what extent party choice in the European Parliament (EP) elections is primarily dependent on voters’ orientations towards the European Union (EU) or just a mere reflection of orientations towards issues and actors in national politics has been debated. By combining insights from individual‐level models of party choice in second‐order elections with theories of sequential decision making this article investigates if, how and at what stages in the decision process attitudes to European integration matters for party choice. In line with previous work on first and second decision rule criteria in EP elections, this article develops and tests hypotheses about how voters’ orientations work at different stages of the voter decision process. The findings, based on Swedish data from a probability‐based three‐wave Internet campaign panel, indicate that many voters are in fact considering more than one party to vote for in the beginning of the election campaign. As expected, left‐right orientations function as a main decision rule with respect to which parties voters even consider voting for, while proximity on the European integration dimension mainly matters as a second decision rule in the final stage of the decision process. Using a sequential model with consideration and choice stages, the article reveals a much larger complimentary effect of EU proximity on party choice than has generally been found in previous research. This serves as a distinct contribution to the emerging research field of individual party choice in second‐order elections.     

The Monitoring Capacity of Civil Society Networks: A Social Network Analysis in the Case of Gender Equality Policy

The role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as a watchdog in the implementation process is widely acknowledged. However, little is known about what determines their capacity to monitor EU policy implementation and how it differs across member states. This article accounts for social capital as well as human and financial capital to determine the monitoring capacity of CSOs. To capture sources of social capital, a network analysis is applied in a comparative case article on the monitoring networks of national platforms of the European Women’s Lobby across eight EU member states. The analysis reveals that CSOs in western member states are rich in human, financial and social capital, while CSOs in CEE member states compensate for this lack of resources by linking up with the Commission.     

Polanyi in Brussels or Luxembourg? Social rights and market regulation in European insurance

The decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union to ban sex discrimination in insurance has shown the potential reach of the principle of non‐discrimination. This paper discusses the different positions taken by participants in the policy process leading up to the decision, in order to reveal the potential and limitations of non‐discrimination as the basis for market‐regulatory social policy. It is shown that the European Commission's initial support for prohibiting insurance discrimination faltered with the realization that the measure would have little efficacy as a distributive social policy. It was left to the Court to assert that non‐discrimination rights are constitutive for European markets, regardless of their functional and instrumental limitations. The Court's focus was on the market‐integrative potential of rights as sources of norms for the conduct of insurance relationships. It is argued that this form of constitutive regulation is distinct from distributive social policy as it does not require that outcomes are egalitarian, but, rather, that the processes governing market relations should respect fundamental rights.     

Transposition and National-Level Resources: Introducing the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive in Eastern Europe

The Cross-Border Patients’ Rights Directive represents an attempt to resolve the unclear situation that had developed due to ‘negative integration’ within the field of healthcare. While the adoption of the directive ends the EU-level decision process, it represents the start of the implementation process, where national institutional structures and interests play a key role. This article investigates the role of resources as a key factor shaping transposition within the member states, with a focus on Poland and Bulgaria. The article shows that a multidimensional perspective of resources is important for understanding transposition of EU directives in member states. While previous research has tended to consider resources at the aggregate, national level, the present study shows that specific concerns about the ‘adjustment costs’ at the sector system level are of key importance.