Macroeconomic performance,political trust and the Great Recession: A multilevel analysis of the effects of within‐country fluctuations in macroeconomic performance on political trust in 15 EU countries, 1999–2011

Recent cross‐national comparative studies have found no effect of countries’ macroeconomic performances on trust in national political institutions, once political explanations (most notably corruption) are taken into account. Although political trust is not determined by the comparison of national economic performance to other countries, it is argued in this article that it is affected by comparisons to their own past performance. In a multilevel, fixed effects analysis of Eurobarometer data (21 waves in 15 European Union Member States between 1999 and 2011) the extent to which within‐country variations in economic performance affect political trust longitudinally is tested. Three major conclusions are reached. First, within‐country, longitudinal changes in performance (growth, deficits, unemployment and inflation) affect political trust. Second, the impact of macroeconomic performance is stronger among the lower educated. Third, even in times of economic duress, budgetary deficits tend to undermine political trust.     

In search of reliable results: Socialist values and political trust in unified Germany – A comment on Campbell's analyses and conclusions

In a recently published article in this journal, Ross Campbell argues that adherence to socialist values establishes a hitherto neglected factor when it comes to the explanation of differences in East and West German citizens’ political trust. As the results of his study indicate, adherence to socialist values impacts negatively on citizens’ political trust, this effect is more pronounced and more stable over time for East German as compared to West German citizens and is sufficiently strong to eliminate aggregate‐level differences in political trust between East and West Germany. However, this research note suggests that Campbell's article contains several substantial inconsistencies and obscurities that question the reliability and validity of the empirical findings presented. It provides a re‐analysis of Campbell's main arguments and shows to what extent his initial conclusions can be upheld after the shortcomings have been remedied. The results of this re‐analysis suggest that socialist values indeed exhibit a negative impact on German citizens’ political trust, which is relatively stronger for East as compared to West German citizens. However, contrary to Campbell's initial results, the negative effect of socialist values on political trust is robust over time for both East and West German citizens. What is more, there is no empirical evidence confirming that differences in adherence to socialist values between East and West German citizens are sufficiently strong to account for aggregate‐level differences in political trust. In light of these findings, two of Campbell's three main conclusions are dubious and call for further examination.     

The price of personalizing politics: Political distrust and economic performance in Latin America, 1996–2006

While research has provided evidence that culture and institutional performance shape individual level trust in political institutions, scholars have neglected to adequately estimate the effect of political institutions and macroeconomic conditions on trust. Using data from the World Value Surveys for eleven Latin American cases, we test if countries with “partyizing” electoral systems - those with rules that encourage voters to hold the party, not individuals, accountable for government performance - experience lower levels of distrust in political parties and the legislature in times of poor economic conditions than those countries with “personalizing” electoral rules. Our analysis shows that the macro political and economic context largely conditions the impact of culture and institutional performance on political trust.     

A crisis of integration? The development of transnational dyadic trust in the European Union, 1954–2004

The healthy functioning and long‐term viability of the European Union (EU) ultimately depend on its citizens finding common cause and developing a shared sense of political community. However, in recent years, scholars and pundits alike have expressed doubts about whether the EU's growing cultural, religious and economic diversity is undermining the development of citizens' shared sense of political community, especially following eastern expansion. In this article, this question is examined using data on a key aspect of political community: transnational dyadic trust. Drawing on a unique set of opinion surveys from the formative years of the EU to the first wave of eastward expansion (1954–2004), the development and sources of dyadic trust among EU Member States is studied. While recognising the importance of diversity for trust judgments in the short‐term, the prevailing viewpoint that it is also a long‐term obstacle to integration is challenged. Instead, it is argued that citizens from diverse cultural and economic backgrounds can learn to trust one another and build a sense of political community over time through greater cooperation and interconnectedness. This theory is tested with data on bilateral trade density, which is seen as a proxy and precursor for other forms of cross‐national interconnectedness. Employing longitudinal models, the article also goes beyond existing research to test the theories over time. The study makes a contribution to the research on European integration, suggesting that over time mutual trust and a shared sense of political community can indeed develop in diverse settings.     

Does Type of Education Affect Political Participation? Results from a Panel Survey of Swedish Adolescents

In several countries it is apparent that individuals with academic gymnasium (upper‐secondary) education show significantly higher levels of political participation than individuals with vocational education. However, previous research on this issue draws exclusively on one‐shot cross‐sectional data. This article utilizes a Swedish panel survey to gauge whether there is a direct causal link between type of education and political participation. Results demonstrate that differences in political participation are already present when students enter different types of education. The analyses show no significant effects of education; instead results support the education‐as‐a‐proxy view: pre‐adult factors predict political participation as well as educational choice.     

Trusting the State,Trusting Each Other? The Effect of Institutional Trust on Social Trust

Trust in state institutions is a prominent explanation of social trust. However, previous—mainly cross-sectional—analyses provide limited causal evidence regarding the relationship between institutional trust and social trust and it is thus essentially unknown whether an observed relationship reflects reverse causality (social trust forming institutional trust), or both forms of trust reflecting deep-seated dispositions (common confounding). Against the backdrop of the shortcomings of previous cross-sectional analyses, this paper utilizes two Danish panel surveys containing measures of both types of trust for the same individuals surveyed at multiple points in time over a long time-span (up to 18 years) to address the potentially reverse and/or spurious relationship. Using individual fixed effects and cross-lagged panel models, the results provide strong evidence of trust in state institutions exercising a causal impact on social trust, whereas the evidence for a reverse relationship is limited.     

Just sick of it? Health and political trust in Western Europe

This article explores two theoretical possibilities for why personal health may affect political trust: the psychological‐democratic contract theory, and the role of personal experience in opinion formation. It argues that citizens with health impairments are more likely to experience the direct effects of political decisions as they are more dependent on public health services. Negative subjective evaluations of public services can lower trust levels, especially if people's expectations are high. Using European Social Survey data, the association between health and trust in 19 Western European states is analysed. The results indicate that people in poor health exhibit lower levels of trust towards the political system than people in good health. The differences in trust between those in good and poor health are accentuated among citizens with left‐leaning ideological values. The results suggest that welfare issues may constitute a rare context in which personal, rather than collective, experiences affect opinion formation.     

Prosocial Values and Performance Management Theory: Linking Perceived Social Impact and Performance Information Use

Performance management techniques are presented as control mechanisms to save money and hold bureaucrats accountable, consistent with negative agency theory assumptions of bureaucrats. We propose an alternative theory of performance management that rests on prosocial values. This theory argues that public servants who see the social impact of their work are more likely to use performance metrics. We operationalize performance information use in terms of purposeful use for internal organizational means, and political use for external legitimation. Those who perceive that their work has a strong social impact are likely to pursue both types of uses, to improve both the effectiveness of their services, and to maintain resources. The data come from a cross‐sectional survey of U.S. public and nonprofit employees.     

What to Do about Missing Values in Time‐Series Cross‐Section Data

Applications of modern methods for analyzing data with missing values, based primarily on multiple imputation, have in the last half‐decade become common in American politics and political behavior. Scholars in this subset of political science have thus increasingly avoided the biases and inefficiencies caused by ad hoc methods like listwise deletion and best guess imputation. However, researchers in much of comparative politics and international relations, and others with similar data, have been unable to do the same because the best available imputation methods work poorly with the time‐series cross‐section data structures common in these fields. We attempt to rectify this situation with three related developments. First, we build a multiple imputation model that allows smooth time trends, shifts across cross‐sectional units, and correlations over time and space, resulting in far more accurate imputations. Second, we enable analysts to incorporate knowledge from area studies experts via priors on individual missing cell values, rather than on difficult‐to‐interpret model parameters. Third, because these tasks could not be accomplished within existing imputation algorithms, in that they cannot handle as many variables as needed even in the simpler cross‐sectional data for which they were designed, we also develop a new algorithm that substantially expands the range of computationally feasible data types and sizes for which multiple imputation can be used. These developments also make it possible to implement the methods introduced here in freely available open source software that is considerably more reliable than existing algorithms.     

Values,trust and democracy in Germany: Still in search of ‘inner unity’?

Twenty years after German reunification, surveys have persistently uncovered differences in political trust between the eastern and western parts of the country. Studies have offered disintegrated and inconclusive assessments of the cross‐regional variation. This variation is traced to a tenacious, retrospective sympathy for socialism steeped in political socialisation and experiential learning. Empirical analyses confirm the presence of two key effects. First, retrospective evaluations of socialism not only fuel popular distrust of political institutions, but are more strongly correlated with trust in the east. Second, East–West evaluations of socialism are sufficiently different to contribute towards explaining the contrasting levels of trust between the two regions. That socialist values constitute a core axis upon which East German attitudes pivot presents a challenge for nurturing trust in democratic institutions and renews attention to processes through which supportive attitudes to democracy are acquired in transitional countries.     

Decoupling practical and legal compliance: Analysis of member states’ implementation of EU policy

Despite the vast literature on policy implementation, systematic cross‐national research focusing on implementers’ performance regarding different policy issues is still in its infancy. The European Union policies are conducive to examining this relationship in a comparative setting, as the EU member states need to implement various EU directives both legally and in practice. In this study, a first attempt is made to analyse the relationship between legal conformity and practical implementation and the conditions for practical deviations in 27 member states across issues from four policy areas (Internal Market, Environment, Justice and Home Affairs and Social Policy). In line with existing approaches to EU compliance, it is expected that the policy preferences of domestic political elites (‘enforcement’) affect their incentives to ‘decouple’ practical from legal compliance. Instead, administrative and institutional capacities (‘management’) and societal constraints (‘legitimacy’) are likely to limit the ability of policy makers to exert control over the implementation process. The findings suggest that practical deviations arise from policy makers’ inability to steer the implementation process, regardless of their predispositions towards internationally agreed policies. The results have strong implications for the effective application of international rules in domestic settings, as they illustrate that political support for the implementation of ‘external’ policy does not ensure effective implementation in practice.     

Do Voters Polarize When Radical Parties Enter Parliament?

Do voters polarize ideologically when radical views gain political legitimacy, or does the rise of radical voices merely reflect societal conflict? We argue that elite polarization as signaled by radical parties' first entrance into parliament leads to voter divergence. Immediately after the election, legitimization and backlash effects mean that voters on both ideological sides move toward the extremes. In the longer term, this polarization is solidified because of radical parties' parliamentary presence. A panel study of Dutch voters shows that the 2002 parliamentary entrance of a radical‐right party indeed led to immediate ideological polarization across the political spectrum. Estimating time‐series cross‐sectional models on Eurobarometer data from 17 countries (1973–2016) shows an additional long‐term impact of radical‐right party entry on polarization. The presence of radical voices on the right has polarizing effects, illustrating how such institutional recognition and legitimization can have a far‐reaching impact on society.     

Increasingly unequal? The economic crisis,social inequalities and trust in the European Parliament in 20 European countries

The 2008/2009 economic crisis has been identified as an important element contributing to declining trust in institutions in Europe and worldwide. However, it is unclear whether this decline in trust is distributed homogenously among citizens or whether there are differences across social strata. This article applies multilevel models to six waves of European Social Survey (ESS) data to analyse changes in trust in the European Parliament (EP) from 2002 to 2012 in 20 European Union countries. Moreover, it investigates whether individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds experienced different reductions in trust. The results indicate that trust in the EP declined the most in the peripheral European countries hit hardest by the economic crisis: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Cyprus, Greece and Spain. Furthermore, the results suggest that the decline in trust was more pronounced among subjects with lower social status. The tightening of the link between social and political inequalities is especially preoccupying considering the importance of trust in institutions for citizens to actively participate in society, voice their needs and demand their place at the table. Hence, the worsening economic conditions, combined with declining levels of trust, are not only troublesome for the functioning of democracies as a whole, but they are also problematic at the individual level as they are likely to perpetuate the divide among subjects at different ends of the social ladder.     

The Dynamics of State Policy Liberalism, 1936–2014

Applying a dynamic latent‐variable model to data on 148 policies collected over eight decades (1936–2014), we produce the first yearly measure of the policy liberalism of U.S. states. Our dynamic measure of state policy liberalism marks an important advance over existing measures, almost all of which are purely cross‐sectional and thus cannot be used to study policy change. We find that, in the aggregate, the policy liberalism of U.S. states steadily increased between the 1930s and 1970s and then largely plateaued. The policy liberalism of most states has remained stable in relative terms, though several states have shifted considerably over time. We also find surprisingly little evidence of multidimensionality in state policy outputs. Our new estimates of state policy liberalism have broad application to the study of political development, representation, accountability, and other important issues in political science.     

Linking two levels of governance: Citizens’ trust in domestic and European institutions over time

This article puts forward a comprehensive framework for explaining the complex and dynamic relationship between trust in the domestic government and trust in the EU, considering time, country and individual-level variation. Using longitudinal comparative data from 32 Eurobarometer survey waves (2004–2018), we first establish that the link between attitude formation at the national and the EU supranational levels is present over time. Second, we show that during ‘extraordinary’ times of crisis the strength of that relationship intensifies. Third, we posit that the European sovereign debt crisis changed the mechanism for this relationship in two ways: during ‘extraordinary’ times, the link is much stronger in countries hardest hit by the crisis, and the relationship holds independent of individuals' political sophistication across all countries. Our findings have implications for understanding the drivers of EU support and theories of institutional trust.     

Solid or Flexible? Social Trust from Early Adolescence to Young Adulthood

The belief that people are generally fair and trustworthy has generated plenty of scholarly attention in recent decades, particularly in the Scandinavian countries, which are often known for high levels of social trust. This article draws attention to the current discussion in the literature on whether social trust is a stable cultural trait marked by persistence or is based on experiences and subject to change throughout life. Based on unique longitudinal data from five different cohorts of young people in Sweden, ranging in age from 13 to 28 years, this article provides an empirical contribution on how social trust develops over time. The results show that there is a greater degree of instability in social trust between 13 and 15 years of age than in other age groups, and that social trust appears to stabilize with age. Findings also indicate that there are substantial inter‐individual differences in social trust among young people within the same age group, both in initial levels and in the rates of change over time. The article concludes that although social trust is relatively stable it tends to crystallize in early adulthood, highlighting the relevance of the impressionable‐years hypothesis.     

Does Public Broadcasting Make a Difference? Political Knowledge and Electoral Campaigns on Television

The political role of the modern media and the impact on public opinion has come under intense scrutiny. The arguments in the scientific dispute have been structured under the optimistic ‘cognitive mobilisation’ and pessimistic ‘media malaise’ banners. For obvious reasons the role of television has been most intensely discussed. TV has the widest reach and is believed to have to the strongest impact. So far, much of the exchange of arguments has been based on data from the United States. In many European countries, public broadcasting is far more prominent than in the United States, and one can argue that the ideals underlying public broadcasting have put their mark on the TV industry in many European countries. Norway is such a case. The interesting question is, of course, whether this matters. Does public broadcasting foster a ‘virtuous circle’ of increased political competence, whereas commercial TV creates ‘media malaise’? Data from the Norwegian 1997–2001 election survey panel is used in this study to overcome the main methodological problem in the many studies based on cross‐sectional data: the question of causality. Too often researchers have based their inferences about the link between media exposure and political knowledge on cross‐sectional correlations. The empirical results do little to support the optimistic view of TV as the great political educator. On the contrary, neither exposure to the state‐owned public broadcasting NRK nor the commercial TV2 help to increase the general level of political knowledge. However, NRK seems to be the preferred channel among the politically well‐informed.     

Post‐ministerial occupation in advanced industrial democracies: Ambition,individual resources and institutional opportunity structures

The post‐office occupation of former cabinet members remains basically unexplored in both single‐case and comparative studies. Is being a minister just a career tout court, or does serving in executive office facilitate movement to other positions? This article sheds new light on this question by advancing the theoretical development and empirical understanding of the various types of post‐ministerial occupation. The analysis takes into account ex‐ministers’ ambition, political capital resources and the institutional opportunity structures that might well affect both ambition and individual resources. Additionally, given that access to executive office is profoundly gendered, the article addresses the central question of whether post‐ministerial occupations similarly present differential patterns for women and men. The empirical results of a cross‐national comparison of 23 advanced industrial democracies show that, for most departing ministers, serving in executive office is indeed a stepping stone to other positions. Post‐office trajectories are not only shaped by ex‐ministers’ political capital resources such as seniority, party office, policy expertise and type of portfolio held while in cabinet, but also by different institutional factors that present country‐specific combinations. Specifically, systemic variables shape the relevance of political capital resources and affect how ambition is constructed and towards which goals. Strong gendered post‐office patterns are not found, although some intriguing gender differences are observed.     

Political Trust and the Local Business Climate: Evidence from Sweden

A re‐analysis of three Swedish studies of political trust at local level shows that the extent to which citizens trust the system of democracy in municipalities correlates strongly with how the employers in that area assess the state of the local business climate. This article deals with the question of how this can be understood. Three sets of underlying explanations are tested: social capital theory, a theory of local well‐being and political‐institutional conditions. The empirical analysis shows that only the theory of local well‐being can explain consistently why political trust and a flourishing local business climate occur in concert. The study emphasises the need to expand research on political trust to also take into account the role played by the business climate. This has been completely ignored in previous research on political trust. Such knowledge would be highly relevant to local policy making. In order to capture the specific mechanisms at work, qualitative case studies of municipalities are suggested as the next step of research.     

Political support among winners and losers: Within- and between-country effects of structure,process and performance in Europe

Why is the winner-loser gap in political support wider in some countries and narrower in others? Previous studies have focused on how the input side of political systems (i.e., the institutional structure) affects the winner-loser gap. This study suggests that one should also consider the output side (i.e., the quality of political process and economic performance) and posits that two mechanisms – rational and psychological – can explain how output factors affect the gap. Going beyond previous research, this article also considers whether contextual characteristics explain the variation in the gap not only between countries, but also within them. Applying mixed models to survey data from 30 European countries between 2002 and 2015, the study finds that the differences in support between winners and losers across countries are smaller in consensual systems, as in these contexts the support among losers is higher. However, changes in the institutional structure do not explain the over-time variation in the winner-loser gap. Moreover, increasing quality of process and economic performance do not attenuate the gap across countries and over time, as they affect positively the political support of both winners and losers. The study shows which contextual factors explain the winner-loser gap and points to the conditions that increase losers’ consent, which is a crucial element of democratic legitimacy.