Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations

Presidents traditionally have had great success when nominating justices to the Supreme Court, with confirmation being the norm and rejection being the rare exception. While the confirmation process usually ends with the nominee taking a seat on the Court, however, there is a great deal of variance in the amount of time it takes the Senate to act. To derive a theoretical explanation of this underlying dynamic in the confirmation process, we draw on a spatial model of presidential nominations to the Court. We then employ a hazard model to test this explanation, using data on all Supreme Court nominations and confirmations since the end of the Civil War. Our primary finding is that the duration of the confirmation process increases as the ideological distance between the president and the Senate increases. We also find evidence that suggests that the duration increases for critical nominees and chief justices and decreases for older nominees, current and previous senators, and nominees with prior experience on state and federal district courts .     

Context and the Economic Vote: A Multilevel Analysis

Randy Stevenson Department of Political Science, Rice University, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, Texas 77251–1892 e-mail: rduch{at}uh.edu (corresponding author) e-mail: stevenso{at}ruf.rice.edu Voters use observed economic performance to infer the competenceof incumbent politicians. These economic perceptions enter thevoter's utility calculations modified by a weight that is minimizedwhen the variance in exogenous shocks to the economy is verylarge relative to the variance in economic outcomes associatedwith the competence of politicians. Cross-national variationsin the political and economic context systematically increaseor undermine the voter's ability to ascertain the competencyof incumbents. We test one hypothesis: As policy-making responsibilityis shared more equally among parties, economic evaluations willbe more important in the vote decision. We employ two multilevelmodeling procedures for estimating the contextual variationsin micro-level economic voting effects: a conventional pooledapproach and a two-stage procedure. We compare the multivariateresults of a pooled method with our two-stage estimation procedureand conclude that they are similar. Our empirical efforts usedata from 163 national surveys from 18 countries over a 22-yearperiod.     

Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis

An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that "clarity of responsibility" within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the "clarity of responsibility" argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance.     

Strategic retirements: A political model of turnover on the United States Supreme Court

The president's ability to nominate justices to the United States Supreme Court is one of his most powerful tools for advancing his policy goals. To maximize the use of this tool it is important that he be able to determine how reasonable it is to expect a retirement from the Court during his presidency. Prior research is inconclusive as to whether Court retirements are politically motivated. In this study I develop and test a political model of Court retirements. The results from estimating the model using exponential Poisson regression show there to be an identifiable political element relating to the timing of retirements from the Court.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia.     

Congress,the Supreme Court,and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational‐anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional‐maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll‐call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress.     

The Supreme Court Prohibits Gerrymandering: A Gain or a Loss for the States?

The 1986 Davis v. Bandemer decision of the U.S. Supreme Courtdeclared partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable, but overruledthe federal district court's judgment that the Indiana legislativeredistricting plan was unconstitutional. The Court split onthe question of justiciability, and those justices who favoredjusticiability disagreed on the appropriate tests to apply intesting a districting plan for unfair partisan gerrymandering.The Court did not specify a clear measure and standard for outlawinggerrymandering. This gives state districting authorities anddistrict courts little guidance in dealing with gerrymandering.If, however, a successful measure and standard are developed,this action is likely to be beneficial to the states.     

Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions

This article is a first attempt to develop and assess the competing predictions of the thermostatic model of public opinion and legitimation theory for the responses of public mood to Supreme Court decisions. While the thermostatic model predicts a negative relationship between the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions and changes in public mood, legitimation theory predicts that changes in mood should be positively associated with the ideological content of the Court's actions. I assess these rival expectations by modeling the dynamic relationship between mood and cumulative judicial liberalism. The model estimates indicate a complex interaction between the Court and the mass public characterized by short‐term backlash against Supreme Court decisions in mood followed by long‐run movement toward the ideological positions taken by the Court. The results emphasize the legitimacy of the Court in American politics and point to a unique role for the Court in shaping public opinion.     

Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court

We examine whether circuit court judges sacrifice policy purity for career goals. We compare the behavior of contender judges–those most likely to be elevated to the Supreme Court–during vacancy periods with their behavior outside vacancy periods. We also examine the behavior of noncontender judges during those same times. The data show that during vacancy periods, contender judges are more likely to vote consistently with the president's preferences, to rule in favor of the United States, and to write dissenting opinions. Noncontender judges fail to evidence such behavior. These findings provide empirical support for the argument that federal judges adapt their behavior to specific audiences, and provide new avenues for research into judges' goals and the role of audiences in judicial decision making.     

Canada: The Supreme Court Sets Rules for the Secession of Quebec

The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1998 that neither the Canadianconstitution nor international law allows Quebec to secede fromCanada unilaterally. Secession would require amending the constitution.However, if a clear majority of Quebecers unambiguously optsfor secession, the federal government and the other provinceswould have a constitutional duty to negotiate. This is an obligationthat the court declared to be implicit in four principles that"inform and sustain the constitutional text"—federalism,democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respectfor minorities. The same set of principles would govern thenegotiations themselves. Accordingly, Quebec could not dictatethe terms of secession, and one cannot assume that agreementwould be reached. If negotiations fail, and Quebec declaresindependence unilaterally, the international community wouldhave to decide whether Quebec's action was legitimate.     

Perceived legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions: Three functions of source credibility

Public reaction to a Supreme Court decision hinges, in part, on the level of diffuse support enjoyed by the Court prior to announcement of the ruling. Previous investigators have exchanged adamant claims concerning the legitimacy-conferring ability of the Supreme Court, yet these studies have consistently ignored theoretical explanations of the psychological determinants of a receiver's response to an authoritative edict. Examined from the context of a cognitive view of persuasion, the credibility of the Supreme Court as a message source should not be expected to have a simple positive effect on opinion. Instead, unique effects may result from the interaction of source credibility and other components of the process of persuasion. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments that demonstrate that the credibility of the Supreme Court can serve three unique persuasive functions: Source credibility can cue a simple positive response, prompt increased cognitive effort, and serve as evidence in support of a persuasive claim.     

The Norwegian Supreme Court and Equitable Considerations: Problematic Aspects of Legal Reasoning

Legitimacy, confidence and autonomy in the court system are dependent on people trusting the institution to make decisions based on predefined legal rules. Simultaneously, confidence in the system is also dependent on the system's capability to adjust to changes in values in society. The Norwegian courts appear to be increasingly basing their rulings on ‘equitable considerations’. This involves the making of decisions by reference not only to predefined rules – as expressed in structures or pre‐existing legal practice – but also to policy considerations such as utility and fairness. Judicial decisions made with reference to political considerations imply that the courts are arrogating a role that democratic theory reserves for legislators. What happens when ‘equitable considerations’ play a large part in the decisions of the Supreme Court? Does the institution have capabilities and mechanisms that sustain such a judicial practice as a legitimate form of law enforcement? I argue that the capability to adjust to changes in society only seems possible if the judges act beyond the domain of traditional judicial competence. Through different kinds of mechanisms, elements of ‘equitable considerations’ over time become hidden and difficult to grasp. On the one hand, this makes it possible for the Supreme Court to sustain a judicial practice as a legitimate form of law enforcement, but simultaneously it creates problems of confidence and legitimacy because the premises for the decisions are not explicated.