Sustaining multilateral trade cooperation in a multipolar world economy

The deadlock in the WTO Doha Round has been accompanied by an increased focus on the negotiation of preferential trade agreements, including so-called ‘mega-regionals’. This paper discusses possible implications for—and possible responses by—excluded countries that have little prospects of participating in most of the mega-regionals. A number of complementary avenues are identified through which such countries might attenuate the potential downsides of preferential trade liberalization among large countries, as well as some proposals that would expand the scope to pursue cooperation on regulatory policies in the WTO as opposed to PTAs.     

Eurodad's campaign on multilateral debt: The 1996 HIPC debt initiative and beyond

'Multilateral debt is not a widespread problem for Severely Indebted Low Income Countries' wrote the World Bank in September 1994. Two years later, the International Financial Institutions-the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund-agreed to a proposal to bring the debt of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) to sustainable levels. While imperfect, the proposal went some way to meeting the demands of NGOs which, with progressive forces both within the World Bank and among creditor countries, have played a crucial role in this process. While the multilateral debt problem is now too great to ignore, the authors maintain that it has been the persistent pressure of these players that has been responsible for the enormous progress made by the IFIs.     

Urban governance and multilateral aid organizations: The case of informal water supply systems

This paper explores the different urban governance models proposed by multilateral aid organizations in accessing water through informal supply systems, to assess the rationale and the guiding principles at the basis of their different ‘governance approaches’. There can be no doubt that most developing countries are now experiencing a rapid and unprecedented urban growth, which is bringing about a rising demand for urban services, especially those concerning water supply. To cope with this pressing issue, the response of multilateral aid organizations—such as the World Bank, UN-HABITAT and the European Union––has been represented by the design and implementation of different urban governance and management systems, called to support an equitable and efficient access to urban water supply services. This paper focuses on the different urban governance approaches through which multilateral donors support informal networks and small scale providers to provide water supply in cities of developing countries. It highlights how these different urban governance approaches address the overall issues of poverty reduction whilst in reality, in certain cases, they also aim to affect and regulate domestic public policies of Third World countries. In particular, it argues that the governance model proposed––and imposed––by the World Bank continues to belong to a neo-liberal policy agenda, which considers water and urban services as commodities to be managed through widespread competition and market mechanisms. On the contrary, UN-HABITAT, and the European Union to a certain extent, highlight the need for an urban governance system that promotes the ownership of development strategies by local communities and that rests on the principles of inclusiveness and equity.

The art and science of mediation

Book reviewed in this article:
Jacob Bercovitch , Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution.
Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor , Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation
Deborah Kolb , The Mediators
Christopher Moore , The Mediation Process     

Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank

This paper explores the influence of Japan and the United States over the geographic distribution of Asian Development Bank funds. Estimation using panel data for less developed Asian countries from 1968 to 2002 suggests significant donor influence with inconsistent weight placed on humanitarian criteria given limited funding for the region's largest countries, China and India. Comparing the results with research on World Bank loan allocation suggests donor interests are relatively more important in the ADB. This finding justifies the existence of the ADB on political grounds but calls into question its relative merits on economic grounds. JEL codes F35 · O19     

The choice among aid donors: The effects of multilateral vs. bilateral aid on recipient behavioral support

Scholars studying foreign assistance differ over whether multilateral aid is preferable to bilateral aid for promoting development, but nearly all build their cases primarily on highly aggregated cross-national time-series data. We investigate this topic experimentally from the perspective of those whom the foreign aid directly affects: recipient citizens and elites. We thus report results of a survey experiment with behavioral outcomes on more than 3000 Ugandan citizens and over 300 members of Uganda’s Parliament. In spite of a large literature suggesting differences, the findings generally reveal few substantive differences in citizens’ and elites’ preferences and behavior toward the two types of aid. While no strong pattern of differences emerges, limited evidence suggests that the public evinces greater trust in multilateral institutions, and both masses and elites feel that multilateral aid is more transparent. Overall, these null results inform an ever-expanding literature, which is increasingly articulating distinctions between multilateral and bilateral aid. At least in the minds of the recipients, however, multilateral and bilateral aid may not in fact be all that different. This accords with the literature noting the strong overlap in aid organizations and bemoaning the fact that they do not specialize more. Our results raise the question about why have both multilateral and bilateral aid donors if they in effect do the same thing.     

Selectivity on aid modality: Determinants of budget support from multilateral donors

Since the late 1990s a selection on policy approach to aid was advocated such that more aid should be allocated to countries with good policies, but there is little evidence that this has occurred. This paper argues that donors may exercise selectivity over the aid modality. Specifically, multilateral donors will cede more recipient control over aid by granting more budget support to those recipients with better expenditure systems and spending preferences (towards the poor) aligned with the donor. We test this for European Commission and World Bank budget support over 1997?C2009 and find some support. Both donors have given budget support to almost half of the countries they give aid, and it is usually a significant share of their aid. The principal determinants of receiving budget support are having a poverty reduction strategy in place, which can be considered a good indicator of aligned preferences, and indicators of government efficiency. These variables did not, however, influence the amount of budget support given. Multilateral donors have been more likely to give budget support to countries with aligned spending preferences and better quality systems, even if they have not reallocated the total aid envelope in that way.     

Emerging donors: the promise and limits of bilateral and multilateral democracy promotion

This paper examines the evolving pattern of democracy promotion by three emerging donors: India, Brazil and South Africa. It first asks how the emerging donors promote democracy through their development assistance. The paper argues that despite the risk of compromising security and trade interests, the emerging donors have adapted to a 2 × 2 (two by two) model of democracy promotion by which they circumvent risk by promoting procedural democracy through bilateral means and non-procedural democracy through multilateral frameworks. Second, the paper asks why these three countries exhibit the same pattern of democracy promotion in spite of not having coordination among them. In response, the paper provides a structure–agent explanation. The paper contends that the structural constraints imposed on emerging donors are conducive to the operation of the 2 × 2 model in promoting democracy. While the model safeguards the emerging donors from criticism of being undue interveners in other countries' domestic affairs, it also privileges them with international recognition for being responsible partners in democracy promotion.     

Endgame at the Kennedy round: A case study of multilateral economic diplomacy

During the details stage of multilateral economic talks, agreements are usually negotiated using a combination of two methods ‐ compromise on individual issues and tit‐for‐tat exchanges. This article identifies the circumstances in which the the US, EEC and British delegations employed these traditional diplomatic techniques, and assesses the effectiveness of these techniques in forging agreement in the details stage of the Kennedy Round, Providing a detailed account of these talks, the article demonstrates that the negotiating techniques of the American delegation were far more flexible than those of the European and British delegations and that this flexibility was vital to the successful completion of the talks. The article concludes that differences in negotiating technique are best explained by a combination of two factors ‐ the contrasting decision making structures of each negotiating team and the international political context of the negotiations.     

Endgame at the Kennedy round: A case study of multilateral economic diplomacy

During the details stage of multilateral economic talks, agreements are usually negotiated using a combination of two methods - compromise on individual issues and tit-for-tat exchanges. This article identifies the circumstances in which the the US, EEC and British delegations employed these traditional diplomatic techniques, and assesses the effectiveness of these techniques in forging agreement in the details stage of the Kennedy Round, Providing a detailed account of these talks, the article demonstrates that the negotiating techniques of the American delegation were far more flexible than those of the European and British delegations and that this flexibility was vital to the successful completion of the talks. The article concludes that differences in negotiating technique are best explained by a combination of two factors - the contrasting decision making structures of each negotiating team and the international political context of the negotiations.