State power and diffusion processes in the ratification of global environmental treaties, 1981–2008

There have been many explanations for why countries ratify global environmental treaties. They range from neorealist theory, to hegemony theory, world society theory, and network embeddedness theory. Drawing on hegemonic transition theory, this paper provides evidence that prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, strong and weak countries ratified a treaty if the USA or the USSR ratified the treaty first. After the fall of the Soviet Union, countries’ proximity to world society institutions increased the likelihood of ratifying a treaty, and only weaker countries emulated the ratifications of the USA and Russia. However, weaker countries also emulated economic, religious, and language peers, diplomatic ties, and neighbors as well. In contrast, more powerful countries ratified treaties more independently. We studied the ratifications of eight universal environmental treaties by 166 countries between 1981 and 2008 and showed that as the geopolitical context changed, the diffusion process changed. The paper argues that the hegemonic transition which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s was an enabling event that helped to explain the new roles that major powers assumed in the 1990s and 2000s and opened the door to the ascendency of global institutions and broader participation in the environmental regime.     

‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B_?US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.     

Implications of EU Enlargement on the EU Greenhouse Gas 'Bubble' and Internal Burden Sharing

Currently, the EU-15 forms the only 'bubble' under the Kyoto Protocol and has negotiated an internal burden sharing. A strategic EU climate policy should include accession countries. Thus, even in the case of early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, it would be sensible to form a bubble with all countries that are certain to be EU members during the commitment period 2008–2012. Of course due to Art. 4.4 of the Protocol the EU-15 has to stick to its own bubble. However, nothing prevents it from forming an implicit bubble including all first wave countries by inducing them to form a bubble on their own and transfer the surplus to the EU-15. Similarly, second wave countries should form a bubble of their own to co-ordinate JI and permit transfers to the EU. This would reduce the gap between business-as-usual and the target by about 50%. If ratification is delayed to a point where it is clear which second wave countries will be members by 2008, the bubble should be extended by those countries. When in 2005 target negotiations start for the second commitment period, the EU should negotiate a bubble consisting of all states being certain to be members by 2013.     

The Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol – Paving the Way for Ratification

This article provides a short account of the international climate negotiations that took place in Bonn from 16 to 27 July 2001. After the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change failed in November 2000, the Parties had decided to suspend the meeting. The ministers present at the resumed session successfully adopted the "Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol", a set of political compromises for the most contentious issues left open by the Kyoto Protocol. Although many details had been transferred to the Seventh Conference of the Parties, November 2001 in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Bonn Agreement already paved the way for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and its entry into force. The Marrakesh Accord adopted on 10 November 2001transforms, with a few exceptions, this political agreement into bindinglegal text.     

How Can the European Union Contribute to a COP-6 Agreement? An Overview for Policy Makers

During the 6th Conference of Parties (COP-6) in The Hague, the Netherlands, November 2000, crucial progress on a number of outstanding issues related to the Kyoto Protocol will have to be made to open the way for its early ratification, if not to save it from complete failure. Given the present lack of internal US political support for the Kyoto Protocol, the EU may play a pivotal role in making the Kyoto Protocol agreement a reality even without initial ratification of the US, if its able to provide sufficient leadership. In this overview article we discuss the main issues under negotiation, the problems of finding agreement and opportunities for the EU to catalyse a compromise agreement at COP-6, building on key scientific papers as included in this issue and discussions at the European Forum on Integrated Environmental Assessment Climate Policy Workshop in Amsterdam. Key elements are the inclusion of sinks, the use of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms as a supplement to domestic action and the international compliance system. Domestic implementation of climate policy is a major factor for the EU's credibility.     

UNFCCC negotiations (pre-Kyoto to COP-9): what the process says about the politics of CDM-sinks

One of the most contentious issues in the negotiations aimed at operationalizing the Kyoto Protocol was the treatment of sinks and, particularly, the eligibility of sinks projects in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This paper attempts to analyse the politics underlying these negotiations, drawing on methods of process tracing, key informant interviews, negotiating texts and secondary literature. Tracing the sinks debate and highlighting key lessons about the nature of global environmental agreements and their institutional arrangements is the first step to recounting the history of the politics of one of the major contemporary international environmental debates. The paper shows that the Kyoto Protocol negotiations on sinks and CDM-sinks were multilaterally supported as a practical solution, but went ‘off track’ due to actors’ interests and tradeoffs. As regards future negotiations on forest sinks in developing countries under the framework of the UNFCCC, the paper argues that these are likely to be influenced by similar constraints, and also by the conservation and development agenda of its supporters; as well as the experience gathered on the CDM and the interests and concerns of developing countries. We broadly frame the paper within the literature on global environmental politics.

International Human Rights Law, Global Economic Reforms, and Child Survival and Development Rights Outcomes

Are recent trends in international law supporting child rights and promoting neoliberal economic reforms complementary or contradictory? To answer this question, we identify the component parts of child rights mobilization, recent global economic reforms, and child rights outcomes to theorize the particular relationships among them. Focusing on child survival and development rights in 99 poor and middle‐income countries from 1983 to 2001, we find that countries' acquiescence to established international law concerning economic rights influences the successful implementation of most of these rights, while the ratification of child rights treaties does not show an effect during the period studied. National links to child rights nongovernmental organizations are also associated with improved child rights outcomes, as is being selected to receive a loan from the World Bank (for reducing child labor and increasing immunizations). We find weak support for the hypothesis that the implementation of loan conditionalities is more deleterious for rights that are costlier to implement. We also find that achieving the goal of neoliberal economic reforms—trade openness—results in less successful implementation of most child rights outcomes considered. Finally, in a related analysis, we find that the ratification of child rights treaties, as well as the adoption and implementation of structural adjustment agreements, enhances the presence of child‐related organizations within countries.     

Border carbon adjustments, WTO-law and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities

This paper considers unilateral border measures, as contemplated by a number of developed states in conjunction with domestic emissions reduction schemes, as they relate to international trade and international environmental law. Specifically, I argue that to the extent that WTO-compliance requires strict adherence to the principle of nondiscrimination, as embodied in the national treatment and most-favored nation provisions in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, there is the potential for conflict with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), both as a free-standing principle of customary international law and as set out in various multilateral environmental agreements and, in particular in the climate change context, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. This is insofar as the unilateral imposition of BCAs by developed countries shifts costs of compliance with environmental legislation in developed economies onto the developing world. Such allocation may conflict with the principle of CBDR, which recognizes the unequal contribution to environmental degradation of developed countries as well as their enhanced ability to address the challenges presented by such degradation and, as a consequence, requires that they undertake more onerous obligations with respect to climate change mitigation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the extent to which this conflict is illustrative of a deeper tension between efficiency and equity considerations inherent in the intersection of international economic law and international environmental law.     

The effects of treaty legality and domestic institutional hurdles on environmental treaty ratification

We study the effects of treaty design and domestic institutional hurdles on the ratification behavior of states with respect to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Specifically, we examine whether (1) strong legality mandated by a treaty such as precisely stated obligations, strong monitoring/enforcement mechanisms, and dispute resolution procedures, and (2) high domestic constitutional hurdles such as requirements for explicit legislative approval deter countries from ratifying a treaty. To test our theoretical claim, we use a new time-series-cross-sectional dataset that includes information on the ratification behavior of 162 countries with respect to 220 MEAs in 1950–2000. We find that treaties that are characterized as ‘hard’ indeed deter ratification. Furthermore, explicit legislative approval requiring supermajority also makes treaty ratification less likely.     

Seizing the opportunity: tackling fossil fuel subsidies under the UNFCCC

Analyses from international and nongovernmental organizations have pointed to the negative environmental, economic and social implications of the sizable subsidies handed out by governments for the production and consumption of fossil fuels. Given their relevance for achieving climate policy objectives, it is perhaps surprising that the climate regime established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) does not address fossil fuel subsidies. This article discusses the possible role of the UNFCCC in tackling fossil fuel subsidies. It suggests that the UNFCCC could enhance the transparency around fossil fuel subsidies and put in place incentives for countries to undertake subsidy reform. However, the possibilites under the UNFCCC will be limited by political barriers to subsidy reform at the national level and will need to be carried out in coordination with other international institutions active in the field.     

Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Process

While adaptation has, in the last 3 years, become the most fashionable item on the climate policy agenda, this was not always so. Since the early 1990s, numerous scientists and policy makers have been making the case that adaptation has been the overlooked cousin of greenhouse gas mitigation. As both are seen to be of equal importance, the lack of policy on adaptation is interpreted as a political strategy by developed countries to avoid admitting liability and the financial consequences of this admission. A tension between those in favour of mitigation over adaptation activities has strongly characterized the discourse on climate change policy. However, a closer look at the history of the concept of adaptation as applied in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process underscores the original intention that the treaty should focus on reducing the source of climate change, rather than on adapting to the changes. Adaptive capacity was considered to be an indicator of the extent to which societies could tolerate changes in climate, and was not seen as a policy objective. As a result of events that have unrolled since the inception of the UNFCCC, needs and perceptions have shifted. Today, there are strong grounds for having adaptation as a policy goal, but it must be recognized that the UNFCCC, and its Kyoto Protocol in particular, are first and foremost about abating greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, adaptation policy may find a more appropriate home beyond the existing climate change regime.     

Linking the global to the national: an application of the international pathways model to examine the influence of international environmental agreements on Cameroon’s forest policy

Cameroon’s tropical forest cover is one of the largest in the world. It is home to some of the world’s rarest plant and animal species. However, the country has suffered extensive forest loss for many decades as a result of socioeconomic and political factors. The growing global concern for the health of the world’s forests and related global issues has placed pressure on Cameroon to sustainably manage its forests. The intricacies of domestic and international pressures on Cameroon’s forest sector means that policy makers have to take into consideration the dynamics of the domestic-international nexus in developing the country’s forest policies. The increasingly integrated global governance of the world’s forests—international agreements, protocols and treaties, international program, international institutions, international actors, and international norms—together constitute international policy regimes that have influenced the direction of Cameroon’s forest policy. Employing the international pathways framework model, an analytic model which describes how transnational actors and international institutions affect domestic policies and policy making, this paper examines the extent to which international environmental agreements have influenced the direction of Cameroon’s forest policy and policy making. The application of the international pathways model facilitated analytic review and allowed for a better understanding of how Cameroon has utilized the complex global forest governance arrangements to enhance its domestic forest policy.     

Who is driving Russian climate policy? Applying and adjusting veto players theory to a non-democracy

What is driving Russian climate policy? This article focuses on the veto player approach developed by George Tsebelis and its applicability for examining the power relations in climate change policy-making in Russia. It makes two original contributions: veto players analysis on Russian climate policy and proposals how to adjust to theory to be applied to non-democracies for comparison with democracies. After identifying the veto players and their preferences, and determining their equivalence in the decision-making process, two case studies are examined: the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the establishment of one of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation, in Russia. Regarding the power play between actors, the latter emerges as far more accessible than the former, where scholars can generally observe only the domestic debate—which, due to the absorption of democratic decision-making institutions by the president, is detached from the actual decision-making process. Three proposals are made for adjusting the veto players approach to facilitate qualitative analysis of Russian decision-making: (1) select cases which involve also lower-level actors in charge of policy implementation; (2) due to implementation problems, changes in the status quo must be sought deeper than in statute-level changes; and (3) note that motivations of actors beyond the actual policy substance can facilitate explanations of puzzling outcomes in the process.     

Can the management school explain noncompliance with international environmental agreements?

Although the management school has been highly influential in the international cooperation literature, the explanatory power of Chayes and Chayes’ three explanations of noncompliance with international environmental treaties remain understudied. Having developed a framework for examining the explanatory power of treaty ambiguity, lack of state capacity, and unexpected social or economic developments, this paper conducts a rigorous empirical test in the context of a well-suited case—the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol. A careful reading shows that the language of the protocol is clear and unambiguous; indeed, there has been no disagreement over the treaty’s content. Furthermore, statistical analyses show no positive effect of political capacity on compliance. Finally, parties had adequate time to meet their obligations, and unexpected developments explain only a small part of the observed noncompliance. These findings pose a serious challenge to Chayes and Chayes’ three explanations of noncompliance—at least as far as the Gothenburg Protocol is concerned.     

中国东盟打击跨国犯罪刑事合作机制探析

中国东盟打击跨国犯罪刑事合作是双边政治、经贸发展的需要;已经建立的双边协商机制和法律合作机制是开展打击跨国犯罪的基础。中国和东盟国家已经签署的引渡条约在政治犯罪不引渡、本国国民不引渡等问题规定落后双边打击犯罪现实,亟需改进;中国和东盟国家司法协助形式较单一,需要增加。对于尚未与中国签署引渡条约的国家,由于不能根据国际公约开展引渡合作,只能开创新的合作思路。未来中国东盟打击跨国犯罪刑事合作应当向着建立区域机构、区域统一逮捕令、强化人员培训技术合作以及网络信息建设方向发展。     

An Evaluation of Pre-Kyoto Differentiation Proposals for National Greenhouse Gas Abatement Targets

Although the Kyoto Protocol has set a precedent for future climate negotiations, particularly with respect to differentiation of targets between countries, the current approach is likely to be insufficient as a foundation for future targets. A more systematic approach is deemed necessary to meet the challenges of negotiating new targets after 2012 as well as involving the USA and perhaps developing countries. We argue that better negotiation tools can be helpful in this regard. We thus present an overview of more systematic differentiation methods for national greenhouse gas reduction targets. We draw from the proposals that were submitted in the climate negotiations from 1995 to 1997 leading up to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU's Triptique approach for internal differentiation of targets, and three proposals discussed in the literature on fairness principles. The most promising and helpful proposals for future negotiations are given particular attention: the second proposal by Japan, the French proposal, the Norwegian proposal, the Brazilian proposal, and Triptique. A numerical illustration of the former three together with the Sovereignty, Egalitarian, and Ability to Pay fairness principles is provided. Using resemblance to the Kyoto Protocol to measure political feasibility, we find that the proposals rank in the order; (1) the second Japanese; (2) the French; (3) the Norwegian; (4) the Sovereignty; (5) the Ability to Pay; and (6) the Egalitarian, the last being particularly infeasible.     

A Regulatory Analysis of International Climate Change Regulation

The political challenges impeding the negotiation of a comprehensive multilateral agreement on international climate change have received a great deal of attention. A question that has gone somewhat overlooked is what essential components an effective regulatory scheme to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should contain. The objective of this article is to examine the regulatory architecture of current international arrangements relating to global climate change regulation. A systematic analysis of the structure, substantive composition, and administrative characteristics of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol is undertaken. The analytical standard against which the agreements are examined is whether current international regulatory arrangements satisfy the basic requirements of regulatory coherence. The analysis identifies how the present scheme consists of a complex institutional structure that lacks a substantive regulatory core. The implications of the absence of functional and effective mechanisms to govern greenhouse gas emission reductions are considered in relation to the principles of good regulatory design. This, in turn, provides useful insights into how a better regulatory scheme might be designed.     

Framework for the future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is struggling in its attempts to address the threat of anthropogenic climate change and create an effective international climate agreement. A substantial part of the problem is consensus decision-making within the Convention. Majority voting is a potential alternative which is already being discussed within the UNFCCC. A comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting suggests that majority voting is superior in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness by allowing for quicker decision-making and semi-global approaches to a climate agreement (termed here as “Critical Mass Governance”). This paper aims to investigate how majority voting could be implemented in the UNFCCC and to consider politically feasible and effective approaches to voting arrangements for the Convention. There is a legal opportunity to introduce voting through adoption of the draft Rules of Procedure, but this faces political opposition. A type of Layered Majority Voting with larger majorities for financial and substantial matters is considered to be the optimal approach in balancing political feasibility and effectiveness. For now, voting is not politically feasible for the UNFCCC, but could be introduced into future bodies or treaties under the Convention.     

Beyond Kyoto: The EU's Contribution to a More Sustainable World Economy

The EU has been leading the world fight against climate change since the late 1990s. This activism on the international scene has served as a stimulus for a common action against global warming that has, in the last 10 years, become a world referent and the central issue in the EU environmental policy. The most relevant initiative is the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme (ETS), adopted in fulfilment of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2008, the EU adopted a new set of measures on climate and energy for the post‐Kyoto period (2013–2020). This new legal framework, coupled with the provisions introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, represents the EU's commitment to promote a more sustainable European and world economic model.     

A critical review of the successful CFC phase-out versus the delayed methyl bromide phase-out in the Montreal Protocol

The Montreal Protocol is often described as an international environmental agreement par excellence. After all, it successfully led to the phase-out of almost 95% of all chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) use. A critical review of the Protocol’s history, however, suggests that its successes are deeply entrenched in the economic opportunities that were made available to phase out CFCs. The Montreal Protocol, in other words, was a “best-case scenario” for CFC producers. This may be problematic for policymakers, ecological modernization practitioners, and other scholars who look to the Montreal Protocol for guidance in phasing out other global environmentally harmful substances and practices that are not as “economically efficient.” The shift to delay the phasing out of methyl bromide (MeBr) in the Protocol, an ozone-depleting substance used to this day primarily in strawberry and tomato production, demonstrates how even this most successful of international environmental agreements can become subject to significant setbacks when economic gains and scientific evidence are not obvious to the global powers. Furthermore, changes in what constitutes a viable exemption to the phase-out of CFCs versus MeBr marks a shift away from concern for the general functioning/welfare of society, and toward concern for the market performance of specific individuals. This shift runs parallel to a lack in economic incentives to phase out MeBr in the United States. The article demonstrates how civil society representation in ozone politics is largely dominated by industry interests, especially when scientific uncertainty is high.