A Failure to Communicate: 9/11 and the Tragedy of the Informational Commons

ABSTRACT

We investigate how networks among service organizations are integrated through a shared participant type of governance. Shared participant governance is a non-brokered type of network coordination where a network is governed by its members without a separate governance entity. We study the integrative capacity of this type of governance by measuring the effect of participation in a shared participant governance on tie formation in networks among service organizations. We analyze three networks of service organizations in three districts of Antwerp, Belgium. In each of these districts, the networks are governed by welfare meetings, defined as a shared participant type of governance. We use exponential random graph models. The results show that a shared participant type of governance has a positive effect on tie formation. We also find that the positive effect on tie formation is dependent on the active participation of centralized actors in the welfare meetings.     

James Bryce: Englishness and Federalism in America and Australia

That the Constitution of the United States served as a modelfor the Australian federation is well established, and is inany case evident from the resemblance of federal institutionsbetween the two countries. Yet substantial differences remain,largely through the determination of the Australian foundersto retain the parliamentary heritage of the Westminster systemof government. It has been pointed out that fames Bryce's lavishexpositions of the American federation distorted American realitieswhen they were viewed through uncompromisingly English lenses.It was Bryce's version of the American federation that allowedthe Australian founders to accommodate their new creation tothe English legacy. However, in Bryce's acclaimed comparativework, his overriding aim was to promote the abiding excellenceof English institutions.     

Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from 'Liddism' to 'Drainism'

Significant shifts have been underway in security intelligence agencies and processes since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Whereas the previous quarter of a century had seen a considerable democratization of intelligence, the article examines whether UK and US government responses risk the re-creation of 'security states'. Changes since 9/11 in law, doctrine, the intelligence process - targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action - and oversight are considered and it is concluded that there is a danger of the rebirth of independent security states.     

The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11

Two years after the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act aspired to replace a sprawling agency‐oriented intelligence apparatus with an integrated, networked intelligence community. The act envisioned a director of national intelligence who would accomplish sweeping structural reforms, while at the same time maintaining and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence operations. This vision has not materialized. The director of national intelligence does not have the power to implement structural reforms. Schisms between the legislature and the executive also hamper reforms.     

9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure

Public discussion about the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks has focused on the human causes of tragedy – on individual mistakes, failures of leadership, and the power plays between intelligence officers in the field and policymakers in Washington. But closer examination of the FBI suggests that organizational weaknesses are the root cause of poor agency performance. Longstanding deficiencies in the FBI's organizational structure, culture, and incentive systems proved crippling in the 1990s, when the Cold War ended and the terrorist threat emerged. These lingering weaknesses ultimately prevented the bureau from capitalizing on 12 separate opportunities that might have disrupted the 9/11 plot.     

Sovereignty and its Presuppositions: Before 9/11 and After

Is the modern states system in terminal decline? Are we witnessing a great transformation in that regard? Are the events of 9/11 indicative of that? Or is state sovereignty evolving, yet again, in response to scientific, technological, economic and social changes – as it has done throughout the post-medieval era of its existence? That latter line of argument is put forward in this essay.     

9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence

Professor Goodman analyses the failure of US intelligence prior to 9/11 setting the context in the 1980s and 1990s. He dissects the flaws of the CIA, FBI and the Pentagon. He argues that the State Department should be strengthened because its capabilities are the most important. He also recommends that the FBI be split in two and that the CIA's budget be disclosed.     

Leonard Woolf,the League of Nations and Peace Between the Wars

Co‐founding The Political Quarterly was one among many of Leonard Woolf's achievements during a long career as a progressive political thinker and publicist, particularly in the field of international affairs. To mark the centenary of the publication of International Government, his most innovative and influential work on the subject, this article seeks to assess Woolf's contribution. It examines the Fabian background to Woolf's work, his support for and approach to the League of Nations and his commitment to collective security as an approach to peace. Through a broader understanding of the League it argues that certain failings in the area of collective security, however profound, should not be permitted to blight an otherwise impressive intellectual legacy.