Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe

In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina(OM), a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economicand political activity in the country’s urban areas. Thisarticle employs a national probability sample survey to analysethe popular reactions of ordinary Zimbabweans to this landmarkevent. It shows that the application of state repression succeedsat some goals, fails at others, and has powerful unintendedeffects. We report that the scope of OM was wide and that themain victims of OM were younger, unemployed families whom statesecurity agents saw as potential recruits for social unrest.Whereas OM undoubtedly disrupted the informal economy, we showthat it did not succeed in banishing urban dwellers to ruralareas or permanently shutting down illicit trade. Moreover,the crackdown thoroughly discredited the police and other stateinstitutions. We also demonstrate that state repression emboldenedits victims, deepening polarisation between political partiesand fortifying the ranks of Zimbabwe’s opposition movement. ^1. Disturbing accounts of the human toll are given by the CatholicCommission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Breaking the Silence,Building True Peace: A report on the disturbances in Matabelelandand the Midlands, 1980 to 1988 (Legal Resources Foundation,Harare, 1997) and Richard Werbner, Tears of the Dead (EdinburghUniversity Press, Edinburgh, 1991). On systematic electoralviolence, see Norma Kriger, ‘ZANU-PF strategies in generalelections, 1980–2000: discourse and coercion’, AfricanAffairs 104 (2005), pp. 1–34. On the violence associatedwith land invasions and crackdowns on journalists, see StephenChan, Robert Mugabe: A life of power and violence (I.B. Taurus,London, 2003) and Andrew Meldrum, Where We Have Hope: A memoirof Zimbabwe (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2004). ^2. For an insightful collection of current analyses by a varietyof Zimbabwean commentators, see David Harold-Berry (ed.), Zimbabwe:The past is the future (Weaver Press, Harare, 2004). ^3. ‘Zimbabwe police target minibuses’, BBC News, 24May 2005. ^4. The Joint Operations Command - comprised of army, police, prisons,and intelligence heads - coordinates military and security affairsand, on these matters, now carries greater policy weight thanthe civilian cabinet. A senior state intelligence officer wasquoted as saying that ‘the operation is meant to reducethe number of people in the central business district so that,if violence erupts, it would be easy to contain.’ ZimOnline (South Africa) www.zimonline.co.za, 24 May 2005. JournalistBaffour Ankomah, usually sympathetic to Mugabe, also reportedthat ‘the operation was the brainchild of Zimbabwe’sintelligence community’ designed to forestall ‘aUkrainian-style revolution’ New African (London), October2005, reprinted in The Herald (Harare), 4–5 October 2005. ^5. Government of Zimbabwe, ‘Response of the Government ofZimbabwe to the Report by the UN Special Envoy on OperationMurambatsvina/Restore Order’ (Harare, 2005). ^6. ‘Rallying cry belies Mugabe’s fear of voter revolt’,The Times (UK), 31 March 2005. ^7. Compared to the 2000 parliamentary election, ZANU-PF’sshare of elected seats rose from 62 to 78, and the MDC’sshare fell from 57 to 41. With the support of an additional30 appointed MPs in the 150-seat House, ZANU-PF therefore enjoyeda two-thirds majority, enough to change the constitution. ^8. Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ‘Statement on the 2005parliamentary elections’, Harare, 3 April 2005. See alsoCarole Andrews and Bryn Morgan, ‘Zimbabwe after the 2005parliamentary elections’, Research Paper No. 05/58 (UKHouse of Commons Library, London, August 2005). ^9. ‘Police in Zimbabwe arrest 9000 traders’, Guardian(UK), 24 May 2005. ^10. ‘Zimbabwe government continues blitz’, AssociatedPress, 5 June 2005. ^11. ‘U.N. condemns Zimbabwe for bulldozing urban slums,’New York Times, 23 July 2005. ^12. United Nations, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabweto Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina bythe UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe,Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka (United Nations, New York, 18 July 2005),p. 7. ^13. ‘UN chief Annan’s statement on Zimbabwe demolitions’,Reuters, 22 July 2005. ^14. ‘Zimbabwe steams ahead with demolitions’, Mail andGuardian (SA), 26 July 2005. ^15. See ‘UN envoy says Zimbabwe’s crisis is deepening’,Business Day (SA), 7 December 2005 and ‘New threat ofurban demolition’, IRIN - Integrated Regional InformationNetworks (UN), 7 April 2006. ^16. For information on country coverage and research methods, seewww.afrobarometer.org. ^17. The sampling frame was the Government of Zimbabwe, Central StatisticalOffice, Census 2000 Zimbabwe: Preliminary results summary (GovernmentPrinter, Harare, 2003). In drawing the national probabilitysample, we followed the standard Afrobarometer sampling protocol,which can be found at http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html.For ease of access to the present article, we did not burdenthe text with extensive methodological apparatus. If readershave queries about data collection or analysis, they are invitedto visit the website or contact the authors directly. ^18. ‘Zimbabwe takes harsh steps in major cities to counterunrest’, New York Times, 2 June 2005. ^19. Action Aid International/Combined Harare Residents Association,A Study on the Impact of ‘Operation/Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’ in 26 Wards of Harare High Density Housing Areas(AA/CHRA, Harare, July 2005). ^20. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission (2005), p. 8. ^21. Ibid., p. 34. ^22. ‘Annan may take up Mugabe invite’, The Scotsman(UK), 26 July 2005. ^23. ‘Mugabe hoping to sidestep Mbeki and Annan’, SundayIndependent (SA), 24 July 2005. Zimbabwe’s Ambassadorto the UN also branded the report ‘exaggerated’,BBC News, 27 July 2005. ^24. The margin of sampling error for a survey with 1048 respondentsis plus or minus 3 percentage points at a 95 percent level ofconfidence. The confidence interval around the point estimateof 54 percent for OM victimization is therefore between 51 and57 percent. This result almost exactly replicates the findingof an earlier survey conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute.Based on a national probability sample of similar size (n =1041) and using the same question, MPOI found in July-August2005 that 55 percent of respondents reported that they or theirimmediate families were affected. See Eldred Masunungure andAnyway Ndapadzwa, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005: Post-Parliamentarysurvey report (MPOI, Harare, August 2005). ^25. Census 2002, p.1. ^26. This guesstimate is conservative compared to the Reserve Bankof Zimbabwe’s claim of 3.4 million Zimbabweans livingabroad in 2004 (www.homelinkzimbabwe.com) and various journalisticaccounts of 3 million or more, for example by Geoff Hill, WhatHappens After Mugabe? (Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005), p. 2. ^27. The World Bank’s African Development Indicators says 43percent are under age 14 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004),p. 309. ^28. Or, taking sampling error into account, between 2.55 and 2.85million. ^29. Survey respondents may have used an especially broad subjectivedefinition when defining an OM victim as a member of their ‘immediatefamily’. There is also a small risk that some victimswere double-counted as members of more than one respondent’sextended family. Either way, we doubt that we have undercounted. ^30. Squatter settlements were unapproved, but many of them had existingcourt judgments that prevented the government from removingthem without providing alternative accommodation. Some shacksin urban areas even had planning permission. ^31. ‘Msika officially launches operation Garikai’, TheHerald (Harare), 30 June 2005. Also ‘Zimbabwe: operationlive well struggles to take off’, IRIN - Integrated RegionalInformation Networks (UN), 19 August 2005. ^32. In Zimbabwe, as in other African countries, young and unemployedpeople are least likely to vote. ^33. Mass Public Opinion Institute, Zimbabwe Elections, 2005 (MPOI,Harare, 2005) p. iii. ^34. Note: the percentage figures should be treated with cautionas the number of cases is small (n = 56). ^35. Sixty percent of these respondents were urban versus 34 percentrural. ^36. 35 percent among the former versus 37 percent among the latter. ^37. 41 percent among the random sample of adults, 45 percent amongdisplaced persons. ^38. For 2004 estimates of institutional trust, see Michael Bratton,Annie Chikwana, and Tulani Sithole, ‘Propaganda and publicopinion in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary AfricanStudies 23, 1 (2005), pp. 77–108. ^39. According to an official report, ‘Police had been approachedby local authorities to help in enforcing Council by-laws, whichwere being ignored . . . (and) to relocate street kids, vagrants,touts and vendors who were causing chaos in town.’ ZimbabweRepublic Police, ‘Zimbabwe Republic Police response toallegations of deaths suffered during Operation Murambatsvina/RestoreOrder’, (Harare, August 2005). ^40. This slight adjustment lies within the margin of sampling errorfor a single survey. ^41. Pearson’s r = 0.271, p < 0.001. ^42. By 9 percentage points: 71 percent for OM victims versus 80percent for non-victims. ^43. ‘Price of basics soars beyond reach of poor Zimbabweans’,Mail and Guardian (South Africa), 20 March 2006. ^44. Pearson’s r = 0.962, p < 0.001. Indeed, these indicatorsare so closely correlated that either could act as a proxy forthe other. ^45. The proportion of MDC supporters who said they did not trustthe ruling party ‘at all’ rose from 49 percent inApril 2004 to 62 percent in October 2005. ^46. Although the results of the bye-election of May 2006 in Budirirosuggest the mainstream MDC headed by Morgan Tsvangirai has littleto fear from the breakaway MDC faction led by Arthur Mutambara. ^47. See International Crisis Group, ‘Post-election Zimbabwe:What next?’ Africa Report No. 93 http://www.crisisgroup.org(7 June, 2005). ^48. Eldred, Masunungure, Anyway Ndapwadza, and Noma Sibanda, ‘Supportfor democracy and democratic institutions in Zimbabwe’,Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 27 http://www.afrobarometer.org(March 2006). ^49. International Crisis Group, ‘Zimbabwe’s operationMurambatsvina: the tipping point?’ Africa Report No. 97,p. 4 http://www.crisisgroup.org (17 August, 2005). ^50. ‘African leaders break silence over Mugabe’s humanrights abuses’, The Guardian (UK), 4 January 2006.     

金融抑制下缅甸金融发展困境与自由化展望

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Repression as a Double‐edged Sword: Resilient Monarchs,Repression and Revolution in the Arab World

The Arab world shows a puzzling variation of political violence. The region's monarchies often remain quiet, while other autocracies witness major upheaval. Institutional explanations of this variation suggest that monarchical rule solves the ruler's credible commitment problems and prevents elite splits. This article argues that institutional explanations neglect the role of repression: increasing the scope of repression raises the costs of rebellion and deters rebels. However, the deterrence effect disappears if repression is used indiscriminately. If remaining peaceful offers no benefits, repression creates new rebels instead of deterring them. A time‐series‐cross‐section analysis of repression and political violence in the Middle East and North Africa corroborates our argument and shows the u‐curve relation between repression and violence. Once we control for repression, monarchies have no special effect anymore. Thus, our article addresses the discussion about monarchical exceptionalism, and offers an explanation why repression deters as well as incites political violence.     

Transnational Migrants,Globalization Processes,and Regimes of Power and Knowledge

This article situates the Bush administration's new strategy in the historical context of the international capitalist order established by the United States at the end of the 1940s and argues that this order, though extraordinarily successful for some decades, is now in crisis. The unique capitalist international community that the United States established under its primacy revived international capitalism while preventing geopolitical rivalries between the main capitalist centers. The leading sectors of U.S. business have become dependent on the preservation of the unipolar primacy order for its own economic security and expansion while the American domestic political economy has failed to revive as an industrial economy meeting the rules of international economics, exhibiting growing problems with current account deficits and rising levels of debt. To manage the resulting tensions between the orientation of American transnational sectors and problems in the domestic American political economy, the United States has developed an international monetary and financial regime that is destabilizing and dependent upon the preservation of American political primacy over the capitalist world. But the Soviet collapse has destabilized the primacy system, while the dominant sections of American capitalism are committed to rebuilding it. The Bush administration is seeking to rebuild U.S. primacy, using U.S. military dominance. But this carries very high risks.     

国际机制与美国霸权

本文旨在从国际机制的角度解读第二次世界大战以来的美国霸权.笔者首先总结了国际机制理论各主要流派对国际机制与霸权关系的认识;其次,提出机制霸权的概念,从历史角度全面剖析美国霸权与国际机制的关系,并以之验证国际机制理论对二者关系的分析;最后,对美国的跨世纪霸权战略的内容、实质进行分析并展望.     

Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism

Since terrorism poses a serious threat to the processes of liberal democracy governments should act decisively to curb terrorist groups. This article examines the range of political, judicial and enforcement measures available, assesses the problems associated with them and the conditions for their success. Political measures include reforms in response to popular unrest, negotiations with terrorist groups and amnesties to encourage an end to violence. Since terrorists seek to influence domestic and international public opinion, the authorities need to counter that propaganda and in particular to explain and justify the political, judicial and enforcement measures they adopt. Governments have to choose between treating terrorism like other forms of criminal behaviour or setting up special courts and passing emergency legislation, with the attendant dangers to civil liberties. Enforcement of anti-terrorist measures has quite often been inept. Coordination is required to prevent police anti-terrorist units and other security agencies from engaging in institutional rivalry. But if these agencies are efficient in their intelligence gathering, and politically supervised to ensure that they act within the law, they can be decisive in the reduction of terrorism, as in Western Europe at the end of the 1970s.     

Repression, Opportunity, and Protest: Explaining the Takeoff of Brazil's Landless Movement

During the mid-1990s, Brazil experienced a rapid intensification of protest for land reform. Official land reform efforts also accelerated, and the issue became a central topic of public concern and debate. This article seeks to account for the abrupt intensification of collective action and to explain its relationship to the other changes, focusing on the political impact of two massacres of landless protesters in 1995 and 1996. These incidents forced authorities to accelerate land reform and to exercise somewhat greater caution in repressing the movement. The shifts in state behavior then helped to accelerate collective action. This argument lends weight to the idea that state repression against a social movement can sometimes serve to engender even greater protest. It also identifies a previously undescribed causal mechanism, political opportunity, linking repression to protest.     

国际机制的有效性与局限性

国际机制是否为独立变量?国际机制的作用体现在哪些方面,其局限性何在?这些问题关乎国际机制作用的评价,但国际机制理论迄今未曾做出明确的回答,各理论流派的认识差别甚大,不存在统一的认识基础.笔者认为,自20世纪90年代中期以来,中国学术界对国际机制理论的介绍已经相对充分,应该转向理论创新阶段.对这些问题的提出和初步解答,基本体现了笔者抛砖引玉的意图.     

Welfare Regimes in Latin America: Capturing Constellations of Markets,Families, and Policies

This article presents both a theoretical framework and a methodology that attempt to capture the complex interactions among labor markets, families, and public policy that currently constitute Latin American welfare regimes. Drawing on cluster analysis based on available data for 18 countries, the study identifies three welfare regimes. Two are state welfare regimes: protectionist (e.g. Costa Rica) and productivist (e.g. Chile); one is nonstate familiarist (e.g. Ecuador and Nicaragua). In a region where people's well‐being is deeply embedded in family relationships, closer scholarly attention to how social structures interact with public policy bears not only academic interest but also policy implications, particularly for adapting particular welfare regimes to the local welfare mix.     

Repression without Exception: A Study of Protest Bans during Turkey’s State of Emergency (2016-2018)

ABSTRACT

Following the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency that would last for two years. In this paper, we focus on an understudied aspect of this period, protest repression during the state of emergency, using an original dataset of protest bans issued in 2007–2019. Engaging with the theoretical claims of emergency scholarship, our paper demonstrates that emergency powers were used to target areas, groups, and issues that were not related to the ‘urgency’ underpinning emergency rule. Moreover, such derogations of rights were perpetuated after the termination of the state of emergency within so-called ordinary legality. These practices were nevertheless embedded in the already authoritarian political-institutional context of Turkey and its layered history of emergencies.     

Repression and development in the periphery: South Korea

Abstract

American social scientists have recently expressed deep concern over the stare of “human rights” in the third world The source of this concern can be pinpointed precisely as the “new moralism” of the Carter Administration. Like Mr Carter, these social scientists address the problem by isolating human rights as a distinct phenomenon which can be dealt with in the abstract, detached from the root characteristics of the political economy within which it occurs. The typical analysis focuses on the individual dictator, who, ostensibly, has available to him a range of choices on the amount of social control that is to be maintained. For example, if the United States were to exert pressure and to discontinue aid, then, according to this view, the dictator would restore democratic rights.     

马来西亚“伊斯兰国”与民族国家:争论、影响与趋势

伊斯兰党在20世纪80年代转型后,致力在马来西亚建立"伊斯兰国"。"伊斯兰国"与巫统主导下的民族国家建构是完全不同的建国方向,两者在最高权力的来源、统治阶层、意识形态三方面有着显著的差异。伊斯兰党现阶段重提伊斯兰刑法后,引起马来西亚两线制的重新分化与组合。由于政党之间的建国理念相异,马来西亚未来的建国方向大体上有三种:马来人主导下的民族国家、伊斯兰国和多族群国家。另外,伊拉克与大叙利亚伊斯兰国组织在中东的崛起,令身处伊斯兰世界的马来西亚民族国家体制也面临着来自外部的强烈冲击。     

正式与非正式国际机制的概念辨析

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联合国制裁恐怖主义机制的功能和不足

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