Deregulation as regulatory reform: the case of environmental policy in the Netherlands

Abstract. Deregulation in the Netherlands has been associated with the perceived crisis of the welfare state. But in the area of environmental policy it has not meant dismantling those substantive regulations designed to promote improved environmental quality. Deregulation in environmental management has involved the retention of overall regulatory objectives while striving to simplify and streamline existing regulatory procedures, and developing alternatives to the more traditional instruments of regulation. Deregulation in this area is a prime example of 're-regulation'- of steps taken to make existing regulations more effective, or to replace rules with other instruments designed to achieve more effectively and efficiently the same behavioural changes sought with the original regulatory scheme.     

Environmental Federalism Revisited: Second‐Order Devolution in Air Quality Regulation

In this paper we examine states' use of local clean air agencies and provide a preliminary assessment of what causes states to devolve air quality policy authority to the local level. Data from a unique comparative state survey shows that states vary widely in the number of local clean air agencies they employ and the amount of authority these agencies have to set standards, monitor air quality, and enforce regulations. Multivariate analyses suggest that second‐order devolution is partly driven by a general propensity to decentralize policy authority, but that policy‐specific factors relating to the problem and interest group environment affect devolution as well. These findings indicate that local agencies play an important role in U.S. air quality regulation, and that the dynamics of state devolution to local agencies deserve further study.     

Assessing Material and Symbolic Variations in Punctuated Equilibrium and Public Policy Output Patterns

Numerous researchers have confirmed sharp and punctuated policy change. Newer findings in U.S. forest policy in the Pacific Northwest and U.S. state tobacco policy have found largely nonpunctuated changes. What are the implications for punctuated equilibrium theory? U.S. state tobacco policy‐making from 1990 to 2006 indicates a wide variety of nonpunctuated policy output patterns including: linear and constant, gently oscillating and increasing, linear and increasing, and linear and constant and then nonexponentially increasing. All nonpunctuated policies resulted in symbolic policy output change except state tobacco licensing, higher tobacco taxes, and enactment of clean indoor air legislation, which resulted in partially material and partially symbolic policy output change. Emerging from this research is a new public policy model based on social policy realism. Public policy output change can be quite complex, sometimes punctuated and sometimes not, reflecting the balance of power between sometimes competing and cooperating interest groups.     

Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to the Bottom?

Proponents of federal environmental standards argue that competition for industrial development creates a “race to the bottom” in which states relax their own environmental standards to avoid losing businesses to states with more “business‐friendly” regulations. This article presents results from a unique survey of state clean air programs that show—contrary to the race to the bottom—a substantial number of states exceed federal EPA standards in a broad variety of clean air programs. Multivariate analyses of these state policies indicate that states strengthen their environmental programs in response to citizen demands rather than weaken their programs in deference to economic pressures.     

Science Use in Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Effects of Political Attention and Controversy

Scholars, policy makers, and research sponsors have long sought to understand the conditions under which scientific research is used in the policy‐making process. Recent research has identified a resource that can be used to trace the use of science across time and many policy domains. U.S. federal agencies are mandated by executive order to justify all economically significant regulations by regulatory impact analyses (RIAs), in which they present evidence of the scientific underpinnings and consequences of the proposed rule. To gain new insight into when and how regulators invoke science in their policy justifications, we ask: does the political attention and controversy surrounding a regulation affect the extent to which science is utilized in RIAs? We examine scientific citation activity in all 101 economically significant RIAs from 2008 to 2012 and evaluate the effects of attention—from the public, policy elites, and the media—on the degree of science use in RIAs. Our main finding is that regulators draw more heavily on scientific research when justifying rules subject to a high degree of attention from outside actors. These findings suggest that scientific research plays an important role in the justification of regulations, especially those that are highly salient to the public and other policy actors.     

Partisan politics,welfare states,and environmental policy outputs in the OECD countries, 1975–2005

Building on the burgeoning literature on the association between the welfare state and the environmental state, this study empirically examines how the politics of the former has affected the development of the latter. We suggest that the size of the welfare state shapes the calculus of environmental policy costs by partisan governments. A generous welfare state lowers the costs perceived by the left‐wing government, as large redistributive spending allows the government to mitigate the adverse impact of the new environmental policy on its core supporters, industrial workers. A generous welfare state also implies diminished marginal political returns from additional welfare commitment by the left‐wing government, which lowers the opportunity costs of environmental policy expansion. To the contrary, because of lower overall regulatory and taxation pressure, a small welfare state reduces the costs of environmental policy expansion as perceived by a right‐wing government. Our theoretical narrative is supported in a dynamic panel data analysis of environmental policy outputs in 25 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development member states during the period 1975–2005.     

Politikwandel und seine Messung in der vergleichenden Staatstätigkeitsforschung: Konzeptionelle Probleme und mögliche Alternativen

Policy change is an important concept in comparative policy analysis. Despite its central significance, most empirical studies fail to provide clear-cut definitions and measurement of this concept. Against this background, this article evaluates previous scholarship on policy change in the areas of social and environmental policy. We find that most studies use proxies for measuring policy change even though they contradict the basic idea of policy-making activities. Furthermore, studies usually neither capture the complexity of policy change, nor take into the possibility of policy change through dismantling account. Additionally, the empirical focus of most analyses is too narrow, thereby impeding robust statements about causality. In response to these shortcomings, we propose a new conceptual perspective, which captures policy change as a broader empirical phenomenon. We discuss its advantages as well as its disadvantages and show the implications for the research process.     

Agenda‐Setting at the Energy‐Water Nexus: Constructing and Maintaining a Policy Monopoly in U.S. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation

Despite calls to increase federal oversight of hydraulic fracturing (HF), the U.S. Congress has maintained a regulatory system in which environmental regulatory authority is devolved to the states. We argue that this system is characterized by a long‐standing “policy monopoly”: a form of stability in policy agenda‐setting in which a specific manner of framing and regulating a policy issue becomes hegemonic. Integrating theories on agenda‐setting and environmental discourse analysis, we develop a nuanced conceptualization of policy monopoly that emphasizes the significance of regulatory history, public perceptions, industry–government relations, and environmental “storylines.” We evaluate how a policy monopoly in U.S. HF regulation has been constructed and maintained through a historical analysis of oil and gas regulation and a discourse analysis of eleven select congressional energy committee hearings. This research extends scholarship on agenda‐setting by better illuminating the importance of political economic and geographic factors shaping regulatory agendas and outcomes.     

Revisiting the governance of privacy: Contemporary policy instruments in global perspective

The repertoire of policy instruments within a particular policy sector varies by jurisdiction; some “tools of government” are associated with particular administrative and regulatory traditions and political cultures. It is less clear how the instruments associated with a particular policy sector may change over time, as economic, social, and technological conditions evolve. In the early 2000s, we surveyed and analyzed the global repertoire of policy instruments deployed to protect personal data. In this article, we explore how those instruments have changed as a result of 15 years of social, economic and technological transformations, during which the issue has assumed a far higher global profile, as one of the central policy questions associated with modern networked communications. We review the contemporary range of transnational, regulatory, self‐regulatory, and technical instruments according to the same framework, and conclude that the types of policy instrument have remained relatively stable, even though they are now deployed on a global scale. While the labels remain the same, however, the conceptual foundations for their legitimation and justification are shifting as greater emphases on accountability, risk, ethics, and the social/political value of privacy have gained purchase. Our analysis demonstrates both continuity and change within the governance of privacy, and displays how we would have tackled the same research project today. As a broader case study of regulation, it highlights the importance of going beyond technical and instrumental labels. Change or stability of policy instruments does not take place in isolation from the wider conceptualizations that shape their meaning, purpose, and effect.     

Do parties matter in internationalised policy areas? The impact of political parties on environmental policy outputs in 18 OECD countries, 1970–2000

This article analyses the extent to which national policies in the highly internationalised environmental sector are influenced by the policy preferences of political parties. The focus is on policy outputs rather than environmental performance as the central indicator of policy change. Based on a discussion of the relevant theoretical literature competing hypotheses are presented. For an empirical test, a dataset is used that includes information on the number of environmental policies adopted in 18 OECD countries at four points in time between 1970 and 2000. The results show that not only international integration, economic development and problem pressure, but also aspects of party politics, influence the number of policies adopted. The number of environmental measures increases if the governmental parties adopt more pro‐environmentalist policy positions. This effect remains robust even when controlling for the institutional strength of governments, the left‐right position of parties in government, the inclusion of an ecological or left‐libertarian party inside the (coalition) government, and the presence of a portfolio that deals exclusively with environmental issues.     

Policy networks and market opening: Telecommunications liberalization in Spain

Abstract.  For a broad range of policy sectors, liberalization was the predominant goal during the 1990s, and the policy change involved gave rise to a wide range of academic debates. In this article we analyze the consequences of these far-reaching policies for the policy process itself. We ask whether the policy changes significantly altered the characteristics of policy processes by considering the timing and extent of the changes in policy networks during those years. More concretely, we discuss the extent to which policy networks changed as a result of market opening, considering the case of the telecommunications policy network in Spain. Using data from two successive surveys, we compare the network structure before and after market opening. Our findings show that only slight changes occurred during this period, making the network denser but not more open. Thus, we suggest that a more successful liberalization probably would have required a network that was more open to new entrants and in which power was less centralized and so able to guarantee a competitive environment.     

Reducing Environmental Risks by Information Disclosure: Evidence in Residential Lead Paint Disclosure Rule

Recently, there has been a surge in environmental regulations that require information disclosure. However, existing empirical evidence is limited to certain applications and has yet to generalize the effectiveness of this approach as a policy strategy to reduce environmental risks. This study evaluates the disclosure rule of the residential lead paint hazard (Title X) introduced in 1996. This regulation is one of the most prominent environmental disclosure laws, but its effectiveness has been relatively under‐investigated. Title X was intended to induce information recipients’ risk prevention behavior by proclaiming lead paint risk in old homes. Specifically, this study assumed three types of behavioral changes could be induced by Title X—(1) testing for lead paint, (2) maintaining painted surfaces in a proper condition, and (3) switching buying choice from old houses to new houses. In addition, using the national American Housing Survey, this study examined whether Title X increased the occurrence of those three behaviors. The results show that Title X increased the probability of homebuyers’ lead testing and decreased the probability of the existence of peeling paint in old homes. The analyses on households’ buying choices found that Title X did not result in a substantial switch from old houses to new houses in any socioeconomic status groups. However, it was found that the policy reduced the instances of households with young children occupying old homes. The findings in this study indicate that the policy generally induced more risk management behavior on existing risks and greatly influenced families with young children to such an extent that they changed their buying choice.     

Struggling with Integrated Environmental Policy: The EPA Experience

Because of the interrelating, cross-media character of many environmental problems, development of comprehensive and coherent policies for their abatement or management is difficult. This is particularly true where, as in the United States, there has been a strong tendency to focus on single issues of complex problems. Nowhere is this problem of policy and program integration more difficult than in the Environmental Protection Agency. This article uses the lead contamination issue to illustrate the obstacles to integration of policy and procedure even for a single environmental pollutant. Given the holistic and ramifying character of environmental problems, how can appropriate policies and regulations be developed in a political system characterized by sectoral, specialized structure and special interest clientele? At the time of this writing, the effects of elevating the EPA to a cabinet level department cannot fully be foreseen. The expansion of EPA to the administration of nonregulatory responsibilities will doubtless bring new problems of policy to this agency. Problems of program integration may increase unless EPA is authorized to devise and adapt more effective integrative procedures.     

Beyond Environmental Regulatory Fragmentation: Signs of Integration in the Case of the Great Lakes Basin

Environmental regulatory fragmentation along the medium boundaries of air, land, and water in Canada and the United States serves to skiff pollutants from medium to medium rather than contain or eliminate them. This pattern is particularly evident in the Great Lakes Basin where many of the most pressing environmental problems stem from pollutant transfer across medium or jurisdictional lines. The impediments to more integrated environmental regulation remain considerable in the Basin, and include the enduring single-medium orientation of federal programs and limitations of state, provincial, or regional innovation. Nonetheless, there is growing indication that regulatory integration need not be dismissed as a theoretical nicety but political impossibility. A series of recent developments indicate a shift toward greater integration in the Basin, prompted in large part by environmental policy professionals who increasingly recognize the limitations of current approaches and are willing to devise alternatives. These developments are occurring at the regional as well as state and provincial levels, and they give far greater definition than ever before to the idea of integrated environmental regulation.     

The political economy of Australian regulatory reform

The problem of regulatory accumulation has increasingly been recognised as a policy problem in its own right. Governments have then devised and implemented regulatory reform policies that directly seek to ameliorate the burdens of regulatory accumulation (e.g. red tape reduction targets). In this paper we examine regulatory reform approaches in Australia through the lens of policy innovation. Our contributions are twofold. We first examine the evolutionary discovery process of regulatory reform policies in Australia (at the federal, intergovernmental, and state levels). This demonstrates a process of policy innovation in regulatory mechanisms and measurements. We then analyse a new measurement of regulatory burden based on text analytics, RegData: Australia. RegData: Australia uses textual analysis to count ‘restrictiveness clauses' in regulation – such as ‘must’, ‘cannot’ and ‘shall’ – thereby developing a new database (RDAU1.0). We place this ‘restrictiveness clauses’ measurement within the context of regulatory policy innovation, and examine the potential for further innovation in regulatory reform mechanisms.     

Voluntary Regulations and Innovation: The Case of ISO 14001

Governments enact environmental regulations to compel firms to internalize pollution externalities. Critics contend that regulations encourage technological lock‐ins and stifle innovation. Challenging this view, the Porter‐Linde hypothesis suggests that appropriately designed regulations can spur innovation because (1) pollution reflects resource waste; (2) regulations focus firms’ attention on waste; and (3) with regulation‐induced focus, firms are incentivized to innovate to reduce waste. This article explores the regulation–innovation linkage in the context of voluntary regulations. The authors focus on ISO 14001, the most widely adopted voluntary environmental program in the world. Examining a panel of 79 countries for the period 1996–2009, they find that country‐level ISO 14001 participation is a significant predictor of a country's environmental patent applications, a standard proxy for innovation activity. The policy implication is that public managers should consider voluntary regulation's second‐order effects on innovation, beyond their first‐order effects on pollution and regulatory compliance.     

The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?

Advocates of consensual political institutions, i.e. institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties, claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs. To date, however, there exists little research – either theoretical or empirical – that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties' policy declarations. We develop a multiparty spatial model with policy-seeking parties operating under proportional representation, in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power-sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party. We determine parties' optimal (Nash equilibrium) policy positions and conclude that power-sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations; in fact, policy positioning under power-sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single-party dominance. Consistent with previous research, however, we find that power-sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs. Our results have implications for parties’ election strategies, for the design of political institutions, and for representative government.     

Regulatory Stringency, Green Production Offsets, and Organizations' Financial Performance

Some scholars have argued that environmental regulatory pressures constrain organizations' financial opportunities, while others maintain that environmental regulations can spur product and technology innovations and encourage greater operational efficiencies. Advocates on both sides have evidence in support of their positions. However, considering both perspectives in tandem and recognizing that other factors may be associated with improved financial performance, we may find that neither position is valid, or that both are. Relying on data for manufacturing facilities in seven countries, this study shows that more stringent environmental policy regimes are related to diminished firm profits. Yet organizations that are motivated by a green production focus—defined as enhancing internal efficiencies and new product and technology development—are more likely to improve their environmental performance. They also demonstrate a greater probability of benefiting financially, thereby offsetting the cost of regulation or accruing a net gain.     

Policy and regulatory design for developing countries: a mechanism design and transaction cost approach

The first-generation literature on policy design has made considerable contributions over the last 30 years to our understanding of the process, politics and implications of policy design and instrument choice. This literature, however, has generally treated institutions as a black box and has not developed a coherent set of frameworks, theories and models of how institutions matter to policy design. In this paper, I unpack the black box of institutions using transaction cost and mechanism design to show how regulations can be better designed in developing countries when institutions are weak, unaccountable, corrupted or not credible. Under these conditions, I show that efficient regulatory design has to minimize transaction costs, particularly agency problems, by having incentive compatible (self-enforcing) mechanisms. I conclude with a second-generation research agenda on regulatory design with implications for environmental, food and drug safety, healthcare and financial regulation in developing countries.