Disentangling the Relationship between Legislative Professionalism and Government Spending

Recent movements to deprofessionalize American state legislatures have been driven partly by the notion that professional legislators spend more than their citizen counterparts. This article explores the relationship between legislative professionalism and government spending, a connection complicated by the possibility that legislators in high‐spending states may choose professional institutions to handle their responsibilities more effectively. I employed propensity score matching, an increasingly used technique of causal inference, to disentangle the relationship. Contrary to previous academic work and popular notions, I found that professional legislatures do not spend significantly more than part‐time bodies do, if one accounts for the fact that legislatures in high‐spending states have a greater need to be professionalized and therefore select those structural frameworks. These findings have important implications for the study of the effects of legislative institutions on public policies more generally and attest to the utility of recently developed techniques of causal inference to disentangle these relationships.     

Party Effects in State Legislative Committees

Legislative scholars have theorized about the role of committees and whether they are, or are not, tools of the majority party. We look to the states to gain more empirical leverage on this question, using a regression discontinuity approach and novel data from all state committees between 1996 and 2014. We estimate that majority‐party status produces an 8.5 percentage point bonus in committee seats and a substantial ideological shift in the direction of the majority party. Additionally, we leverage a surprisingly frequent, but as if random occurrence in state legislatures—tied chambers—to identify majority‐party effects, finding similar support for partisan committees. We also examine whether the extent of committee partisanship is conditional on party polarization or legislative professionalism, but we find that it is not. Our results demonstrate that parties create nonrepresentative committees across legislatures to pursue their outlying policy preferences.     

Legislative term limits in the United States

From 1990 to 1995 almost half of the American states adopted term limits for their congressional representatives and state legislatures. Although the US Supreme Court declared these laws unconstitutional as far as federal legislators are concerned, many states are proceeding to implement term limits for their own legislatures. This article examines the historical background to rotation in office, the political and constitutional issues involved, the term limits movement and its evolving strategies, congressional action on a proposed constitutional amendment and the impact on state legislatures. It concludes that the relative decline of the term limits movement since 1995 can be explained by a number of factors, including factionalism among its supporters and improving economic conditions in the country, but that it has made its own distinctive mark on American politics and its effects will be felt over the coming years.     

More than Rubber-Stamps: The Consequences Produced by Legislatures in Non-Democratic States beyond Latent Legitimation

Despite various works suggesting the contrary, legislatures in non-democratic states are overwhelmingly generalised as ‘rubber-stamps’ that provide nothing other than latent legitimacy for those in power. Based on examination of legislatures in 10 of the world's most undemocratic states this paper highlights their capacity to act in precisely the opposite manner, serving to empower citizens, strengthen opposition groups and weaken dictatorial regimes. Whilst recognising that legislatures can be manipulated and subjugated by such regimes, the article seeks to highlight the variations between legislatures and the need to take account of their true potential.     

Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels: Evidence from the U.S. States

Procedural cartel theory states that the majority party exerts influence over legislative outcomes through agenda control. This research tests predictions from the party cartel theory in five state legislatures. I assess party influence through comparison of term‐limited and nonterm‐limited legislators. I argue that term‐limited legislators (who are not seeking elective office) are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect means to determine the existence of party influence. The results demonstrate that party influence is present in these legislatures. I find that party influence is magnified on the procedural, rather than final‐passage, voting record which is precisely where procedural cartel theory predicts. I find lower levels of ideological consistency and party discipline among members for whom the party leadership offers the least—those leaving elective office. These results provide support for party cartel theory, demonstrating further evidence of how parties matter in modern democracies.     

Legislative success in open sky congresses: weak gatekeeping prerogatives and the loss of majority support

In legislatures with weak gatekeeping institutions and constrained plenary time, scheduling rules and majority requirements explain inter-party differences in the consideration and approval of law initiatives. In this paper a mixture survival model is used to analyse legislative success in a legislature with very weak gatekeeping prerogatives, the House of Representatives of Uruguay. Evidence is provided that the loss of majority support depletes plenary time more rapidly and yields an ideological drift that benefits the median voter of the House. The results inform recent debates on the endogenous formation of a plenary schedule in open sky legislatures.     

The politics of discretionary Medicaid spending, 1980-1993

Why do some states choose to spend more than four times as much as others to provide health care to the disadvantaged? Political scientists who have traditionally explored this question by analyzing trends in overall Medicaid expenditures lumped states' discretionary spending in with other money that states are mandated to spend. Analyses of total expenditures found that socioeconomic factors drove spending but that party control of state legislatures made no difference in health policy making. By isolating discretionary state Medicaid expenditures from total spending figures, I reexamine the influences of political as well as economic and demographic factors. The often-doubted importance of party control becomes clear. This study investigates spending patterns in the discretionary portions of state Medicaid programs in forty-six states from 1980 to 1993 and analyzes both incremental program changes and absolute differences in state spending. To discover how greatly the researcher's choice of dependent variables can affect results, optional spending is separated from total spending levels and the variation is modeled in both. Focusing not on the spending that the federal government requires of state officials but on the policies that state officials actually choose allows a balanced exploration of both political and economic effects on welfare expenditures. This research also provides new insights about which forces will shape policy decisions if more and more control of the public health care system is devolved to the states.     

Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems

Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateralism less often under divided government. While executives see greater potential policy gains through unilateral action during divided government, we argue that their likelihood of acting unilaterally depends on an opposed legislature's ability to retaliate. When polarization is high and majorities are marginal, executives are freer to act unilaterally given the difficulties legislatures have in statutorily responding. Unilateralism is also more likely when facing opposition if legislatures lack nonstatutory means of punishment, such as regulatory review. In the largest analysis of gubernatorial executive unilateralism to date, we use a new data set of 24,232 executive orders in the 50 American states between 1993 and 2013 to evaluate this argument and find strong support for its predictions. These results provide insights into how legislative policymaking capacity can influence the functioning of separation of powers systems.     

The Policymaking Role of State Supreme Courts in Education Policy

In this article, I examine the relationship between courts and legislatures from a comparative perspective. Specifically, I discuss how (1) the ideological composition of the bench, (2) the propensity of court involvement in a given policy area, and (3) the presence of an advisory opinion affect the number of bill introductions and policy enactments by state legislatures. Examination of education policy in the American states reveals that ideologically distant courts limit the number of bill introductions and bill enactments in state legislatures. Alternatively, the presence of an advisory opinion increases policy introduction and enactment in state legislatures. A fundamental implication of these findings is that courts exert the greatest impact on policy during the introduction stage of the legislative process. Previous studies have not examined the introduction stage and have therefore marginalized the real impact of court influence on policy.     

Laws and Roll Calls in the U.S. Congress, 1891–1994

Recent empirical studies of lawmaking activity by legislatures rely heavily on roll call based measures and assume that roll call activity reflects lawmaking activity. We question this assumption for the case of the U.S. Congress. We examine several plausible sources of dissonance between the set of enacted public statutes and the universe of recorded votes in the U.S. Congress, using a comprehensive dataset of public enactments and roll call activity between 1891 and 1994. Because only 11.9% of the bills signed into law receive a recorded vote in the House, only 7.9% receive a recorded vote in the Senate, and only 5.5% receive a recorded vote in both the House and Senate, we provide guidance as to when studying voting behavior is likely a reasonable proxy for lawmaking behavior. There are sometimes important differences between the laws that do and do not receive a roll call that researchers should account for when using roll calls to study lawmaking in the U.S. Congress.     

Term Limits and Legislative‐Executive Conflict in the American States

State governments have experienced considerable institutional change in the last several decades. None appeared at first glance to be as far‐reaching as the legislative term limits that were adopted by over 20 states in the 1990s. The evidence to date suggests that term limits have indeed changed the character of many of the states' legislatures, if not always as predicted by their advocates. We report data on veto dynamics over the period 1989–2008 to determine how term limits have impacted legislative‐executive relations. Our data both challenge and support what has become the conventional wisdom, i.e., that term limits will weaken legislatures relative to their governors. States with more stringent term limits experienced fewer gubernatorial vetoes but proved more likely to override those vetoes when they were issued. Taken together the evidence suggests that the relationship between governors and legislatures in the wake of term limits is more complex and variable than scholars and others had previously thought.     

Government Growth and Professionalism in U.S. State Legislatures

This article analyzes the professionalization of American state legislatures since the 1960s and expands on previous studies by considering the strategic incentives of members. Fiorina and Noll's (1978a, 1978b) theory that reelection‐minded legislators serve as “ombudsmen to the bureaucracy” on behalf of their constituents suggests that legislatures have professionalized in response to growth in public spending in order to strengthen members' abilities to handle increased facilitation duties. I used longitudinal analysis and instrumental variables regression to test this hypothesis and disentangle causal directionality, since professional legislators may have the means and incentive to spend more than their citizen counterparts. Both methods revealed empirical support for the Fiorina and Noll hypothesis that spending increases caused legislators to become more professional.     

Slash,Shoot, Kill: Gang Recruitment of Children and the Penalties Gangs Face

Criminal street gang recruitment of minors has proliferated through countless communities in the United States as tensions continue to rise between gangs, communities, and the police. In response, many state legislatures have proposed legislation to combat such influence. However, not only are the proposed penalties too lenient, but some states do not even have laws that prosecute criminal street gang recruitment of minors. This note proposes that all 50 states enact an anti–gang recruitment statute specifically targeting recruiters of criminal street gangs by criminalizing gang recruitment of a minor.     

Juvenile Waiver 2014: A Review of State Statutes

Juvenile waiver has received much attention from the public, practitioners, and scholars. Prior studies have documented the increased use and effects of waiver. In this study we examine the current state of the law regarding juvenile waiver. We replicate 1995 and 2003 studies that examined state waiver statutes and detail the changes in prosecutorial, judicial, and legislative waiver since 2003. While the juvenile crime rate has dropped dramatically, it is unclear why legislatures’ fascination with juvenile waiver has also decreased. In this study we determine that juvenile waiver remains popular with legislatures, although there are signs of change.     

A Bridge to Somewhere: Mapping State and Congressional Ideology on a Cross‐institutional Common Space

Researchers face two major problems when applying ideal point estimation techniques to state legislatures. First, longitudinal roll‐call data are scarce. Second, even when such data exist, scaling ideal points within a single state is an inadequate approach. No comparisons can be made between these estimates and those for other state legislatures or for Congress. Our project provides a solution. We exploit a new comparative dataset of state legislative roll calls to generate ideal points for legislators. Taking advantage of the fact that state legislators sometimes go on to serve in Congress, we create a common ideological scale. Using these bridge actors, we estimate state legislative ideal points in congressional common space for 11 states. We present our results and illustrate how these scores can be used to address important topics in state and legislative politics.     

Vanishing vaccinations: why are so many Americans opting out of vaccinating their children?

Vaccinations against life-threatening diseases are one of the greatest public health achievements in history. Literally millions of premature deaths have been prevented, and countless more children have been saved from disfiguring illness. While vaccinations carry unavoidable risks, the medical, social and economic benefits they confer have led all fifty states to enact compulsory childhood vaccination laws to stop the spread of preventable diseases. Today, however, vaccines are becoming a victim of their success--many individuals have never witnessed the debilitating diseases that vaccines protect against, allowing complacency toward immunization requirements to build. Antivaccination sentiment is growing fast in the United States, in large part due to the controversial and hotly disputed link between immunizations and autism. The internet worsens fears regarding vaccination safety, as at least a dozen websites publish alarming information about the risks of vaccines. Increasing numbers of parents are refusing immunizations for their children and seeking legally sanctioned exemptions instead, apparently fearing vaccines more than the underlying diseases that they protect against. A variety of factors are at play: religious and philosophical beliefs, freedom and individualism, misinformation about risk, and overperception of risk. State legislatures and health departments now face a difficult challenge: respecting individual rights and freedoms while also safeguarding the public welfare. Nearly all states allow vaccination exemptions for religious reasons and a growing number provide "philosophical" opt-outs as well. However, in all but a handful of jurisdictions, neither objection is seriously documented or verified. Often, the law requires a parent to do no more than simply check a box indicating she does not wish her child to receive immunizations. The problem is exacerbated by financial incentives schools have to encourage students to opt out of vaccinations. The rise in parents opting out has caused the AMA grave concern, with many experts decrying the rise of so-called "exemptions of convenience." In some areas, nearly one out of five children have not received their recommended vaccines. The consequences are serious not only for those unprotected children, but for the rest of society as well. "Herd immunity" is threatened as more and more parents free ride off of the community's dwindling immunity, and outbreaks of diseases thought to have been conquered have already occurred. Lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers threaten them with bankruptcy, costs are being externalized onto the healthcare and legal systems, and vulnerable populations are suffering harm or even death. In the interests of social welfare, state legislatures and health departments should consider methods to ensure that the exemption process is carefully tailored to prevent check-the-box opt-outs of convenience, while still allowing exemptions for those with earnest and informed convictions or medical reasons.     

Term Limits,Campaign Contributions,and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures

Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we perform a cross‐state comparison of the relative influence of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank‐and‐file legislators before and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.     

Committee Outliers in State Legislatures

In this paper, we extend recent work exploring the prevalence of outlying committees in American state legislatures. Using an expanded sample of 45 states and measures of legislator preferences generated by a single, federated group, we find that most legislative committees are representative of the parent chambers from which their members are selected. Furthermore, we test multivariate models designed to account for theoretically relevant patterns in variations in outlier percentages among control and noncontrol committees. The fact that our models are such poor predictors of nonrepresentative committees speaks to the idiosyncratic nature of the relatively small percentage of outlying committees in the states. This conclusion, in turn, provides further support for the proposition that representative committees are simply rational.