Judicial Review of Politics: The Israeli Case

In the tradition of studies questioning the impact of celebrated court rulings, this article discusses the effectiveness of the judicial review of politics conducted by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Israeli Supreme Court is generally viewed as a highly influential, almost omnipotent body. During the last two decades, the Court has intervened repeatedly in the so–called political domain, thereby progressively eroding the scope of realms considered non–justiciable. It has ventured to enter domains of 'pure' political power to review the legality of political agreements, political appointments (appointments of political allies to public positions), and political allocations (government funding to organizations affiliated with its political supporters). The prevalent perception is that these developments had a significant impact on Israeli political life. The present article challenges this view and argues that, on closer scrutiny, the influence of the Court on many of the issues reviewed here is negligible. First, many of the doctrines developed by the Court in order to review political measures proved ineffective. Usually, when the Supreme Court (acting as a High Court of Justice) engages in judicial review, it lacks the evidence needed in order to decide that administrative decisions on public appointments or public funding should be abolished because they were based on political or self–serving considerations. Second, the norms mandated by the Court hardly influence politicians' decisions in everyday life, and are applied only in contested cases. The reasons for this situation are not only legal but also socio–political. Large sections of current Israeli society support interest–group politics and do not accept the values that inspire the Court.     

Justices,Political Actors,or Both: An Exploration of the Brandenburg Line Through the Regime Theory Lens

Regime theory seeks to explain decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States by noting that justices tend to decide cases in ways that align with the prevailing political ideology. The theory emerged from political science literature and has not been explored regarding communication law. This article tests regime theory against the progression of seven Supreme Court precedents that led to the threatening speech test established in Brandenburg v. Ohio. The test is traditionally viewed as the fruit of about a half-century of deliberate judicial evolution. The analysis found regime theory helped explain the Court's progression and decisions in this line of cases, but contained some notable weaknesses.     

Appointment Politics and the Ideological Composition of the Judiciary

Scholars have advanced a wide range of theories regarding the role of Senate confirmation in judicial appointments. In this article, I directly test the predictions of these models using a novel measure of the ideology of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The main results indicate that the filibuster and majority party have predominated in appointment politics. Prompted by recent events, I also conduct a simulation‐based exercise to examine the ideological composition of the judiciary under a confirmation regime in which the filibuster is not present. This exercise suggests that the Senate filibuster induces moderation in judicial appointments; the elimination of the filibuster is likely to result in a more contentious, if less dilatory, confirmation process and a more polarized judiciary.     

Justice Without Borders: Human Rights Cases in U.S. Courts

In 1980 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals broke with years of legal tradition and ruled that human rights victims could sue their oppressors in federal court—even if the alleged violations occurred outside the country. This court based the extension of its authority on a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act now referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). ATCA cases present a unique opportunity to study judicial behavior in the face of separation of powers interests, traditions of judicial restraint, sovereign immunity defenses, and an active internationalist movement to extend human rights guarantees worldwide. Combining legal analysis with quantitative methodology, I find that U.S. federal courts are slowly accepting an internationalist approach to human rights, and that interest groups are largely driving this transformation. Sovereignty concerns and judicial ideology are not conditioning case outcomes, but party resources and separation of powers issues are.     

消极的美德理论:比克尔的司法审查理论研究

比克尔于1961年出版的《最小危险部门——政治法庭上的最高法院》一书体现了他的司法审查思想精髓,并在该书中提出了消极的美德理论。他认为,司法审查的正当性在于它对宪法原则的捍卫,并分别从最高法院的优势、最高法院对政治部门的尊重、最高法院对原则与权宜之计的调和等方面进行了论证。据此他主张在具体的司法实践中,法院应该通过拒发调卷令、政治问题学说、狭窄的判决等方式践行消极的美德之策略。比克尔的消极的美德理论在美国宪法学界产生了重大的影响,尤其是他主张的法院之独特功能在于缓解原则与权宜之计的紧张这一观点,成为他宪法理论中最具原创性的贡献。     

Expertise,Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

What roles do prior expertise and accumulated experience play in shaping ideologically consistent voting on a specialized court? Using a dataset of obviousness patent cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit spanning 1997–2007, we show that prior expertise enhances the influence of ideology on judicial decisionmaking, but that accumulated experience does not. In addition, we build on previous work and show that ideology is a factor in decisionmaking in technical areas of law, contrary to the received wisdom on patent cases.     

Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Appellate Division

Research on the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that judges' decisions are influenced by their policy preferences. Moreover, judges behave strategically to facilitate outcomes that conform as close as possible to those preferences. We seek to generalize this assertion to judicial actors in two very diverse social systems: Canada in the post-Charter years and apartheid-era South Africa. Specifically, we analyze the use of panel assignments by the chief justices in both countries. We find that chief justices do behave strategically. Chief justices in both countries do not assign judges to panels randomly but rather are influenced by the tenure and ideology of the sitting judges and the issues presented in the case.     

Birth Order,Preferences, and Norms on the U.S. Supreme Court

The members of the U.S. Supreme Court have different ideas about what constitutes good judicial policy as well as how best to achieve that policy. From where do these ideas originate? Evolutionary psychology suggests that an answer may lie in early life experiences in which siblings assume roles that affect an adult's likely acceptance of changes in the established order. According to this view, older siblings take on responsibilities that make them more conservative and rule‐bound, while younger ones adopt roles that promote liberalism and greater rebelliousness. Applying this theory to the Court, I show that these childhood roles manifest themselves in later life in the decisions of the justices. Birth order explains not only the justices’ policy preferences but also their acceptance of one important norm of judicial decisionmaking, specifically their willingness to exercise judicial review.     

At the Procedural Crossroads

Decision No. 8-rp/2010 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) of March 11, 2010 (hereinafter, the Decision) rocked the legal community. In that decision, the sole body of constitutional jurisdiction gave an official interpretation of the terms "highest judicial body," "high judicial body," and "initiation and conduct of cassation review procedure" contained in Articles 125 and 129 of the constitution of Ukraine. With regard to the constitutional petition, the CCU held in particular that the constitutional status of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (SCU) does not permit this tribunal to conduct cassation review of the decisions of the high specialized courts, courts that exercise cassation review authority.     

How an Authoritarian Regime in Burma Used Special Courts to Defeat Judicial Independence

Why do authoritarian rulers establish special courts? One view is that they do so to insulate the judiciary from politically oriented cases and allow it continued, albeit limited, independence. In this article I present a contrary case study of an authoritarian regime in Burma that used special courts not to insulate the judiciary but to defeat it. Through comparison to other Asian cases I suggest that the Burmese regime's composition and character better explain its strategy than does extant judicial authority or formal ideology. The regime consisted of war fighters for whom the courts were enemy territory. But absent popular support, the regime's leaders could not embark immediately on a radical project for legal change that might compromise their hold on power. Consequently, they used special courts and other strategies to defeat judicial independence incrementally, until they could displace the professional judiciary and bring the courts fully under executive control.     

Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf

This article explores the struggle for judicial power in Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf focusing on two questions. First, how did pro-Musharraf regime judges expand judicial power, leading to a confrontation with the regime? Second, how did the bar and the bench mobilize in the struggle for judicial power? The author shows how, instead of blindly supporting economic liberalization in a period of economic growth, the Supreme Court expanded power by scrutinizing questionable urban development, privatization, and deregulation measures in a virtuous cycle of public interest litigation. The author also describes how a politics of reciprocity explains the social mobilization of lawyers as the bench protected the bar from regime penetration, and the bar protected the bench from regime backlash. The Pakistani case questions some of our assumptions about economic liberalization and courts in authoritarian regimes, and the study invites scholars to explore the role of courts in developing judicial support structures and the role of lawyers in social movements.     

Interpreting the Basic Law and the Adjudication of Politically Sensitive Questions

In this paper, I shall essentially lay out five interpretiveprinciples that the Hong Kong judiciary should observe. First,the Hong Kong judiciary can disable themselves from giving effectto National People's Congress (NPC) Acts that are inconsistentwith the Basic Law. Second, the Court of Final Appeal has aduty to make a reference to the NPC's Standing Committee (NPCSC)when it needs to adjudicate over two conflicting Basic Law provisions,one whose affairs fall within the Central Government's concernsand the other which falls within the limits of Hong Kong's autonomy.Third, in reading the text of the NPCSC Interpretation narrowlywhile observing its central tenor, the Court would be respectingthe plenary interpretive mandate conferred on the NPCSC whileretaining its role as the primary interpreter of the Basic Law.Fourth, so far as a Mainland National Law has been formallyincorporated into the Basic Law, it cannot be deemed in violationof another constitutional clause. Finally, I would argue thatnot all constitutional affairs falling within the limits ofHong Kong's autonomy are automatically justiciable; where thereis a textual commitment to a coordinate branch of government,the Court may only interfere with the decisions made by thepolitical branches on traditional grounds of judicial review,i.e. illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety.     

中国司法改革的宏观思考

中国司法改革的主导任务是通过制度创新 ,提高司法机构“公共产品”的出产能力和效益 ,更有效、更充分、更完善地保护社会主体的正当权利 ,创造、完善并维护适应新的历史条件的政治、经济以及社会生活诸方面的法律秩序。与此相适应 ,中国司法改革的基本内容在于重新配置并合理界定各种权力关系。由于中国司法改革受诸种条件约束 ,因而改革具有复杂性 ,必须进行整体设计、“由上而下”全面推行。     

Law and American Political Development

This essay reviews the recent volume edited by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch, The Supreme Court and American Political Development (2006), as well as the broader literature by law scholars interested in American Political Development (APD). The Law and APD literature has advanced our knowledge about courts by placing attention on the importance of executive and legislative actors, and by providing political context to our understanding of judicial decision making. But this knowledge would be more powerful if it would embrace the broader APD field's orientation toward the importance of state and institutional autonomy for understanding politics and political change. Law and APD scholars could go further in examining the ways in which courts and judges act institutionally, and how the legal branch as an institution impacts American politics and state-building. In doing so, Law and APD scholars would contribute not only to our understanding of judicial decision making but also to our understanding of the place and importance of courts in American politics.     

Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise in Reviewing Agency Decision Making

What role does judicial subject matter expertise play in the review of agency decisions? Using a data set of decisions in which the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) is reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, we investigate this question and find that greater subject matter expertise does make it more likely that a judge will vote to reverse an agency decision.     

宪政民主还是民主宪政?——试论美国最高法院与民主

宪政和民主是现代政治体制中相辅相成的两个部分,如果说民主是河,宪政则是堤。为了限制民主的冲动性与盲目性,美国人制定了成文宪法,在代表制基础上实现了宪政民主。与国会、总统一样,美国最高法院也是民意代表,只不过更为间接和持久。通过解释宪法,美国最高法院不断修补宪政之堤,在尊重民意的基础上引导民意,将宪政民主转向民主宪政,维护了自身的地位与权威。     

美国司法政治变迁的内在逻辑——从“罗伊案”说开去

美国的司法政治是司法与政治交互作用的产物。随着司法权的扩张,联邦最高法院突破"政治问题不审查"之传统,主动或被动地介入政治争议;随着政党对峙的尖锐,政治力量乐于将棘手的政治争议交由司法裁断;藉此,司法政治演变为常态政治,司法判例成为经久不衰的政治争点。自上个世纪70年代以来,围绕罗伊案半个多世纪的争议,不仅客观地暴露了美国司法政治发展的内在逻辑,而且也充分地展示出司法政治在美国的作用方式和涵摄空间。     

Speech, privacy, and the power of the purse: lessons from the abortion "gag rule" case.

In Rust v. Sullivan, 59 U.S.L.W. 4451 (1991), the US Supreme Court ruled that neither the privacy interests of family planning clients nor the 1st Amendment interests of their counselors prevented the government from banning all discussion of abortions in federally funded family planning clinics. In doing so, the Court also reaffirmed its view that the state and federal legislatures have virtually unlimited discretion in limiting or conditioning social welfare programs, a view having even greater long-term implications for American health policy than the implications of Rust for the constitutional protection of abortion. Rust upheld the Department of Health and Human Services' 1988 directive prohibiting the use of any funds from Title X of the Public Health Service Act (authorizing family planning programs) in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. This means that a clinician may lawfully respond to a client's inquiry about abortion only with a denial that abortion is an option. Thus, while allowing women the constitutional protection to chose an abortion, the Court has allowed the legislature to freely use the power of the purse to discourage or prevent the choice of abortion. Rust's greatest impact may well be in its acceptance of the enormous power wielded by the government over funded activities, especially in health policy. Justice Rehnquist believes there is not constitutional right to health, welfare, or any other government benefit; the legislative branches of the government cannot be required by judicial interpretation of the Constitution to provide any particular benefit or service to anyone. Even when the government chooses to fund a particular benefit, it is free to condition that benefit with virtually no judicially enforceable limits on that discretion.     

Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of international legal regimes

Tensions and occasional overt defiance of international courts suggest that compliance with international regimes is not a self-evident choice for domestic judges. I develop a formal theory of domestic judicial defiance in which domestic and supranational judges vie for jurisprudential authority in a non-hierarchical setting. The model emphasises the role of domestic non-compliance costs and power asymmetries in determining the conduct of domestic and international judges. I argue that the EU represents a special case of a particularly effective international regime. Weak domestic courts have little to gain from an escalated conflict with the European court of Justice. But even domestic judicial superpowers like the German Federal Constitutional Court have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation with European judges. The analysis also yields new insights into concepts, such as “judicial dialogue” and “constitutional pluralism” that have featured prominently in the legal literature, and suggests new hypotheses for empirical research.     

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Rewriting the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht

This article contains an urgent plea for the re‐establishment of legal honesty in Europe. European law is a victim of European economic crisis. The emergence of the concept of conditionality within national and European jurisprudence, or the judicial imposition of a market discipline upon national budgets, is also a part of a chronicle foretold given in the face of the volatile power of international finance markets. Yet, in rewriting the judgements given by the Court of Justice in the case of Thomas Pringle and by the German Constitutional Court in its matching jurisprudence on the European Stability Mechanism, this article seeks to overcome the destruction of constitutionality within Europe, the foreclosure of a European space for the politics of alternatives and the condemning of individual Europeans to lasting suffering within a perpetual austerity regime.